Deception at Messines

[PhilB]

From Messines to 3rd Ypres (Thomas Floyd) contains this piece about his time in the Salient.

"Priestley.... had been in command of a party of eight whose mission had been to fetch back some steel helmets from the trenches. (A ruse had been played upon the Boche on Messines night. A large number of helmets had been placed in such a position as to encourage the Boche to think that we were concentrating troops there instead of, or as well as, Messines and Wytschaete!)"

Whilst not doubting the veracity of Lt Floyd`s statement, it`s hard to see how such a deception worked?

[kenneth505]

It seems incredible to me as well. I sometimes think of it as an opportunity to at least do something.

Peter Barton in his comprehensive Passchendaele tome describes an attack by the 8th Norfolks on the Poelcappelle brewery as late as Sept. and Oct. where 300 to 400 wooden cut-outs of troops were employed. He reports that 'over the course of the war 12,000 of these Millboard soldiers were created, produced in ten different 'attitudes' of attack. They would pivot down near the ankles and be raised and lowered by means of a wire attached to the nominal back. One soldier could manage four or five this way. Occasionally raising one or the other. Eventually he would become aware of his groups demise as the resistance on the various wires would reduce to zero.'

This much effort and investment may demonstrate the programs value. Now I wonder, did any of the Millboard cut-outs earn citations or notice in dispatches? Certainly not to the level of recognition that the pigeons received but then again there weren't as many cut-outs employed either.

[WhiteStarLine]

In April 1918, the 11th AIF Brigade unit war diary reports that during an attack on a flanking division the enemy wore British pattern steel helmets. This not only made it difficult to distinguish friend from foe, but the enemy also waved the helmets as a pre-arranged signal for retirement. All ranks were warned accordingly.

[jacksdad]

Does it give any idea how the helmets were used.

I assume just a pile of helmets would not have tricked anyone..

[PhilB]

Exactly my thoughts, Roger. I can`t think of a way in which a load of helmets could be made to deceive German observers - nor cardboards cutouts for that matter. It would be nice to know if these ruses actually worked. Given a good pair of Zeiss binoculars, would they pull the wool over an experienced German`s eyes?

[kenneth505]

I suspect the efforts paid dividends over and above simple deception. Even if obviously a deception the enemy must spend some energy on keeping tabs. In an environment where survival is frequently a matter of simple chance having any task to focus on may have been preferable to waiting and some officers (managers) personality style is to take any action simply to act.

If there was no value would 12000 Millboard Men have been conscripted? That represents a lot of time and energy from many different departments, manufacturing, shipping, training. I know that all organizations invest in programs that are a complete wash so maybe this was too.

[PhilB]

Lt Floyd refers to a "large number" of helmets. Can anyone suggest what one could profitably do with a few hundred to give the impression of troops massing?

[Tom Tulloch-Marshall]

What they did was this, - they welded the helmets to “ankle-snapper” pickets and during the hours of darkness screwed these into the ground at the very edge of the front line trench so that the rims of the helmets were hard down to the earth. Next day the german snipers shot holes in these to their hearts content, but to their dismay observed that none of these “soldiers” fell back into the trench dead. The germans concluded that they were up against a regiment so hard that you could shoot them through the head as many times as you wanted and they didn’t even bother to duck. Then the germans all panicked and retreated to the support trenches.

Alternatively the original story could be kibosh.

Tom

[mebu]

The cut-outs referred to by Ken were known as Chinese attacks, and are often recorded as such in war diaries.

Attached is a drawing of an example, these were used in groups to give an impression of an attack to draw artillery fire.

Regards Peter

[Latze]

Might it be possible that the helmets were used not to fool ground but aerial observers? On many aerial photographs steel helmets are rather clearly visible in trenches and shell holes. I know that the Germans informed their troops about the fact that the helmets are very much visible from the air and taught ways to avoid this (sitting under ground sheets etc.)

regards

Matt

[jacksdad]

bingo Matt

that seem a very plausible answer.

[SiegeGunner]

I have certainly translated German aerial reconnaissance reports of enemy assembly and approach trenches being packed with men who were not visible over the parapet at ground level. A conspicuous show of helmets above the parapet would not stand up to scrutiny and investigation (with machine-gun and rifle fire) for very long. In circumstances where an attack was obviously imminent and the name of the game was concealing its exact point of departure and its extent, diversionary artillery preparation and random wavings of fixed bayonets above the parapet were both safer and more effective.

[PhilB]

Very plausible, Matt. It would be nice to see an aerial photo of helmeted men in packed trenches!

[centurion]

Very plausible, Matt. It would be nice to see an aerial photo of helmeted men in packed trenches!

Indeed given that all the aerial photos I have seen were taken at an altitude from where they would be impossible to discern. Matt do you have examples you can post?

[J Banning]

There are examples of German aerials showing helmeted men in trenches in Peter Barton's aforementioned Passchendaele book. See page 221.

There are also other aerial images in the book clearly showing how easy it was to spot men in the dreadful landscape of battle that Third Ypres had become solely from the distinctive shape and way the light played on their helmets. See pages 262, 330 and others.

[Latze]

Thanks Jeremy,

I was going to point to the same photo in Peter Barton's book. If one would try to scan it, I fear nothing much would e discernible, unfortunately.

regards

Matt

[Latze]

For an example of German camouflage methods against this, see Peter Barton's "The Somme. A new panoramic perspective", p. 211.

regards

Matt

[Marilyne]

As far as Matt is right about the aerial sight, think on the ground also.

WHAT WAS THE WEATHER ?? And seeing conditions?, The way you see and observe on the field and how far you see (or think you see) is dependant on how clear it is. Give a bit of fog and some rain, the helmets can be used as "camouflage"... simple lesson from basic training.

Marilyne

[MikeMeech]

Hi All

The RFC (and other air arms) did do trials on what the observers would be able to see on the ground from various heights. Trenches could be seen to be occupied from 1500-2000 feet, but in a 'good light'. The colour of uniforms from 600-700 feet, again I expect in good visibility. A 'normal' Contact Patrol (for observing what was going on during battle and identifying the location of troops on the ground) was considered to fly between 1500-2500 feet, although during the Somme it was more likely to be down to between 500-1000 feet. Other battles would be flown lower, even down to 50 feet, depending again on battlefield visibility either due to weather conditions or battlefield 'smoke'. Interestingly helmets were not considered a good identifying feature for troops on the ground as both the German and British helmets, if uncovered, just appeared to show up as 'black' without shape.

I hope that is of interest.

Mike

[PhilB]

Interesting replies, ladies & gents. But the jury still seems to be out on whether helmets were or weren`t useful as decoys.

I imagine that the optimum height for observing an enemy front line would depend on what you were looking for. If looking for men, would it be a case of the lower the better? Would a pilot flying at very low altitude (say 50ft) be at more or less danger of being hit as his time of exposure would be very small?

[MikeMeech]

Hi Phil

Reference the question of being hit. We should remember that if the aeroplane was trying to observe what was going on in the ground battle it would not be a 'quick in and out'. So the aeroplane would be 'vulnerable' to some extent but it was found that it is more likely that the machine whould be 'shot up' rather than 'shot down'. That is bullet holes through the airframe which meant the it would have to be repaired or replaced after returning to its airfield. Unless the the pilot or engine were hit it was likely to return to base. That said according to Trevor Henshaw's great and most useful book 'The Sky Their Battlefield' (Appendix 1), it gives Contact Patrol (low level) loses as 147 aircraft for the whole war, while artillery co-operation aircraft (higher level) loses as 619. The threats were slightly different of course, the artillery machines not only flew higher but further forward and were more vulnerable to enemy scouts. At low level the contact machines and in 1917-18 counter-attack machines were less at risk from those scouts but more in range of rifle and machine gun fire from the ground. However, there are examples of situations where the troops are so busy fighting on the ground that the aircraft are ignored (greater threat to life and limb are closer to hand), and there is also official documentation (eg. SS 205) that positively encourages troops to fire at aircraft, as many troops felt that there fire was ineffective due to it not crashing, when damage that needed repair had been done. It was always a question that very low flying was done if it was needed to gather the information required. Indeed, some official documents have a reminder to the commander that he should consider the risk to the aeroplane, especially if the observer and pilot were lost then they might be replaced by less experienced personnel which may mean less useful information coming to him later in the battle. So 'Is the information you require important enough to increase the risk to the crew, the loss of who might be detrimental to your future information requirements?'. Sometimes there would be no alternative of course, especially, for whatever reason, the infantry did not light their flares or show their other indicators, that meant the aircraft would have to fly low to identify uniforms. Other problems were mist or low cloud where again there was no alternative to very low flying, but that would also gives problems for accurate shooting from the ground. Last of course the aeroplane was not defenceless and they could and did shoot back, using their machine guns and some cases bombs against them. The contact machine initially and the counter attack machine in 1917-18 would also call in artillery fire onto enemy positions or counter attacks that were building up when spotted, so firing at aircraft was not always considered a risk free option for those on the ground.

I hope that is of use.

Mike

[WhiteStarLine]

At Dernancourt, on the River Ancre, on 5th April 1918, Bean records that the attacking Germans wore British pattern steel helmets during an assault.

After a short interval, during which the movements ahead ceased, an extended line of men was seen there, coming over the edge of the slope. They appeared to be wearing British

helmets, and it seemed possible that some other party of Australians might be withdrawing. Adams, however, after careful scrutiny, made sure that, though some of the helmets

were British, the men were German. Fire was at once opened. To get at them better, a Lewis gunner with the party, Lance-Corporal Bannister, stood up and fired his gun from the

shoulder of Lance-Corporal Squires.

[PhilB]

As a ruse de guerre, is that "within the rules"?

[WhiteStarLine]

This one is from the action at Le Hamel, on 4 July 1918:

On the shoulder above Sailly-Laurette the dummy attack, simulated by Lieut. Campbell and five men of the 55th raising raising and lowering fifteen papier mache figures over the parapet for thirty-five minutes after "zero," drew intense machine-gun fire, some of the models beiing riddled with bullets.

[Marilyne]

As a ruse de guerre, is that "within the rules"?

Good evening,

If I may answer that question: it was certainly permitted.

Article 24 of the Annex to the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and the Customs of war on Land, the Hague, 18 Oct 1907 (short; H IV R) states that: "Ruses of war and the employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country are considered permissible"

Question is now : what is a ruse?? (and not perfidy)

Article 37 §2 of Additional Protocol I to the geneva convetions defines it as: "acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law [...] do not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law". For example: camouflage, decoy and mock operations.

Of course, Art 37 PAI did not exist in 1914-18, but as the definition is drawn from a long standing custom, we can use it.

So to answer the question, yes, wearing helmets of the adversay is within the rules of ruse, and in not considered perfidy.

Marilyne