Prelude to "The Black Day"

[phil andrade]

From Sheffield's The Chief , page 298 :

...a German attack against III Corps on 6 August had captured some ground...But it seemed that the....attack was a local initiative

This intrigues me.

The extraordinary success of the British attack at Amiens on 8 August 1918 symbolises more than any other episode how Haig and his men began their advance to Victory.

It's perhaps too easy to forget how dangerous the situation was for the Entente, even at that late stage.... a consideration that makes the British success all the more remarkable.

This is why I was intrigued when I read about this local German attack, and my interest has been aroused. I do not have access to the BOH at the moment, but I would like to investigate what it says.

I have this from Randal Gray and Christopher Argyle's Chronicle of the First World War in the entry of 6 August 1918 :

German div. counter attack at Morlancourt regains much ground & 250 PoWs ( British 18th & 58th Div replacing Australians).

This is quite a significant action, and clearly the Germans were not so cowed and demoralised. The phrase "counter attack" is important....was this some knd of riposte for the success at Hamel on July 4th ?

Apart from the questions that I wish to ask about this incident, I am keen to advocate how it suggests that the Germans were still aggressive, numerous and on the alert, clearly being able to exploit a situation and turn it to their account. Apart from anything else, it must have been an unsettling affair for those charged with maintaining secrecy prior to the great onslaught that was being prepared.

Information and/or comments, please.

Phil (PJA)

[connaughtranger]

Hi

The OH gives a paragraph to the event. The attacking German 27th Division was a good fighting, well-rested division with brand-new equipment. 5 officers and 231 OR's were captured from the 18th and 58th British divisions and ...."none of them said anything about the impending attack"

[George Armstrong Custer]

I'm not sure why you are surprised that the German army at the start of August 1918 was still capable of launching a local attack which had some initial limited success before being rapidly contained. The German army may have shot its strategic bolt by this time, but it remained a highly dangerous, if fatally wounded, beast on the eve of and during its terminal retreat. The OH makes it clear that the German operation on 6 August had nothing to do with suspicions of an impending grand attack by the British armies, and was indeed a local initiative deemed necesary by the commander of the German Second Army in an attempt to put a stop to further British advance near Morlancourt.

The capture of ground from III Corps on 6 August caused no panic in strategic terms, and at no stage affected the general situation as far as the impending assault scheduled for 8 August was concerned. As Haig's diary records, Butler was simply told that as far as his III Corps was concerned the battle had begun and that he must carry out his orders to cover the left of the advancing Australian Corps to the best of his ability. In the event, Butler's forces had recaptured half the ground by 10am. The main concern at Corps HQ and GHQ was in regard to the men captured by the German assault, who included artillerymen involved in establishing forward dumps for the big push on 8 August. Yet none of these British POW's divulged any intelligence and, as Charles Messenger has recorded in his The Day We Won The War, "none of those involved in the [German] assault appear to have recognised the significance of the dumped artillery shells or Sadleir-Jackson's future battle headquarters."

In short, the assault on III Corps' front on 6 August was an unsurprising local tactical initiative by the German 27th Wurttemburg Division, a well rested and well equipped division. It was contained and a successful counter-attack begun the same day. Whilst it caused some dislocation of III Corps' scheduled role for 8 August by altering its infantry start line, this was worked around by III Corps' counter attack being regarded as the beginning for them of the 8 August battle. The OH also notes the inevitable consequence that III Corps' troops were not fresh and rested when 8 August dawned. But by far the biggest threat posed by the German assault on 6 August was that the secrecy of the imminent 8 August operation might not remain intact. This intelligence threat was not realised and the success of 8 August needs no reiteration here.

George

[connaughtranger]

The 18th Divisional history sets out a number of reasons for the success of the German attack:

1. Newly taken over trenches that were winding, puzzling and only knee-deep

2. Heavy rains

3. Night of 5th dark, with no moon.

4. 8th Londons, the incoming troops, were tired and their relief was slow.

5. Only a few of the 2nd Bedfords, scheduled to relieve the East Surreys had appeared when the German bombardment began.

According to the history the 27th Wurttemburg Division had been out of the line training intensively for upwards of 3 months

[phil andrade]

I'm not sure why you are surprised

George

Not so much surprised, as intrigued...i.e. interested, curiosity aroused.

That the Germans were still able and willing to fight hard on the defensive is attested by the casualties sustained by the BEF in the final advance.

I had not appreciated how they still had such an appetite for taking the offensive, though.

Thanks for your replies, George and connaughtranger.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

The extraordinary success of the British attack at Amiens on 8 August 1918 symbolises more than any other episode how Haig and his men began their advance to Victory.

It's perhaps too easy to forget how dangerous the situation was for the Entente, even at that late stage.... a consideration that makes the British success all the more remarkable.

It is easy to over-emphasize the significance of Amiens. It was an important battle, don't get me wrong. But the context is worth repeating. There were two even more decisive blows that pre-dated Amiens. The first was Operation Marneschutz-Reims. This was the last major offensive carried out under Ludendorff's command. It was decisively defeated on day one, not least because the Allies finally managed to defend in depth.

The psychological impact of Operation Marneschutz-Reims was bad enough. It did not spell the end of German offensive aspirations, however. That was ended by the Second Battle of Soissons. Foch has husbanded a significant reserve, including French tank forces. The scale and suddenness of the attack came as an even greater shock.

Now we have a pin-point size German 'attack' on Chipilly ridge, just before the Battle of Amiens. It is unwise to extrapolate from this event to the German army as a whole. Leaving aside the psychological effects mentioned before, there were still significant portions of the German army that were not geared to be attack divisions. There was always the danger that the Germans would defend resolutely. This has been covered in George's ealier post. It was an ever present consideration. Foch never took his eye off the need to counter another German offensive but as to such an offensive posing a major risk...

Le Hamel was the prelude to Amiens. It pointed to the difficulties that the Germans were experiencing, even with defending. Amiens was not really a surprise but it was the point at which even Ludendorff had to acknowledge that there was no possibility of the German army taking the initiative again. From an Allied perspective it was one more example of how the German army was failing systematically; an example with the precedents that have been listed above.

Robert

[kenneth505]

Considering the energy and ferocity the Germans were able to muster throughout 1918 does it lend an argument in favor of the 3rd Ypres expenditure of men and material? If Britain had dug in awaiting US mobilization versus attacking in 1917 could Germany have mounted a St. Michael type offensive six months earlier, in the fall of 1917 with even more drastic effect?

If I start to believe the above does this mean I'm starting to see the point of view of Haig and attrition?

[George Armstrong Custer]

Ken, the short answers to your two questions are yes and yes. Even more dangerous, had the British not launched Third Ypres, was the possibility that the Germans might have begun offensive probes in 1917, leading to something larger, against the French. Even had the German offensive still not been launched until March 1918, the absence of the impact of Third Ypres upon their capabilities would certainly have had consequences not favourable to the Allies. Jack Sheldon has made the telling point about Third Ypres that "There had always been an assumption on the German side that the Allies would continue to press their attacks there until worsening winter weather brought operations to a halt." Haig couldn't shut down Third Ypres early enough from the German point of view - but they knew why he would want to press on and pragmatically expected him to do so as long as possible. Other key strategic imperatives also impinged upon Haig's decision making. But combine the fact that the Germans saw pressing Third Ypres as the logical thing to do from the British point of view with the added potential which the 1917 battle (and the Somme the previous yesr) robbed from the German Spring 1918 offensive, and seeing Haig's point of view becomes inevitable.

George

[phil andrade]

Sheffield cites a quote from Von Kuhl that very much bears out the notion that Third Ypres "pinned" the Germans in Flanders and prevented them from exploiting the fragility of the Entente at that time when the French were so vulnerable.

He also mentions that Petain advocated that Haig pursue a policy of limited and lavishly "ordnanced" attacks like those that the French so successfully mounted in the Aisne and Verdun sectors. How far the British advances in the fighting of Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde rivalled those French successes is something that invites discussion. It is, of course, arguable that the French achieved those spectacular and relatively cheap local triumphs precisely because the British were engaging the Germans so intensively in Flanders.

I like Sheffield's book. He clearly endeavours to present significant criticisms of Haig's generalship, so as not to be charged with being excessively aligned with the Terraine school of historians.

There were also some aspects of Haig's personal conduct which , Sheffield suggests, did not present his character in the most flattering light, although these are greatly outweighed by more attractive features.

Apparently, Doris taught Douglas to dance when they were touring the World in the post war years : I was surprised. I would have thought that his social life - not to mention the traditions of hunting and regimental customs - would have required him to dance at a lot of functions as an adjutant. Sheffield states that Haig only focused his dance floor attentions on the prettiest women, avoiding the older and less glamorous ones. Sly rascal indeed !

Forgive me if I share some lovely news with you : our third grandchild - Charlie - was born today at 2.15 in the morning. He's a lovely little fella. Had he been born on the sheduled date ( tomorrow) he might have been the seven billionth human being, according to the pundits who speculate on demographic trends. We must console ourselves with the prospect that he might be number 6,999,999,999 !

Sorry....this post belongs more properly to the "Slow Horses and Fast Women " thread.

Fatigue on my part...it was a long and draining night at King's College Hospital ( did I get the apostrophe right ?).

Phil (PJA)

[kenneth505]

Congratulations on Grandparentness Phil. Let's hope the next hundred years are are as great as this last hundred. A remarkable sentiment considering that our topic is included in that period. Yet I do wish that earnestly.

After reading Peter Hart's The Somme: The Darkest Hour on the Western Front I recall taking away his assertion that Haig's policy was on target and attrition was inevitable. This seemed radical to me. In retrospect I suspect I was still to much influenced by what may be the popular culture portrayal, Lions led by Lambs and all that. Now I have to wonder if Haig's exertions were more difficult and his results at least equally impressive to other, possibly more famous and beloved, 'war of movement' type Generals.

I Recognize that this is taking this thread well off target.