Haig on ' The Value of Mechanical Contrivances'

[Mark Hone]

In his book 'A New Excalibur', A.J. Smithers makes a reference to a section of Haig's Final Despatch called 'The Value of Mechanical Contrivances', in which he cautions against regarding tanks etc as war-winning 'wonder weapons'. A very short extract is given in the text. I was hoping to use a longer quote as part of a GCSE Controlled Assessment assignment but cannot find this ection in any online version of Haig's Final Despatch or the version (admittedly labelled an 'extract') printed as Appendix Four of the Sheffield and Bourne edition of Haig's War Diaries and Letters. Can anyone help?

[squirrel]

Pages 329 to 333 in the N & MP reprint of Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches edited by J H Boraston. PM me your e-mail address and I will send a scan of the "Mechanical Contrivances" section. An interesting read.

[centurion]

Its in here http://www.archive.org/stream/sirdouglashaigsd00haiguoft/sirdouglashaigsd00haiguoft_djvu.txt

[George Armstrong Custer]

The Value of Mechanical Contrivances is point 16 in Haig's Final Despatch. His central point is that despite the utility of technological developments, boots on the ground are decisive - as true today as when he wrote it. For a so-called cavalry obsessive, Haig rightly places the infantry role as central to consolidating any success which military technology may have helped win. Here's the full text:

'The Value of Mechanical Contrivances

16. A remarkable feature of the present war has been the number and variety of mechanical contrivances to which it has given birth, or has brought to a higher state of perfection.

Besides the great increase in mobility made possible by the development of motor transport, heavy artillery, trench mortars, machine guns, aeroplanes, tanks, gas and barbed wire have in their several spheres of action played very prominent parts in operations, and as a whole have given a greater driving power to war. The belligerent possessing a preponderance of such mechanical contrivances has found himself in a very favourable position as compared with his less well provided opponent. The general superiority of the Allies in this direction during the concluding stages of the recent struggle undoubtedly contributed powerfully to their success. In this respect the Army owes a great debt to science, and to the distinguished scientific men who placed their learning and skill at the disposal of their country.

It should never be forgotten however that weapons of this character are incapable of effective independent action. They do not in themselves possess the power to obtain a decision, their real function being to assist the infantry to get to grips with their opponents. To place in them a reliance out of proportion to their real utility, to imagine, for example, that tanks and aeroplanes can take the place of infantry and artillery, would be to do a disservice to those who have the future of those new weapons most at heart by robbing them of the power to use them to their best effect.

Every mechanical device so far produced is dependent for its most effective use upon the closest possible association with other arms, and in particular with infantry and artillery. Aeroplanes must rely upon infantry to prevent the enemy from over-running their aerodromes, and, despite their increasing range and versatility of action, are clearly incapable in themselves of bringing about a decision. Tanks require the closest artillery support to enable them to reach their objectives without falling victim to the enemy’s artillery, and are dependent upon the infantry to hold the position they have won.

As an instance of the interdependence of artillery and tanks, we may take the actions fought east of Amiens on the 8th August, 1919, and following days. A very large number of tanks were employed in these operations, and they carried out their tasks in the most brilliant manner. Yet a scrutiny of the artillery ammunition returns for this period discloses the fact that in no action of similar dimensions had the expenditure of ammunition been so great.

Immense though the influence of mechanical devices may be, they cannot in themselves decide a campaign. Their true role is that of assisting the infantryman, which they have done in a most admirable manner. They cannot replace him. Only by the rifle and bayonet of the infantryman can the decisive victory be won.'

[Steven Broomfield]

As someone (Slim?) said: All wars are infantry wars.

It always seems to me that, however his detractors might take Haig's quotes out of any context, the old boy seemed to have a nack of hitting the nail fair and square where it should be hit. On the head.

[squirrel]

It always seems to me that, however his detractors might take Haig's quotes out of any context, the old boy seemed to have a nack of hitting the nail fair and square where it should be hit. On the head.

Agreed.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Indeed, Steve - though it was Evelyn Waugh, apparently. But as Gary Sheffield's new biography of Haig notes, Slim - widely seen as the greatest British commander of the Second World War - did describe his victory over the Japanese at Imphal-Kohima in terms of phases which are strikingly similar to those prescribed by Haig on the Western Front. Sheffield doesn't quote him directly, but Slim wrote:

(i) Concentration - as each side strained every sinew to bring its forces into the fight.

(ii) Attrition - as week after week in man-to-man, hand-to-hand fighting, each strove to wear down the other's strength and to break his will.

(iii) Counter-offensive - as gradually, but with increasing momentum, the British passed to the attack, and

(iv) Pursuit - when the Japanese broke and, snarling and snapping, were hunted from the field.

George

[squirrel]

I was explaining this last week to a visitor to the Western Front who was criticising the frontal attack.

I explained that it was not possible to go over, under or round the German positions; initial attacks could only be frontal and only infantry could finally capture, consolidate and hold a position once gained. It sunk in - eventually.

[Terry_Reeves]

This passage has always amused me:

I will conclude with a story which was told me some ten years ago by General Gouraud, a great fighting French general of the last war, who was then Governor of Paris. He was dining with three British generals, of different arms of the service. He told us the following as current in the French Army to illustrate the characteristics of the three principal arms:

"The general gives an order to the infantryman. The infantryman, being rather stupid, does not well understand what the general wants, but goes out and engages the enemy.

"The general gives an order to the artilleryman. The artilleryman understands it perfectly, but being much cleverer than the general goes and does something quite different.

"The general gives an order to the cavalryman. The cavalryman smiles politely and goes off to water and feed his horses."

We all assured him that things were arranged differently in the British Army.

Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, The Good Soldier, Macmillan, London,1948.

TR

[Mark Hone]

Thanks very much for the text and interesting discussion.

[Old Tom]

I am not sure if it was Wavell or Slim who is quoted as saying 'All his battles had been fought uphill in the rain on the edge of his map'

Old Tom

[squirrel]

Field Marshal the Lord Slim :

"All battles are fought uphill, at night, in the rain, at the junction of two,or more, map sheets.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Of related interest to the 'Mechanical Contrivances' passage from Haig's Final Despatch, is this entry from his Diary for 19 March 1918, referring to a lunchtime discussion with Churchill, who was visiting GHQ. In this, Haig pinpoints the flaw - beyond the limited capabilities and reliability of the tanks - regarding the large numbers of trained crew which didn't exist but which would be required for Churchill's typically off the cuff scheme for an en masse replacing of men with machines:

"Churchill has written a Paper urging the reorganisation of the Army so as to employ mechanical appliances to take the place of men, because we are lacking in manpower. He stated that with the approval of the War Cabinet, he was proceeding with the manufacture of a large number of tanks (4,000). This is done without any consideration of the manpower situation and the crews likely to be available to put into them!"

George

[JimSmithson]

Typical George of the mindset that continued in Britain (and almost catastrophically in Russia) up to the next war that the crews were never really considered in the equation. The tank was the winner, not the men inside it. Thus the poor crew arrangements in early British and Russian tanks of the 30's.

Jim

[truthergw]

Typical George of the mindset that continued in Britain (and almost catastrophically in Russia) up to the next war that the crews were never really considered in the equation. The tank was the winner, not the men inside it. Thus the poor crew arrangements in early British and Russian tanks of the 30's.

Jim

The mind set of Wilson and Churchill also included planning for the campaigns of summer, 1919 and 1920!

[Ron Clifton]

Hello all

In considering the proposition that the tank was a "war-winning weapon" we need to remember that the Allies invented it and the Germans never had very many. In 1940 the Germans had superiority over the Aliies in tanks, hence the success of the "blitzkrieg" in both Poland and France. Later in that war, and especially against Russia, when tank strengths were comparable, the result was a very bloody and expensive slogging-match.

When both sides have a relatively similar strength in any new weapon, be it tanks, gas or aircraft, a stalemate often develops and the fighting ability and spirit of the men who operate the new weapons comes into play.

Compare "... but we have got

The Gatling gun, and they have not."

Any innovation gives the innovator a temporary advantage. The trick is to turn that advantage into victory before the enemy catches up.

Ron

[Bernard_Lewis]

I left the book in the holiday complex 'library' in June 2011 but from memory Alistair Horne in 'France 1940 - To Lose a Battle' indicates that the early German tanks (Mk I and Mk II etc.) were not especially superior to the British/French versions. The real difference was in their deployment -the Germans using them en masse while the Allies deployed them in small packets which proved not up to the task. Allied command also seemed incapable of speedy and effective responses to German thrusts.

Bernard

[Steven Broomfield]

I believe the French Hotchkiss and Somua types (in 1940 - H35 and S39, IIRC) were pretty good; the Chard 2bis was (for it's time) well-armoured and well-armed; and the British Cruiser tanks were probably as good as (at least) the PzII.

As Bernard says, it was tactics and morale which adversely affected their use.

I believe Rommel, no less, was very shaken by the counter attack at Arras by the RTR, using the Matilda II: we were not placed to exploit the effects of this success.

[Ron Clifton]

Rommel's adjutant was apparently killed in the Arras counter-attack, while actually standing next to him! It was near the village of Wailly.

I have also read - and it may have been in "To Lose a Battle" - that the German Marks I and II tanks could not knock out a Matilda (itself not an especially good tank) at a range of zero feet. Their position improved when the Mark III came along, and of course the Czech t-38. (But we are straying off-topic a bit!)

Ron

[Bernard_Lewis]

On reading the Alistair Horne book (well worth a read) the Arras 'counter attack' seems to have been a bit of a damp squib (if deadly for some, of course). Promised units failed to appear and - though the attack may have panicked the Germans who were astonished by their success to date - it was a pin ***** to what it might have been.

On such chances do battles hinge, I suppose.

Bernard

Oh dear, I've upset the naughty word guard! I'm sure you can work out what I was trying to say.

Bernard (is innocent...)