Pull back to the Hindenburg line

[wiking85]

http://books.google.com/books?id=HT95LCHyqg0C&printsec=frontcover&dq=gerald+feldman+army+in&source=bl&ots=O6Wypgxhyv&sig=tGlZdeJgXLnxYYSL0t8gdxxe6fA&hl=en&ei=C35VTYXtOYGdlgfArIj0Bw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&sqi=2&ved=0CBYQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

Gerald Feldman in his seminal work on German army relations with industry and labor suggests in one chapter on the failure of the Hindenburg Program that the resulting collapse in production, specifically explosive powder production, caused Ludendorff to order the pull back to the Hindenburg line. This is the first time I've seen this written, but based on the information presented it seems somewhat reasonable. According to the author 1 million men were combed out of the army as a result of the Program to man factories or help build them as a large number were being produced to satisfy the Program's production increases and this obviously deprived the army of a large number of soldiers. Beyond that the push to build factories (most of which were never used or completed) drew materials away from existing production of war goods, plus caused the transportation crisis and to a large degree the coal and food crisis of 1916. The result was that explosive powder production had fallen by nearly 1000 tons (~7200 tons to 6,000 tons) by early 1917 instead of increasing them. The shortfall was already occurring before 1917 and it promised to only get worse.

As a result of these numbers Hindenburg-Ludendorff decided to shorten the line and free up men and equipment for other ventures instead of returning to the offensive in the West in 1917. The author goes on to state that had these shortfalls not been caused by the Program that the Germans would have been strong enough to attack in the West after defeated the French at Chemin des Dames.

I am not proposing a What If, but just want to know if the fall back to the Hindenburg Line was the result of industrial failures and the removal of men from the army to build and man factories rather than purely military results in the field.

[Robert Dunlop]

wiking, Jack Sheldon has provided a very interesting examination of the events leading up to the withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line. It is in his book 'The German Army at Cambrai'. The arguments were complicated and heated. It wasn't just about industrial failures.

Robert

[centurion]

I've oft said we should have a sub forum on the economic factors, however in this case I'd agree with Robert - it was much more complex. The casualties in the Somme came as a dreadful shock to the German high command. Conventional wisdom said that an attacker would suffer at least two casualties for every one that the defenders did. At the Somme the German defenders took more casualties than the British and French combined. The German army could not afford another Somme and maintain the offensive in the East.

[Alan Tucker]

We need more explanation of the Feldman argument here in terms of the chronology. It is not a question of when the pull back took place but when the decision to build the Hindenburg Line was taken. I think this was after the Cambrai conference on September 8 1916 at Crown Prince Rupert's HQ. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were there with senior commanders. But I do not know the exact date of the decision.

[truthergw]

I would agree that the reasons for the decision to build the Hindenburg line were complex and of long standing. The lack of resources including manpower was a major factor in the planning of Verdun which took place at the beginning of 1916, never mind 1917. I do not think one can ignore the additional effects of Verdun and the Somme when looking at the decision making process leading to the fall back.

[wiking85]

I will have to look over the chronology that Feldman presents and will try to present things as best I can. I would certainly support and economics forum for the website.

The rationale that the author uses is that the offensive in the West was impossible because 1 million men were combed out of the army/denied as replacements by the Hindenburg plan, which also caused an explosive/shell shortage necessitating a defensive posture instead of attacking out of the remaining Somme bulge. The author is also an economic specialist, so I'm sure his view of things is colored by his subject of study, but it does make sense that given the decrease in munitions and the purposeful denial of manpower through an industrial program would limit the ability of the army to act in the field, which would be a major factor in the decision to pull back to a straight prepared line of defense.

Had these materials been available in 1917 it would make more sense to retain the bulge rather than straighten the line, as it would give a much better jump off point for an offensive toward either Doullens or Amiens.

[centurion]

Had these materials been available in 1917 it would make more sense to retain the bulge rather than straighten the line, as it would give a much better jump off point for an offensive toward either Doullens or Amiens.

It wasn't straightening the line that was important - the Hindenburg line contained numerous defensive features that it would have been impossible to construct in the old line under artillery fire (at least not without massive casualties). These included reinforced concrete bunkers, pill boxes, machine gun positions, anti tank trenches etc and all the accoutrements of defence in depth. This is what allowed it to be held by fewer men.

What is the evidence that the men released went back to civilian manufacturing jobs? (as opposed to being posted toother areas of military need).

[wiking85]

It wasn't straightening the line that was important - the Hindenburg line contained numerous defensive features that it would have been impossible to construct in the old line under artillery fire (at least not without massive casualties). These included reinforced concrete bunkers, pill boxes, machine gun positions, anti tank trenches etc and all the accoutrements of defence in depth. This is what allowed it to be held by fewer men.

What is the evidence that the men released went back to civilian manufacturing jobs? (as opposed to being posted toother areas of military need).

I am aware of the advantages of the Hindenburg line over the previous line, especially as it incorporated the new defensive doctrine that was learned at the Somme.

Feldman's book indicates the men removed/exempted from service went into mining, manufacturing jobs (many skilled workers were taken from service that previously were not needed as there were no jobs they were crucial for), transportation workers (i.e. run/maintain trains for the civilian sector and for rail repair), as well as construction workers to build the new factories required under the Hindenburg program were all removed from service or liability for service. Some were necessary to remove regardless of the Program or not, but the vast majority were not ultimately needed, or at least would not have been needed if the economy had continued to have been managed with the step-by-step increases of the War Ministry as had been the case with the Falkenhayn OHL. Indeed, most factories were never used/completed and many pre-existing factories had to be shut down anyway due to resources being used up in unnecessary factory construction and the subsequent transportation crisis.

Obviously the question is whether all these men would have been useful to the army is a matter of debate, but the issue was also covered in less detail by Holger Herwig:

http://books.google.com/books?id=foqdQgAACAAJ&dq=holger+herwig+first+world+war&hl=en&ei=49VWTc2MB8SqlAfhu8zDBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAA

http://books.google.com/books?id=2YqjfHLyyj8C&pg=PA486&dq=holger+herwig+first+world+war+hindenburg+program&hl=en&ei=8tVWTZSlKsOclgf638CQBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=holger%20herwig%20first%20world%20war%20hindenburg%20program&f=false

He suggests that 125,000 were taken out of uniform for the program to serve in factories, but this doesn't cover men exempted from call up in 1917 that were utilized in the Program, nor workers freed up by the closing of inefficient factories and rationalized transportation/manufacturing plans. Also this doesn't to my knowledge include soldiers used to help build additional factories that were kept off the line until 1918 and could have been more useful at the front.

There were something like 60,000 men released from the front to work in the coal mines and more might have been taken for other purposes that Herwig does not account for.

http://books.google.com/books?id=2YqjfHLyyj8C&pg=PA486&dq=holger+herwig+first+world+war+hindenburg+program&hl=en&ei=8tVWTZSlKsOclgf638CQBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=hindenburg%20program&f=false

This section also mentions the 1 million man figure, but I think that is taken from Feldman, who is listed in the sources, who IIRC did not break down that number.

[Robert Dunlop]

It wasn't straightening the line that was important...

There is no doubting that the Hindenburg Line was created as a defensive position in the first instance. Jack Sheldon noted that 'the purpose of the work was two fold. The first reason was to ensure that any Allied breakthrough could not be operationally expanded or exploited in any significant way; the second, and the reason that ultimately dictated the occupation of the Siegfriedstellung, was that it would permit the German forces to withdraw in the face of a serious Allied offensive, provided only that the latter was recognised in a timely manner.'

In the event, the Germans withdrew before the 'serious' Allied offensive got underway. Jack provided insight into this. 'Despite all views to the contrary, in order to save manpower and especially, in view of the coming offensive, to generate urgently needed reserves, there was only one realistic solution: to shorten the line. The Wotan-Siegfried-Riegel plan, it was calculated, would only reduce the front by thirteen kilometres and save six divisions, whereas a bold move back to the Siegfriedstellung meant a shortening of forty to forty five kilometres and manpower savings of thirteen divisions' [both quotes from the German Army at Cambrai].

Robert

[JimSmithson]

In "Meine Kriegserinnerungen", Ludendorff writes fully of the effects of the Hindenburg Plan, not only the loss of men but also the effects of a wholesale restructuring of the war effort on the part of industry. At no point does he bring that topic and the "Alberich Bewegung" together. He writes of the difference in numbers of divisions and that with offensives expected in France and on other fronts it made sense to shorten the line and create a reserve. Although of course the loss of men to industry does lead to shortages they do not seem to have been on a scale that could be regarded as the cause for the retreat in early 1917; not according to Ludendorff at least. A factor, of course, but only one of many.

Jim

[SteveMarsdin]

Good evening All

Given the difficulties of verifying the statistics over on the "casualty discussion" thread, will it not be difficult to prove actual numbers ? A naive thought on my part but if the numbers withdrawn to "industrial service" were as substantial as the economist suggests couldn't that help explain some of the discrepancies "highlighted" there ?

[wiking85]

Looking back at Feldman's work and with the information presented here from Sheldon's work, it seems that the industrial failings did not play a role in the decision process of OHL, as by the time the decision had been made, September 1916, Groener was not yet in charge of the War Ministry and had not yet implemented the Hindenburg Program. Seeing as how Feldman's book was written in the 60's on reissued in the 90's, he probably did not have as much access to information as we do now, nor did he focus on military matters, which may explain the controversy. So my question then to you all is with the soldiers released by Hindenburg Program and supplies lost by starting the Program, could the German army have attacked in the West in 1917?

[JimSmithson]

Ludendoff is absolutely clear that in 1917 the war was to be one of "Abwehrschlacht" (pp 306-307 Meine Kriegserinnerungen) - it means defensive battle.

Jim

[centurion]

Germany certainly suffered from the lack of a WW1 Albert Speer but whilst industrial output was a problem (and not just because of a lack of industrial man power but because of of the very structure of the industrial base in which to put them (Germany was ahead of France and Britain combined in heavy industry and chemicals but simply did not have enough plants and, more important, experience in manufacturing of engineered products such as mass produced vehicles, engines etc and you don't get that by pulling soldats out of line). But what was ignored was Germany (and the KuK's) ability to feed themselves - in 1914 both were net exporters of basic food stuffs, by the end of 1918 they could only produce enough food to meet about 50% of estimated requirements for an average minimum diet. This was because of a lack of man power (men at the front) but more important a lack of fertilizer (nitrates going in making explosives and organic just doesn't cut it in these circumstances) a lack of draught animals and/or tractors (taken to tow guns) and a broken distribution system (e.g. milk rotted because there were no trains to take it to the towns and cities). Neither Hindenburg nor Ludendorff seem to have even considered this in their plans.

[truthergw]

Looking back at Feldman's work and with the information presented here from Sheldon's work, it seems that the industrial failings did not play a role in the decision process of OHL, as by the time the decision had been made, September 1916, Groener was not yet in charge of the War Ministry and had not yet implemented the Hindenburg Program. Seeing as how Feldman's book was written in the 60's on reissued in the 90's, he probably did not have as much access to information as we do now, nor did he focus on military matters, which may explain the controversy. So my question then to you all is with the soldiers released by Hindenburg Program and supplies lost by starting the Program, could the German army have attacked in the West in 1917?

They had their hands full defending at Arras, Chemin des Dames, Ypres and Cambrai but it gave them the mass of manoeuvre with which to attack in Spring, 1918.