Counter Battery Fire

[PhilB]

SDGW lists some 3000 RFA/RHA/RGA officers and a correspondingly large number of ORs. I don`t know whether this number is large as a percentage compared with infantry regiments but it does show how dangerous artillery service was. I assume that the major danger was from counter battery fire (or possibly accidents) - were there other major dangers? Assuming that the RGA were further back, did they run less risk from counter fire or did the calibre of their guns make them a preferred target?

[rflory]

My experience concerning RA officer casualties (KIA, DOW and WIA) is that the majority of them were from enemy artillery fire, both counter-battery and normal harrassing fire, although a number of FOOs died due to sniper fire both at the OP and coming and going from OPs. In the service papers the cause of death or wounding is usually listed as 'gsw' (gun shot wounds) but that term was also used for shrapnel wounds.

During the war each side continually tried to locate and destroy enemy batteries and usually when a battery fired on an enemy target, the other side would immediately reply with counter-battery fire. Also prior to major offensives there was a significant effort to locate enemy batteries and when the barrage was fired for that offensive a good portion of that fire was directed at known locations of enemy batteries.

It is also surprising how many RA officers and men were killed and wounded by HE rounds that landed on their dugouts or messes.

Dick Flory

[bmac]

At least on 1st July 16 RFA officers went forward with some advancing infantry units and became casualties as a result. Certainly happened to several from the 46th and 56th Divisions.

[PhilB]

This gives an idea of being on the receiving end of counter fire. I think the rockets are launched by insurgents from top left and the US counter fire follows.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Si1hxVYlDqw

[SiegeGunner]

... were there other major dangers?

I'm not sure whether this applied elsewhere, but on the Belgian coast, where British naval guns were emplaced in concrete bunkers that were virtually immune to HE fire (excepting rare direct hits on the embrasure), the principal hazard in the later part of the war was gas shells. As it was largely impossible for them to kill the British gunners 'at work', German aerial reconnaissance concentrated on locating their camps in the rear and dugouts etc close to the batteries, and these were regularly subjected to 'cocktail' bombardments of HE, shrapnel and gas, timed to coincide with periods of outdoor activity such as morning musters, working parties, afternoon recreation, church parades and the like.

[nigelfe]

RA casualties from CB fire were notably heavy at Passchendaele in 1917, the problem being that the Germans held the high groud and overlooked much of the gun areas. I think there are figures that indicate that RA cas were heavier than those of the infantry at that time. In addition to cas from CB fire and fire agaisnt OPs, there was also HF that could well hit ammo resupply parties at night.

CB fire and its management can be quite complex, it is entirely wrong to assert or assume that all located HBs are immediately engaged or that previously located HBs are immediately engaged if they open fire. It depends on the commander's policy at the time. Another fortunate point is that German map shooting (ie predicted fire) was generally not as effective as British. The obvious exception being air observed fire, when the Germans had local air superiority. The main reasons for lees effective fire was German relative technical backwardness in sound ranging and in map shooting tecniques, add to this flawed arty C&C arrangements for CB.

[MikB]

Artillery duels have been characteristic of many wars - both sides attempting to reduce the enemy's capability prior to or during major ground offensives. They still occur where neither side has effective air power or it's difficult to use it.

The poets were strongly aware of it in WW1 - somebody (can't remember who) wrote:

...the hurrying batteries behind the masking hills

For their new parley setting themselves in array

In crafty forms unmapped.

(...or something like that)

...which implies constant changes of position, and layouts intended to make it difficult for the enemy to locate the source of fire. So perhaps it's not surprising that these duels caused substantial casualties on both sides.

Regards,

MikB

[nigelfe]

Artillery duels may well have been a feature of the direct fire, black powder era. Beyond that its artistic licence. Actual CB tactics are somewhat more complicated, starting with whether the aim is to destroy or neutralise the targetted bty.

[Mark Hone]

As covered in my thread about Lt John Hobhouse RGA, FOO parties could indeed suffer heavy casualties, and might consist of quite a few people. Hobhouse's at Langemark comprised him and 11 OR, although the majority of these appear to have been Signallers rather than RGA per se and so presumably don't come up in the Artillery casualty stats. Only Hobhouse and one other man returned unscathed. The relative of a boy whose grave we visited on our 2008 tour was killed along with his entire section of RE Signallers while supporting the 330th Brigade RFA FOO Lieutenant Hughes on 4th November 1918.

[PhilB]

What proportion of the RA officers would be serving close to the guns and what proportion on other duties like FOO?

[nigelfe]

A battery normally only had a single observing officer forward, although the role rotated so sometimes there would probably have been 2 in the same OP, one being 'under instruction' or just during handover. It was also fairly normal for the captain (later AKA BK) to stay in the wagon lines with the horses, etc.

On paper the normal officer establishment for 6 gun bty was Maj, Capt and 3 subalterns. However, battery accounts (at least from the second half of the war) suggest there could be twice the number of subalterns.

One of the issues was that although tactical fire control was the BC's responsibility, he was sometime the only person trained to do the map shooting calculations, which kept him on the gun position. The tactical fire control responsibility is important because the BC had the authority to order the his guns to engage opportunity targets. However, it became the practise for other officers to undertake the observing officer role and 'inherit' the BC's authority.