Artillery FOO 1917

[Mark Hone]

I am preparing the spiel for my annual school tour. This year we shall be following the progress of Lieutenant Richard Hobhouse, 38th Heavy Brigade RGA who won the Military Cross for leading an observation patrol into Langemark during its capture by 20th Division on 16th August 1917. He was the great-grandfather of one of the boys on the tour. As I'm not by any means an artillery expert, I'd appreciate some help with describing FOO techniques in this period. Hobhouse took 11 NCOs and men with him. I'm presuming that these were mainly signallers, presumably toting lots of telephone wire leading from their previous OP at Stray Farm near Pilkem. Would Hobhouse also have had means of communicating with circling aircraft? Backup methods such as pigeons? How many guns would 38 HB have consisted of? I think that the standard ORBAT was four batteries of six guns but this presumably varied under real-life conditions. Apologies if any of these are naive questions but I come from a line of many generations of PBI! The only thing I remember about artillery is that you never say 'repeat' on the radio.

[Robert Dunlop]

Mark, your description of Lt Hobhouse's taking forward the 11 NCOs and men is pretty good. The men would have been mainly signallers, IMHO. There would have been a lot of wire, which required carrying forward, laying, connecting up and maintaining the connections whenever they were [inevitably] broken by German shellfire or British men/vehicles breaking the wire. Hobhouse would not have had a wireless for communication to the aircraft. The planes assigned to the battery would have communicated via a dedicated wireless at the HQ or nearer the guns. Backup methods including flags and signalling lamps. Some of the 11 men would have stayed back to pick up messages from signalling, then relayed them back to the battery. I haven't read of pidgeons being carried forward by FOOs. During Third Ypres, the British used captive balloons as an alternative recipient for signalling lamp messages.

There are some good accounts of FOOs working in the field in 1917, including the Master of Belhaven's diary and Talbot Kelly's book "A Subaltern's Odyssey: A Memoir of the Great War 1915-1917".

Robert

[rflory]

Mark: For the makeup of a heavy battery you might want to look at "What is a Heavy Battery" in Stand To!, Summer 1992, #35, pages 29-31.

I don't know what information you have on Lieutenant Hobhouse, but here is what I can tell you about him:

Captain Sir John Richard Hobhouse, MC, RGA

Born at Hadspen House Castle Cary, Somerset on 27 Feb 1893, the third son of the Right Hon. Henry Hobhouse, LLD and his wife Margaret Heyworth, seventh daughter of Richard Potter of Standish House, Gloucestershire.

Educated at Summer Fields from 1904 to 1906; Eton College from 1906 to 1911; and at New College, Oxford

Served in France with 38th Heavy Battery, RGA from 1917 to 1919

Military Cross in the London Gazette of 26 Sep 1917 (citation:London Gazette, 9 Jan 1918.

Once wounded.

In 1920 he became a partner in the firm of Alfred Holt and Company, ship-ownere and was a director of Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Company Limited.

JP for the city of Liverpool from 1929

On 23 Nov 1926 he married Catherine Stewart Brown and they had three children: Richard Henry, born 27 Maj 1928; John Stewart, born 31 Jan 1932; and Sarah, born 18 Aug 1929.

Regional Commissioner, NW Persia, 1939-1940

Regional Shipping Officer for the Northwest, Ministry of War Transport from 1941 to 1945.

Made a Commander, Order of Orange Nassau by the Netherlands

Treasurer of Liverpool University from 1942 to 1948

From 1948 to 1947 he was Pro-Chancellor, University of Liverpool.

Knighted in 1946

Sources: The Old Public School-Boys Who's Who: Eton;List of Etonians Who Fought in the Great War MCMXIV-MCMXIX; Eton School Register, Part VII, 1899-1909; Summer Fields Register, 1864-1960.

[mhifle]

Hi,

Here are a list of Codes used by a FOO when communicating to the Artillery, from a Field Note Book. This was posted a while ago on this site.

Regards Mark

[Mark Hone]

Thanks for the replies and interesting information. If anyone does have a good first hand account of a FOO in action in this period I'd be very grateful as it allows me to give a little 'atmosphere' when i'm telling the story. Unfortunately we don't have an account written by John Hobhouse, who seems to have been rather dismissive about his MC. The family believe he never actually bothered to collect it, but I haven't been able to verify this. I think this is unlikely as he was subsequently knighted and was quite a prominent figure in the North West.

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is an example from Talbot Kelly:

"It was essential [just prior to the Battle of Messines in June 1917] to find Hollebeke church because our guns were due to register it as one of the key points on which a barrage would start in a few days time... So the next day, after consulting a map, I was sent out with two signallers and a lot of telephone wire and told to do my damndest to register Hollebeke church. I went to the same bombing block that I had been at the day before, and then moved over to my left to the road that ran from Ypres to Hollebeke.

This time I was lucky, for I found that from the middle of the road where it crossed the crest of the hill I could see about 800 yards away a rather imposing mass of rubble that must have been the church. But whilst admiring the view a German field battery opened fire on me and my signallers and chased us over the ridge, and into cover. Still I had noticed that in the middle of the road, a little way in front of where I had been standing, there was a fairly large shell crater, on the further side of which were two dead Germans, and I came to the conclusion that if I could get myself and some telephone wire into that shell hole behind the extra cover of the Germans, I would be able to register the church.

Leaving my signallers under cover and taking the telephones and dragging some wire I crawled on all fours down the road and into the hole, arriving without interference. It was not a very pleasant spot... and I felt extremely isolated. However, I fixed my wire to the telephone and got through to the battery and started to shoot. After about my third round the German gunner FOO, wherever he was, who had probably seen my crawl down the road, started taking a hand in the proceedings and from then on every round we fired he fired one back at me."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The previous example was part of the pre-registration process, which took place before a battle started. Here is another example but this time describing the role of a FOO during a battle. It comes from Campbell's book 'In the Cannon's Mouth'. The action took place at almost the exact time and place that Lt Hobhouse won his MC:

"At last the weather improved. The Great Offensive was to be resumed, the infantry would attack again, the artillery would go forward. We received our orders, all the minute details, the same creeping barrage, the exact times, the position to which we would advance. And each battery was to supply a Forward Observing Officer to go up with the infantry. 'Whose turn is it?' the Major asked. It seemed to be mine.

I was aware of a feeling of anxiety. This would be the most responsible as well as the most dangerous task that had been given to me, but I was reasonably confident that I could do it.

I was not going alone. Vernon of B Battery was coming with me. Our responsibility began at Z [the time when the attack was officially due to start] + 100 minutes when the second wave was to go through. By that time we were to be at Bank Farm [which was about 2/3 the way between Langemarck and Zonnebeke], in our present front line, we were to follow up from there, finding out how far the infantry had gone and the strength of the opposition against them. We were to lay out a telephone line forward from Bank Farm and send all our information there. Another telephone line from Bank Farm to the rear was already in operation, its maintenance was the responsibility of the Royal Engineers, not ours.

It was a dark night [when they set out]... we were to call in and see the Colonel on the way up. 'Information is what we want,' he said to us. 'All that you can get: where we are, where the enemy is, any strong points that are still holding out. You supply the information, we do the rest. It's not only for our guns, we can get the heavies behind us to fire at anything that's too big for us.

Now we had to leave the road, we had to clamber over trenches and shell-holes. This was where the two front lines had been a fortnight earlier [ie July 31st 1917]. We could only go very slowly, our signallers had more than a mile of heavy telephone wire to carry in addition to all their ordinary equipement, which included two lamps. We had eight signallers, four from each battery, my Bombardier Turner who was in charge of the party, and we also had four men from a trench mortar battery who had joined us at Brigade Headquarters. They were to act as runners if we could not get our information back by telephone.

At... 4.20 [am - Z Hour]... there was a roar of guns behind us. Daylight slowly came. Now we could see the battlefield. In front of us the ground sloped very gradually for about half a mile. Then began to rise again, a little more steeply. That must be Bank Farm, a little to our right, just across the stream.

We... arrived at Bank Farm, we were in good time, our party had suffered no casualties, we had not even been particularly frightened, none of the shells had fallen close to us. How we were to go up the slope on the other side and find out where our infantry had got to.

But we never went beyond Bank Farm.

I saw one of our machine guns firing from a trench at a short distance on our right. If the attack had been successful there ought to have been no German within range of a machine gun from here by this time. 'We'd better find out what's happened before we go any further,' [Vernon] said.

We separated. There were plenty of people to ask, but no one could tell me much. Then I saw Tommy Rust, one of A Battery's officers, and a friend of mine. It had been alright at first, he said: then the infantry had met a counter-attack; and the pill-boxes had shot at them from behind.

I saw Vernon looking for me and went to where he was. His information was much the same as my own. At that moment we saw some men coming down the slope in front of us. They didn't seem to be walking properly, they looked as though they were walking in their sleep. It was the first time I had seen men who were finished. 'We must tell Brigade what's happened,' I said.

'We can't,' Vernon said, 'there's no line.'

'Is it down?' I asked. I thought he meant it had been cut by shellfire.

'I don't think it's ever been up.'

We sent back one of our runners, but I did not feel sure that he would ever find his way to Brigade Headquarters. At the best it would take him an hour and he would certainly never return to us. We sent a second one a few minutes later. I made him go a different way.

Then I went to find Bombardier Turner, he might be able to suggest something. 'I'll try a lamp,' he said, when I had explained the situation to him. 'The sun's good,' he said. Within a few minutes he came to tell us that he was getting an answer from the ridge behind us and that we could send messages through to Brigade Headquarters. We sent one immediately. The attack on our right had failed, we said...

It was not yet seven o'clock."

Campbell then describes coming under heavy German shellfire. He and Turner made their way to Bank Farm and sought shelter in one of the captured German concrete pillboxes. There they met other FOOs. Eventually, at noon they decided:

"...we were doing no good where we were, we could see nothing from Bank Farm, there was no telephone line, we were no longer even in lamp communication with the ridge behind us. Turner said there had been no reply to his signalling for some time past.

We went back up the hill, not to the place which we had left at dawn, but a little to the left of it. That was where Turner had been signalling to, and we knew there was a line from there back to our batteries. We had to wait for some time when we arrived there, the other artillery officers were there before us, they were all telephoning their brigades. But at last it was our turn and we got through to Cherry. He said we must keep a good look out for enemy movement; there was quite a chance of his launching a strong counterattack...

We had just finished speaking to him. The telephone was inside a pillbox, the other officers had gone outside, we were looking at each other. There was the sudden scream of shell, followed by a very loud explosion.

We went outside... [and] found a place about a hundred yards in front of the pillbox, and our signallers laid out a line to it from the telephone pit. There was a small patch of flat ground on which we could lie down and a shell hole close to it in which we could shelter if we had to. But we did not have to use it, no other shells fell close, the peace and stillness of a summer afternoon seemed to have descended on the battlefield."

They returned in the early evening.

Robert

[BMoorhouse]

Mark,

I have tried to pm you this but am told that your message box is full.

Slightly 'off topic' - if you want an account of the fighting to capture the village on the 16th please pm/e-mail me. You might find it of interest in setting the scene for a visit, and when also considering the artillery tasks that day.

Regards,

Brendon.

[nigelfe]

Officially he'd have been an 'observing officer' and 'standing in' for his battery commander (see below*). Tactical fire control being the BC's responsibility. He would have been expected to have a good grasp of 'Catechism for Heavy and Siege Artillery Subalterns', 1917, 40/WO/3552. Sect IV deals with Observation, Sect V with Ranging, Sect V1 Action, Sect VII liaison, Sect VIII Capabilities of your battery, Sect IX Telephony (including the three tests for the D3 telephone to ensure its in working order).

RGA ranging was the same as the rest of the Royal Artillery, the observer ranged on the line BT ordering range in yards and switch from zero line. The Artillery Code was used was used with morse telegraphy. He may have had visual communications means as well. He probably used a stop watch to help identify his battery's fire from others.

Apart from visual communication he would have had no comms with aircraft, and he had no need, his gun position was a different matter.

* "Do you thoroughly appreciate the fact that, whoever is watching from the battery OP, be it the BC, or a gunner in in the Observation Party, is nominally commanding the battery and must call it into action instantly if necessary, get it shooting, and then make his report?"

[jhill]

I did a fair of of reading about artillery and whatnot for the period of the Canadian operations at Passchendaele in October and November of 1917. Unfortunately I did not write anything down systematically, but the basic gist went like this:

There are many reports of FOOs (Forward Observation Officers) attached to the War Diaries of the various units involved, although not all. I am posting an example for the 6th November operation which resulted in the capture of the location of Passchendaele Village. Although it is not obvious here, the general orders were that one FOO party would go forward in each Divisional sector, to serve both field and heavy artillery. In addition a seperate OP (Observation Post) would go forward for the Corps Counter Battery Office.

These parties normally carried telephone wire and Lucas(signalling) lamps, but in this battle wire was not always carried. The job of these fellows was to set up a post near the infantry objective and establish communication with the advanced reporting centre some way to the rear. This latter was to be on a buried cable and able to relay messages to the Headquarters of the Divisional Artillery and hence to the Batteries. Most of the early messages would report the progress of the infantry. Later on Zero Day they would report any possible massing of the enemy for counter attacks.

The infantry also carried forward signallers. On 6th November they carried telephone wire, Lucas lamps, power buzzers (a gadget that one stuck in the ground and sometimes could send a signal of sorts for a way through the earth), pigeons, and message pads carried by runners. On this occasion the only thing that worked for the infantry were the runners, but the artillery was fairly successful with the lamps. Even the lamps were not foolproof. They needed to have a clear line of sight to the receiving station and were easily disrupted by smoke and dust. Later on Zero Day there were problems because too many lamps were trying to signal from a small area. Some of the artillery posts used pigeons without much success. On this day one of the artillery FOO parties carried forward a wireless set which later in the day was successfully put into action, although this was not common at this time.

As pointed out above, FOOs were not in contact with aeroplanes. Spotting aeroplanes reported targets directly to stations in the rear. Communication was one way. Aeroplanes had transmitters only, not receivers. Contact aeroplanes communicated with infantry by calling with a klaxon horn. The infantry responded with flares or canvas panels laid on the ground.

I suspect many of us have a more modern image of the FOO calling down fire in real time, but that belongs to a later age. The reports for 6th November marvel at the speed of the messages from the FOOs, but the shortest times to reception must have been in the range of 20 or 30 minutes. The only 'fast' way to call for artillery in those days was for the infantry to send up an "S.O.S." rocket which could be answered in minutes by a battery firing on a pre-determined point.

Of course, I do not know if your fellow's story followed this plan, but I think this is more or less typical of the way things were done during an advance at this time.

[Mark Hone]

Thanks very much for all your help.