Artillery Question

[BMoorhouse]

Artillery batteries were used for defensive fire duties in case of enemy attack. Just dealing with infantry attacks (ie not considering counter-battery work etc) during the more static phases of trench warfare:

How was this organised?

Did each battery have a number of potential fire zones?

Were such targets normally pre-registered?

Was there any difference between German, British and French systems?

Should counter attacks be called for, how would the artillery planning fit in with these?

My apologies for asking such a potentially broad question.

Brendon.

[ianjonesncl]

Brendon

As a start this is an extract from Notes on Artillery, June 1916 (Complied by the General Staff):

"Arrangements for Defence.—A certain force of artillery is detailed for the support of each infantry brigade holding a portion of the line. Batteries are then allotted to each Sector. Arrangements are made to cover the front with rifle and machine-gun fire, and the places are selected where artillery fire is required. A code letter and number is given to each place on which guns are layed, and a sketch showing the code should be kept by the Company Commander in the trenches, by the Battalion Commander, at the O.P., and at the battery"

• The points where artillery fire was required would be agreed between the infantry and the artillery.
• The targets would be allocated a number
• The gun data for the targets could would be determined (it could be Registered or Predicted - see later on)
• The data for each of the targets would be available at the OP, Battery and on the gun for future engagement

An example can be seen here of target information being noted down.

[ianjonesncl]

Notes on Artillery, June 1916 (Complied by the General Staff):

A Hostile Attack.—Special arrangements must be made to meet a hostile attack by night, in a fog, or under cover of smoke and gas. Time is the essence of the problem, and it is more important to start guns firing at once than to wait for discussion on the telephone as to the exact position where the enemy has been first seen. Every gun should be normally layed on its "night line" when not otherwise engaged, and on receipt of a pre-arranged signal will open fire at once on this line, "sweeping" a certain amount where necessary. The Officer at the battery then endeavors to ascertain the situation, but if the wires have been cut, he must use his own discretion as to continuing fire.

An alarm signal is necessary, and the occasions on which it should be used must be clearly understood. Every precaution should be taken to prevent it spreading needlessly to neighbouring units.

==

The pre-arranged signal was usually very flares being fired. The process to fire by telephone was with a predesignated code word. An example from an account of 251 Brigade RFA details the code word FISHFROG, being the order to fire on the SOS targets.

The account from 251 Brigade also indicates that the "SOS Lines were continually changing.

The response to calls for fire could be pretty quick as this extract from the War Services of the 62nd Divisional Artillery for June 1917 shows;

"About this time I used often to go round the O.P.'s in my spare time, and to test the quickness of the different batteries in getting off a round on a trial call of S.O.S. I considered it distinctly good if a battery opened fire within 40 seconds of getting the call, but as time went on most of them became extraordinarily quick to answer, and I well remember my satisfaction when, during a walk round the O.P.'s in company with General Benson, Commanding the 5th Corps Artillery, we tried a few S.O.S. tests, and one of my batteries got off the answering round in 17 seconds. I think that the record time was nine seconds, the battery that reached it being C/310, then in position in the Noreuil Valley."

[ianjonesncl]

Were such targets normally pre-registered?

Again from Notes on Artillery, June 1916 (Complied by the General Staff)

When infantry reliefs take place, Battalion and Company Commanders should see a round or two fired the day before they come in, so that they may know where they can expect help.

=

This would suggest pre-registration.

The notes are from 1916 and many of the requirements for effective predicted fire (survey, mapping, calibration, meteor) were in an embryonic state. It may be that at a later date predicted data was used.

[ianjonesncl]

On deployment the Zone to be covered would be designated.

As an example the zone allocated to the 1st Northumbrian Brigade RFA on deployment in the Ypres salient in 1915 "extended from the Roulers Railway northwards to the Verlorenhoek road"

As the war progressed and mapping improved, then map references could be used as this extract from the 251st RFA Group Operation Order No 103. 5th July 1917. shows;

"The zone covered by 251 R.F.A Bde Group will be bounded on the North by a straight line drawn from 0.14b.4.8. to 0.17a.0.8 and on the South by a straight line drawn from 0.20b.3.8 to 0.23a.0.8."

[Robert Dunlop]

The attached diagram illustrates the SOS zone for a field artillery battery in the Lens area. The coordinates were described in the book 'The diary of the 61st Battery Canadian Field Artillery 1916 to 1919' and I translated these onto a map of the area:

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

This attachment illustrates a late war harassing scheme, as described in Weber's 'Field Artillery Group in Battle'. These schemes were different from SOS schemes. Harassing fire was used especially at night, when a constant level of fire was used throughout the night. The colours illustrate the type of scheme. A & B were used in the event that a German relief was suspected in the relevant areas. C & D were used to harras troops that were already in place. The numbers refer to the field artillery batteries in the group: 42nd, 53rd and 87th Batteries.

Robert

[ianjonesncl]

The use of harassing fire can be seen as Offensive-Defensive action. In Marble's The Infantry can not do with one gun less it states;

"The battle of Loos was the largest, best-planned, and most successful British attack of the war so far. It envisaged some partially defensive measures built into the bombardment as well as more active steps to support troops against counter-attacks. For the first time harassing fire was organized to interdict German reserves (and the headquarters directing them) before the battle"

Another example of a harassing fire scheme can be seen in this Map of Harassing Fire for the preparation for the Battle of Hill 60 in 1917. It shows the relevant targets with their numbering.

[BMoorhouse]

Robert/Ian,

Many thanks for your excellent replies that are very helpful.

I assume that the Germans and French operated similar systems for defence?

I have read accounts that suggest a great degree of flexibility in German artillery supporting counterattacks to recapture trench systems. ie - bombarding their own captured front line positions. Presumably this would have been done by observed fire that was adjusted or by sortening the fire that might otherwise have been dropped on no-man's-land?

Robert - your 61st Canadian Field Artillery co-ordinates are interesting. They appear to overlap the British front line and extend quite a long way behind the German front line - a much bigger area than I suspected. Presumably these were the pre-registered zones to fire on, the exact location of the fire being adjustable depending on circumstances.

Regards,

Brendon.

[Robert Dunlop]

Brendon, those details were not available but I would agree with your presumption.

German and French schemes were very similar. There were some subtle differences. For example, in active areas of the late-war Front, British counter-battery detection was so good that German light batteries had to move into position at night to fire harassment shoots, and then withdraw. They could not afford to stay too long in one place, which made it difficult to have everything registered well in advance.

All sides made frequent use of silent batteries, which never fired unless absolutely necessary.

Robert

[ianjonesncl]

Brendon

Again from the Notes on Artillery, June 1916 (Compiled by the General Staff.)

This deals with a counter attack by the Germans when the British have captured a trench;

"If our infantry have captured a hostile trench and require artillery support at short notice, some other form of code should be used, as the use of the ordinary alarm signal in this case would lead to fire being directed on our own troops. V.V.V. followed by the name of the regiment requiring assistance is suggested as a suitable code when fire is required in front of a captured trench"

I would also agree with the presumption that fire would be adjusted back on to a trench system if required. This reference from the 1916 notes indicates this " If fire is required on any other place, it should be described with reference to one of the selected points.".

If the SOS targets had been fired and not been successful, then a correction from that point to the guns can be made to bring fire down onto the target can be made.

Ian

[BMoorhouse]

Many thanks for your help.

Regards,

Brendon.

[Pete1052]

Brendon, try clicking on this link for "The Infantry Cannot Do with a Gun Less" by Sanders Marble, which I believe is an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Chapter 7 is on artillery in the defense. If our resident forum artillery expert Nigelfe doesn't find this thread try sending him a personal message with your question.

[bob lembke]

A lot of the German light field artillery eventually became assigned to "infantry gun batteries" or "accompaning batteries" in a manner not carried out by the allied forces, I believe. In part this was made necessary by the threat of tank attacks. Toward the end of the war each front-line infantry regiment eventually had one or two of these. Sometimes these batteries were also instructed to very carefully conceal one gun very close to the front, and not to use that gun for normal fire missions, but to keep it concealed for emergency missions, like a tank attack. Sometimes they were built into a wrecked house. Of course a skillfully concealed and crewed field gun, close up, could really tear up a tank attack.

I have collected a lot of material on these. Some storm battalions had a infantry gun battery. These guns were sometimes specially modified, mostly to be more easily man-handled over the battle-field.

Bob Lembke

[Robert Dunlop]

The British used manhandled field and mountain guns as infantry support weapons earlier in the war. Some were used in support of the opening of the Battle of the Somme. The approach never really got off the ground. Although these tactics proved effective at Neuve Chapelle for example, the subsequent changes in German defensive systems, coupled with the vulnerability of these guns to counter-preparatory fire meant the practice was not as widespread as in the German army.

Various types of guns were used in the anti-tank role, including 15- and 18-pounders in 1918. These guns suffered severe damage/capture and casualties during German preparatory bombardments and assaults.

Robert