British Tactics 1/7/16

[PhilB]

Doughty`s Pyrrhic Victory, p294.

"staff officers at 6th Army openly complained about having to participate in an offensive organized `for amateurs by amateurs`. Fayolle noted in his diary that British tactics were `infantile`" There are also suggestions that the BEF only succeeded on the right flank because of the French advance there.

This indicates that either the French had climbed a steep learning curve since their early expensive (and unsuccessful) efforts at the offensive or that they were indulging in rather condescending professional sniping. Or both.

[John_Hartley]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Nov 16 2008, 05:19 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

There are also suggestions that the BEF only succeeded on the right flank because of the French advance there.

You couldn't dismiss this suggestion lightly. Although you might also argue that the French attack was greatly assisted by them having 30th Division to their left.

[PhilB]

I`m surprised at lack of reaction to this! I would have thought that, after the way the French fought their early battles, they would be in no position to use expressions like these about their allies? If British tactics were infantile, how does one describe the French offensives a l`outrance?

[Rob Connolly]

Well, IIRC, it was the French who wanted an all-out attack by the British on the Somme by June with no hanging about. Haig wanted to wait until September to ensure that his amateur army would be better trained and more experienced, thus somewhat less amateur. By then, of course, matters at Verdun might have impinged on whether the French wanted assistance from mere amateurs or not.

[phil andrade]

The French were not being condescending in their disdain for British tactics. They had good reason to be critical: it was all too apparent, even to British observers, that Fayolle's troops moved quickly and skillfully in small groups from crater to crater, while British formations were clumsy and more vulnerable to enemy fire. Moreover, French artillery was far more effective. There was a much greater proportion of heavy ordnance deployed by the French than the British, and the resulting success of the French South of the Somme attests the devestating impact this had....IIRC, the cellars in the village of Montauban were crammed with German dead who had succumbed to French artillery and heavy mortar fire.

Above all, we must surely acknowledge that the French army had been tutored in the hardest school of all - Verdun.

Here the preponderance of German artillery meant that the French put on a compelled husbandry, and had to adapt by increasing their proportion of firepower to manpower. The soldiers had to disperse more, or die. The French gunners had to match the Germans, or perish. I think that the French success on July 1st 1916 was very much a function of the lessons thay had learnt at Verdun: likewise, the British improved dramatically after their initial catastrophic defeat on the Somme.

Some of the casualty statistics supply startling testimony to French tactical superiority over the British. For the entire Western Front, in the period July -October 1916, official figures reveal that the French lost 341,000 killed, wounded and missing, and succeeded in inflicting 337,000 casualties on the Germans fighting against them. In the meantime, the British lost 453,000 and inflicted only 200,000. Now I realise of course that these statistics are controversial, and that they demand circumspection - it might well be, for example, that a significant number of German casualties recorded as being inflicted by the French in this case were actually caused by the British; but I think that in generalised terms they attest the relative performance of the Franco-British armies. It is also apparent that the same source provides strong indications that the British improved dramatically in the fighting afterwards.

Hindenburg emphasised, in his memoirs, that he considered the French more skillful fighters than the British, whom he described as rigid and clumsy. He also stressed that the British were more stubborn and resolute than their French allies.

Phil.

[PhilB]

Thanks, Phil. Weren`t the British made acquainted with the lessons drawn by the French from Verdun then? Either the French didn`t tell them or they refused to accept them?

[bmac]

To be fair to the British, however, there were some special circumstances attending French success at the southern end of the Somme front on 1st July 1916. Firstly, the Germans believed that they were unlikely to face much in the form of offensive action from the French because of the losses at Verdun. When appeals from Von Below came for additional reserves they went north of the River Somme (to Gommecourt mainly in the shape of the 2nd Guard Reserve Division) and he made the decision himself to move the 10th Bavarian Division from south of the Somme to north of the river in order to meet the perceived main threat.

It is the case that French artillery was more concentrated and, per yard, of a heavier nature (which may well have benefited XIII Corps in front of Montauban) but that came from a tactical decision about the length of line to be attacked and the necessary deployment of the artillery to cover that line. The success of the French gunners is conceivably as much a factor of the shortness of their front and the ability to concentrate guns as it is of the quality of the guns and gunners themselves. Not saying it was or wasn't, but just raising the point.

One must also examine the behaviour of the defenders and the quality of the defences. Because the Germans anticipated the attack to be more likely in the northern sector (Gommecourt to Fricourt) there are some indications that the work done on the defences further south was of a poorer quality. I believe a division was rotated out of the line in the sector around Montauban not long before the attack (a relatively unusual event) and there were some concerns about the robustness of the fortifications inherited. There was also a key difference in the tactical response of the local commander once the bombardment started. To the north instructions were given at divisional level that artillery was only to open general fire in the case of an obvious attack or a release of gas otherwise appeals for artillery support were quite likely to be refused. The intention was to conceal from the aerial observers, the Allies having air superiority, the number and location of German batteries and it worked spectacularly well on 1st July where, north of the Ancre, the German guns put down a highly effective barrage. South of La Boiselle, however, this artillery discipline was less strict and appeals from the infantry were too readily allowed. Batteries were spotted and were in weaker positions, thus the destruction of the German artillery at the southern end of the British front and beyond.

Lastly, the French attacked south of the river two hours after the attack to the north catching the Germans unawares with their focus on the other side of the Somme.

Certainly, French 'fire and movement' tactics were more sophisticated and effective at that time but there were a number of other elements which facilitated their progress on 1st July.

[John_Hartley]

I believe a division was rotated out of the line in the sector around Montauban not long before the attack (a relatively unusual event) and there were some concerns about the robustness of the fortifications inherited.

I don't know whether there was a divisional rotation but certainly there was a relief on 29/6:-

"About 8pm, 8th Company, 6th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment, received orders to relieve troops in the front line in front of Montauban. Leutnant Josef Busl, commanding 3 Platoon, wrote in the official regimental history “On the previous night, I had re-established communications with the front line by means of a patrol and under the heaviest artillery fire”. The situation was no better on the 29th .After receiving provisions in the quarry at Montauban, they moved slowly forward: “The company reached the position about 5.30am after an extremely exhausting march through heavy artillery and machine gun fire. This had been hit by constant fire and the trenches were, in places, demolished, the sniper posts scarcely of any use. The platoon had use of only 3 – 4 dugouts. Although our men were exhausted due to the continuous over exertions and privations, the necessary clear-up started immediately. On the evening of the 30th, another dugout was crushed with the loss of 8 men. As far as rations were concerned, only coffee could be fetched owing to the constant heavy fire.”

(Extract from my Hellfire Corner article)

John

[phil andrade]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Nov 20 2008, 01:17 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Thanks, Phil. Weren`t the British made acquainted with the lessons drawn by the French from Verdun then? Either the French didn`t tell them or they refused to accept them?

That's hard to answer. My suggestion is that lessons from experience are not easy to convey : take the US troops, for example, that fought in the last six months of the war......by rights, they should have enjoyed the benefit of all the Entente experiences in the previous four years, but they still deployed in a manner that exposed them to undue punishment. A French officer wrote a manual on infiltration tactics quite early on in the war, but it was the German army that employed them to spectacular effect on the grand scale. At this juncture I venture a rather controversial point....the Germans were perhaps more adept at communicating the lessons of their experience than their Anglo-French counterparts. I can't say that this can be vouchsafed, but the theme came over strongly in Jack Sheldon's book on the Somme: there is an implication that German staff work was orientated especially to the assimilation of knowledge gained on the battlefield, and that this was immediately and ruthlessly turned to account "on the coal face" ( horrible expression - forgive me!). I think I remember Jack Sheldon actually saying this when he addressed a conference at Canterbury in 2006: this was an international event to commemorate the 90th anniversary of The Somme. He said - if my memory serves me well - that the German army retained a qualitative edge over its enemies because it was so accomplished at learning lessons and applying them quickly. I say this with diffidence, but it might go some way to answering your question, Phil. Just by way of an edit, there's also the more obvious point that in Coalition warfare, allied armies that speak different languages are going to find it harder to communicate than an army where everyone speaks the same language.

Phil.

[healdav]

That's hard to answer. My suggestion is that lessons from experience are not easy to convey : take the US troops, for example, that fought in the last six months of the war......by rights, they should have enjoyed the benefit of all the Entente experiences in the previous four years, but they still deployed in a manner that exposed them to undue punishment. A French officer wrote a manual on infiltration tactics quite early on in the war, but it was the German army that employed them to spectacular effect on the grand scale. At this juncture I venture a rather controversial point....the Germans were perhaps more adept at communicating the lessons of their experience than their Anglo-French counterparts. I can't say that this can be vouchsafed, but the theme came over strongly in Jack Sheldon's book on the Somme: there is an implication that German staff work was orientated especially to the assimilation of knowledge gained on the battlefield, and that this was immediately and ruthlessly turned to account "on the coal face" ( horrible expression - forgive me!). I think I remember Jack Sheldon actually saying this when he addressed a conference at Canterbury in 2006: this was an international event to commemorate the 90th anniversary of The Somme. He said - if my memory serves me well - that the German army retained a qualitative edge over its enemies because it was so accomplished at learning lessons and applying them quickly. I say this with diffidence, but it might go some way to answering your question, Phil. Just by way of an edit, there's also the more obvious point that in Coalition warfare, allied armies that speak different languages are going to find it harder to communicate than an army where everyone speaks the same language.

Phil.

Has any organisation ever learnt from the experience of an organisation in another country?

Every country intones, 'we have the best health system in the world' and similar. No doubt the British/French/German generals intoned 'we have the best army in the world, how could foreigners ever teach us anything?'

[Tom A McCluskey]

Hi All,

After the Nivelle Offensive, April 1917, I don't think the French are in a position to look piously down on the British from their ivory tower - carved out of infantry tactical proficiency. There are many reasons why the southern attacks were more successful, and I don't think that individual tactical expertise was the major governing factor. Other issues such as:

Not as well-defended

It was near the water table (of the river Somme)

Larger ratio of heavier [French] guns per yard

Using the daylight to suit the French artillery coordination (which, incidentally, was fundamental to the misfortune of the British attack)

need to be considered

Aye

Tom McC

[John(txic)]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Nov 16 2008, 05:19 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Doughty`s Pyrrhic Victory, p294.

From memory, so I may be totally incorrect - you will struggle to find any positive comment about the BEF in this book.

[Jack Sheldon]

Here are a few more thoughts. The French were initially extremely successful because inter alia the length of front they attacked was determined mathematically by the number of heavy howitzers available. If anybody wants to read it up, it is all in the French Official History. They worked out how many were available, allowed so many per kilometre and that determined the width of their assault. They also had agood supply of gas shells which made their counter-battery work nmore effective. In addition the Germans calculated (wrongly) that the French would be so pre-occupied at Verdun that they would not participate on the Somme. They actually withdrew 10th Bavarian Div in late June 1916 from south of the river, where they had been for many months, to reinforce XIV Res Corps. This forced XVII Corps to reorganise and to make the remaining formations take over much wider sectors. Some, such as IR 61 which took over from Bav IR 16 west of Chaulnes, had to put all three battalions in the front line and had nothing in reserve. The German artillery south of the river was weak and not as well organised as it was to the north and so on.

It is probably worthy of note that, with the exception of the battle to turn Peronne from the north, operations in the French sector were subsequently generally at a lower rate of intensity than was the case to the north. Certainly German units and formations tended to stick it out longer between reliefs down there.

Jack

[PhilB]

The French were initially extremely successful because inter alia the length of front they attacked was determined mathematically by the number of heavy howitzers available. They worked out how many were available, allowed so many per kilometre and that determined the width of their assault.

Jack

Were the British not able to do this?

[bmac]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Nov 21 2008, 11:31 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Were the British not able to do this?

No, because GHQ determined the points between which the attack should take place and the depth of the penetration. Artillery resources were then applied to these parameters rather vice versa.

[bmac]

Here are a few more thoughts. The French were initially extremely successful because inter alia the length of front they attacked was determined mathematically by the number of heavy howitzers available. If anybody wants to read it up, it is all in the French Official History.

Jack,

Are copies of this ever available apart from in France? I can't see a trip to Paris to read up on this (assuming my French was up to it anyway, which question my French masters could have answered 40 years ago!).

Bill

[PhilB]

No, because GHQ determined the points between which the attack should take place and the depth of the penetration. Artillery resources were then applied to these parameters rather vice versa.

Which do you consider the better approach?

[bmac]

I'd go for matching objectives to resources, as did the French at that point.

[Robert Dunlop]

The problem was far more complex. In many sectors of the British attack, it appears that the artillery barrage lifted from the German lines as the British infantry began their assault. More artillery would not have solved the problem faced by the infantry in these sectors. Either the barrage had to stay on the German line if the infantry crossed the whole of No Man's Land, or the infantry needed to be nearer the German line when the barrage lifted.

Robert

[bmac]

I wasn't saying it was the only concern and the co-ordination of the guns and infantry was certainly another problem, but that was a Corps level issue once the decisions about width of front and depth of penetration had been decided by GHQ. The dilution of the British artillery's impact was a function, however, of the width of the front and the depth, which took in the first and second German lines for a large chunk of the front. From that point on, any other foul ups simply compounded the problems caused by not enough heavy guns per square yard of territory (not just yard of front) in the original programme.

[Chris_Baker]

I'd go for matching objectives to resources, as did the French at that point.

I wouldn't. Surely good practice in any military operation (or in business, which is why I disagree) you set strategy, determine objectives, then assemble resources appropriately, then determine tactics?

[bmac]

And if the resources are inadequate to the objectives set?

[Jack Sheldon]

Bill

I am tied up this afternoon, but I shall try to put my hands on the calculations as soon as I can. They appear either in one of the main Tomes or amongst the documentary annexes.

Jack

[bmac]

Bill

I am tied up this afternoon, but I shall try to put my hands on the calculations as soon as I can. They appear either in one of the main Tomes or amongst the documentary annexes.

Jack

Jack,

Thanks. No rush whatsoever but will be interested to see how they compare to the BEF's calculations.

Bill

[Robert Dunlop]

The dilution of the British artillery's impact was a function, however, of the width of the front and the depth...

Yes. But that does not mean that the artillery was insufficient to achieve a significant result. It merely means that there were fewer guns per yard than if the front had been narrower. What if all of the infantry assaults had followed the example of 36th Division?

It is very likely that there is a threshold of guns per yard below which it is impossible to launch a successful assault, presuming wire is cut and the barrage is designed to protect the infantry assault appropriately, ie lift off the enemy line when the infantry arrive. There are too many problems with the way the artillery was used, and examples of how it might have been otherwise, IMHO, to say that the failure was due to widening of the front and reduction in number of guns per yard.

Robert