XI Corps annotations

[George Armstrong Custer]

A couple of weeks ago Armourersergeant very kindly sent me copies he had made in the NA of a draft chapter from Brig-Gen. James Edmonds' Official History. The draft chapter in question would become Chapter XV of the published Official History - 'Military operations : France and Belgium, 1915.' What is of interest, however, is the fact that these draft chapters are the ones which Edmonds sent to Haig for his comments, and they bear Haig's pencilled underlinings, insertions and marginal annotations. Not only that, but they deal with the contentious issue of the positioning and eleventh-hour movement of the XI Corps (21/24 Divisions) general reserve at Loos on the night of the 25/26 September. By comparing Edmonds' draft chapter, Haig's annotations to it and the final published version we get an interesting insight into both Edmonds' technique as author as well as whether it is sustainable to claim that Haig either did, or attempted to, 'whitewash' or 'sanitise' the OH in his own favour. In order to make the sequence of Edmonds' draft chapter, Haig's annotations and Edmonds' final published version as clear as possible, I've colour-coded them below as follows: Edmonds' draft chapter is in BLACK. Haig's pencilled insertions into the text of the draft chapter and marginal notes are in RED. Edmonds' published version of the OH is in BLUE. It is therefore readily apparent whether Haig was attempting to 'sanitise' Edmonds' original draft chapter in his own favour and whether Edmonds' subsequent published version of the OH was unduly influenced by Haig. My own comments are given in GREEN.

From page 2 of Edmonds’ draft chapter:

An understanding, although not an entirely satisfactory one, had been arrived at between Sir John French and General Haig, whose Army was to fight the main battle, as to the employment of the general reserve. It was to remain under the former’s personal command, and he would put it under General Haig’s orders as soon as he considered it was required. At a conference with General Foch, on 26th August, at which General Haig was present, Sir John French stated that eight British divisions would be employed in the main attack, “comprising six divisions for the assault and two divisions in general reserve.” General Haig naturally concluded that two divisions of the general reserve would [be at hand and would] be placed at his disposal immediately the battle began, and in his plan of operations issued on the 28th August, he included two divisions of XI Corps as part of the organisation of the First Army for the offensive. Relying on this, and in view of Lord Kitchener’s directions to “act vigorously,” he had, with Sir John French’s approval, placed all the six divisions of those two corps in the front line of assault, and he had assured his corps and divisional commanders that ample reserves would be immediately behind them to carry on the advance.

Haig’s annotation to the above underlined section of the draft chapter:

This is quite correct. Sir J. French’s orders to me were to make my plan of attack on the understanding that XI’s 2 Div’s would be at hand when required. – Haig. 7 Jan 1928

From page 273 of the published OH:

An understanding, although not a satisfactory one, had been arrived at between Sir John French and General Haig, whose Army was to fight the main battle, as to the employment of the general reserve. It was to remain under the former’s personal command, and he would put it under General Haig’s orders as soon as he considered it was required. In a G.H.Q. letter dated the 7th August, the G.O.C. First Army was informed: “The troops available for the operations will be those of your own Army, plus the Cavalry Corps and two divisions held in general reserve under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.” At a conference with General Foch, on the 26th August, at which General Haig was present, Sir John French stated that eight British divisions would be employed in the main attack, “comprising six divisions for the assault and two divisions in general reserve.” He subsequently told General Haig to make his plan of attack on the understanding that two divisions of the general reserve would be at hand and placed at his disposal when required. In his plan of operations issued on the 28th August, General Haig included therefore two divisions of the XI Corps as part of the organisation of the First Army for the offensive: in fact, he regarded these two divisions as an immediate reserve to the I and IV Corps. Relying on this, and in view of Lord Kitchener’s directions to “act vigorously,” he had, with Sir John French’s approval, placed all six divisions of these two corps in the front line of assault without retaining any corps or Army reserves, and he had assured his corps and divisional commanders that ample reserves would be immediately behind them to carry on the advance.

Comment:

Haig has not, therefore, sought to change Edmonds' own take on the situation in the draft chapter, and merely indicates his agreement with Edmonds' interpretation.

A footnote from page 2 of Edmonds’ draft chapter:

Sir John French’s attitude towards the employment in the field of inexperienced divisions, such as the 21st and 24th, is reflected in a memorandum with regard the New Armies written by him to the War Office early in the year (3rd January 1915) :-

“The experience I have gained during the war leads me to a very decided conclusion that it would not be advisable to organise troops so raised and so trained, and having only such officers and staff as are available, in any higher units than brigades; at any rate until some time after they have joined forces in the field and gained considerable experience. I will go further, and say that a large proportion of the troops would be most usefully employed as battalions.

“I feel quite sure that to put an Army corps, or even a division, composed of these troops, and organised in the manner proposed, straight into the field under commanders and staff who are inexperienced in up-to-date European warfare might easily become a positive danger.”

Haig’s annotation to the above footnote in the draft chapter:

Against the views expressed here, Sir John stated (when he selected the two new Div’s of the XIth Corps) that not having been in the trenches, but fresh from training in open warfare, these new troops would be better for the attack & pursuit resulting from a successful assault than our own seasoned units which had become sticky and disinclined to leave their trenches because of the ‘trench habits’ which they had learnt. – Haig. 7 Jan 1928

Footnote from page 274 of the published OH:

Sir John French’s attitude at one time towards the employment in the field of inexperienced divisions, such as the 21st and 24th, is reflected in a memorandum with regard to the New Armies written by him to the War Office early in the year (3rd January 1915) :-

“The experience I have gained during the war leads me to a very decided conclusion that it would not be advisable to organise troops so raised and trained, and having only such officers and staff as are available, in any higher units than brigades; at any rate until some time after they have joined the forces in the field and gained considerable experience. I will go further, and say that a large proportion of the troops would be most usefully employed as battalions. I feel quite sure that to put an Army corps, or even a division, composed of these troops, and organized in the manner proposed, straight into the field under commanders and staff who are inexperienced in up-to-date European warfare might easily become a positive danger.”

In September 1915, however, he considered that new divisions fresh from training in open warfare would be better for the pursuit following upon a successful assault than more seasoned troops that had become “sticky” and disinclined to push forward, on account of the “trench habit.”

Comment:

In the published OH Edmonds has left his original footnote intact, but adds to it Haig's note on how French made a different statement on employing troops fresh from training in September 1915 to the one Edmonds' draft chapter quoted from January 1915.

From page 4 of Edmonds draft chapter:

General Haig expressed the view, in which he was supported by General Foch, that the Lillers area, more than sixteen miles by road behind the British front near Vermelles, was too distant from the battle to allow the divisions of the XI Corps to intervene in time to reap the result of any initial success. He drew the attention of Sir John French to the fact that [in accordance with the C-in-C’s instructions] the plan of operations of the First Army had been based on the assumption that at least two divisions of the general reserve would be close at hand, and that if held at Lillers they would not be able to reach the battlefield until the evening of the day of assault, at the earliest.

From page 275 of the published OH:

The published OH reproduces the text of Edmonds’ draft chapter exactly, without incorporating Haig’s suggested insertion. This seems to be an indicator of his editorial independence - he quite correctly solicits the opinions of Haig and others, but reserves the right to choose what to incorporate or reject.

From page 6 of Edmonds’ draft chapter:

That same evening [19 September] Sir John French replied:- “Two divisions of the XI Corps will be assembled in the area referred to in your letter by daybreak on he 25th September.” From this, the last communication on the subject prior to the battle, General Haig concluded that his views had prevailed, that the 21st and 24th Divisions would be at his disposal immediately the assault began, and that Sir John French intended to retain only the Guards Division and the Cavalry Corps as a final reserve. Such, however, was not the case. Sir John French had agreed to move the 21st and 24th Divisions nearer the battle front in order to be able to take advantage of any local advance, but he still intended to keep the entire XI Corps intact in his own hands until the situation had developed. A misunderstanding thus arose which was to have disastrous consequences for the divisions concerned and the fate of the battle.

Haig’s annotations to his underlining in the above:

There was no misunderstanding as far as I was concerned – it was a direct difference of opinion between the c-in-c and myself as to how close up to the fighting troops the Reserves should be. I maintained here (as well as at Cambrai in 1917) that the troops in general reserve should follow as close as possible those in reserve. For three weeks or more before this battle I was in dread of what actually did happen (as my diary shows); and I did my utmost to get outside influence to bear on Sir John (Kitchener, Foch etc) to get him to modify his view and post the Reserves close up. Foch lunched with me one day and then went on to see French but all to no purpose. Notwithstanding our differences of view as to the “position of readiness” of the Reserves, I was still ordered to make my plan “on the understanding” that two divisions of the Reserve would “be at my disposal when required.” These are the facts and you can take them down as you think desireable. – At the 12th hour I think Sir John meant to have the Reserves closer up but it was then too late – the troops could not be got forward any quicker. – Haig. 7 Jan 1928.

From page 276 of the published OH:

That same evening Sir John French replied:- “Two divisions of the XI Corps will be assembled in the area referred to n your letter by daybreak on the 25th September.” From this, the last communication prior to the battle, General Haig, in default of any qualification in the answer, concluded that his views had prevailed; that the 21st and 24th Divisions would be at his disposal immediately the assault began; and that Sir John French intended to retain only the Guards Division and the Cavalry Corps as a final reserve. Such, however, was not the case. Sir John French had agreed to move the 21st and 24th Divisions nearer the battle front in order to be able to take advantage of any local advance, but he still intended to keep the entire XI Corps in his own hands until the situation had developed.¹

¹The reason given in Sir John French’s despatch of the 15th October 1915 is: “In view of the great length of the line along which the British troops were operating, it was necessary to keep a strong reserve in my own hand. The XI Corps...was detailed for this purpose.”

General Haig’s views as to the allocation of the XI Corps are reflected in the operation orders of the assaulting divisions of the First Army: e.g., 47th Division operation orders (see Appendix 19), stated that “the 3rd Cavalry Division and XI Corps are in Army reserve.” In reality only the 3rd Cavalry Division (less one brigade) was in the First Army reserve.

Comment:

This was clearly the nub of the matter for Haig - there was no 'misunderstanding' as far as he was concerned. Edmonds' published OH dispenses with the suggestion of a 'misunderstanding' and instead is rewritten to explain what Haig's belief was 'in default of any qualification in the answer' from French regarding XI Corps' two divisions. The published OH also adds a footnote giving both Haig's and Frenches views.

From page 7 of Edmonds’ draft chapter:

The commander of the XI Corps, in a subsequent report on the march of the two divisions, wrote :- “I am of opinion that the delay was caused chiefly by their own indifferent march discipline, especially as regards front-line transport. These divisions only received their transport just before leaving England, the drivers were nor well trained and the march discipline of these new divisions, though good when marching without transport was certainly not good when marching with it, and constant halts and checks occurred.”

Haig’s annotations to his underlining in the above:

But this last night march was a most difficult problem, owing to narrow roads and small groups of men going to the rear and also going forward at the same time during the night.

From page 277 of the published OH:

Once again Edmonds leaves his draft chapter unchanged in the published OH and does not incorporate Haig's annotation.

From page 8 of Edmonds’ draft chapter:

This condemnation, according to a consensus of opinion of participants in, and spectators of, the march, is too sweeping. There had been little to complain of in regard to march discipline on the previous nights when the roads in the back areas passed through were clear: it was in fact extraordinarily good, the divisions having done much marching in England.

Haig’s annotation to his underlinings in the above:

The troops were then fresher & roads wider. – Haig.

From page 278 of the published OH:

This condemnation, according to a consensus of opinion of participants in, and spectators of, the march, is too sweeping, and as the Guards Division suffered the same checks and halts when marching up on the 29th, some other cause must be sought. There had been little to complain of in regard to march discipline on the previous nights when the roads in the back areas traversed were clear and the men were fresh; and the divisions had done much marching, although only by day in England.

Comment

Here Edmonds clearly decides Haig's point is valid enough to alter his draft chapter to incorporate it in the published OH.

From page 8 of Edmonds’ draft chapter:

On the night of the 24th-25th the march discipline of the leading battalions, even of their transport, was entirely unsatisfactory. The chief cause of the delay and opening out on this occasion seems to have been absence of road control – a matter outside the powers of the divisions.

Haig’s annotation on his underlining in the above:

There was abundance of “control”: both “officers” and “orders” – see the statements maps & plans for same. It was the absence of roads for such a move by night. – The lack of roads was one of the main reasons why I urged that the reserves should be close up. You must recognise the fact that “the XIth Corps” and those “in control of traffic” were called upon to do an impossible thing! – Haig. 7 Jan 1928.

From page 278 of the published OH:

The real cause of the delay and opening out of units was on this occasion seems to have been the holding back of the divisions until the very eve of the battle, and then sending them up, although the road system was inadequate to accommodate them in addition to the abnormal traffic at such a time, thus creating a condition of affairs which no “road control” could overcome.

Comment

Edmonds takes on board Haig's suggestion that 'road control' was in place but, under the circumstances, it was a well-nigh impossible task for those trying to orchestrate such control.

From footnote on page 9 of Edmonds’ draft chapter:

No intimation appears to have been given to the French railway authorities of the march of the XI Corps, nor enquiry made as to when the barriers would be closed, so that the columns could be arranged with intervals to correspond.

Haig’s annotation to the above footnote:

Amⁿ and food supply trains had to run of course. But even if the rails authties had known what could they have done? The troops wanted the roads all night: not only the XI Corps but the downward traffic. The fact is: to recognise the whole area was terribly over-congested!

From footnote on page 278 of the published OH:

The delays at the level crossing were not due to want of foresight on the part of the 21st and 24th Divisions, which had been informed by the XI Corps that arrangements had been made and they need not anticipate stoppages. The French railway authorities, however, could not carry out the time-table agreed on.

Comment

In the published OH, Edmonds exonorates XI Corps from the implied blame of his draft chapter for failing to have the foresight to inform the French railway authorities of their march schedule. Edmonds shifts blame to the French railways for not carrying out the agreed timetable. Haig's annotation had been more understanding of the French railways' problems and the need to keep ammunition and food supplies running in conjuction with the movement of troops. This comes back, of course to Haig's view that the general reserve should have been moved up far earlier than it was.

From page 10 of Edmonds’ draft chapter:

Sir John French had unexpectedly? gone forward to the Chateau Philomel, some three miles south of Lillers on the previous evening, where only the normal French telephone system was available, and no special wires had been laid for communication to the Armies or his headquarters staff nearly twenty miles away at St. Omer.

Haig’s annotation to the above:

And I think he only had his personal staff with him; Sir Wm Robertson was at G.H.Q. so there was no machinery at Sir John’s hand for operating the Reserves!

From page 279 of the published OH:

Sir John French, taking only his personal staff, had unexpectedly gone forward on the previous evening to the Chateau Philomel, some three miles south of Lillers, where only the normal French telephone system was available for communication with his headquarters staff nearly twenty miles away at St. Omer, and there was no communication by wire with his Armies.

Comment

Although he incorporates Haig's information on French taking only his 'personal staff' to Chateau Philomel and the inadequate machinery available to operate the reserves, Edmonds chooses to ignore Haig's underlining and questioning of his use of 'unexpectedly' in describing French's decision to move there. Haig was clearly suggesting that this was a calculated move on French's part.

I'm afraid that's all the excerpts which I have from Arm - though I'm extremely grateful for his taking the time to forward copies of his excellent reproductions of these documents to me. My conclusion is that this shows Haig to have been interested in establishing as factual a record as possible at all levels - as witnessed by his comments on behalf of traffic control, the French railways and the XI Corps divisions. And it's not surprising to find Haig making it clear that, as far as he was concerned, there was no 'misunderstanding' of where the reserves ought to be placed, but rather a fundamental difference of opinion between himself and French. But that's a far cry from being evidence of trying to perpetuate a 'whitewash' or 'sanitisation ' of the OH as the likes of Winter have claimed. Edmonds, too, comes out of this comparison of draft OH, participant annotations, and published OH, with his editorial integrity intact. He chooses to both accept and reject elements of Haig's input, and some of what he does include he puts in footnotes alongside the opposing (French's) point of view.

Haig made his annotations to Edmonds' draft chapter on 7th January 1928, three weeks before he died. I believe his contributions show what a loss his input to the OH series was.

ciao,

GAC

[squirrel]

Thanks for posting this GAC; interesting reading.

[Rob Connolly]

Thanks for taking the time to post an interesting subject. I, for one, didn't realise DH had died before he'd given his input to the OH.

[armourersergeant]

It makes interesting reading. Just got back from France this evening, so will take sometime to read them in more detail and give some feed back.

Just for the record, Freddie Maurice, did after the war put to Edmonds in a similar document that he felt responsible for the lack of behind the lines control. He had left it to 1st Army, whe really he felt he should have insisted it be done, or done it himself! This contradicts somewhat Haigs words. Maurice was no hater of Haig, even going to bat for him in April 1918, so his words should carry some weight.

I have the documents somewhere, though they may not be too relevant to the way GAC wants this to go, after all its is not an examination of the use of the reserve, but a look at how the OH was effected, or not, by Haig.

regards

Arm