Verdun from the East

[Chris Boonzaier]

This may be a silly question, and I have no idea of the answer... but here goes...

Why did the Germans keep pushing from the North and not attack from the East? Attacking to the South of Fort de Tavannes or between Abaucourt and Blanzee striking between fort Moulainville and fort du Rozellier.

All the best

Chris

[Chris Boonzaier]

I relate this to the positions in May-June 1916.

best

Chis

[Gerald Moore]

Chris, I'm certainly no expert on the Battle of Verdun, but perhaps this topographical painting from a publication by the Service Historique de l'Armee de Terre may suggest an answer to your question. It would appear that any German heavy artillery emplacements or supply routes on the Woevre Plain would have been exposed to observation from the French positions on the Cotes de la Meuse.

[bob lembke]

The initial push was certainly from the north, on the right bank of the Meuse, on a rather narrow front, by three army corps. I think that the fighting then was extended to the left bank as the advancing forces on the right bank were taken under flanking fire with observation from Mort Homme. The final serious push was down toward the area Chris suggested, toward Fort Souville and Fort de Tavannes. This attack moved forward, but not enough, and the High Command called off major operations and shifted a lot of the forces to the Somme. I have a letter from my father from Stenay-sur-Meuse at this time and he described columns of men marching to the north, moving toward the Somme, 24 hours of the day. He expressed being quite happy remaining back at Verdun.

As to the original plan, I believe that there was a rail line into Verdun from the south, but this was not usable for supplying the French forces as it was already pinched off by German artillery to the south. There was a route into Verdun from the north-west (The Sacred Way), and a push from the north and across the left bank could have cut this. So there was an advantage attacking from the north-east, if the advance had progressed far enough.

The initial fighting, with overwhelming artillery support and carefully planned set-piece battles, must have cost the French disporportunate (sp?) casualties in the opening days of the battle, as a number of their divisions were totally chewed up. But then the battle swung to a slogging match trading roughly equal numbers of casualties, which for the Germans was no way to win the war. So the serious fighting was ended none too soon for the Germans. The city of Verdun, was valuable for drawing French forces into the meat-grinder, but was a symbolic trophy, not an important strategic objective. It was more bait than a critical objective.

Bob Lembke

[paul guthrie]

I wonder if it's really true the German objective was French casualties as opposed to taking ground also. We all have been led to believe this but according to Hew Strachan this is not mentioned in contemporary documents but in Falkenhayn's post war memoirs.

[bob lembke]

I have not looked into this interesting question. The conventional story, as Paul suggested, is that the initial objective was to force the French to defend a place that they could not abandon, and then "bleed them white", as it is said. But then the German commanders got carried away. I don't know if contemporary documents would state this, which is a question of intentions, not operational steps. So memoirs might be a good place to start. I have read a lot of Crown Prince Wilhelm's memoirs, but not with an eye to this question. One would like to have several memoirs pointing in the same direction; any one (or all), might just be covering his butt, after the fact.

One wonders if the material costs of setting up the initial attack were so great as to overshadow the high initial French casualties. What about a strategy of inflicting the initial crushing casualties and gains and then move the infrastructure to another opportunity. Due to the constrained German material resources, it might not have been a worth-while strategy, but perhaps better for the Allies, which I guess the Somme was.

Bob Lembke

[Paul Hederer]

Hello Chris,

There were multiple reasons for there being no push from the east.

In the original strategic concept for Verdun there were to be attacks from the east, along the front you describe, extending as far south as A.A. Stranz, and and a corps was even designated and set aside to carry out these attacks. These eastern attacks were to occur after the northern push had made a certain amount of headway.

As illustrated with the beautiful map, the terrain was a big factor. Trying to attack up the Meuse heights from the east was well-nigh impossible. XV. AK tried this and suffered heavy casualties. The Corps made good progress over the Woevre low-lands and then stuck fast as they reached the steep edge of the heights. To be honest, even this easy progress was more due to the French decision to give up the plain than anything.

Resources were another reason. Though there were attacks planned on both the east and west flanks of the main push, I do not think there were the artillery resources available to carry them out. Maybe a better way to put it would be to say there was not the willingness to release the needed resources from the OHL strategic artillery reserve. When XV. AK made its push they had to be heavily supported by artillery firing from the north. It was never allocated enough artillery to carry out its task. For attacks further afield, such as the planned attacks by A.A. Strantz, again there was very little artillery ever actually allocated for this. There was also the added (and important) difficulty of artillery on the plain trying to fire at positions on the much higher heigts.

The lack of resources is demonstrated by the fact that the designated number of 210 mm batteries was never assembled, and had to be supplemented by trench mortars in the attack corps. Also, the attack for the west bank was supposed to be ready to go at short notice, but in fact the artillery for this attack on the flank was not in place until almost ten days after the battle started.

Why did the Germans persist in attack from the north? Attacking along the the tops of the Meuse heights was infintely easier than trying to attack up them. This is agreed upon by most German officers involved, and those who studied the battle later. The main controversy centers around the lack of a simultaneous attack on both the east and west banks of the Meuse at the beginning of the offensive.

About the real purpose of the Verdun battle--well volumes could be and have been written on this. IMO the concept described as "bleeding the French white," was the true concept in Falkenhayn's mind. The famous Christmas memorandum of 1915, which Falkenhayn mentions in his memoirs would most likely seem to be something he put together at a later time--that being said it doesn't mean that this was not his intended purpose. There are plenty of contemporary accounts that verfiy that this was his true purpose behind the battle. Even critics such as von Deimling of the XV. AK (mentioned above) confirms this in his memoirs through conversations he had with von Knoblesdorf (5. army COS). Verdun must be examined in the whole of the German strategic plan for 1916, and not on its own. It was one of a series of actions to be carried out.

The idea of pinning the enemy and making him defend unfavourable ground was not new, and Verdun was a good choice for an operation with that purpose. I think too much speculation and mystery surround the concept of the battle, and this can be extended to the battle as a whole. It was a complex battle, and it takes some sorting out to make sense of it, but the mystery and myth are later inventions.

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Crown Prince Wilhelm, who was responsible for the German forces in the Verdun area, notes that planning for the attack on Verdun began in late 1914:

"The unexpected success of our heavy artillery against the forts and outer works of Antwerp, which, as in Liege, collapsed like a pack of cards, made us wonder whether the hated fortress of Verdun could not be made to fall in a similar fashion. On the 8th October, from the heights of Crépion and of the Côte d'Horgne, I observed the first bombardment of the Douamont fortress with heavy artillery. General Headquarters, and my Army Headquarters were naturally concerned, in the first place, in determining the actual strength of the enemy's constructions, a question on which the war material to be used, particularly the amount of ammunition and the number of batteries, depended.

Army Headquarters comtemplated launching simultaneous small attacks on both banks of the Meuse, and to this end the Corps Headquarters of the 5th and 6th Reserve Corps produced accurate estimates of the forces and war material they thought they would require to carry out the scheme of attack on their respective sectors."

Given that the estimates included more than 40 trainloads of ammunition, plus scarce pioneer resources, the plan was kept on hold until the middle of December 1915.

Then Wilhelm wrote:

"The fate of the fortress would be sealed if we could succeed by a surprise attack with superior forces, and covered by a powerful mass of guns, in pushing rapidly forward as far as the commanding north-east slopes of the Côtes de Meuse and getting possession of the forts crowning them. 'Once the eastern bank is in our hands' - so ran the wording of the project - 'we can reduce the field works and permanent forts on the western side by flanking fire; and even if we cannot secure possession of these fortifications, the value of the fortresses to France will have disappeared by reason of the loss of the eastern banks.'

In order to facilitate the task before the main offensive, a simultaneous attack against the south-eastern side of the fortress by the Army Detachment Strantz from the line Combles-Mouilly was discussed; but the idea abandoned in view of the difficulties afforded by the wooded country, of which the fighting of April and May 1915 on the 5th Corps front had left us with vivid recollections, and in view of the possibility of the attack being taken in flank from the western bank of the river.

The leading principles which formed the basis of this project of the attack had, before being placed on paper, been exhaustively discussed with and received the approval of the High Command at General Headquarters."

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

Crown Prince Wilhelm, who was responsible for the German forces in the Verdun area, notes that planning for the attack on Verdun began in late 1914:

"The unexpected success of our heavy artillery against the forts and outer works of Antwerp, which, as in Liege, collapsed like a pack of cards, made us wonder whether the hated fortress of Verdun could not be made to fall in a similar fashion. On the 8th October, from the heights of Crépion and of the Côte d'Horgne, I observed the first bombardment of the Douamont fortress with heavy artillery. General Headquarters, and my Army Headquarters were naturally concerned, in the first place, in determining the actual strength of the enemy's constructions, a question on which the war material to be used, particularly the amount of ammunition and the number of batteries, depended.

Army Headquarters comtemplated launching simultaneous small attacks on both banks of the Meuse, and to this end the Corps Headquarters of the 5th and 6th Reserve Corps produced accurate estimates of the forces and war material they thought they would require to carry out the scheme of attack on their respective sectors."

Given that the estimates included more than 40 trainloads of ammunition, plus scarce pioneer resources, the plan was kept on hold until the middle of December 1915.

Then Wilhelm wrote:

"The fate of the fortress would be sealed if we could succeed by a surprise attack with superior forces, and covered by a powerful mass of guns, in pushing rapidly forward as far as the commanding north-east slopes of the Côtes de Meuse and getting possession of the forts crowning them. 'Once the eastern bank is in our hands' - so ran the wording of the project - 'we can reduce the field works and permanent forts on the western side by flanking fire; and even if we cannot secure possession of these fortifications, the value of the fortresses to France will have disappeared by reason of the loss of the eastern banks.'

In order to facilitate the task before the main offensive, a simultaneous attack against the south-eastern side of the fortress by the Army Detachment Strantz from the line Combles-Mouilly was discussed; but the idea abandoned in view of the difficulties afforded by the wooded country, of which the fighting of April and May 1915 on the 5th Corps front had left us with vivid recollections, and in view of the possibility of the attack being taken in flank from the western bank of the river.

The leading principles which formed the basis of this project of the attack had, before being placed on paper, been exhaustively discussed with and received the approval of the High Command at General Headquarters."

Robert

Robert,

A few points-the planning for an attack on Verdun was begun as early as 1914, but the planning for the offensive in the form it took began later. I think the distinction is important. The plan by von Knobelsdorf called for many more troops to take the fortress--22 divisions, I believe. . He submitted numerous plans--all were rejected.

The statement about the attacks being abandonded due to terrain is misleading. In the attack orders for February 1916 two corps were allocated for these attacks--XV. AK and XXII. R.K. with A.A. Strantz.

Wilhelm's final statement about the discussion of the plans is debatable. This might be what Wilhelm thought, or maybe what he wanted to present as his view. He later complained that his COS and Falkenhayn did not inform him of the true intent of the battle--this may be true, again, this may be what the Crown Prince wanted to think--or for others to think. His statements are contradictory and should be taken with caution. With the amount of study that went into the battle I would refer only to Crown Prince's writings in the interest of gaining his perspective--for serious discussion of the planning and execution of the offensive he's about the last source I would use!

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Paul, do I detect a hint of dislike directed at the Crown Prince . I won't comment on the veracity of his statements. He does, however, illustrate some important general principles that ring true.

First, when an army command and/or corps HQ were in the same place for a long time, they would constantly review the possibilities of initiating attacks in, as well as defending, the sectors they were assigned to. The same thing was seen with the planning for Third Ypres, for example. It had been going on for a long time before the final set of plans were drawn up under Gough. Thus, it is of some interest when Wilhelm mentions that, in earlier draft plans, the possibility of attacking on both sides of the Meuse was seriously considered.

Second, knowing that the original planning had considered the option, it is very significant that the west bank attack option was, apparently, dropped for the actual battle. It was not a case of the Staff Officers not thinking about the problem - it was an active decision not to attack on both sides of the Meuse. This is very important. The Prince's perception of why is interesting, but needs ratifying. He perceives that the initial goal was to attack quickly on the east bank, then enfilade the west bank. Of course, this reasoning overlooks the fact that the French on the west bank would be able to do precisely that to the Germans during their attacks on the east bank, potentially negating the notion of a quick advance. If Wilhelm's perception is based on a correct understanding of his Chief of Staff, then this was clearly a faux pas IMHO.

FWIIW, I treat all such memoirs as self-serving. There is always a germ of truth. It is only by intersecting various accounts that we can get to something like a clearer picture. I do not have access to material from others involved in the planning, but their perspectives would be crucial, as you rightly point out.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

PS: I forgot to touch on the issue of the difficulty of the terrain. I believe this reference from Wilhelm relates to an attack from the south-east, which is unrelated to the question of the west bank and Mort Homme.

Robert

[Paul Hederer]

Robert,

I've read Wilhelm's account, but I can't say I feel I dislike him --he simply was not a serious player in the planning concerning Verdun, so I don't take him seriously--about the same attitude as was shown by OHL and 5th Army itself in relation to the CP. His only real influence on the battle was pushing to get von Knobelsdorf dismissed late in the battle--but that was no mean feat as he was on the way out as it was!

Falkenhayn would not release the reserves to conduct an attack on the west bank at the beginning of the battle. Without exception, every senior officer involved in the planning, and even some on the sidelines at OHL, expressed their concern and opinon that this was a grave mistake--which it was. What is so ironic was that the reserves had to be released anyway, so there was no economy of force by denying the attacking army the needed troops in the first place.

I agree with you about intersecting various accounts to gain an understanding of an event. In realtion to Verdun I found Willi's account interesting in relation to his interactions with his COS (von Knobelsdorf) but in relation to the Verdun planning aspects there are perhaps half a dozen accounts by various Generals at Verdun, which provide informed views. In addition, the archive contain a great deal of material produced by officers after the war who studied the battle from all aspects.

My impression of the CP at the battle is one of a good-natured commander with a real interest in his troops, but powerless to influence the course of events. This later made it easy for him to distance himself from the bad turn the battle took. Not an unfair view as von Knobelsdorf had the most influence on the battle.

Paul

[Robert Dunlop]

Ah, not a serious player. Now that I understand... .

Your point about von Falkenhayn makes sense. I could not understand why the Staff Officers would make such an error of judgement. The operational problem posed by the west bank is blatantly obvious, and from your reading it was at the time too. If von Knobelsdorf had total control over the execution of the plan, then both sides of the Meuse would have been attacked simultaneously. Therefore, someone higher up the command chain had to have made the decision not to release the reserves, in the context of some other significant potential crisis or opportunity. Thus the spotlight moves onto von Falkenhayn. See, I knew that quoting the CP would surface something important - .

Robert

[truthergw]

So Falkenhayn and Sir John will be sitting side by side on the benches in Valhalla, defending their decisions on the reserves. Would the failure to attack on both banks have helped mislead Joffre in his initial underestimation of the seriousness of the attack?

[bob lembke]

I have stated it before, but I have a good opinion of the Crown Prince, aka Little Willy. It is probably fair to think of him as not the heavy lifter as the professional staff officer, but that fitted in well with the basic doctrine of the German command structure, with the COS being a professional General Staff officer and doing the heavy-duty conceptual work, while the titular CO was not exactly a figure-head, but was the responsible father-figure. Sort of like, in western corporate structures, the CEO vs. the COO. Many German divisions had a CO who was a Generalleutnant, while the COS might be a Hauptmann. (Incidentally, Little Willy never was awarded really high rank; I think he first was a Generalmajor (Brigadier) and then a Generalleutnant (Major-General). One should recall the supposed exclamation by Big Willy, as Little Willy went off to war; something like: "For heaven's sake, pay attention to Xxxxx!"; Xxxxx being his COS. (Is this true? Is there a reference?)

But he seemed to have good common sense, and perhaps on some matters his basic judgements proved better than the more "professional" staffers. (I think he could be considered a professional officer, but not a General Staff officer; he served many many years as an officer, from Gefreiter at 8 or so to cavalry colonel, although I suspect that he did have special leave opportunities. He did look sort of goofy, and I think that this was a problem, and utilized by Allied propagandists.

I have mentioned my father's contacts; Wilhelm and his father were patrons of my father's unit {Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer) }; and as my father's company was stationed in Stenay-sur-Meuse, Wilhelm seemingly frequently dropped in on the company, and chatted up the men. A unit source other than my father said that he would talk to a EM, and recall personal details, family matters, from a previous visit, showing his interest. My father, a Pionier (sapper Private) told me that he caged cigarettes from the CP's hand several times while being chatted up, and this is corroborated by both the contemporanious family correspondence, and, more generally, Little Willy's memoirs, in which he stated that he had an officer detailed to carry a supply of packs of cigarettes for him, which he would offer to the common EM. He seems to have been a warm and concerned person. I am sure that he was a skirt-chaser, but if you dismissed royalty of the period (or this period) and high-ranking officers if they dipped their pen in the wrong inkwell you would be missing lots of leading personalities of WW I. I sort of remember accounts of a certain king traveling to Paris for a good scrub, experienced in a French bathtub full of champagne and administered by two Parisian fellow-cleanliness-lovers and fellow bathers. (Is this true? any sources?)

As to his brief early dalliance with the Nazis, who didn't? (Certainly many, but there were many admirers of the Germany of the 1930's in the leading circles in the West; we needn't mention a list.) My one titled English relative (Cousin Lady Phyllis) loved AH and the system so much that she moved to Germany in the 1930's and just got back to England when war was brewing to serve in the Foreign Ministry during the war (Got to meet her in London before she passed, a grand lady, much beloved by her German cousins.) My German relatives were always amused by the manner in which the big Nazi-lovers in the family were the 100% English, my maternal grandmother and her first son Harry, both England-born and 100% English, while Harry's sister Edith hid a Jew in her Berlin apartment in late 1944, which I am not sure all of us would do, certainly at that dangerous time. This is an area in which we tend to exhibit selective amnesia, IMHO.

Hope you didn't mind the personal stuff; I find it fascinating. (Naturally!)

Bob Lembke

[Chris Boonzaier]

Many German divisions had a CO who was a Generalleutnant, while the COS might be a Hauptmann.

Indeed.... but the Generalleutnant had once been a Hauptmann and had had the Hauptmann's functions earlier in life... it gives better understanding than becoming a "Just add water" commander of an army.

Best

Chris