Interesting information from John Reed.

The Evolution of Artillery is really what developed my interest in the RA of the First World War. The transition from battery sized shoots over open sights, to indirect fire and scientific gunnery. The development of the concept of the barrage, essentially the first fire planning that took place introduced the tactical use of Artillery in pre planned all arms operations.

The development for the creeping barrage undoubtedly assisted the infantry in achieving their objectives and hopefully reduced casualties. Luckily there were Officers of vision who were able to initiate these concepts, but sadly as Lt. Col Brooke records it was "by a process of trial and error", a process of experiment in battle, experiments which were paid with mens lives. What would also have been hard would have been to gain acceptance of new tactics, with many Corps and Divisional Commanders having a poor concept on the role of Artillery, and certainly not from a a Lt. Col !!! (sadly there are some of this ilk still around in my day).

Interesting reading..........................................

This text is taken from "The Evolution Of Artillery in The Great War" by Lt. Col. A F Brooke DSO psc fisrt published in the Royal Artillery Journal 1924.

BATTLE OF THE SOMME.

With five months of continuous operations, the Battle of the Somme provided suitable conditions for trying out some of the tactical ideas which had resulted from the last year's fighting. We have seen in a previous article that the organisation of the artillery had made distinct strides during the winter months preceding this offensive. We were now provided with artillery capable of exercising a marked influence in the field of battle. Certain refinements in its organisation, and reinforcements to its strength were still required to bring it up to the standard which it reached during the latter part of the war, yet it had attained its early, manhood, and its actions at this period are consequently of particular interest to us.

The policy of destruction received a free rein, both tactical and strategical surprise was entirely sacrificed, the four days' preliminary bombardment of Loos was replaced by one of seven days. We endeavoured to destroy all the wire covering the front system of defences, all fire trenches, strong points, and main communication trenches, whilst the early stage of development of our counterbattery methods prevented us from also including the hostile batteries in our scheme of destruction. Trench mortars were now available in sufficient numbers to be entrusted with the destruction of the front line of wire entanglements. All other wire defences were engaged with 18 pounders firing shrapnel since no efficient wire cutting H.E. Shell was available at that date. The trench destruction was entrusted to the Corps heavy artillery. The decision as to the degree of destruction required was transferred to the actual infantry units destined to carry out the attack. Such a procedure may at first strike one as logical. The individual destined to carry out an assault over a given trench system should be the best judge as to the degree of destruction required to ensure success to his undertaking. On closer examination the procedure presents certain aspects which alter the case. Destruction can only be obtained by protracted methods and by the creation of shell torn areas obstructing forward communication. Yet neither of these factors affected the enterprise of the unit to which a limited objective had been allotted, they only concerned the higher formations, but certainly exercised a vital influence on the operation as a whole. The result of such a decision could only lead to longer periods of preliminary destruction, and greater obstruction through shell torn areas.

Turning to the artillery support during the initial attack and the subsequent operations of the prolonged struggle, we observe distinct progress in the artillery tactics. We had failed to appreciate the paralyzing effects possible in preparatory bombardments but we were beginning to realise the neutralising possibilities in the support, of the actual attack. The germ of the new "rolling" or "creeping" barrage had, as we have already seen, been evident at Loos. The battle opened with the attack of July lst still supported by a system of "lifts" from trench to trench regulated by a pre-arranged time programme. The whole object of this method, being to prevent the defenders manning their trenches until such time as the assault¬ing troops were sufficiently close to them to admit of the trench being rushed before its fire power could be re-established. The Germans were quick to realise that the only method of avoiding such neutralisation of the fire power of the defence lay in siting a proportion of automatic weapons in the space intervening between the trenches. It therefore became necessary to sweep the ground in advance of the attack, irrespective of all visible defences. We produced a curtain of fire moving in advance of the assaulting troops, regulated by a time table based on the predicted rate of advance of the infantry. By a process of trial and error we arrived at the required density of this fire, and the distance of each lift necessary to cover all the ground. With a maximum rate of fire of four rounds per gun per minute we found that one 18 pdr. Per 25 yds. of front would provide a sufficient maximum volume of fire, whilst variations in the density of this fire could be regulated by reduc¬tions in the rates of fire. To ensure that all ground should be covered by our curtain of fire in its forward movement, we decided that lifts of 100 yards would meet requirements. During the course of the attack definite pauses were arranged conforming to the capture of the various objectives and providing the protection required by the infantry against hostile counter-attacks. As the battle progressed our curtain of fire was found to be lacking in sufficient depth. Casualties were suffered from hostile fire origin¬ating in advance of the zone covered by the barrage. This fault was remedied by additional curtains of fire from 18 pdrs., 4.5in hows. and medium artillery in advance of the initial line.

The parent of the rolling barrage, namely the trench to trench lifts, had left an unfortunate legacy to its offspring in the shape of unnecessary complications. The attacking infantry, used to definite lifts from one trench to another, whilst approving of the inter¬vening ground being covered, insisted on the curtain of fire being built tip on each successive trench. Had all trenches been parallel to each other and to the front of attack complications would not have arisen, this was not the case, as a result barrages were attempted necessitating intricate evolutions of fire which were neither possible nor necessary, and calculated to introduce serious errors.

Our tactical conceptions of artillery support in the attack had by now altered materially from those held in 1914. The "accessory" role of the artillery was now left far behind, the days were gone of attacks planned by infantry with artillery requested to co-operate to the best of its ability. The infantry, deprived of its mobility through the hostile fire power, now required a combined plan of attack to regain its power of movement through the proper applica¬tion of the available artillery power. This degree of mobility had, however, only been regained through the sacrifice of the power of manoeuvre in the attack. Our plans of attack were assuming a rigidity which required considerable re-adjustment in our tactical ideas.

The long drawn out nature of the Somme battle provided suit¬able conditions for further developments in our systems of harassing fire, which had already been in evidence during the previous year's fighting. We realised that the efficiency of such fire was dependent on the accuracy of the available intelligence and the care with which programmes of harassing fire were produced.

Our lack of faith in the efficiency of our methods of counterbattery work is well exemplified by the massive gun emplacements constructed to support the initial attack. Gradually the lessons we had learnt in 1915, combined with our daily increasing experience, resulted in the adoption of improvised methods in an endeavour to co-ordinate the various existing counter-battery efforts. A Heavy Artillery Group H.Q. was selected in each Corps, and made responsible for counter-battery work, the commanding officer of the group becoming to all intents and purposes the counter-battery officer of the future. Although at that date still unofficially recognised, this new system at once produced marked improvements in our counter-battery methods. Hostile artillery intelligence now became systematically collected and collated, the work of survey sections was developed and turned to good use, methods of engaging hostile batteries became standardised, and last but not least, the ca-operation of artillery and aircraft was directed into proper channels.

John

Source: Creeping Barrage