Just been looking at the Counter Battery fire tasks for the preliminary bombardment for the Somme, and reading General Sir Martin Farndales's History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery Western Front 1914-18.

Farndale - History of the Royal Artillery Western Front 1914-18 states " Artillery commanders were obsessed with the need to keep fire immediately in front of the infantry. In doing so, they again allowed counter battery tasks , and ability to switch guns of the barrage to deal with the unexpected, to slip into second place".

Farndale goes on to say "But who could blame them -they were feeling their way with new doctrines and new techniques when their equipment was not up to it"

The doctrine adopted in for the Boer War was a distinct phase which was to win the Artillery Duel, this moved in 1908 toward artillery being more directed toward increased co-operation with the infantry.

So not really feeling their way – more relearning lessons – and it was not a common doctrine. Batteries allocated on CB fire ranged from 4 in one Corps, and 12 to 15 in others.

The details of resources allocated to CB tasks to Official History, and of the results detailed by General Farndale are interesting

VII Corps - Gommecourt

Despite the allocation of nearly 60 guns to CB tasks, only 20 rounds per gun per day were allowed. Only one RFC aircraft provided observation, and many German batteries remained undetected.

3 x batteries 4.5 inch howitzers

3 x batteries 60 pounders

3x batteries 4.7 inch guns

1 x battery 9.2 inch howitzers

3 x 6 inch guns

1 x 9.2 inch gun

Not surprising therefore that the Germans were able to use Artillery fire to devastating affect during the initial assault, then able to prevent re-enforcements coming forward by a standing barrage.

VIII Corps - Serre / Beaumont Hamel

Guns were pre registered by the use of aircraft, thirty two batteries were destroyed, and the same number engaged.

1 x battery 4.5 inch howitzers

4 x batteries 60 pounders

1x battery 4.7 inch guns

4 x batteries 6 inch howitzers

1 x battery 12 inch howitzers

1 x section 6 inch guns

X Corps - Thiepval

A good concentration of guns of all calibre were allocated to the task, however, with only six, eight or twelve rounds per target, fire was nor affective, and the enemy guns were not silenced.

2 x 18 pounder batteries

1 x battery 4.5 inch howitzers

7 x batteries 60 pounders

2x batteries 4.7 inch guns

3 x 12 inch howitzers

III Corps - Ovillers / La Boiselle

In this sector coordination with the RFC was not good; consequently the enemy guns had not been silenced.

8 x batteries 60 pounders

2x batteries 4.7 inch guns

3 x 12 inch howitzers

The 34^th Division suffered some of the highest casualties on the 1^st July, the Tyneside Scottish and Tyneside Irish in particular. Inaccurate artillery fire not only fails in its effect, it places undue strain on gunners and their guns wasting ammunition.

XV Corps - Fricourt / Mametz

The four batteries from the Corps assigned to CB were overwhelmed with requests for fire from aircraft, balloons and observers. It was fortunate that the CB fire of the 8^th Division (III Corps) had knocked out many of the German guns. Not sure about the cross boundary firing!!!!

4 x batteries

XIII Corps - Montauban

In the valleys north of Mametz and Montauban, the German Batteries were almost destroyed, together with most of their ammunition.

One of the most successful attacks on the Somme – where the Artillery were able to suppress the enemy guns, it allowed the infantry to close on their objectives and perfgorm the task for which they had been trained.