George Butler, #240733

[badboy17]

I recently came upon a Princess Mary Tin at a Military show in Southern Ontario, inside I came upon the contents of one George Butler from 9 Edward Street in Glasgow, Scotland. It was his Membership Card in the Boys' Brigade dated 1911-1912. He was aged 15 as stated in the book. When I returned home I instinctively checked the CWGC archive and found that George Butler was a memeber of the 1/9th Glasgow Highlanders, Highland Light Infantry. He had died on September 29th, 1918 and is buried in TARGELLE RAVINE BRITISH CEMETERY, VILLERS-GUISLAIN. I was just curious as to the history of the battalion 1/9th Glasgow Highlanders of the HLI, as by the war I figure that Mr. Butler was 18 at the start of the war and was thus at the frontline by around First Ypres in October/November, 1914. Is there anymore information that anyone might have?

[grantowi]

From SDGW:

Regiment, Corps etc.: Highland Light Infantry

Battalion etc.: 9th (Glasgow Highland) Battalion (Territorial).

Last name: Butler

First name(s): George

Initials: G

Birthplace: Glasgow

Enlisted: Glasgow

Hth

Grant

[Malcolm]

Some info from War Diary Glasgow Highlanders which is downloadable from the web here.

http://www.rhf.org.uk/Books/9HLI%20War%20D...914%201919).doc -

Extract:

[19 September 1918: march - about 4 miles east - from Léchelle to near to front line at Equancourt (about 10 miles southeast of Bapaume)]

Battalion left LECHELLE by cross-country track to EQUANCOURT where they arrived at 9am and were disposed in trenches E of the village. Work was commenced to build shelters with material salved from the surrounding villages.

[20 September 1918: near to front line at Equancourt]

Building of shelters continued. Bn HQ had numerous huts built in a narrow sunken road which was named ROUKENGLEN. In the evening the 2nd Worcs were warned to prepare to move on 20 minutes notice. The remainder of the brigade were told to hold themselves in readiness.

[21 September 1918: near to front line at Equancourt]

Building of shelters continued. The 2nd Worcs moved up in support of the 19th Bde who were engaged in straightening out the line.

[22 September 1918: transit - about 4 miles east - from Equancourt to front line support at Villers Guislain (about 10 miles south of Cambrai)]

Battalion moved up to right Bde support, taking over from the 2nd Worcs. At 9.30pm an operation took place to capture a few posts in the line remaining in the enemy’s hands. On the left the operation met with great success but on the right the Worcs were not up in time to co-operate with the Artillery barrage.

[23 September 1918: front line support at Villers Guislain]

Occasional shelling of Coy areas during the day. In the afternoon parties carried bombs and TM ammunition to front line HQ, and in the evening parties carried rations from Bde HQ to KRR HQ. Bde HQ were heavily shelled from 6.30pm to 7.30pm with HE and gas. There were several casualties. D Coy’s carrying party lost 1 killed, 3 wounded and several gassed.

[24 September 1918: front line support at Villers Guislain]

The 16th KRRC attempted to clear a considerable pocket of Bosche from the line but were held up by MG fire. Day fairly quiet except for considerable shelling.

[25 September 1918: front line at Villers Guislain]

Day quiet. Battalion moved up to the front. Relief complete by midnight. B & D Coys in front, A & C in support near battn HQ.

[26 September 1918: front line at Villers Guislain]

In the early morning there was very heavy artillery fire round battn HQ which was in a small corrugated iron shelter. During the day the enemy kept putting down bursts of fire on the area and in the afternoon Bn HQ moved and dug in on a bank of a sunken road 500 yds S. Capt E McCosh MC, OC “B” Coy who was the only serving officer of the original battalion who had been continuously with the battn was severely wounded.

Capt McCosh died at CCS.

[27 September 1918: front line at Villers Guislain]

Continued construction of Battalion HQrs. Coys engaged in deepening trenches. Arrangements were made for a bombing attack to drive enemy out of a pocket of the front trench which they occupied between 1st Middlesex and our left flank. The attack was ultimately cancelled.

[28 September 1918: front line at Villers Guislain]

3.30pm: CO attended conference at Bde HQrs and received orders to arrange for an attack to take place tomorrow morning, the final objective being PIGEON TRENCH just West of CANAL at HONNECOURT.

7.15pm: CO held conference of Coy Commanders and issued verbal instructions.

11.30pm: Received written orders from Bde.

[29 September 1918: front line at Villers Guislain]

1am: Issued written orders to Coys.

3am: A & C Coys moved up to front line.

4.40am: B & D Coys moved out of trench on to assembly tapes. B Coy on right, D on left formed up on a 250x front in 2 waves of 2 lines each. A Coy moved into front line. No.9 platoon C Coy took up position 60x in front of a pocket of enemy in LIMERICK Trench. All were assembled and ready by 5.40am, unnoticed by enemy.

5.50am: Barrage opened and TMs bombarded enemy pocket.

5.54am: B & D Coys moved forward followed by A Coy in lines of sections in column. 3 enemy light MGs opened fire from the German posts in front of our line but the men cheered and charged the line killing a few and taking one or two prisoners, the remainder of the garrison running away. The fog at this time was moderately thick. Meanwhile No.9 platoon of C Coy assaulted the German pocket in LIMERICK TRENCH and succeeded in bombing to X 15d 5.7 where the enemy made a stand. But after a bomb fight the advance continued and they cleared the trench to within 40x of the road, 12 enemy being killed and a couple of prisoners taken in the operation with a loss of only 4 men.

6am: The main advance in the meantime encountered stiff MG fire from both flanks on the right from the direction of KILDARE TRENCH and MGs in GLOSTER ROAD and on the left from crossroads X 15d 9.9. The centre however managed to make progress and get across GLOSTER Road which the flanks were engaged in a fire fight in which the LGs of all Coys took part in subduing the enemy fire and after about 15 minutes the whole line advanced once more, all three Coys having mixed up by this time. Casualties - approx 3 Officers, 80 OR.

The few enemy nests directly on the line of advance did not give much trouble as they fled when the line got near them. But those on the flanks who were not directly menaced by the advance kept on firing. The fog kept on getting thicker all the time which lessened the casualties but made keeping of touch and direction difficult.

6.20am: As the advance continued the left flank came under heavy MG fire from Cross Roads at X 16 central. The left flank formed round and started moving northwards to engage these guns. The remainder kept on moving on to objective thus creating a gap. This party gradually decreased till it numbered only 12 under Lt Johnstone, all touch having been lost with the remainder.

6.45am: They halted about X16D 5.6 and Lt Johnstone reconnoitred to the right but could find no trace of the rest of the Battalion. The position being untenable Lt Johnstone was ordered to withdraw by Capt Lamberton.

7.05am: GLOSTER ROAD was examined on the way back with a view to digging in and holding on but this was also found to be untenable owing to dead enfilade MG fire from Xroads to the north and a further withdrawal was made to the old German positions in front of LIMERICK TRENCH.

7.50am: About 30 prisoners were taken during this withdrawal and the party which, with the addition of stragglers picked up on the way back now numbered 30, started putting these positions in a state of defence.

8.15am: At 8.15am a message arrived from LIEUT Brodie to say that he was digging in with about 60 men - elements of all three Coys on the line about X 16 a 3.3 – X 16 d 6.4 and asking for instructions. The Worcesters were found to be in their original positions and not to have advanced.

8.45am: Accordingly a message was sent to LIEUT Brodie to withdraw his men on to the position which was being consolidated. This messenger was unfortunately captured and the message did not get to Lieut Brodie. At this time a further advance was made up LIMERICK TRENCH to the road, No.11 Platoon having reinforced No.9 and the advance was continued along LEITH WALK to X roads X 15d 9.9 where a strong post was established. This caused the enemy to evacuate the posts in MEATH TRENCH and small parties were dealt with by LG fire. Fog getting thicker.

10.30am: Fog cleared. Another message received from Lt Brodie asking for instructions. Enemy were observed dribbling up STORAR AVENUE and massing in the TARGELLE VALLEY. Considerable shelling of our new line and old front line and heavy MG fire from different points in front. Artillery was asked to fire on targets.

10.45am: Enemy attacked and cut off Lt Brodie’s party. He put a TM on to them and MGs fired on them from LEITH WALK. Under cover of this he worked round their right flank and rushed them, taking about 50 prisoners. Lt Brodie escaped capture by feigning death and later managed to get back to our lines.

11am: All advance posts withdrawn to our old front line and every available man made to stand to in the line expecting attack. The enemy however did not attempt to exploit his success further and the situation became easier. The Pioneer Platoon was sent up as a reinforcement. The remainder of the day was spent in organising for defence. Our front was shortened, the Worcesters taking over from the right of MEATH Posts. Casualties at this time - 9 Officers 350 ORs.

During the evening and night a few stragglers managed to regain our line. The enemy approached close at night but not to his most advanced positions. During the night 36 wounded were brought in. Patrols were withdrawn at 12 midnight on account of bombardment. There was the usual amount of MG fire from enemy.

[30 September 1918: front line at Villers Guislain]

The morning stand to was unusually quiet.

9am: Enemy reported to have withdrawn. Our scouts investigated ground in front and found all clear.

11am: Battalion moved forward in Artillery formation, preceded by scouts to its objective of the day before (PIGEON TRENCH) without encountering opposition.

Touch was established with Middlesex on left and Worcesters on right. Four advance posts pushed out in front. During night officer patrols investigated ground up to canal and found ground clear of enemy. All bridges broken. During next 36 hours patrolling was continued both by day and night. A certain amount of sniping and MG fire from the opposite bank, also occasional artillery activity including gas shelling of Bn HQrs in the evening - and area in rear.

[signed] AH Menzies Lt Col Comdg Glasgow Highlanders

Aye

Malcolm

[badboy17]

Cheers guys, Thanks for such a quick reply!

I was wondering if the battalion had any particular significance at The Somme or in later actions at Ypres (Passchendaele, Messines, Hill 60).

[eltoro1960]

Just in case it is of interest to you, there is a copy of George's will held in the National Archives in Edinburgh, the ref number is SC70/8/900/38.

John

[badboy17]

Thank you John, I will be sure to check up on that, was there no result on SDGW of how Butler died Grantowi?

[Malcolm]

His will says killed in action.

Aye

Malcolm

[Versigny]

The 9th HLI (Glasgow Highlanders) war diary mentioned above was transcribed by Alec Weir as part of his research prior to writing the battalion's Great War history, recently published as "Come On Highlanders!".

Private 240733 George Butler's number indicates that he probably only joined the 9th HLI in 1917 or 1918, and was perhaps in the same batch as Ian Hislop's grandfather who also took part in the battalion's contribution to the big push, in September 1918, to break the Hindenburg line. Hislop's grandfather survived the war and with Alec Weir's help it was possible to incorporate the 9th HLI element of his story into Ian Hislop's "Who Do You Think You Are?" tv programme.

The so called Targelle Ravine is at Villers-Guislain, just west of the St-Quentin canal and Butler's grave (inscribed with the often seen "Good-night Beloved Not Farewell".) is alongside 73 other 9th HLI burials in the CWGC cemetery there.

[robertsim]

I recently came upon a Princess Mary Tin at a Military show in Southern Ontario, inside I came upon the contents of one George Butler from 9 Edward Street in Glasgow, Scotland. It was his Membership Card in the Boys' Brigade dated 1911-1912. He was aged 15 as stated in the book. When I returned home I instinctively checked the CWGC archive and found that George Butler was a memeber of the 1/9th Glasgow Highlanders, Highland Light Infantry. He had died on September 29th, 1918 and is buried in TARGELLE RAVINE BRITISH CEMETERY, VILLERS-GUISLAIN. I was just curious as to the history of the battalion 1/9th Glasgow Highlanders of the HLI, as by the war I figure that Mr. Butler was 18 at the start of the war and was thus at the frontline by around First Ypres in October/November, 1914. Is there anymore information that anyone might have?

This is an extract taken from Shoulder to Shoulder by Colonel A K Reid about the action at Targelle Valley.

On the night 22nd/23rd (September) the 100th Brigade relieved the 19th on the right of the divisional front, the Worcestershires and K.R.R.C. going into the front line and the Highlanders into Brigade reserve in the line which had been taken over from the 21st Division.

Forty-eight hours later the Highlanders relieved the K.R.R.C., B Company taking over the front line next the Worcestershires with D on its left, and C in support. Headquarters and A Company occupied a sunken road which was continually enfiladed from Villers-Guislain. On D Company’s left a pocket of Germans still held out between our trench and the 98th Brigade, and a brisk exchange of rifle grenades was kept up with these people.

At dawn Major Teddy McCosh, MC, who was now commanding B Company in Meath Post, was studying the ground over which the battalion was soon to attack, when he was badly wounded by a rifle grenade. He was carried back to the dressing station at Lechelle where he died. His death was felt as a personal loss by every officer and man of the battalion, in which he had served since 1914. He had been offered tempting staff appointments on several occasions, but had always insisted on remaining with the battalion he loved. Mobilized as its most junior subaltern, he had commanded the battalion with distinction during the battle on the Menin Road in 1917, and had acted for long periods as Second-in-Command. A Cambridge Rugby Blue, he took the keenest interest in all regimental games. Always cheery, always fearless, his popularity extended beyond the battalion through the Brigade and Division

The Highlanders were now occupying the centre of the Targelle Valley, with the Worcestershires and —the 98th Brigade on the south and north slopes respectively. The Valley from crest to crest was about 2,000 yards wide, and 1,700 yards in front was the main enemy position Pigeon Trench. Beyond the Worcestershires the left flank of the Fourth Army was up in line, but Villers-Guislain, a fair-sized town on the high ground overlooking our left rear, was still held by the enemy. Leith Walk, a road — sunken for the greater part of the way — led down the valley for 1,000 yards then turned half-left up the northern slope. About 300 yards in front of, and parallel to, our position was Gloster Road, also sunken, with other sunken roads and trenches behind it. Leith Walk, which cut our line at the pocket of Germans, and Gloster Road were both occupied by the enemy, who also held trenches along both the south and north slopes. We were accordingly looking into a box into which the enemy could fire from three sides. In the centre of the valley 400 yards short. of Pigeon Trench was a large quarry, ‘Pigeon Quarry’.

At dawn on 27th September a big attack was launched by the 4th, 6th, 17th, and Canadian Corps on our left, to bring the main body of the Third and First Armies up in line with the Fourth Army and so enable Rawlinson’s artillery to bombard the formidable defences of the Hindenburg Line without the obstruction of fire from the left flank. The day’s fighting, the roar of which could be distinguished in our own trenches beyond the local bombardment, was successful, our own 52nd Division in the centre south of Moeuvres playing a particularly distinguished part., Next day our troops reached Marcoing on the St. Quentin Canal, and the Germans evacuated Gouzeaucourt north-west of Villers-. Guislain.

The Fourth Army was now going to attack the Hindenburg Line on a twelve mi1e front between Holnon and Vendhuile with 9th, 2nd American and 3rd Corps, and a strong force of tanks, In front of the Americans and the right of the 3rd Corps the Canal goes through a tunnel 6,000 yards long. The 33rd Division was ordered to co-operate by advancing down the Targelle Valley at dawn on the 29th to secure the ground covering the crossings of the canal. As a preliminary, and a very necessary one, Villers-Guislain was to be captured by a night attack.

Brigade orders were issued at 9.50 p.m. on the 28th. The 2nd Worcestershires were to advance along the southern spur, with Pigeon Trench as their objective. The Glasgow Highlanders down the bottom and northern slope of the valley — their objective was Pigeon Trench from its lowest point to Leith Walk on their left. The attacks were therefore slightly divergent, the Worcesters advancing due east, the Highlanders rather northeast. Special platoons were to be detailed by both battalions to get in touch along the sector of Pigeon Trench, about 500 yards, which was not being attacked frontally. On the Highlanders’ left the 98th Brigade was ordered to advance along the northern spur. The advance was to be covered by a creeping barrage by the 33rd Divisional Artillery moving at the rate of one hundred yards in four minutes. There were no heavy guns available, and no tanks.

The gap between the Worcestershires and Highlanders was to be covered by machine gun fire, and in addition four machine guns were to advance with each battalion. Close support by trench mortars was provided for and R.E. parties were attached to each battalion to deal with suspected booby traps. When Pigeon Trench was secured, patrols were to be pushed out beyond. The K.R.R.C. was in Brigade Reserve with orders to push down to the canal at Ossu as soon as its passages there were secured.

Although operation orders were only issued late on the 28th General Baird had already explained his intentions to battalion commanders. Indeed the attack had originally been planned for the 28th, but had been postponed as impracticable, and during the afternoon he had reported to 5th Corps that in his opinion success could not be expected unless the attack were assisted by tanks or more artillery, or unless the enemy’s machine guns were effectively blinded by a heavy curtain of smoke. But his remonstrance was unavailing. It was essential to secure the success of the decisive attack further south, and neither guns nor tanks were sufficiently numerous to be spared. The orders must stand.

From the Highlanders’ point of view the task was indeed formidable. An advance down the valley would be liable to direct enfilade fire from both flanks unless the Worcestershires on the right, and the 98th Brigade on the left made rapid progress. The Worcestershires in their turn had their right badly exposed, while the 98th Brigade’s task was complicated by the failure of the night attack on Villers-Guislain. Formidable tasks were no new experience for the units belonging to the 33rd Division.

During the night tapes were laid in front of our trenches and before dawn B and D Companies, formed up on them, with B on the right. A Company occupied the front line ready to go forward as support. C Company (less No.9 Platoon) was kept in hand, as reserve. No.9 Platoon under Lieut. A. R. Lamberton was given the duty of clearing out the pocket of Germans on our front line at Leith Walk.

In the grey dawn of a misty morning, at ten minutes to six the artillery barrage opened. For four minutes trench mortars bombarded the Leith Walk pocket, then Lamberton dashed forward with his platoon. The Highlanders jumped into the trench, bayoneted the garrison and bombed the dug-outs. Lamberton then advanced along the trench towards Leith Walk. The Germans were now putting up a fight with bombs, but Sergeant Beaton, jumping out of the trench, ran along the top throwing bombs into it. A number of Germans were killed, the platoon got forward and two prisoners were taken.

Lamberton’s final objective was the Leith Walk-Gloster Road crossroads, 300 yards in front, but about forty yards short of Leith Walk the trench he was in became shallow and open to machine gun fire from both sunken roads. This fire was so heavy that an advance over the open was out of the question, and the platoon could only hold the position it had won and keep the enemy in front under rifle fire.

On the right the main attack had gone forward simultaneously with Lamberton’s. The field guns did their best, but the four minutes’ barrage was rather thin. Then the Highlanders advanced through the mist, B and D Companies moving side by side in two lines followed by A Company in section columns. As soon as our men showed themselves three advanced machine guns opened fire, causing some loss including Captain K. B. Thomson commanding B Company, wounded.

The posts were quickly rushed, a few Germans were bayoneted, one or two surrendered, the remainder escaped in the fog. The Highlanders went on, and the centre reached Gloster Road. Both flanks, however, were held up; those on the right by machine gun fire from Kildare Avenue a trench on the southern ridge, the left by fire from Leith Walk. All available Lewis guns now brought these machine guns’ nests under fire, and the whole line got across Gloster Road.

Casualties up to now were 4 officers and about 80 men. In addition to Captain Thomson wounded, three very gallant young officers had been killed: Lieut. G. G. Taylor, 2nd Lieut. A. M. Bruce, and 2nd Lieut. J. J. A. Ritchie.

The fog was now thicker, and under its cover the Highlanders continued the advance. Heavy fire was still coming from both flanks, but it was now unaimed and more or less ineffective. The fog was both a blessing and a curse; a blessing because it screened our men, for the time being, from the murderous fire, a curse because it destroyed the cohesion of the advance yet enabled the Highlanders to reach an isolated position far beyond the troops on their flanks.

The three companies were now considerably mixed up; indeed as companies they had ceased to exist. The leaders for most of the time could only see a few yards, and could only control. small groups within the range of their vision, but officers and N.C.O’s carried on.

The enemy when met with seldom waited long enough for our men to get to close quarters. with them, but escaped in the fog. Heavy machine gun fire from the left now caused our left flank under Lieut. W.C. Johnstone to swing round to deal with it. His party dwindled till he had only twelve men with him, and further progress seemed hopeless. The attack had been in progress for nearly an hour, Johnstone had advanced about 800 yards, half-way to the final objective, but he was now completely isolated with his small party, and had no idea where the rest of the battalion was. He sent back a message saying that he was held up by machine guns, and giving the map reference of their position. He then went off to the right to try to find the main attack, but could find no trace of it. The centre and right had gone on.

His message was received at H.Q. at 6.50 a.m. Johnstone’s position was reported to the artillery.

Meanwhile No.9 Platoon had been reinforced by No.11 and by seven o’clock the Leith Walk-Gloster Road cross-roads had been captured, and a post established there. Endeavours were now made to get in touch with the 1st Middlesex but without success. On the right also the Worcestershires had not succeeded in reaching Gloater Road, their leading platoons having been wiped out by machine gun fire.

The Highlanders in the valley were now in a most precarious position. They could hold on to the position won, or even advance further, as long as the fog lasted, but if it cleared they would almost inevitably be wiped out. Lieut. Johnstone was ordered to withdraw to Gloster Road and dig in there. He had now collected some stragglers and with thirty men and an equal number of prisoners he reached Gloster Road. The road, however, was enfiladed by machine guns from the right so Captain Lamberton ordered him to withdraw further to the line of the Germans’ original front posts and consolidate there.

Lieuts. D.P. Brodie, MC, J.C.Dewar, Leggat, and Menzies, leading mixed parties of men belonging to B, D and A Companies had penetrated about 1,000 yards into the enemy’s positions. During the advance many of the junior N.C.O’s had shown excellent leadership, particularly Corporal Duncan McLean who lead charges against several machine gun posts before be was wounded. Lieut. Dewar was also wounded about the same time.

Colonel Menzies now had definite information that the Worcestershires were back in their original positions. He had had messages from Brodie and Leggatt reporting progress. They were digging in pending further instructions. The fog was still very thick. At 8.45 a.m. he sent orders to Brodie to withdraw from his position. Unfortunately the enemy intercepted this message. At half-past ten a last message was received from Brodie asking for instructions.

By this time the fog had cleared and the enemy shell-fire increased. Over 1,000 yards in front fifty or sixty of our men could be seen near Pigeon Quarry. They were completely isolated. The enemy worked round their flanks. Machine guns opened on them from all, directions. Trench mortars bombarded them from Leith Walk.

Our guns, machine guns and Lewis guns gave what assistance they could but the enemy worked round Brodie’s right, and covered by machine gun fire from Leith Walk reached his position. Lieut. Leggatt, Corporal S. H. Johnston and a few men burst through the Germans and escaped, the rest were killed or captured. Brodie himself avoided capture by feigning death, and managed to get away after dark.

The German artillery-fire was now concentrated on our old and new front lines. At 11a.m., it was decided to abandon all that remained of the captured positions. Our casualties now amounted to 9 officers and 350 men. A, B and D Companies were down to platoon strength, and all four could only muster 174 rifles. Movement was observed along the German communication trenches and a counter-attack was expected. The Worcestershires who themselves had lost 11 officers and 230 men, took over part of our front line, and the Brigade Pioneer Platoon was sent up as a reinforcement. The Germans, however, confined themselves to artillery fire.

There was no change in the situation during the afternoon. At night patrols went out, and under cover of these, thirty-five wounded were brought in. This work had to be hurried as a bombardment was ordered for midnight, but every available man worked with a will and all the wounded that could be found were safely carried back.

During the night enemy machine guns were active all along the front, but at dawn all was quiet. Patrols which were sent forward reported that the enemy had retired. At 11 a.m. the battalion advanced down the Targelle Valley unopposed, and occupied Pigeon Trench, which was found to be a deep well constructed trench protected by wire. Contact was established with the 2nd Worcestershires on the right and 1st Middlesex on the left. Patrols were pushed out in front and the ground up to the canal was found to be clear of the enemy.

The valley was strewn with our dead. The Highlanders as they marched down the valley naturally thought bitterly of the heavy price that had been paid the previous day in their vain endeavour to cross the same ground. Their defeat, however, had really been a victory. The efforts of the 100th Brigade had helped the Fourth Army to break the Hindenburg Line both by drawing fire and reinforcements from the crucial point further south.

On the right the 1st, 46th and 52nd Divisions had crossed the canal and stormed the Hindenburg Line. In the centre, although not equally successful the Americans backed up by the 5th Australian Division had also made a good advance, while on the left the 18th and 12th Divisions had reached the high ground overlooking Vendhuile. Simultaneously the Third Army had progressed in the direction of Cambrai.

The Battle of the Hindenburg Line was only part although by far the most important part, both in difficulty and results — of a larger scheme. In Flanders the Second Army and the Belgian Army with French troops attached had attacked on the 28th and were rapidly pushing the enemy back on a wide front. The French and. Americans had also started an offensive towards Mezieres.

[badboy17]

Thank you all so much for the help, I am truly grateful that there is a place like this to get the information needed!

Cheers,

Sean

[Guest]

I have just discovered this site and information regarding George Butler. He had a brother William and sisters Jeanie and Elizabeth who all emigrated to Canada. He also had a younger brother James. I would love to know if there are any family members who could contact me.

[EdwardSutton]

My son at Targelle Ravine  2018 at the grave of his gt gt Uncle Frederick William Saxton . We found an WW1 British army brass button , slightly squashed but complete  with shank, turned blue like copper does, as we looked downwards ,that must have been uncovered when the gardeners turned over the earth. It is a lovely peaceful place in the middle of a field and easy to find.