Bergmann MP18.1

[bob lembke]

Does anyone know how the MP18 was deployed? Was this more a support weapon limited to dedicated teams or were complete platoons equipped with it?

Not an expert here, but I think that the plan was to issue one MP18 to each Gruppe oder Trupp (squad or dection), perhaps to the Gruppefuehrer, as they did with the MP 42 during WW II, bringing a bit of automatic fire to the squad. By 1918 the Gruppe (say 10 men) had become the unit of manuver in the German Army, while I think that it still was at the company level in the British Army.

Bob Lembke

[Robert Dunlop]

Bob, I would urge great caution with such comparisons. The functioning of highly specialised elite forces within the German army cannot be taken to be norm, especially in 1918. Reports from British combatants frequently mention the cumbersome nature of many German attacking forces, which enabled heavy casualties to be inflicted. Large groups of German soliders manoeuvred in relatively close formations, making them very vulnerable. Some instances clearly relate to advancing forces being taken by surprise, who had not deployed into more open assault formations. There are other instances, however, when large close formations persisted in attacking, taking away any excuse of surprise.

By 1918, the British company was not the smallest unit of manoeuvre.

Robert

[bob lembke]

Bob, I would urge great caution with such comparisons. The functioning of highly specialised elite forces within the German army cannot be taken to be norm, especially in 1918. Reports from British combatants frequently mention the cumbersome nature of many German attacking forces, which enabled heavy casualties to be inflicted. Large groups of German soliders manoeuvred in relatively close formations, making them very vulnerable.

By 1918, the British company was not the smallest unit of manoeuvre.

Robert

Robert;

In 1916 the Trupp of about 10 men was the unit of manuver in my father's unit, which was elite and had developed very special tactics. They generally did not want to operate with the regular infantry if they could avoid it. I am not sure, but I would guess that in the German infantry the unit of manuver was probably the company.

It is my understanding, based on Brit sources, that the battalion was the unit of manuver in 1915/1916, probably due to the severe shortage of trained/experienced cadre, leading, supposedly, to a situation in which it might be that the lt.-col. CO of a battalion might be the only officer in the battalion with a proper military education. Even they were severely limited in their freedom of operation; I have read of a lt.-col. of the period, wanting to move two MGs placed somewhere by detailed orders due to the flow of battle, and the lines being cut, having to send a runner to a brigadier for written permission to move the MGs, it taking four hours for the runner to return. This is in dramatic contrast to the German Army, where initiative and even willful disobeyance of written orders was encouraged (It was better to be right!), and the captain or even 1st lt. commanding a front-line battalion under attack only reported to his divisional commander, and if attacked and reinforced might command one, two, three, or theoretically even four regiments in the defense.

My understanding from a British source is that the unit of manuver in the British Army became the company in 1917, but that this move was very controversial.

I do not know what the British unit of manuver was in 1918.

A couple of days ago I read a detailed quote from Ludendorff on how the unit of manuver was moved down to the Gruppe or section, no date, but related to the later days of the war. I think I could dig up the citation. I think it was in Cron. He stated that this was very good for the self-esteem of the NCOs.

I have mentioned how in my father's unit a platoon of flame-throwers commanded by a senior NCO would be sent to an army corps for an attack, and the NCO had the right to review the plan of attack written up by or under the authority of a Generalleutnant, say, and he had the right to state that the plan of attack was deficient, and that his platoon would decline to participate unless the general's attack plan was improved in regard to the employment of flame-throwers. And the NCO or lieutenant had a written order of the OHL (Hindenburg and Ludendorff) to back up this right. This was a unique situation, but illustrates the extreme delegation of authority that was central to German command concepts. As the British cadre gained experience more trust was given to junior leaders, but there was a great gulf in this area througout the war.

In regard to troops bunching up and being great targets to artillery or MGs, I am assuming that you are referring to the great offensive of Spring 1918, if a general felt he had to rush a regiment or division quickly forward, perhaps thru a gap, to maintain momentum, the men would be bunched up and vunerable. This of course could happen whether the unit of manuver was the squad or the division. Really two different questions.

Bob Lembke

[Robert Dunlop]

Bob, I agree that troops would advance in close order. If caught is this formation, then the casualties would be very high. There are, however, several examples where it is absolutely clear that the Germans were not simply pushing forward. One example involved the New Zealand Division, which was rushed down to help stem the tide of Operation Michael. They formed a defensive line that was repeatedly attacked by Germans in close order formation. The first attack might be excused as you suggested. But not multiple attacks.

Robert

[robert_sfl]

Thanks for the info, so I assume the MP18 was really confined to the Sturm Bataillons and not intended to become a widespread weapon.

Considering the VP, I would propose that an SMG is also defined by its tactical concept rather than the caliber being the only criterion. The original VP design is not what I would consider an SMG but perhaps the Austrian single barrel conversion would be.

I guess the Pederson Device, the VP and the MP18 were all approaches to find a high firepower trench arm, but with different focus on mobility and tactics.

[centurion]

Thanks for the info, so I assume the MP18 was really confined to the Sturm Bataillons and not intended to become a widespread weapon.

Considering the VP, I would propose that an SMG is also defined by its tactical concept rather than the caliber being the only criterion. The original VP design is not what I would consider an SMG but perhaps the Austrian single barrel conversion would be.

What Austrian conversion? The conversions were Italian!

[robert_sfl]

I meant the single barrel Sturmpistole 18 version, the Beretta Model 1918 is of course a true SMG too if you refer to this. Maybe the Austrians did not even convert them to single barrel themselves. This is not more than a picture and a short description that I recall, which showed a single barrel Sturmpistole 18 and called it an Austrian conversion type. I do not have the source at hand so dont take it personal and skip my comment .

[4thGordons]

It is my understanding, based on Brit sources, that the battalion was the unit of manuver in 1915/1916, probably due to the severe shortage of trained/experienced cadre, leading, supposedly, to a situation in which it might be that the lt.-col. CO of a battalion might be the only officer in the battalion with a proper military education. Even they were severely limited in their freedom of operation; I have read of a lt.-col. of the period, wanting to move two MGs placed somewhere by detailed orders due to the flow of battle, and the lines being cut, having to send a runner to a brigadier for written permission to move the MGs, it taking four hours for the runner to return. This is in dramatic contrast to the German Army, where initiative and even willful disobeyance of written orders was encouraged (It was better to be right!), and the captain or even 1st lt. commanding a front-line battalion under attack only reported to his divisional commander, and if attacked and reinforced might command one, two, three, or theoretically even four regiments in the defense.

Bob Lembke

Bob - I am unable to reference this closely now as I am at work and off on a trip over the weekend but just last night I read a very interesting commentary upon this issue of small unit tactics viz British and German (also - to stay on thread a bit on the usefulness of Lewis guns as mobile firepower) in Christopher Duffy's "THROUGH GERMAN EYES: The British on the Somme" which contains lots of discussion of German reports of British tactics. I think Duffy would probably (based on largely German documents) challenge some of your commentary here. This work focuses on July-Nov 1916 obviously, so it challenges these in the same period to which you are referring. The book made some interesting points based on documents with which I am totally unfamiliar but which you may know better. Duffy also challenges some of the more simplistic learning curve arguments too (arguing for a series of steps - including some back down - rather than a curve) in a manner I found refreshing.

Chris

[bob lembke]

Thanks for the info, so I assume the MP18 was really confined to the Sturm Bataillons and not intended to become a widespread weapon.

Robert;

My understanding, not authorative, is that it was intended to get a MP 18 into every infantry Gruppe (section or squad) in the German Army. This corroborated by a wonderful photo that Tom W. has, of the Kaiser reviewing what seems to be a training course of men on the MP 18, with a double row of dozens of men at attention witrh the MP 18 slung over the shoulder (actually you can't see them, only the strap, since the barrel is so short) and two magazines stuffed in their blouse pockets. Tom has examined the men carefully and pointed out two men standing side by side from Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer) (my father's unit) and the Sturm=Bataillion Nr. 5 (Rohr) (a unit he fought with) . But Tom also identified men from many other regiments, so it seems fro/m that evidence that the weapon was intended for wide distribution. I have never heard of it being employed in combat before the end of the war. Some of the Freikorps got them after the war, and my father's cell leader in the Schwartze Reichswehr had one, which he once used on a "left" riot.

Tom has posted that photo a couple of times on fora in recent days, once on GWF and once on GMIC, I think.

Bob

[bob lembke]

Bob - I am unable to reference this closely now as I am at work and off on a trip over the weekend but just last night I read a very interesting commentary upon this issue of small unit tactics viz British and German (also - to stay on thread a bit on the usefulness of Lewis guns as mobile firepower) in Christopher Duffy's "THROUGH GERMAN EYES: The British on the Somme" which contains lots of discussion of German reports of British tactics. I think Duffy would probably (based on largely German documents) challenge some of your commentary here.

Chris

I may be all wet here, and may even be thinking of another author, but I think that I looked in a book by this Duffy fellow (or is there a "Paddy" something guy? - any rate, someone with a quite Irish handle) in a Border's and found a number of assertions that I took considerable exception to. But that is what makes a horse-race.

I am very comfortable asserting that the German approach to deligation of authority and responsibility was markedly different generally to the UK forces in the two armies. However, the Germans found, as the average quality of their manpower degraded, that they could not always successfully transfer some of their concepts from storm units, which were primarily research and training organizations, to the mass units. In 1918 they had to designate about a third of their divisions as "not worth much", although not in exactly those words.

Bob

[Landsturm]

I find it hard to believe that Finnish Jägers (arriving back in Finland in February 1918 to fight in the Civil War) would have had much experience on Bergmann at the time. MP 18 was a rare piece and most certainly didn't see action in Finnish hands during WW1 (meaning Finnish Jägers fighting in the Eastern Front or Finnish Civil War in 1918) and I find it hard to believe that the German intervention force (Ostsee-Division) carried them either. It was after the war that Bergmanns arrived in Finland weapons arsenal.

From Jaegerplatoon.net

Finnish use: Suojeluskunta (Finnish Civil Guard) acquired these submachineguns and used them in between 1922 - 1939. For Winter War (1939 - 1940) the great majority of Suojeluskunta weaponry was transferred to Finnish Army, among them these submachineguns were issued to Finnish Army front-line troops during Winter War. During Continuation War (1941 - 1944) coastal troops and home-front troops used them.

During World War 1 Hugo Schmeisser developed SMG MP/18-I, which German weapons factory of Theodor Bergmann started manufacturing in year 1918. The German Army soon accepted the weapon and Bergmann factory manufactured some 35,000 (or 25,000 depending source) by the end of Wolrd War 1. This weapon was the first practical machinepistol/submachinegun and even if German Army managed to issue less than 10,000 before end of World War 1 the weapon gained such a reputation that Versailles peace treaty ending the war especially listed submachineguns as weaponry banned from German Armed Forces. The original MP/18-I submachinegun had a weak point in form of magazines, which were far from ideal: It used so-called snail-drum magazines, which Tatarek and Von Benkö had originally developed for artillery version of Parabellum P-08 pistol).

Soon after World War 1 Schmeisser developed Bergmann factory improved version of MP/18-I, which used box magazines. Year 1920 Bergmann sold manufacturing license of this improved MP/18-I now known as Bergmann to Swiss weapons factory S.I.G. (Schweitzerische Industrie-Gesellschaft). After making the deal S.I.G. started manufacturing Bergmann submachineguns in several calibers. S.I.G. manufactured Bergmann submachinegun was exported to several countries including Japan, China and Finland between 1920 - 1927. The Japanese and Chinese Bergmann submachineguns were made in 7,63 x 25 Mauser. Also Estonian Tallinn model 1923 submachinegun manufactured in only small numbers was directly based to MP/18-I. Production of Bergmann submachineguns in S.I.G. factory ended year 1927, S.I.G. offered introduced improved version in 1930, but with very little success. So S.I.G. started producing MKMO submachinegun (which was later developed to MKMS machinepistol). Later in Germany the development of improved MP/18-I led to development of MP/28-II submachinegun.

Finnish Army was not interested about submachineguns in early 1920's, like most Armies of that time it doubted if this type of weapon would be useful to military. However, Suojeluskunta (Finnish Civil Guard) didn't have no such doubts and it bought first 1,000 Bergmann submachinegun already year 1922. By 1932 Suojeluskunta had bought 1,415 submachineguns of this model. Around that point Suomi M/31 replaced Bergmann in acquisitions of submachineguns. Once Finnish Army finally had become convinced about the excellent qualities of Suomi M/31 also Suojeluskunta decided to follow its example and from that on acquire Suomi M/31 submachineguns instead of Bergmanns. When Winter War begun Suojeluskunta Bergmanns were transferred to Finnish Army, which had serious shortage of automatic weapons. Finnish Army issued them to frontline troops for Winter War. Additional 108 Bergmann submachineguns were bought from Switzerland also during Winter War. 100 of them were the same 7.65 mm x 21 Parabellum calibre weapons like the earlier acquired Suojeluskunta Bergmanns, but eight seems to have been 9 mm x 19 Parabellum calibre version. Helsinki-based company "Ilmakunnas" acted as go-between in this deal in which the weapons arrived by very long route via Le Havre and Stockholm. Besides these also 290 Bergmann in 7.63-mm x 25 Mauser calibre were offered from Switzerland, but the Finns decided not to buy them (probably because yet another new calibre for submachineguns would have complicated ammunition supply). During Continuation War Bergmann submachineguns were first issued to coastal troops (until captured Soviet submachinegun soon replaced them in that use) and later they were used by homefront troops. In this way they kind of returned home as basically homefront troops, which contained mostly Suojeluskunta members, which were not fit for frontline duty. After World War 2 Suojeluskunta was disbanded and ownership of remaining Bergmann submachineguns were again transferred to Finnish Army - this time for good. Finnish Defence Forces kept Bergmann M/20 warehoused until they were sold to Interarmco in 1960.

Lindelöf submachinegun, Finnish copy of Bergmann:

Finnish Leonard Lindelöf's machine factory got itself license for production of Bergmann submachinegun in 1922. As the name suggests Leonard Lindelöf owned the factory. Submachineguns that this factory was to manufacture under license were exact copies of Swiss Bergmann M/20. Lindelöf had grand plans of large-scale mass-production of submachineguns and invested accordingly. Early on the prospects for this factory looked positive as the first order arrived swiftly - Suojeluskunta (Finnish Civil Guard) ordered 200 submachineguns indentical to 7.65-mm Bergmann M/20 in December of 1922. But then Lindelöf's factory run into problems - it had promised delivery of these 200 weapons in just 8 months and this proved much too little. Production-wise Bergmann-submachinegun was typical 1st generation submachinegun - complicated weapon with its parts machined from steel. So manufacturing them was slow and demanded large number of tools and machinery. Time needed setting up production had been seriously underestimated and even suspicion of sabotage surfaced. These delivery delays were breach of contract and because of them Suojeluskunta cancelled its order. Heavy hit came when Swiss played Lindelöf out from competition by offering Bergmann SMG with bargain prices to Suojeluskunta in 1923, these bargain priced Bergmann submachineguns filled the needs of Suojeluskunta and lead into situation in which Suojeluskunta no longer had needs to buy more submachineguns for some time. Because of this Lindelöf's lost his only important customer and when first submachineguns made by his factory finally were finished in 1925 the factory had sell them in small quantities to any authorities willing to buy (local level Suojeluskunta organisations, Police, Customs, Coastal Guard, Estonian Police etc...). The factory had about 160 mostly unfinished submachineguns warehoused, but no clients for them.

Year 1930 Lindelöf contacted again Suojeluskunta trying to sell the remaining submachineguns. However Suojeluskunta was loosing interest as the new Suomi submachinegun made Bergmann-design look outdated. Soon after this Lindel&oumlf's factory faced financial difficulties. Year 1932 he contacted again Suojeluskunta, who decided to help the factory by ordering 10 submachineguns, which the factory was to manufacture from its unfinished parts. The factory gave Suojeluskunta 12 already finished submachineguns as a pledge. But once again keeping to the contract proved impossible for the factory - as earlier the delivery was delayed again and again. Suojeluskunta had no other option than cancelling the contract and take position of the 12 submachineguns earlier given as a pledge. The final nail to coffin for Lindelöf's plans was when Suojeluskunta that same year made decision from that on to buy only Suomi M/31 submachineguns instead of Bergmanns. Lindelöf had acquired the tools and machinery made for production of Bergmann submachineguns, but now had to sell the unfinished parts and tools as junk. Lindelöf version of Bergmann submachinegun when compared to the Swiss one was not such a high quality and its magazines were not interchangeable, but otherwise the weapons were identical. The small amount of Lindelöf made Bergmann submachineguns were used the same way as the Swiss made ones and got experienced exactly the same fate in Finland during World War 2 and after it. The estimated total production of Lindelöf submachineguns was only about 60 or 70. While Lindelöf's factory never again manufactured complete firearms it manufactured parts for some weapons still during World War 2.

It's true that Bergmann inspired Aimo Lahti in his design of M/31 "Suomi".

[per ardua per mare per terram]

I am very comfortable asserting that the German approach to deligation of authority and responsibility was markedly different generally to the UK forces in the two armies.

The German army was so wonderful that they failed in their objectives in 1914 and 1918. The German Navy were so confident in their abilities that they perfected the tactic of turning together from the enemy and running away as fast as possible!

[bob lembke]

The German army was so wonderful that they failed in their objectives in 1914 and 1918. The German Navy were so confident in their abilities that they perfected the tactic of turning together from the enemy and running away as fast as possible!

I don't believe that I explicitly stated that the German command model in WW I was superior to the British Command model in that conflict, especially the command model that was to some degree made necessary by the crisis in the UK command cadre in 1915 due to their severe losses in Belgium in 1914. But that is a reasonable conclusion. I put the question to a friend, a US Army colonel who has commanded a brigade twice in Iraq, and who recently had his first promotion panel for promotion to brigadier. He is the author of a masterly two-volume study of a major British battle in WW II, and has taught at the famous Pionierschule in Munich, so he is familiar with modern European armies and their command concepts.

My friend responded that the proof of the pudding was that command concepts in modern European armies, including the British, are much closer to the German model of the period than the rigid WW I British model.

I only gradually became concious of the rather extraordinary command concepts of the German WW I Army over a period of several years, as I studied that conflict over the last eight years, and I feel that they should be of interest to the serious student of that war. The question is closely linked to the question of the lowest unit of maneuver in the several armies as the war progressed, which several of us have been discussing in relation to the attempts to provide automatic weapons to smaller units, in this case to the Gruppe or section, which seems to have been the purpose of the intended distribution of the Bergmann MP 18 to the Gruppe level in the German infantry.

Bob Lembke

[pelle]

So there are a few mentions in passing in some books, and in this thread, that the mp18 saw service in ww1, but can anyone point to any specific case of it actually being used before end of the war?

John Walter in "Central Powers' Small Arms of World War one" does not seem to believe that they were used, or at least not in any great numbers (".. there was no evidence to show that the MP18.1 had ever been officially approved. Series production had begun by the spring of 1918 - the first manual was issued in April of that year - but claims that 12,500-50,000 guns had been made prior to the Armistice lack authentication." it is also listed in the book with "Adaption date: none(?)")

I have been reading quite many books and contemporary ww1 docuements, even if I am by no means an expert like many of the forum members here, but I have never seen a mention anywhere of a mp18. Something exotic and new like that would surely be worthy of a mention in a war diary or official history if a unit ran into enemies using those weapons I think(?).

[apple]

Such as?

Yeah, quibbling over terms seems kind of pointless

Pistol ammunition+ blowback action= SMG ??? If so, then the first SMG was the Winchester Model 1907.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winchester_Model_1907

The French government initially ordered 300 Model 1907 rifles in October 1915 from Winchester, soon followed by an order for 2,500 more rifles. Ammunition orders for these rifles exceeded 1.5 million cartridges of .351SL before 1917. Subsequent orders in 1917 and 1918 totaled 2,200 Model 1907 rifles. According to factory records, these rifles were modified for fully automatic fire and fitted with Lee-Navy rifle bayonets.^[4]

Or, was it the first Assault Rifle?

[centurion]

So there are a few mentions in passing in some books, and in this thread, that the mp18 saw service in ww1, but can anyone point to any specific case of it actually being used before end of the war?

John Walter in "Central Powers' Small Arms of World War one" does not seem to believe that they were used, or at least not in any great numbers (".. there was no evidence to show that the MP18.1 had ever been officially approved. Series production had begun by the spring of 1918 - the first manual was issued in April of that year - but claims that 12,500-50,000 guns had been made prior to the Armistice lack authentication." it is also listed in the book with "Adaption date: none(?)")

I have been reading quite many books and contemporary ww1 docuements, even if I am by no means an expert like many of the forum members here, but I have never seen a mention anywhere of a mp18. Something exotic and new like that would surely be worthy of a mention in a war diary or official history if a unit ran into enemies using those weapons I think(?).

 Doesn't have to be in great numbers to qualify as first

[Robert Dunlop]

I am very comfortable asserting that the German approach to deligation of authority and responsibility was markedly different generally to the UK forces in the two armies.

British Field Service Regulations 1909 (reprinted with Amendments, 1914) on operation orders:

"An operation order should contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more [emphasis in the original]. It should tell him nothing which he can and should arrange for himself. The general principle is that the object to be attained, with such information as affects its attainment should be briefly but clearly stated; while the method of attaining the object should be left to the utmost extent possible to the recipient, with due regard to his personal characteristics."

"ii. A departure from either the spirit or the letter of an order is justified if the subordinate who assumes the responsibility bases his decision on some fact which could not be known to the officer who issued the order...

iii. If a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his orders, when such departure is clearly demanded by circumstances, and failure ensues, he will be held responsible for such failure."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I only gradually became concious of the rather extraordinary command concepts of the German WW I Army over a period of several years...

The question is closely linked to the question of the lowest unit of maneuver in the several armies as the war progressed, which several of us have been discussing in relation to the attempts to provide automatic weapons to smaller units, in this case to the Gruppe or section, which seems to have been the purpose of the intended distribution of the Bergmann MP 18 to the Gruppe level in the German infantry.

Forgive me, Bob, but your point could easily be misinterpreted. It is not correct that the Bergmann MP 18 was distributed to all Gruppen in the German infantry. You keep confusing the elite units with the German infantry as whole. Undoubtedly, if the war had gone on long enough, Bergmanns would have reached all units.

Also, I would urge caution in describing the command concepts as 'extraordinary' in a positive sense. Unless you are prepared to acknowledge the multitude of 'extraordinary' command mistakes that were made.

Robert

[bob lembke]

British Field Service Regulations 1909 (reprinted with Amendments, 1914) on operation orders:

"An operation order should contain just what the recipient requires to know and nothing more [emphasis in the original]. It should tell him nothing which he can and should arrange for himself. The general principle is that the object to be attained, with such information as affects its attainment should be briefly but clearly stated; while the method of attaining the object should be left to the utmost extent possible to the recipient, with due regard to his personal characteristics."

"ii. A departure from either the spirit or the letter of an order is justified if the subordinate who assumes the responsibility bases his decision on some fact which could not be known to the officer who issued the order...

iii. If a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his orders, when such departure is clearly demanded by circumstances, and failure ensues, he will be held responsible for such failure."

Robert

Robert;

I have never seen the above regulations, but if they were the "letter of the law" of command in the British Army, they do not match what my readings tell me was the culture of command in the British Army, at least up to and thru 1916. My readings on the British Army are from British sources, and they have exposed many examples of absolutely rigid top-down command. I have mentioned the example of the Lt.-Col. CO of a battalion, wanting to move two MGs due to tactical need in an engagement, and having the phone lines cut, sent a runner to a brigadier for written permission, which took four hours to receive. It includes a division marching into heavy German wire and MGs at the march, in columns of battalions, rifles at port arms, men forbiden to fire or run, and the Germans in a few minutes of fire shot down 8012 men. Then the order "To the rear, march" (or the Brit equivilant) was given, the division marched to the rear, and the Germans refused to fire into their backs. (I posted this incident on this forum, and Pals instantly identified the action.)

I have made a study of the Special Brigade, and I have read of at least one occasion when the attack plan was for a gas release at 7 AM, and at 7 AM the wind was blowing into the British trenches, and at 7 AM the Special Brigade engineers opened the valves of the gas tanks, and, not being entirely silly, fled, but unfortunately ran with the tank valve wrenches (I guess they had to account for them, or pay for them from their pay), and the infantry attacked, but unfortunately the wounded had to be taken back into the trenches and laid in the bottom of the trench, where the gas, still escaping from the hundreds of tanks, was the thickest, and choked the wounded.

I have read many examples of such British rigid command, what German officers of the period called Kadaverdiziplin, or "the discipline of the dead". (And, yes, some German officers were inclined to such bone-headed tendencies, but they were in the minority, I believe, and were ridiculed.) I can give many examples of the ability and practice of German officers to directly disobey specific written orders. In some extreme cases the German officer disobeying the written order dictated a brief memo to the files on his decision to cover his butt.

Bob Lembke

[bob lembke]

Forgive me, Bob, but your point could easily be misinterpreted. It is not correct that the Bergmann MP 18 was distributed to all Gruppen in the German infantry. You keep confusing the elite units with the German infantry as whole. Undoubtedly, if the war had gone on long enough, Bergmanns would have reached all units.

Also, I would urge caution in describing the command concepts as 'extraordinary' in a positive sense. Unless you are prepared to acknowledge the multitude of 'extraordinary' command mistakes that were made.

Robert

Robert and Pelle;

I may have not written clearly. It is my understanding that it was intended to distribute the MP 18 down to the Gruppe or Trupp level, i.e., to the section or the squad. However, in my readings of German material in German on the war, which may have averaged two hours a day for over 8 years, I cannot recall one instance of a mention of the MP 18 actually being issued to a unit (elite or not) in the field, or being used in combat.

Tom Wictor's remarkable photo, which seems to show the Kaiser reviewing a training course for the MP 18, and shows him reviewing a double line of at least several dozen men from many units, including storm units, each one with a shouldered MP 18, and each with two snail magazines jammed in their blouse pockets, should prove that men were trained in its use during the war.

But there are a number of photos of Freikorps men armed with the MP 18 right after the war, and as I said my father's cell leader in his Schwartze Reichswehr cell had one, and used it to single-handedly break up a left riot.

Bob Lembke

[Robert Dunlop]

I have mentioned the example of the Lt.-Col. CO of a battalion... the Special Brigade... many examples of such British rigid command...

Bob, what examples have you read of British commanders directly disobeying written orders?

Have you seen examples of detailed German orders that are highly specific and not mission-based?

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Bob, the platoon (Zug) was officially 'sanctioned' as the smallest self-contained unit of manoeuvre on 14th February, 1917. Lt General Kiggell, Chief of the [british] General Staff, issued a memorandum (O.B./1919/T) entitled "The Normal Formation for the Attack". Kiggell noted that "the normal formation described below is one which has frequently been employed with success in recent fighting [in other words, it had already been in use on the battlefield prior to February 1917]; it is simple and adaptable to the varying conditions of the trench-to-trench attack. It should also prove suitable in most instances of open warfare."

Kiggell went on to say "the Platoon* is to be regarded as the unit [which is] the normal formation for attack".

* Emphasis in the original

Robert

[pelle]

Sorry to bump this old thread, but I'd just like to write a short summary of what can be said about the MP18.1 then from what has been presented (so far):

- A few thousand were produced before the end of the war.

- They were used in 1918, after the war, in Germany.

- It is likely that some sturm units were trained in how to use them.

- They are likely to have been used at some point during the war, although no one reading this thread knows of any specific such occation (thus it is also possible, from the information presented so far, that they were in fact never used in the war).

[Tom W.]

Here are the Kaiser and General Oskar von Hutier reviewing a line of submachine gunners from several different units, including, infantry, pioneers, Jäger, the flamethrower regiment, and Sturmbataillon Nr. 5 (Rohr), date and place unknown. Was this a Maschinenpistolen-Kursus? Is it just an honor guard? No idea.

[TonyE]

Yeah, quibbling over terms seems kind of pointless

Pistol ammunition+ blowback action= SMG ??? If so, then the first SMG was the Winchester Model 1907.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winchester_Model_1907

The French government initially ordered 300 Model 1907 rifles in October 1915 from Winchester, soon followed by an order for 2,500 more rifles. Ammunition orders for these rifles exceeded 1.5 million cartridges of .351SL before 1917. Subsequent orders in 1917 and 1918 totaled 2,200 Model 1907 rifles. According to factory records, these rifles were modified for fully automatic fire and fitted with Lee-Navy rifle bayonets.^[4]

Or, was it the first Assault Rifle?

I don't think the Winchester M1907 could in any way be described as an SMG. Despite what the infamous Wiki says about it, the .351SL was not a pistol cartridge and the weapon as made was not fully automatic. As the French later had it modified it to full auto and issued it to trench clearing parties, I agree it has a claim to be an assault rifle though.

The British use was confined to air service and we issued ball and tracer rounds for it.

However, all this is irrelevent relative to the discusion about the Bergmann and whether it actually saw service. I cannot find it at the moment, but I am sure I have a British Ordnance Board Proceeding (OB Proc.) analysing a captured Bergmann in 1918. If so, at least some got to be used in combat. I will keep looking.

Regards

TonyE