Jump to content
Free downloads from TNA ×
The Great War (1914-1918) Forum

Remembered Today:

The Anzac Legend


PhilB

Recommended Posts

While going through the Australian Official Medical History (as you do), I came across this: 'At 4.30 a.m. on April 25th, in the critical hour between moonset and daylight, the 3rd Brigade effected a landing, captured the "First" ridge, and chased the enemy inland.' A footnote at this point then reads: 'The landing was at first opposed by only a single company.' (Butler p131).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Bryn,

Always read the Medical OH in the bed :D Thanks for the reference.

From the maps in Turkish OH the company was responsible for the area from south of Anzac Cove to the Agyhl Dere. If you look at David Cameron's 25th April 1915: The Day the Anzac legend was born map 2.1 he shows the dispositions of Faik's company in detail: a platoon (No 2 platoon) covering the Cove itself, with one section on Ari Burnu, one section on Hell Spit and one section on Plugge's Plateau. There is also a section from No 3 Platoon (Faik's reserve platoon) about 750 metres south of Hell Spit. He shows No 1 Platoon at the Fisherman's Hut. Faik and the remainder of No 3 Platoon are shown located on Second Ridge just south of Quinn's Post.

Cheers

Chris

Link to comment
Share on other sites

For those following the casualty count, Chris Henschke has kindly sent me a scan of the 1st Bde war diary page with the total Bde casualties for the period 25 Apr to 6 May inclusive that is the first 12 days. They are:

Killed - 237

Wounded - 924

Missing - 468

Total - 1629

Bean's comparative figures for 1st Bde 25th - noon 30th April

Killed - 153

Wounded - 754

Missing - 478

Total -1385

Similar range, but it highlight's Bill's question as to where Bean drew his figures from, given the 1st Bde War diary includes another 6 days figures.

Has anyone got access to the NZ Bde war dairy/figures? I will chase up the 2nd and 3rd Bde war diaries.

Cheers

Chris

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Winter is not right either, he underestimates, but it is still worth having a look at Winter's "Inevitable tragedy, 25 April". I think that is the title.

Peter

Link to comment
Share on other sites

  • 3 months later...
We used our own set of WWI rules and the figures were 6mm with one base representing one company or two guns.
Peter, we have been looking into gaming the landings in 6mm. Just a point of clarification. Each artillery stand represented a section of guns?

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

  • 5 months later...

Robert,

What is the significance of representing a section of guns rather than batteries in the war game?

Cheers

Chris

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Hi Chris. It would depend on the ruleset but there is a very serious risk that the effects of artillery would be significantly over-estimated. In two respects. Firstly, it could give the impression that sections were the units of command and manoeuvre, encouraging gamers to distribute artillery more widely than was the case. More seriously, the effects of artillery could be significantly over-rated, especially when firing indirect.

Robert

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Thank you Robert.

If this is so, then can I assume there is a strong possibility that the results of the wargame, on which Peter based his book, significantly overestimated the effects of the Turkish artillery on the Anzac landing? This may explain our different deductions. The evidence I have read doesn't support the claim that the Anzacs were subjected to an artillery bombardment of the scale Peter claims.

Another issue that arises, is that many historians appear not to understand the actual role/functions of a covering force when explaining away Sinclair-Maclagan's decision to halt on Second Ridge. A covering force operates ahead of the main force for the specific purpose of delaying, disorganizing, and deceiving the enemy before he can attack the force being covered. It operates in a dispersed manner, like a screen, and is not required to hold ground indefinitely. It's primary function is to disrupt the enemy and protect the main body from interference from the enemy, falling back if in danger of being overwhelmed but continuing to delay and disrupt the enemy.

In the case of the 3rd Brigade this could only be achieved by getting the battalions onto Third Ridge and delaying the Turks from that position. By stopping on Second Ridge Sinclair-MacLagan effectively abrogated his covering force responsibility without any real reason for doing so. There were a good two hours from the time 3rd Brigade stopped on Second Ridge and the first Turkish reinforcements began arriving in the southern sector of Third Ridge. Certainly enough time for the brigade to get to Third Ridge as Lt Plant of the 9th Battalion demonstrated by reaching Anderson Knoll ahead of these reinforcements. Plant travelled the furtherest, by far, of those small groups which actually made it to Third Ridge ahead of the Turks. From positions on Third Ridge the 3rd Brigade could have forced the Turks to deploy in the open ground to the east and to fight to get to get onto the ridge itself, thus gaining time for the rest of Anzac Corps to deploy as a formation. This was the task MacLagan was given but failed to carry out.

By stopping on Second Ridge, and diverting the 2nd Brigade to cover his right flank, he effectively threw away the initiative which the Australians had achieved and handed it to the Turks, which breaches one of the fundamental maxims of war. He did this when there were few Turkish forces opposing him and two hours prior to the first Turkish reinforcements arriving near Third Ridge. In fact there is evidence that he took the decision before the troops even left Plugge's Plateau.

Stopping on Second Ridge made no military sense whatsoever, and in doing so made any Turkish artillery action against them a lot easier, as the troops were now concentrated in a confined area. Had they pushed on to Third Ridge the effects of the Turkish artillery would have been greatly diminished due to the greater dispersal of the Anzac troops over a wider area of ground and the Turkish artillery having to deploy further to the east. The artillery, with one exception, could not have had observation beyond Third Ridge. The only battery that could have fired on the main body by direct observation was that which accompanied Mustafa Kemel, but it didn't arrive on Chunuk Bair until after 10:30 am. But had the 2nd Brigade, which was to seize that feature, not been diverted to the southern spurs of Second Ridge, ...????

Cheers

Chris

Link to comment
Share on other sites

If i might return to the original post and address the second point regarding the effect of an immediate evacuation upon the ANZAC legend, it had always been my impression that the legend as such relied more upon the dedication of the Australian and New Zealand soldiers to 'stick it out' over the subsequent months rather than upon the landing itself. at least that is how it is has always been represented to me; to parse Keegan it was the only epic of the war. one would have thought 'epic' by definition required a long term commitment. if this is correct then, to be vulgar, 'to turn tail and run' as it might have been expressed by contemporaries, on the first day seems unlikely to have fitted the parameters of an 'epic'. therefore would it not be safe to assume, given the poor reputations maintained by many other divisions throughout the war in similar circumstances, that the ANZAC legend might have been somewhat less than it was? even if immediately commited to Helles, the point remains that on the evening of its first major engagement the ANZACS had been forced to withdraw, if a withdrawal had been authorized.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Hi Bren122,

Welcome to the forum.

The Anzac legend was born of many inputs; the first being Ashmead-Bartlett's glowing news report of the landing. Others followed including dramatic paintings of the landing during the war, picturing the beach littered with dead and wounded. Good patriotic stuff in the time of war. Myth was built on myth as the years passed. IMO, the landing was the beginning of the legend and it was built upon during the campaign itself and for years later.

Had the request to withdraw been granted by Hamilton, I feel sure the legend would have suffered a very severe setback.

Both divisional commanders, Bridges and Godley, urged withdrawal and after allegedly demurring Birdwood sent the request to Hamilton. In circumstances such as these, that is after taking the offensive, when commanders of a force urge or request a withdrawal, it is an admission of defeat - pure and simple. Any suggestion the first day was a victory for the Australians and New Zealanders ignores this crucial point.

However, it was not simply a matter of turning and running away, or of even withdrawing back to the beach and embarking. In the circumstances a withdrawal and embarkation in the face of an attacking enemy would have been disastrous. An amphibious withdrawal is probably the most difficult operation undertaken. It requires considerable planning, a well coordinated withdrawal on the ground and the resources to lift the men off the beach. It could have been done at Anzac, but it is very likely it would have been a shambles with a good more men many being lost. Hamilton obviously recognised this and thus turned the request down. Had he not, the legend wouldn't have even got off the ground unless, of course, we portrayed it as a glorious defeat.

Cheers

Chris

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Had the request to withdraw been granted by Hamilton, I feel sure the legend would have suffered a very severe setback.

Especially as the other beachheads became established. Is it possible that any legend could subsequently have been built up on Gallipoli if the ANZAC division had been transferred to another beachhead? And, if not, what chance on the Western Front?

On the question of amphibious withdrawal, although accepted as very difficult, it did work successfully and on a larger scale some months later. Is there reason to believe it couldn`t have been done so well at Anzac if Hamilton had approved it?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The successful withdrawals in December 1915 were the result of detailed planning, preparation and rehearsals, together with deception activities and devices. The withdrawal was planned and undertaken in a carefully considered sequence and the troops were fully briefed.

This was a completely different situation than that on the night of 25th April.

On 25 April nothing had been planned or prepared, the troops could not have been briefed properly, there were no planed routes or sequencing of the withdrawal. The Anzacs were in contact with an enemy who had regained the initiative and were actively attacking. Under these circumstances confusion would have reigned supreme and it would probably have been a disaster. Not the conditions any commander would consider undertaking an amphibious withdrawal under. A number of troops would have been got off but an equal number would most likely have been left behind.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The Anzac legend is very powerful in Aussie folklore. If Hamilton had sanctioned the withdrawal, and the ANZAC division had been transferred to Helles, say, is it considered that there would still have been opportunity to build a legend there? And, if not, would the Western Front or Palestine (where ANZAC performance was at least as creditable) have provided it? Was it more or less inevitable that the ANZAC`s performances would produce a legend somewhere for a young country ready for it?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Any subsequent action by the ANZACs would have produced a legend; yes. but consider the usual view of the Boer War. in several engagements, both as colonial contingents and in the Commonwealth Horse for the Australians and their equivalents for New Zealanders, both groups had performed as well, if not better, than in equivalent actions in the first world war. the largest single memorial at King's Park in Perth is actually for the Boer War (the main memorial, though conceived and eventually built to honour the losses of the first world war, is now a general memorial). yet the overriding view of most Australians is that it was a very dirty war which sullied our national reputation with the execution of Morant and Hancock for shooting prisoners towards the end of the war. so while the military achievements and spirit (minus the shooting of prisoners of course) are still spoken of widely in the army reserve, whose units descend from some of the colonial contingents, i don't think that even the regular army cites the war more than in passing, and that the general public shies away entirely because of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the two officers.

contrast that with the effect on the Gallipoli legend had the soldiers been withdrawan, with severe casualties, within 12 hours of their first major engagement. one might even go so far as to speculate whether the tributes that surround the prisoners of the Japanese, which could be said to overshadow the performance of our fighting troops in almost every theatre other than the Kokoda Trail, might have found a parrallel in the treatment of Australian prisoners of the Turks; the fate of the British and Indian troops captured at Kut being a ready guide.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now
×
×
  • Create New...