The Anzac Legend

[PDW]

Chris

I think the mention of Aust arty (not all of it just a few guns) firing about 400 rounds in a day several days after the landing comes from David Horner's book, a history of Australian artillery-cant recall the title.

Peter

[Crunchy]

Thank you Peter,

If it was just a few guns then the disparity becomes even greater, the fewer the guns the smaller the tonnage expended.

My issue is not about the ability of the guns to fire 400 rounds per day, that is quite easy, it is the ability of the Turks to undertake the re-supply of some 14,400 rounds to the guns in one afternoon across the terrain they would have had to negotiate to get to the gun positions, even if rough tracks had been prepared beforehand. I have subtracted the ammunition carried in the limbers of each gun which I have put at 75 rounds per gun, it might be less or more but not by much.

Cheers

Chris

[PDW]

Chris

First a general point. I think you may be underestimating Ottoman preparedness and this has an effect on our discussion about artillery. While they did not, as you say, in a very broad sense, expect a landing near Ari Burnu they must have seen it as one of the higher priority locations along a very long front. For example only two machine gun companies were placed along the coast from S beach to Fisherman's Hut. One was at Cape Helles and the other was between Fishermans Hut and Gaba Tepe ( see map p 71) which is where their line of defence ended-there being only outposts north beyond that towards Suvla. This seems to me a good indicator they viewed Ari Burnu as a distinct possibility. I seem to recall their emplaced heavy artillery also reflects this opinion, that Ari Burnu is a priority if not first priority but I dont have the Ottoman info on hand to support that.

Now back to artillery rounds available. As I understand it we have to consider three spots-the rounds with the guns, the first line mobile reserves and the major dumps. I say on p 107 that there were 500 rounds with each battery but I have to report I have cocked up the reference to this. It is wrong and I must look thru my notes and figure out where the correct reference is. That happens sometimes. Probably it was from Poniatowski, the Austro-Hungarian running their military mission to the Ottoman Empire. On the same page though you will see evidence that the mobile reserves were 1200 rounds per 4 gun battery.

Peter

[Crunchy]

Peter.

Thank you for this information, it paints a clearer picture.

I think 500 rounds carried with each battery would be about right (with 75 rounds per gun being 450 rounds carried in the battery) but I have been working on a 6 gun field battery: based on the German organisation of 18 guns in a Regiment and that the Ottomans adopted a similar organisation. Can you confirm how many guns were in a Turkish field battery as opposed to a heavy battery? If the mobile reserve was 1200 rounds per 4 gun battery then, together with the ammunition carried with the guns, we have 18,700 rounds (11 batteries - 44 guns) and I concede they wouldn't have had to draw on third line holdings held in dumps.

A couple of questions though. Are the 44 guns all field guns or do they include the two heavy gun batteries at and near Gaba Tepe (a 4 x 18 cm gun battery and a 4 X15 cm gun battery)? Were your calculations of rounds fired per gun based on the rounds carried in first line holding and the mobile reserve or the total rounds actually fired?

In regard to preparations I think the Ottomans did an awful lot in the short time available. Bean (Vol 1) says that 5th Army was formed on 24th March and that Liman von Saunders undertook his initial reconnaissance on the 25th March (p236). On p 238 he describes the preparations the Turks undertook which includes road improvement and arrangements for ammunition dumps "at Kilia Liman and other centres". It also appears that the 19th Division may have been on the Peninsula at that time.

I recall reading in Von Saunders (Five Years in Turkey) that he expected the landings to occur either at Bulair at the neck of the Peninsula or on the Asiatic shore but I don't have a copy with me so I can't confirm it. On the Peninsula the next priority I recall was Helles and finally Gaba Tepe and the disposition of forces reflects this.

With regard to the machine company, I also thought MG's were allocated to the defences at Gaba Tepe and the Fisherman's Hut. Bean and other Battalion histories talk about MG fire from these two places during the landing. Both sites provide good long fields of fire in enfilade to troops attempting a landing on these long beaches. Recently, however, I have read some Turkish sources that cast doubt on the MG company being deployed in this area at the time of the landing.

One is the Turksih Orders dated 9th April which says the southern sector "will be defended by two battalions of the 25th Regiment, the MG company and by the Fortress company..." and the Kaba Tepe zone by "one battalion of the 27th Regiment". On the next page it says "The 27th Regiment (less one battalion), the Machine Gun company and mountain battery under my direct command will remain in reserve tomorrow in the camp (under canvas) in the olive grove West of Maidos." Of course that was 9th of April and doesn't mean they were not deployed into the beach defences later - however....

Gallipoli 1915, Day One Plus based on the account of the Commander 27th Regiment says p 10 " By then the Turks estimated 4000 ANZAC's are already ashore. The task of containing them was shouldered by the 2nd and 3rd platoons of the 4th Company with a maximum of 160 rifles and not a single machine gun." The account goes on to say "The battalions were not equipped with machine guns. ... A company of machine gunners was under the direct operational orders of the Regimental commander." On p 13 Sefik Bey (CO 27th Regiment) issued instructions to his reserve battalions on 25th April in reacting to the Anzac landings. " The 1st Battalion was to follow the existing main road to Kapa Tepe ... The 3rd Battalion together with the machine gun Company would follow the 1st at the double on the road leading to the North." Another riddle of Anzac!!!

Cheers

Chris

[PhilB]

On the 25th April, like the British, we failed to achieve even the initial objectives and in fact were driven back off Battleship Hill and Baby 700 that afternoon.

http://www.anzacsite.gov.au/1landing/ shows the map below illustrating the difference between first day objectives and attainment. However, the objectives were based on the assumption that the landing would be in the chosen place. Is there good reason to believe that the objectives would have been more closely reached if the landings had been in the right place?

[Crunchy]

Phil,

The misplaced landing has be put in context.

The 3rd Brigade was supposed to land on a 1600 yard frontage with its right flank about one mile north of Gaba Tepe and its left flank just south of Hell Spit, the souther headland of Anzac Cove. They were to "push forward at all cost" and secure a covering force position (or screen) from Battleship Hill on the main range and along Third Ridge to Gaba Tepe, including capturing the forts. This was to cover the landing of the main force and delay the Turks from interfering with that disembarkation. By landing where they did the 10th battalion was about the same distance from its objective and the 11th Battalion considerably closer to its. 9th Battalion was much further from its objectives and IMO could never have captured Gaba Tepe.

The 3rd Brigade screen would have been thin in places given the distance it had to cover, but covering forces are not expected to hold ground necessarily but to provide a screen to cover the main force and delay any enemy advance. Nor does one have to hold all of the ground with troops - lower portions and gaps can be covered by fire and a covering force can fall back on the main force if it is forced to. The main object of a covering force is to delay the enemy to allow the main force to get ashore and deploy without being drawn into the battle before it is ready to do so. It is a difficult task and it is accepted that a covering force will be outnumbered by the enemy force it is seeking to impose delay on. Other terms used for covering force type tasks are Advance Guards during offensive operations and Rear Guards during withdrawals.

The 2nd Brigade was to land immediately behind and slightly to the north of the 3rd with its left hand battalion actually landing in Anzac Cove. Its task was to move up and secure the main range from Chunuk Bair to Hill 971. These two brigades would thus hold a sufficiently large area for the rest of the Corps to land and deploy behind them ready for the advance to Mal Tepe.

1st Brigade was the Divisional reserve and the NZ &A Division would land after 1st Australian Division for the advance to Mal Tepe.

The reason the force only got as far at it did is that Sinclair-MacLagan halted his brigade (the 3rd) on Second Ridge, well short of his objective, and convinced McKay (Commander of 2nd Brigade) not to carry out his task and divert the 2nd Brigade to cover the right flank of the 3rd Brigade on the lower spurs of Second Ridge. Small parties of the 3rd Brigade which did not get the order to halt moved out and reached Third Ridge at isolated points. The largest party was about 120 under Tulloch who got onto Battleship Hill. Much of the disorganization talked about actually occurred later in the day as Bridges fed units of the 1st and New Zealand brigades piecemeal into the line established by Sinclair-MacLagan. There was not enough room behind Second Ridge to allow the main body to disembark and deploy without being drawn into the covering force battle.

Cheers

Chris

[PDW]

Chris

Under pressure from the kokoda thesis so answers will be brief.

Yes I was including the hvy batteries in Gaba Tepe/Palamutluk ridge area but I think you will find they were the exception as each was just a two gun battery. Apart from them all batteries were 4 gun field guns or mountain gun batteries.

The Ottoman official history is very clear about the location of machine guns on the coast. I copied my map of mmg coy locations from them. I have not seen anything since to make me doubt their Off Hist has this one right. Perhaps 27 Reg brought another mmg coy with them. I cant recall.

Peter

[Crunchy]

Thank you Peter.

All the best for your thesis. Hope it all goes well. No more questions until then!!!!

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

Peter,

Came across the following in an article titled "The Ottoman Crisis of May 1915 at Gallipoli" by Tim Travers in War in History Volume 8, Number 1, 2001 p 75.

"The next day, 29 April, a shell shortage was reported, since the expenditure of shells was running at more than 1600 per day (while production even in August 1915 was only 1400 per day)."

The source is attributed to "Enver Pasha to First (Ordnance) Department, 29 April 1915" Note 7 on p 76

This means that at, say, 1650 shells expended per day, for the first four days of the campaign Ottoman shell expenditure was 6600 shells across both fronts - Anzac and Helles. This places a completely different complexion on the weight of Ottoman artillery fire at Anzac on 25th April. Let's assume that more was fired at Anzac on the 25th than anywhere else or on any other days (lets say 40% of the total was fired at Anzac on the 25th April) we get around 2640 shells, which is still a lot but well short of the 17,600 (based on 400 rounds per gun x 44 guns) used in the wargame. Thus it would seem that the impact of Ottoman artillery on the Anzacs on 25th April was not anywhere as great as the wargame indicated.

Cheers

Chris

[PDW]

Chris

There is something in this. My impression is that there were a lot of rounds available in April and they were rapidly expended in the first few days so pretty soon- maybe 29 April as your evidence suggests- panic buttons were pushed as the expenditure could not be sustained.

However I wonder about the details. "More than 1600 a day" does not say what the daily expenditure was. It could have been 1650 as you suggest, or many times more than that. The same evidence might, it seems to me, be used to support an arguement that there was a huge (and unacceptable in the long term) expenditure of rounds in the first day or so.

Peter

[Crunchy]

However I wonder about the details. "More than 1600 a day" does not say what the daily expenditure was. It could have been 1650 as you suggest, or many times more than that.

Peter,

I think that "many times more than that" is drawing a rather long bow. To suggest that a primary source which states "over 1600 rounds per day" could mean "many more times" the number of rounds fired or "does not say what the daily expenditure was" is really stretching the bounds of credibility too far. It gives a daily expenditure of "over 1600 rounds". If it had been many more times than 1600 rounds per day I feel sure the number quoted would have reflected it. Any reasonable person would assume that "over 1600 rounds per day" means in the order of 1600 -1700 rounds per day - I took the mean figure of 1650.

The other reason why I don't believe the weight of gunfire was as heavy as that used in the wargame is based on reading many personal accounts written by participants. To preface my case: it is well known that inexperienced troops in their first actions exaggerate the amount of fire received and the number of troops they are fighting against. We just have to consider the Germans at Mons, who believed the British troops they were confronting had many more machines guns than the two per battalion that were actually employed. It is not until they are more experienced under fire and have some basis of comparison that more accurate accounts are made. My own experience in action bears this out even with troops who have undertaken considerable and realistic training prior to deploying on operations. The Anzacs had not been exposed to the more modern live fire exercises designed to give troops some "battle exposure" by exposing them to the effects of live fire and enemy weapon recognition. The 25th April was their first exposure.

17,600 rounds being fired into the small congested area at Anzac, as the wargame claims, would have been a devastating amount of gunfire that would have made a huge impression on all of the troops. Yet, while several of the personal accounts speak of the Turkish artillery fire and the discomfiture and casualties it caused, it is not a common thread across many of the accounts. Many accounts make no mention of the Ottoman artillery fire; nor does Bean say it was of the ferocity that the wargame suggests it was. In interviews during the 1970's with participants at the Landing not one of them mentioned the Turkish artillery fire. Indeed the big impression of two of them (8th Battalion on Bolton's Ridge) was that they didn't see a Turk all day and it was relatively quiet with odd flare ups of firing until late in the afternoon when a large attack occurred to their front - probably the attack on Pine Ridge.

Thus I am still skeptical that the parameters used in the wargame were based on accurate data. No evidence based on primary sources has been presented to date which supports the wargame ammunition parameters. Without seeing the actual source material on which those parameters were based I believe they have significantly over-estimated the number of Turkish artillery rounds fired at Anzac on the 25th April. Their results seem to be inconsistent with the accounts of participants, Bean and the Turkish source quoted in my previous post. Consequently, those results should be treated with caution until the validity of their ammunition expenditure parameters can be proven.

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

Peter,

I have just been reading Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War by Edward J Erickson.

The author has based his history on research of extensive Turkish sources. The picture he paints is of a Turkish Army that had undergone extensive re-organization during 1913-14 following its defeat in the Balkans Wars. III Corps (employed for the defence of the Peninsula) was one of the more efficient and best trained Corps, having survived the Balkans debacle relatively intact and retaining its original divisions the 7th, 9th and 19th. Yet what emerges throughout the initial chapters of the book is the relative unpreparedness of the Ottomans for a modern war, particularly the shortage of machine guns, artillery and artillery ammunition. The following are just some of the quotes addressing these shortages:

In discussing the situation just prior to the outbreak of war p7 In material terms, the army was ill-equipped to fight a modern war. Most divisions had twenty-one or fewer of the 75mm field guns that they were authorized out of an establishment of twenty-four. This artillery force was a mixed bag of French Schneider, German Krupp and Austro-Hungarian Skoda pieces and numbered about nine hundred field pieces. ... p 8 Overall the Army needed two hundred and eighty field artillery pieces to bring itself up to war establishment. … The machine gun situation was much worse. Each Turkish Infantry Regiment was authorized four machine guns. Some regiments were short and the army needed two hundred to equip the regiment force to standard. At battalion and company level, there were simply no machine guns and the army estimated that it needed several thousand more to fill all requirements. ... Ammunition stockage was low and the Turks were unable to meet anticipated wartime demands. … For the Turkish artillery, there were about 588 shells available per gun.

p 81 on the situation at Gallipoli just prior to the landings Although ammunition for some of the larger calibres of artillery was in short supply, the morale in the Fifth Army ....

p 88 in relation to the early fighting at Gallipoli The fighting during the first weeks of the Gallipoli campaign was fierce. The Turkish defenses had depended largely on manpower and rifles rather than on machine guns and artillery. In particular artillery ammunition had to be carefully husbanded because of limited quantities on hand.

This study seems support the view that the Ottomans were quite deficient in artillery ammunition and machine guns immediately prior to the outbreak of war and that these deficiencies continued well into 1915. Given that there were shortages of artillery ammunition in all Armies by early 1915 it seems unlikely that the Ottomans could have remedied this deficiency to any great extent prior to the Landings on 25th April, particularly as they had been fighting against the Russians on other Fronts since November 1914.

Cheers

Chris

[PDW]

Chris

Erickson's book is very good. You might also like his 'Defeat in detail' about the Ottoman Army in the Balkan Wars 1912-1913. Again this is all worrying stuff for my position BUT I only address one day of fighting -and the first day at that. It is quite true that within a few more days the general shortage of artillery rounds made itself felt in 5th Ottoman Army at Gallipoli. I have addressed this problem in my book where I argued that, partly because they were so profligate in the first day or three, the same serious shortage all WWI armies experienced at one time or another emerged.

As to the number of guns 5th Army: Because it held a strategically vital place it had priority in obtaining replacements for the gun losses that had occured in 1912-1913.

Still battling with the thesis. May not reply for a week or so.

Peter

[PhilB]

Is there an agreed figure for the number of Anzacs killed and wounded at Anzac on 25/4/15?

[Crunchy]

Phil,

I doubt there is an agreed figure. The only definitive source I have found for 25th April is 749 killed, out of about 12, 000 - 14,000 thousand Australians engaged, as listed here http://www.awm.gov.au/roh/results.asp However, we must treat this with caution plus or minus. The 1st Division was withdrawn from the line sometime on 30th April when the first roll calls were taken and the casualties determined.

Sorry it doesn't take you to the page I thought it would. Go to advanced search, Put in the date 25 April 1915 and First World War and it will take you to the honour roll of Australians killed on that day.

Cheers

Chris

[Bryn]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Jun 12 2008, 06:43 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Is there an agreed figure for the number of Anzacs killed and wounded at Anzac on 25/4/15?

There will never be an agreed number as some deaths were not recorded until later, when it was possible to check rolls, etc., at which time, rather than assigning a specific date of death, a date spread was instead used. There are marked differences in the way different units handled this. The 11th Battalion AIF, for example, used many more of these date spreads than did most other battalions during the first few days or week. There are accounts of officers being killed, and their bodies never found, while carrying entire roll books. This goes for the New Zealand battalions as well as Australian.

AWM figures are not based on any close examination of individual records; in other words they are not the result of any investigation into a date spread being given for a soldier's date of death. If that soldier's date of death is recorded as (for example) 25-27 April 1915, there has been no attempt on the AWM's behalf to sort out which date is the actual date of death. In such cases I'm not sure whether the AWM regards that individual's death as being, and adds that statistic to, the 25th, 26th, 27th, or none of these. Such investigations would still not definitively determine accurate numbers, but in any case, the AWM would not be the body to look to for such a concern for accuracy, as there appears to be no priority given to accuracy in many AWM writings. 'Near enough is good enough' seems to be the bottom line. We see these date ranges again commonly in the fighting in August 1915.

[Crunchy]

, as there appears to be no priority given to accuracy in many AWM writings. 'Near enough is good enough' seems to be the bottom line.

Bryn,

I think this is somewhat unfair. In all my dealings with the AWM in helping with the Post 45 Galleries production, the over riding factor was a concern about accuracy and authenticity. Things were checked and re-checked to ensure they were correct and the Director took a personal interest in ensuring accuracy. I am not an employee of the AWM, I was simply asked to be a technical adviser of one section on a voluntary basis, and I saw a good deal of the work and checking of what went into that Gallery

Yes, there are some inaccuracies on their site, titles to photos, casualties during heavy fighting, etc but a good many of these stem from many, many years ago when they first came into the Memorial, incidentally under Bean's Directorship. The discrepancies in the dates of casualties go right back to the early days on Anzac, as you have correctly pointed out. We can hardly hold the current staff responsible for these inaccuracies and Bean himself had to accept the source of the photo, dates of casualties etc. If the initial records of the casualties are incorrect due to the way they were recorded, how can we blame the AWM for not getting it correct? That is why I said the figure must be used with caution plus or minus.

IMO they do an excellent job overall under a very tight budget. None of us are perfect.

BTW I wasn't aware of the date spread approach used by units. Thanks for that. In the overall scheme of things, however, I don't think it really matters if there were 749 or 999 killed on the 25th. Until the mid-20th Century casualty returns were always inaccurate simply because of the scale of casualties and record keeping wasn't a priority for combat units.

Regards

Chris

[PhilB]

The spread approach in listing casualty numbers doesn`t appear to have been adopted elsewhere. From the Lancashire Fusiliers Regtl History:-

"During the night of 25th April ......... the strength of the battalion was returned as 11 officers and 399 ORs, so that casualties were only exceeded by those of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers who had 1 officer and 374 ORs left ..."

I was hoping that the level of Anzac casualties might reflect the severity of the Turkish bombardment. Some 800 from 10,000 averages at around 80 per battalion. If these were all killed, it would indicate about 350 per battalion total casualties - quite a lot when some battalions may not have been heavily involved?

[Crunchy]

Phil,

All 12 Battalions of the 1st Australian Division were ashore by just after 1300 and all were engaged in the fighting that day. The vast majority of the casualties on the 25th were in these battalions plus a few from Bde HQ, Fd Engr Coys, Fd Amb, etc.

Total strength of these battalions was 11, 615 (Bean Vol 1. p281) Add to this another 935 from Div and Bde HQ and the Fd Engr and Fd Amb which were Bde troops, the total for 1 Aust Div, less Arty Bdes and Div Tpt, is 12,550. Using the roll figures which includes about 12 dead from non battalion units I make it around 62 per battalion killed. I don't know what basis you are calculating the wounded per battalion. Bean at p566 estimates the total loss on the 25th as about 2000, with 1200 wounded passing through the clearing stations by midnight and on pxxiii says 1800 wounded were evacuated in the first 24 hours, which gives around 150 wounded per battalion but of course we will never know the true figure.

4 Australian Brigade began coming ashore late afternoon but suffered few casualties that day - 16th Bn had 1 KIA according to the roll.

Regards

Chris

[Bryn]

Chris,

the fact that the AWM does nothing to alter glaringly-obvious errors in their writings, even when these are pointed out to them, convinces me otherwise. As for exhibits, it took literally decades for them to change the casualty figure for Indian forces at Gallipoli in the gallery. Now admittedly that was eventually done, but what it strongly indicates to me is that there must be few, or no, people with detailed knowledge of the campaign (and I mean DETAILED), either working there, or with any influence to change things there. The current director insists on the full-capitalisation of the word 'Anzac' for every occurrence of the word as this is the 'house style'. Check any copy of 'Wartime' or the web site - on one web page in the refernces section Bean's 'The Story of Anzac' has been modified (because Bean obviously didn't know what he meant to say when he titled the book) to be 'The story of the ANZAC'. One is the story of a place. The other is the story of an Army Corps, and no matter what you THINK it should be that's not an excuse to undertake academic fraud which it certainly is when you re-label someone else's work so that it fits your own view. Never mind that this is wrong - historically and grammatically. See here: http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/gallipoli.asp

In many cases the original wording of texts - particularly, but not limited to, titles - written by Bean and others has been altered to fit this policy. This also is academic fraud, as it appears to be done in order to 'prove' one's own policy is right.

So while I accept that the huge majority of people working at the AWM would be concerned with getting it right, unthinking policy and a lack of detailed knowledge of something as fundamental to Australian history as the origin and use of 'Anzac' at the top completely destroys my faith in a 'top-down' concern for accuracy. I mean, if you aren't worried about getting THAT right, and, worse, actively ensure the inaccuracy is perpetuated and accepted as correct by blindly following a self-imposed bureaucratic policy, that's not a concern for accuracy. Not by any definition, however lax. Even senior research staff at the AWM, who know the policy is stupid, are unable to have it altered.

The inaccuracy of casualty figures from Gallipoli are not the AWM's fault and I never even hinted otherwise, let alone said that. I merely pointed out that the AWM figures are not based on any detailed examination of these. Which is true; they're not.

[Andrew P]

Like other battalions of the 3rd Brigade, The 11th Battalion was able to get most of the men out of the line for a roll call on May 2nd 1915. It seems many of those missing were later marked down as killed on May 2nd, the date they were listed as missing in the roll.

Sgt Frank Seccombe is a case in point. In a diary of an 11th Bn soldier I have it says Sgt Seccombe was killed soon after he landed. This soldier who wrote this was himself evacuated wounded on the evening of the 25th and so was not able to give his witness account of this Segeant's death when the roll was called on May 2nd.

All up 35 11th Battalion men are listed as dying on 2nd May 1915 when they were actually out of the line that day.

Regards

Andrew

[Crunchy]

Thank you Andrew, It is a good point and highlights the difficulties of determining the losses on any particular day.

Cheers

Chris

[Bryn]

Thanks Andrew. My point exactly.

Sgt Seccombe will be recorded by the AWM as having died on 2nd May, as that is his official - though not actual - date of death.

With some research, he's one more that could and should be added to the total for 25th April.

[Andrew P]

No worries Chris & Bryn. I'm just hoping to find some corroborating accounts of Seccombe's (and others) deaths on April 25th before I send the info to OAWG with the hope that they might amend the 'official' dates.

Cheers

Andrew

[PDW]

Phil

My research makes me think Anzac casualties on the day of the landing were high. I reckon at least 4000. There were estimates like this made at the time but somehow the lowest one, 2000 or so, has crept into the history books and established itself there. I know Crunchy is going to comment on this so I will respond now that the evidence is in my book.

Peter

and I dont have was going to keep away from GWF for a week as I am busy elsewhere but I could not resist another opport

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Jun 12 2008, 06:43 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Is there an agreed figure for the number of Anzacs killed and wounded at Anzac on 25/4/15?