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Remembered Today:

The Anzac Legend


PhilB

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"Kim: As for Aussies and Kiwis making a national day out of a defeat, I think it is more to do with admiring the tenacity and adaptibility of the raw soldier, (even though the Kiwis had more training, they were still, in world terms, raw), and the fact that they gave their all, in what turned out to be, for reasons above them, a hopeless situation."

Exactly, Chris. I did say I probably expressed it badly. ;)

As for the Canadians, I'm here to learn.

Cheers

Kim

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  • 2 weeks later...

Crunchy

Cant let this one (below) pass Crunchy. Hamilton tasked the Anzacs with engaging the entire Ottoman 5th army reserve and keeping it busy so the main landing (Cape Helles) could proceed unopposed by it. This the Anzacs did, defeating and the Ottoman reserves attempt to drive them into the sea. Thats a win ! Get a hold of 'The battle of Anzac Ridge'. Maybe it will convince you the Anzac landing was indeed a victory.

Peter

"I don't think anyone seriously thinks that the Landing on the 25th was an Anzac victory."

Cheers

Chris

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Crunchy

Sure, thats the position they were to get to and defend against the expected attack of the Ottoman reserve. As it happened the Ottomans were quick off the mark and the Corps had to stop on a line closer to the beach and short of the objective to repel the attack. The most important thing was to keep the Ottoman reserve busy, it was of less importance to get to that line. In the sense that they engaged and defeated the Ottoman reserve, which was the major Ottoman force available on 25 April ( the Anzacs took on and defeated 12 of the 16 Ottoman infantry battalions engaged on the peninsula that day and faced 44 of 56 Ottoman guns that were engaged) they won, I reckon, a victory. As a general rule when you are advancing to find and fight the enemy and you beat them though that means you fall short of where you were meant to get to that day you can hardly call that a defeat especially when the enemy you beat was the enemy's main force.

Peter

Peter,

My research indicates they were tasked to seize the Sari Bair heights, including Hill 971, and from there advance on Mal Tepe and cut the north- south communications that ran down the eastern side of the Peninsula. They simply dug in on Second Ridge well short of their objectives - that's a failure in my book.

Regards

Chris

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Peter,

I am not sure we can claim they defeated the Turkish reserve - it seems to me that the Turkish reserve not only stopped the Anzac force from achieving its objectives on the ground, they actually drove them back off Baby 700, which dominated the Anzac line thereafter and thus hemmed them into a tiny position of no tactical importance, let alone strategic importance, where from they could do little to influence the campaign. A tenet of any defensive battle is to seize and hold the high ground. At the end of the day the Turks held the high ground and had the Anzacs penned in. From a military standpoint that is hardly a victory. At the tactical level a victory requires one adversary to stop the other from achieving its aim and at the end of the battle retain the dominant position and the initiative. The Turks achieved their aim and retained the dominant ground and the initiative, so I am at a loss as to why you believe they were defeated. As it was the Turks were able to rush reinforcements to the Helles area from 9th Division, which had responsibility for the defence of southern half of the Peninsula.

To claim this is a victory is to ignore the strategic aim of the Anzac landing. Hamilton not only wanted the Anzac Corps to draw off the Turkish reserve, he wanted them in a position from which they could strike at the rear of the Turkish force facing the British at Helles. Thus the strategic intent of the landing was not achieved. Drawing the reserves off was only part of the task, a more important achievement was doing so while gaining a position from which they could influence subsequent operations and in this they failed. Simply drawing off the reserves on the 25th April and be penned in for the rest of the campaign is a waste of a valuable resources which no military commander worth his salt can accept as successful. Even Bean, Vol 1 p 452, who goes to great lengths to justify MacLagan's decision says " It did not need a brain of the acuteness of Colonel White's to realise the landing at Gaba Tepe had failed in its object. ... if it had succeeded in seizing and holding Hill 971, or even Chunuk Bair, a position of great advantage for the further conduct of the campaign would have been won."

Nor do I think it is correct to claim that the Turkish reserves stopped the Anzacs. The evidence indicates that they secured Second Ridge around 6 am or a little there after. It was at this point that Sinclair-MacLagan ordered them to dig in, while small advance parties made their way forward to Battleship Hill and at points along Third Ridge. Bean, in Two Men I Knew, writes of Bridges and White arriving on the 400 Plateau sometime after 8am and Bridges felt there was nothing to prevent the advance from continuing in that area. White felt that the precious hour in which an advance might still be made was being allowed to slip away. That is, the force stopped on the orders of Sinclair-Maclagan, not because of the intervention of the Turkish reserves.

Cheers

Chris

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you can hardly call that a defeat especially when the enemy you beat was the enemy's main force.

Peter,

The 19th Division was not the Turkish main force, it was the 5th Army reserve. 5th Army comprised III and XV Corps, a total of 6 divisions deployed to defend the Peninsula and the Asiatic shore. A reserve by definition is not the main force - it is a small portion of the main force held in reserve to reinforce the main line or to meet unexpected situations. To say that the Anzacs defeated the Turkish main force is incorrect, as I have explained above they didn't even defeat the 19th Division. The 19th Division did exactly what a reserve exists to do and they did it very well.

Cheers

Chris

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Chris

I see this will be hard work but I will have one more go.

1) Kemal mounted a full scale attack on the Anzacs with the objective of driving them into the sea. He failed. I happy conceed he held some good ground at the end of it but he launched an attack intended to wipe them out and failed to do so.

2) Kemal had the 5th army reserve and was not supposed to commit it without permission from his army commander. He went ahead anyway which would have been a disaster for the Ottomans if the Brits had made any headway at Cape Helles. In such a circumstance Von Sanders would have said where is my army reserve? Kemal would have replied-sorry about that, I committed it against the enemy feint attack- and I failed to smash them. As it turned out the Cape Helles attack made little progress against a very small number of Ottomans so Kemals mistake had no huge consequences.

3) Re the strategic aim. I dont believe Hamilton expected as much from the Corps. Note his comment on the 'dig' order'. "You have got thru the difficult business (getting ashore) you only have to dig dig dig until you are safe." Knowing as he did the great strength of the Ottoman forces arrayed inland of Ari Burnu I believe he was quite content with the result- the Corps pinned all the Ottoman reserve all of the day. I think you underestimate the potentially immense concequences ( supposing the Brits had been successful) of drawing off the Ottoman reserve. Wont get into a discussion of the rest of the campaign as I am only saying day one was an anzac victory.

4) I do think the Ottomans were visible deploying in front about when the advance stopped-but even if not Sinclair-Maclagan was well ( pre battle intelligence) aware of the large enemy force that was somewhere out there nearby. The Corps intel also had identified one extra Ottoman regiment tucked away just south east of Gaba Tepe and he feared he would expose his right to it if he went further inland. This was actually an intel mistake as that regiment was not there but S-M thought it was. Also S-M and others thought that a newly raised poor quality military instrument with almost no artillery on shore on day one- such as the Corps, might easily fracture and run when attacked by about an equal number of regulars with 40+ guns, I reckon S-M though the smart and safe move was dig in where he was. He told Bean this later. My opinion is had they advanced to third ridge the Corps would have been defeated and driven into the sea.

I guess this partly depends on what you think of the Corps. I see it as very fortunate a Corps put together at a barbie the weekend before ( and I stress again without artillery) held off a top class regular army with a 500 year tradition ( and lots of artillery).

5) Taking the high ground. The plan covered what to do if the Ottoman reserve was not there. While it had been observed from the air for a month in the same spot it was always possible it may have moved a night or two before the landing and air recon not picked this up. In such a case then the idea was take the high ground and , possibly, if all is going well, push on across the peninsula.

Ill have a look at your other message and send a little more.

Peter

[

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Chris

1) Sorry I did not make my point clear. I meant the 5th army reserve was the main force available to do any fighting on day one. There were nineteen Ottoman battalions in the southern part of the peninsula. Three of them did not fight on the day. Twelve engaged the Corps and four engaged the Brits. There were 64 guns. 8 did not fire, 12 engaged the Brits and 44 engaged the Corps. Of the forces mentioned here arrayed against the Corps at the start of the day two thirds of it was under 19 div. By the middle of the day all of it was under 19 div orders. In this sense the Corps engaged the main enemy force on day one.

2) I think you must agree an army commander expects the reserve to be available when he calls for it. Kemals committment of most of his reserve before he had any news from the boss was not what reserves are supposed to do. The beauty of Hamitons plan- landing the Corps so close to the reserve, meant that Kemal may not really have had much choice in the matter. It is debatable how little of his force he could have kept out of a fight with the Anzacs and how much of it he could have kept available for when his army commander called for it.

Ottoman officers said in their official history that they were aware there would be several landings and it would be tricky to work out which one was the main one and that they did not actually work this out for sure until day three. I am pretty sure Von Sanders would have wanted to keep his reserve to throw at the main enemy landing, and not at a feint, when he could figure out which one it was.

I reckon if the Brits had been on Achi Baba by the end of day one Kemal should have been stood against a wall and shot. He was a very lucky man.

PS. While writing the book I wargamed the landing half a dozen times to test out some maybes. The most interesting feature of these simualtions was whatever different approach the Anzac players tried- going further on inland as you propose for example-whatever they did the Corps got shot to pieces by the Ottoman artillery which analysts at the time said was equivalent in quality to the French, Brits or Germans.

Peter

Peter,

The 19th Division was not the Turkish main force, it was the 5th Army reserve. 5th Army comprised III and XV Corps, a total of 6 divisions deployed to defend the Peninsula and the Asiatic shore. A reserve by definition is not the main force - it is a small portion of the main force held in reserve to reinforce the main line or to meet unexpected situations. To say that the Anzacs defeated the Turkish main force is incorrect, as I have explained above they didn't even defeat the 19th Division. The 19th Division did exactly what a reserve exists to do and they did it very well.

Cheers

Chris

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Peter,

Rather than responding to each of your points let me put my case, remembering that our particular debate in this thread is whether the Anzacs won a victory and defeated the Turks on the 25th April, as you have asserted above. Like you, I don’t believe ANZAC could have achieved its operational objective given the response of the Turks and the inexperience of the Anzac force. Nor have I said they could have achieved it in this thread or anywhere else. But I don’t believe the Anzacs won a victory and that we defeated the Turks.

Whether or not the Anzacs defeated the Turks on the 25th April ought to be considered against the campaign objectives of both the Turks and the Allies. Before considering the relative objectives at Anzac I think it is important to understand the nature of the Turkish defence employed on the Peninsula, the objectives of the British and the relationship between the Helles and Anzac landings. I would like to address these before putting my case in regard to victory and defeat at Anzac.

In relation to the first, Von Saunders had 6 Divisions to defend an area extending from the Turkish mainland at the head of the Gulf of Saros, the complete Peninsula and across to the Asiatic shore opposite the entrance to the Dardanelles. With such a long coastline for the forces available, he could not defend everywhere. Therefore, he employed what Bean calls a "trip wire" defensive posture, or defending lightly supported by strong reserves. In employing a "trip wire" defence, all of the force is not deployed forward on the coast with the aim of stopping the enemy from gaining a foothold, a "destroy them on the beaches" approach. It involves establishing a screen of defended localities on the coast and holding strong reserves inland at locations from which they can respond to the actual landing sites. The defended localities provide the screen or “trip wire” to provide early warning of the landings and oppose the invading force by inflicting as much delay and disruption on the enemy as they can. The reserves deploy forward to the threatened points as quickly as possible and counter attack to try and contain the enemy lodgement. This allows the rest of the Army to be redeployed against the enemy lodgement to stop any further advance and then, if possible, go onto the counter offensive to eject them. Thus a trip wire defence accepts that the enemy will make a lodgement but it employs strong reserves with the aim of containing that lodgement until the main force can be re-established against the enemy incursion. Thus for the Turks to be successful and achieve their aim on the 25th April they had to confine the invasion to the initial beachheads and stop any further advance inland, rather than ejecting the invaders altogether.

So that other readers of the post can understand the thrust of our argument, as you know the Turkish defence had the 5th Division deployed on the mainland at the head of the Gulf of Saros, III Corps of two divisions (7th and 9th) allocated to the Peninsula, with the 7th Division at Bulair covering the neck of the Peninsula and the 9th Division covering the southern portion from south of Suvla Bay to Helles. XV Corps of two divisions was on the Asiatic shore. In the Anzac area itself one battalion of the 27th Regiment covered a five and a half mile frontage. One division (the 19th) was held as the 5th Army reserve, which Von Saunders located in a central position at Boghali, such that it could reinforce either the 7th Division, the 9th Division or XV Corps depending on where the landing took place. But this was not the only reserve. Each Division held strong reserves. Thus in the 9th Division area, four battalions were deployed in defended localities to cover some 20 miles of coastline and five battalions were kept in reserve, whereas a normal ratio would be six battalions forward and three in reserve.

Hamilton’s task was to capture the Turkish forts covering the Narrows. To achieve this he had 5 divisions (29th, RND, 1st Australian, New Zealand & Australian of 2 brigades and a French division). In outline his plan was to make the main effort at Helles with the 29th Division. Phase one was to land at the foot of the Peninsula and seize the high ground at Achi Baba, which was the ground of tactical importance in that area, supported by three subsidiary operations. Phase two was to concentrate the RND and French divisions with the 29th Division and advance up the Peninsula and capture the Kilid Bahr plateau. From there the Allies were to capture the forts at the Narrows.

To support the landing of the 29th Division, three subsidiary operations were undertaken. Two of these were feints pure and simple. In the north, the transports carrying the RND made a demonstration in the Gulf of Saros so as to give the impression that a landing would be made in that area and thus hold all Turkish troops there, including the 7th Division reserves. The French division landed on the Asiatic shore to hold XV Corps in place. That this was only a feint to hold the Turks in place is demonstrated by the pre-arrangement that the French would then be withdrawn and sent to reinforce the 29th Division at Helles. Thus they were to secure a small beachhead and no more.

The third was a secondary operation to support the main Allied advance from Helles and involved the Anzacs landing at Gaba Tepe and I disagree with you on the object of this operation. Phase one required them to seize the main Sari Bair Range including the ground of tactical importance from Chunuk Bair to Hill 971. Phase two involved an advance to Mal Tepe, which overlooked the straits and the N-S communications to Helles, which I recall you agree with in a previous post. While Hamilton intended this landing, like the two feints, to draw off Turkish reserves, this was not the sole task of the Anzac landings as you assert. The intention according to the Dardanelles Commission Report was “When the Anzac and Helles Forces had established themselves at Mal Tepe and Achi Baba the intention was that a converging attack should be made from those points upon the Turkish positions at Kilid Bahr”. This is a valid military approach provided the conditions are right: it places a force behind any Turkish force opposing the main thrust up the Peninsula, denies the enemy from concentrating all his forces against that advance and alleviates what is otherwise a frontal advance with minimal room for manoeuvre. Even on the 25th April Hamilton wrote in his diary (p78) “ If the Australians get through to Mal Tepe the whole Turkish Army on the Peninsula will be done in.” The Operation Order of the 1st Australian Division makes no mention that their task was to act as a feint to draw off the Turkish reserves. It clearly states that the objective was the seize Hill 971, Hill Q and a line running from Chunuk Bair along Third Ridge to Gaba Tepe. Bean states (Vol 1, p220) that “from the operation orders and written instructions” the role of ANZAC was for the covering force (1st Australian Division) “to seize and hold at any rate the lower crests and southern spurs of Hill 971. The main body of the corps, landing later, was to leave the covering force to hold this position, guarding the northern flank, and to push past on the south and seize the inland spur of Hill 971 “and especially Mal Tepe”. (This is the ridge that runs SE from Hill 971 to Mal Tepe). Bean continues “Gaining such a position”, the instruction said, “ the Army Corps will threaten, and perhaps cut the line of retreat of the enemy’s forces on the Kilid Bahr plateau”. … “should the A and NZ Army Corps succeed in securing this ridge, the results should be more vital and valuable than the capture of the Kilid Bahr Plateau itself”. That they would draw off some of the Turkish reserves was indeed one of Hamilton’s intentions, but to assert that this was the sole function of ANZAC does not accord with the instructions and orders given to Birdwood and it ignores the broader operational task of the Corps. That it was not simply a feint to draw off the Turkish reserves is evident by the following: there was no intention or pre-arrangement to withdraw the ANZAC, as there was in the French case, and Hamilton allocated a Corps of two divisions, comprising five brigades or 2/5ths of his entire force to the task. I agree it was a big ask for such an inexperienced force but the British had a very low opinion of the Turks and their pre-landing intelligence shows that they badly underestimated the Turkish fighting ability

Thus to the question of whether the Turks were defeated and the Anzacs scored a victory on the 25th April, noting that victory and defeat have quite precise meanings in military terms.

For the British to claim success they would have to secure their phase one objectives, including the ground of tactical importance in their respective areas. This required ANZAC to secure the main Sari Bair range and the line Hill 971 to Mal Tepe; not just draw Turkish reserves against them. To claim victory, by the standard measure of the term, they would have to defeat the Turks such that the Turks would be forced to withdraw from the battlefield; the recognised measure of defeat is that the defeated force withdraws or is driven from the battlefield.

For the Turks to achieve success they would have to confine the British and Anzac landings to their initial beachheads. To achieve victory they would have to eject the invasion force from its lodgements, noting they could not expect to eject the British employing a trip wire defensive posture with the forces they had over the area they had to cover

Turning to consider victory or defeat at Anzac in more detail. There, four Australian battalions landed against less than a company of the 2nd/27th Regiment and were quickly reinforced by another four battalions, with eight more Anzac battalions preparing to disembark. Advancing inland for less than a mile they halted well short of their objective at around 6 am on the orders of the leading Brigade Commander and dug in on Baby 700 and along Second Ridge. Small parties moved forward from this line and up onto Battleship Hill and points along Third Ridge in accordance with their initial orders. I don't accept that Sinclair-Maclagan could see any Turkish reserves deploying against him when he made the order to halt. He actually ordered the halt when he was on Plugge's Plateau (Bean. Vol 1, p 276) pointing out the line to held to the 11th and 10th Battalions before they moved off from there and from a point where he could only see the seaward slopes of Second Ridge - that is he made the order based on his own pre-conceived ideas and fears, not the actual situation on the ground. The only Turkish reserves that could have been nearby at that time was the reserve company of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment and I have seen no evidence that he saw it.

In response to this, some of the Turkish reserves; initially the 57th Regiment from the 19th Division (the 5th Army reserve) and the remaining two battalions of the 27th Regiment (part of the 9th Division reserve) force marched some five miles to confront the invading force. Thus during the majority of the 25th April, sixteen Anzac battalions (1st Australian Division and the New Zealand Brigade) were fighting at most six Turkish battalions from the 57th and 27th Regiments. Not only did this outnumbered Turkish force confine the Anzacs to their initial beachhead, they secured the ground of tactical importance (Chunuk Bair to Hill 971) and recaptured Battleship Hill and Baby 700; driving the Anzacs back across the Nek. They also drove the rest of the line back to the seaward slopes of Second Ridge. During the night they penetrated along Russell’s Top such that they could fire into the rear of Second Ridge. As Bean writes (Vol 1, p452) “When darkness fell, the Australians had been thrown back both on the main ridge and on either side of it.”

In the late afternoon, the 77th (Arab) Regiment from the 19th Division, which even the Turks rated as unreliable, was inserted into the line between the 57th and 27th Regiments and disintegrated when it attacked the Australian line that evening.

Apart from the failure of the 77th Regiment, the Turkish reserves had done remarkably well. They could hardly be said to have been defeated. Not only did the Turks secure the ground of tactical importance, they recaptured the high ground of Baby 700 ground which dominated the Anzac line, established themselves on Second Ridge and had confined the Anzac force into a very small beachhead of no tactical importance and from which they had no chance of supporting the main effort from Helles. In fact it was the last line that could be held before being thrown back into the sea and barely 1500 yards from the coast at its deepest point. Even if Mustafa Kemel's aim was to drive the Anzacs into the sea, which I am not sure it has been stated as such when he responded to the news of the landing, he can hardly be accused of being defeated.

Whether the Anzacs had been defeated in the military sense of the term is debatable, but they had certainly not defeated the Turkish reserves. The Turks had gained the dominant position by the end of the day. Nor could they claim to have won a victory, they had not driven the Turks from the field. Nor could they claim success. While they had diverted Turkish reserves onto themselves, they had failed to achieve their operational objectives and had, in fact, been forced back from their initial gains into a position that was barely tenable and militarily very weak. Both Godly and Bridges believed the situation was so bad that they urged Birdwood to request an evacuation of the whole force. Birdwood, albeit reluctantly, relayed the request to Hamilton. This is hardly the reaction of a victorious force that has just “defeated the main Turkish force”. As Beans says (Vol 1 p452) " It did not need a brain of the acuteness of Colonel White's to realise the landing at Gaba Tepe had failed in its object." And that from a highly regarded and distinguished Australian officer who, as Chief of Staff 1st Division, was in a key position to know the true situation as to whether the Anzacs had won a victory or failed in its objective.

Thus I stand by my original statement that initiated this exchange, I don't think anyone can seriously consider that the Landing on the 25th was an Anzac victory. Nor do I believe that we can seriously claim that the Turkish reserves were defeated; they certainly lost heavy casualties but they achieved what they were supposed to do and prevented the Anzacs from getting to first base.

Regards

Chris

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Chris, I agree. It could be argued that the Anzacs were not defeated on the 25th, but this is not the same as saying they were victorious.

Robert

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Hi Robert,

I am assuming that you agree with my position. :)

The reason I say that it is debatable whether the Anzacs were defeated is firstly, they remained on the battlefield and held the final line. On the other hand, both Godly and Bridges argued for immediate evacuation that evening, which Birdwood assented to. Thus the Anzac Commanders wanted to withdraw from the battlefield, which is an acceptance of defeat. That they were unable to do so was because they didn't have the means to withdraw and Hamilton refused, imploring them to "dig, dig dig and hold on". Had Hamilton assented to the request for evacuation and provided the boats, there seems little doubt that the Anzac commanders would have attempted it. Thus it could be argued the Commanders on the ground had accepted defeat and the reason the force was not defeated in the full sense of the word is because they didn't have the means to withdraw. That is not to say I think a hasty evacuation would have been successful, I think it would have been disastrous in the circumstances. I come down on the side of what actually happened, ANZAC remained on the battlefield and thus could not be considered to have been defeated. But as you say, this quite different to claiming a victory. Although do I accept that others could reasonably argue that the Anzacs were defeated because they failed to achieve even their initial objectives.

Regards

Chris

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Chris

Thanks for the considered and lengthy reply. I agree with a lot of it, but not all, and we will have to battle this out further when the next meeting of the Canberra Pals takes place.

For now let me mention two points. 1) You say the Ottoman reserve did what it was supposed to do. What do you think of my point that a reserve is supposed to keep itself available to do what its army commander says and not go charging off after the nearest enemy as soon as they appear, which is what Kemal did. 2) In part in your reply you assess the battle in the context of the campaign which is not what I was doing. This does of course give a different perspective. It is easy to find battles that were victories in the context of the day (which is all I claim) but in the context of a larger canvas, the campaign, they look much less impressive. Ligny 1815, Lutzen 1632, Dresden 1813 and Prague 1757 are a couple of examples that come to mind as I saw them recently.

Peter

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This is a fascinating thread.

Both accounts are well reasoned and balanced and I find myself agreeing alternatively with both.

Ultimately, it would seem to me that neither side was victorious on the day even though both had achieved part of their aims. And by the same token, neither had been defeated either because both remained intact and with the ability to continue the fight.

I think 'stalemate' best sums up the events of the day. (as it does ytour debate :D )

Cheers,

Tim L.

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Guest Bill Woerlee

Peter & Chris

Thanks for the time and effort in presenting a history of the landings. I understand how much time and effort these comments take and thus have read them carefully to make sure I have fully understood the thrusts of your arguments. As I have said, fascinating stuff and thank you for sharing it on this forum.

I am not as sanguine about the outcome as Robert appears to be. There are absences of evidence whereupon a proof seems to be drawn in defining the nature of victory and defeat. While acknowledging that the binary of the English language is deficient in creating an alternative explanation - we are stuck with the terms "victory" and "defeat" - neither of you have actually given any indication as to the nature of these terms in your discussion, possibly fundamental in establishing a thesis. In so doing there appears to be a confused centre where it is difficult to see sense.

Take for instance the tasks assigned to the different forces. It is argued above that each force did they did what they were supposed to do. The Anzacs landed and held the territory while the Turks counter attacked and hemmed everyone in. Indulge me here but this reminds me of the argument between efficient and effective. A bus can be efficient if it follows the route and fails to pick up any passengers, indeed it is far more efficient than one that picks up passengers. Obviously it is less effective than the one that picks up passengers. In each case the bus is doing what it is supposed to do. Now equating it to the above argument, since both forces were doing what they were supposed to do, I feel the actual question is more about the effective completion of the task.

Similarly, if we are to employ this argument that forces did what they were supposed to do, then we can mount a good case that the Turks did not lose at Beersheba and nor did the allies win. While not wishing to take the argument in that territory, I am just pointing out the logical conclusions that may be drawn.

Perhaps for matters of clarity, it might be of benefit if Peter and Chris were to list in dot point the theoretical elements that comprise victory or defeat and then check them off against the history. Apart from clearing up any misunderstandings, it would help the struggling reader actually come to grips with what you fellows are really saying in your essays.

Cheers

Bill

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I`m gratified by the tone and knowledge expressed in these posts. May I draw on that knowledge to ask how it`s considered that the Anzac landing compared with the other landings of the day in terms of the aims and the degree to which those aims were achieved?

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Phil

Thanks for the compliment. Just a quick reply. I see the French landing as successful in that it kept the Ottomans in doubt about which was the main Allied effort for the crucial first couple of days. Helles, as the main landing, was a total failure. The reason I say this is by the afternoon 29 Div, on the front of X to W beaches, outnumbered the local Ottomans by six to one. Apart from those holding the line they had built up six fresh battalions on shore but not engaged. Had this force been thrown at Achi Baba ( the objective) I reckon it would have fallen. With no Ottoman reserve available at Cape Helles, as it had been unwisely committed against the Anzacs, there was a possibility of the whole operation succeeding.

Peter

I`m gratified by the tone and knowledge expressed in these posts. May I draw on that knowledge to ask how it`s considered that the Anzac landing compared with the other landings of the day in terms of the aims and the degree to which those aims were achieved?

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PS. While writing the book I wargamed the landing half a dozen times to test out some maybes.
Peter, how did you wargame the landing? Which rules? Reproduction of terrain? Thanks for the extra details.

Robert

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Robert

Re wargaming - we did the Anzac landing only. I was in the Top End wargames group in Darwin, Northern Territory. We used our own set of WWI rules and the figures were 6mm with one base representing one company or two guns. The scale was 200mm=1 kilometre and the table was 2.5 metres long. Terrain was very accurate-took a while to do. We left it set up over several weeks and several different 'teams' of wargamers played both sides with different deployments and landing plans to get an idea of what would work and what would not work. In none of the games did the Anzacs do any better than the real thing-usually worse. As I mentioned earlier the theme that ran through all the games was the power of the Ottoman artillery. Whenever the Anzacs tried to manoeuvre they got badly shot up while the Ottomans did not have the same problem- The RNs naval bombardment was, according to Ottoman sources, fairly useless and I accept this assessment .

Not everyone thinks wargames are useful when you try to analyse a battle but I think they are so the outcome of the games contributed to my belief that the Anzacs did the right thing on day one- they stopped and dug in as best they could on the first useful bit of terrain, Second Ridge. This served to minimise, to some degree, the amount of damage done by the Ottoman artillery. It is not widely known that the scale of Ottoman artillery available on 25 April was roughly the equivalent to that on the western front in 1915. On the Anzac front the Ottomans had 9,000 men and 44 guns. Thats 5 guns per thousand men which is a lot of artillery. I argue in the book that the bombardment of the afternoon of 25 April, preparatory to the main Ottoman counter attack, probably exceeded in weight of shot that by the Brits at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915.

Peter

to be as accurate as possible

Peter, how did you wargame the landing? Which rules? Reproduction of terrain? Thanks for the extra details.

Robert

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It is not widely known that the scale of Ottoman artillery available on 25 April was roughly the equivalent to that on the western front in 1915. On the Anzac front the Ottomans had 9,000 men and 44 guns. Thats 5 guns per thousand men which is a lot of artillery. I argue in the book that the bombardment of the afternoon of 25 April, preparatory to the main Ottoman counter attack, probably exceeded in weight of shot that by the Brits at Neuve Chapelle in March 1915.

Peter

I haven`t seen this argument before, Peter, and I find the quantifying of gun density per 1000 attackers unusual - it`s more usually guns/length of front attacked? Would you maintain that the Anzac barrage exceeded that at Neuve Chappelle when taking into account gun density per length of front, calibre of guns, type of shell, static nature of NC entrenchments etc?

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Phil

Using the ratio of guns per thousand men gives me away as not being a 20th Century specialist. From about 1700 it has been a standard way of assessing the power of an army's artillery though I have myself noticed that from 1914 it is more common to speak of guns per length of front. I can see the point of that too but I think the original method is at least as useful.

As to Neuve Chappelle, where incidentally I was a few weeks ago considering this very point, I do believe the Ottoman bombardment was greater. Having said that I made a very simple sum in my book. I just calculated, from good but less than complete evidence, what I thought the total weight of shot was in each case and the Ottomans seemed to win that one over the BEF. As you point out one of the differences was that the Hun trenches were well established whereas the Anzacs were pretty much a target in the open on the day of the landing. It is a complex question and more research might prove me wrong. My main point was just to remind everyone that the Ottomans had an awful lot of artillery on hand on 25 April and that their bombardment was at least comparable to similar things happening at the same time on the western front.

Peter

Peter

QUOTE (Phil_B @ May 23 2008, 06:11 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>
I haven`t seen this argument before, Peter, and I find the quantifying of gun density per 1000 attackers unusual - it`s more usually guns/length of front attacked? Would you maintain that the Anzac barrage exceeded that at Neuve Chappelle when taking into account gun density per length of front, calibre of guns, type of shell, static nature of NC entrenchments etc?
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"The Battle of Neuve Chapelle began on March 10, 1915, at 8:05 a.m., when British forces attempted to break through the German trenches at Neuve Chapelle and capture the village of Aubers, less than a mile to the east. In the opening assault, 342 guns barraged the trenches for 35 minutes, partially directed by 85 reconnaissance aircraft flying overhead. The total number of shells fired during this barrage exceeded the number fired in the whole of the Boer War, a frightening testament to how much the nature of war had changed in less than 15 years.

Following the opening barrage, British and Indian infantry forces immediately moved in to attack the German trench line along a 4,000-yard-long front." (http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=Article&id=340)

This compares with:- "On the Anzac front the Ottomans had 9,000 men and 44 guns." I`m trying to follow your contention here, Peter - are you saying that the length of the Turkish barrage made up for the comparitively low number of guns?

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1) You say the Ottoman reserve did what it was supposed to do. What do you think of my point that a reserve is supposed to keep itself available to do what its army commander says and not go charging off after the nearest enemy as soon as they appear, which is what Kemal did.

Peter,

Sorry I haven't replied to your questions earlier - it has been a very busy week.

With regard to your question of the employment of reserves. My point was that a reserve is required to reinforce the main line or be available to react to unexpected situations which is what some of the Turkish reserves did at Anzac on the morning of the 25th April. Your point "that a reserve is supposed to keep itself available to do what its army commander says and not go charging off after the nearest enemy as soon as they appear, which is what Kemal did." really depends on the doctrine pertaining at the time to the use of reserves . Fundamentally, you quite rightly question whether Kemel's actions were appropriate, given whose reserve it really was.

In terms of British and French doctrine you are quite correct in saying that, in general, a reserve is controlled by the Commander whose reserve it is and doesn't react until that controlling officer directs it to undertake a particular task. In the case of the 19th Division the controlling officer or superior commander was Liman von Saunders, Commander 5th Army; and under British and French doctrine it would wait for his orders and directions. This approach does not allow much initiative from the reserve force commander to react to a situation without orders from above.

On the other hand, German doctrine at the time allowed a much greater level of initiative from its subordinate commanders and, in fact, expected its officers to use their initiative in order to take appropriate action when they saw the need to. This was based on the German concepts of (i) Bewegungskrieg, (ii) "the independence of subordinate commanders", often erroneously described as Aufstragtatik or "mission orders", and (iii) an aggressive approach on contact with the enemy.

Bewegungskrieg or war of movement, meant the manoeuvre of large units to strike the enemy a sharp, often annihilating blow as rapidly as possible.

The "independence of subordinate commanders" meant that commanders were given a mission to achieve but the method and means were theirs alone and they were expected to use their initiative to achieve the object of that mission; indeed they were expected to disobey orders if they felt those orders would not allow them to achieve the mission. Thus if a reserve commander saw a situation that required him to act in order to achieve the overall mission of the force he belonged to, he was expected to act without waiting for orders from above. It was a level of initiative rarely seen in the British or French armies and had been ingrained in German officers since the compact made between Frederick William and the Junkers in the late 17th Century.

The aggressive approach on contact with the enemy was designed to dominate the situation and seize the initiative from the enemy. On the battlefield German tactics, sometimes called "swarm tactics", were offensively oriented and required commanders to aggressively close with the enemy and wrest the initiative from him. Flanking units and reserves were expected to march to the sound of the guns to support the force in contact and thus build up a local superiority on the battlefield and if possible outflank him. On occasion this led to inferior German forces taking on a superior enemy force and winning by sheer aggression and bluff; the Battle of Mars la Tour in 1870 being an example of such.

The Germans had been training the Turkish Army for several years before the war and the German Military Attache in Istanbul had been successful in getting Turkish officers trained in Germany, particularly at the German War Academy. To what extent these German doctrines were inculcated in Turkish officers is hard to say and whether Mustafa Kemal trained in Germany I do not know, but the influence was there. Von Saunders was schooled in this doctrine and it is likely he discussed his expectations with his Turkish subordinates - their reactions on the morning of the 25th April tend to bear this out. Thus, Mustafa Kemel's actions on that day were very much in accordance with what von Saunders would have expected him to do.

With regard to Mustafa Kemel's actions and the deployment of the 19th Division. The initial request came from the Commander 9th Division, who asked Kemel to "send one battalion to Ari Burnu in order to meet the invaders". Kemel, realizing the importance of Hill 971 and having received information that the enemy were making for that feature, decided to intervene himself and took the whole of the 57th Regiment with him. (Bean Vol 1. p448; see also Cameron, 25th April 1915, p90). The rest of the 19th Division (72nd and 77th Regiments) remained near Mal Tepe. Kemel ordered the 77th Regiment forward after he had assessed the situation on the ground and it arrived late that afternoon. III Corps commander, Esat Pasa, authorised the deployment of the the 72nd Regiment after midday and it arrived on the battlefield about nightfall. (Bean Vol 1, p449, 452; Cameron. p181, 240, 244). This seems a reasonable approach to the situation.

I'm afraid I haven't time to address your second question at the moment but will do so later.

Cheers

Chris

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Phil

Right again Phil. I just looked up what I wrote several years ago-did not remember it fully. The point was if you look at the length of front under bombardment and the weight of shot fired then 25 April can be compared to similar events on the western front like Neuve Chapelle. The front was shorter at Anzac but the number of shells probably fired (we dont have precise data) was greatly in excess of the short Brit bombardment at NC. The Ottomans also had a larger proportion of heavy guns.

The relationship of X number of guns per thousand troops is a different point. Its just a way of expressing if an army has lots of guns or not. For example Napoleonic armies aimed for four guns per thousand and sometimes had six. Great War armies aimed for even more than this.

Peter

QUOTE (Phil_B @ May 23 2008, 11:13 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>
"The Battle of Neuve Chapelle began on March 10, 1915, at 8:05 a.m., when British forces attempted to break through the German trenches at Neuve Chapelle and capture the village of Aubers, less than a mile to the east. In the opening assault, 342 guns barraged the trenches for 35 minutes, partially directed by 85 reconnaissance aircraft flying overhead. The total number of shells fired during this barrage exceeded the number fired in the whole of the Boer War, a frightening testament to how much the nature of war had changed in less than 15 years.

Following the opening barrage, British and Indian infantry forces immediately moved in to attack the German trench line along a 4,000-yard-long front." (http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=Article&id=340)

This compares with:- "On the Anzac front the Ottomans had 9,000 men and 44 guns." I`m trying to follow your contention here, Peter - are you saying that the length of the Turkish barrage made up for the comparitively low number of guns?

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The front was shorter at Anzac but the number of shells probably fired (we dont have precise data) was greatly in excess of the short Brit bombardment at NC. The Ottomans also had a larger proportion of heavy guns.

Peter,

If we don't have precise data for the Turkish artillery at Anzac then how can we state that the Ottoman bombardment was probably greatly in excess of that fired at NC. Surely that is speculation rather than a finding based on hard evidence.

You have said that in every scenario in the wargame you played, the Anzacs were "cut to pieces". Yet while the Anzacs were certainly shelled on the 25th April and there is evidence that a number of troops found it very discomforting, there is no evidence that the Anzacs were actually "cut to pieces" on the 25th April 1915. The position they took up on Second Ridge was confined and cramped but if they were not "cut to pieces" in the actual battle in such a conjested area then one has to question the validity of the parameters used during the wargame.

I am assuming that some of the scenarios you tested included them taking their initial objectives, the high ground on the Sari Bair Range and along Third Ridge, or at least taking up a position forward of Second Ridge. This was a considerably larger area and provided a greater dispersal of troops across the ground. Surely these larger areas and the consequent greater dispersal of troops on the ground would have lessened the concentration of Turkish artillery fire across the whole front and thus lessened the ability for them to cut the Anzacs to pieces, unless of course all 44 guns fired on the same target at the same time.

Do we know when each Turkish battery actually deployed onto the battlefield during the 25th April? A message from 19th Division to 9th Division sent at 0825 said that the 57th Regiment and a battery of field guns departed Boghali at 0810 and the Commander of the 27th Regiment has said that his scouts began engaging the Anzacs on Third Ridge at 0830 hours and that he had only a single field gun available to him when he was ready to launch his later attack. The battery supporting the 27th Regiment had not yet appeared. This was two and half hours after the Anzacs halted their advance on Second Ridge. Thus it would appear from the evidence that the Turkish artillery only came into action piecemeal during mid to late morning and we do not know when all 44 guns were finally engaged in the battle.

Do we know the locations each of the Turkish batteries actually took up during the battle and whether all were engaging with direct fire (the most accurate and more responsive means to changing targets at that time of the war) or indirect fire (which was not as accurate and less responsive to changing targets at that time)?

Do we know the first line ammunition scales per gun held within the batteries and the second line ammunition holdings per battery held by the ammunition columns further to the rear? Do we know the actual expenditure of Turkish artillery ammunition on the day? Where these scalings and expenditure applied during the wargame? Apparently not. Do we know how quickly the guns were re-supplied from the second line holdings as it was highly unlikely they created dumps behind the battery positions?

Do we know the way in which targets were engaged? Were the batteries centrally controlled onto one nominated target or was fire control and target engagement under battery control? We know that at one point the transports and the troops coming ashore mid- morning were engaged by artillery while other guns fired on Second Ridge. Thus it appears from the evidence that the Turkish artillery did not fire concentration fire missions but that they engaged targets over a wide area - this disperses the fire of the guns available. It is also doubtful that fire control and direction was coordinated centrally and thus the ability for all 44 guns to switch targets quickly was considerably reduced.

If we are to say that the Turkish artillery and its effect can be accurately gauged from a wargame then these details have to be factored into the wargame. If they are not known and they are not applied to the wargame parameters, then we are guessing what the actual effects would have been?

If we are to transpose the results of a wargame and claim that this is what would have happened in the actual battle is to assume that the Turks would have reacted in exactly the same way as those playing the wargame. It would also require the wargame to accurately represent the disposition of guns, their fire control and direction, the targets actually engaged and the ammunition actually expended as the Turks would have done had they been presented with the same scenarios as the wargamers . Surely we cannot claim this? While wargames are useful in analyzing possible results they cannot be said to actually replicate what would have happened on the actual battlefield in the sense that if the Anzacs did this the Turks would have done this, or if they had moved here all 44 guns would have engaged them at that point and at this time. We all know that it is quite easy to prove a particular theory through wargames provided we set the parameters to allow the theory to be proven.

Cheers

Chris

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2) In part in your reply you assess the battle in the context of the campaign which is not what I was doing. This does of course give a different perspective. It is easy to find battles that were victories in the context of the day (which is all I claim) but in the context of a larger canvas, the campaign, they look much less impressive.

Peter,

If I my post gave that impression I am sorry, it is not what was intended. I am assessing the results of the battle in the context of the objectives the Anzacs were set for the 25th April. Of these the 1st Australian Division objective, of the Sari Bair Heights to Hill 971 and a position along Third Ridge from Battleship Hill to Gaba Tepe, was intended to be taken on the first morning. This position was to cover the deployment of the rest of the Corps on the 25th April, and then the Corps, less those on the Sari Bair range, was to advance to the line running from Hill 971 to Mal Tepe. Whether or not this second line was to be secured by the evening of the 25th April is unclear but Bean gives the impression it was. I need to read the actual Corps Orders and Instructions to see if a time by which the line was to be captured is given. Nonetheless, the line at its deepest point at Mal Tepe is 6500 yards from the landing beaches, which is considerably shorter than the 10,500 yards the 29th Division had to advance to secure the Achi Baba Heights on the 25th. It would make military sense to secure that line as quickly as possible and Map 7 in Bean Vol1, p227 clearly shows the Mal Tepe line as the objective of the Corps at the landing. Therefore I think it is fair to say that the intention was for ANZAC to secure this line by the evening of the 25th April. Whether they could or not is a separate issue.

Thus in the context of the objectives they were set, the Anzacs failed to achieve even the initial objective of 1st Australian Division and the failure to do so does not constitute a success let alone a victory.

To compare Ligney, Lutzen etc with the Anzac objectives and action on the 25th April is, IMO, comparing apples with lemons. The campaign contexts and objectives, the scale of the campaign areas and the battles within them are quite different from the context, scale and intentions at Anzac.

Cheers

Chris

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we are stuck with the terms "victory" and "defeat" - neither of you have actually given any indication as to the nature of these terms in your discussion,

Perhaps for matters of clarity, it might be of benefit if Peter and Chris were to list in dot point the theoretical elements that comprise victory or defeat and then check them off against the history.

Bill,

Apologies for taking so long to come back to you.

The following quote is taken from my post that you refer to

To claim victory, by the standard measure of the term, they would have to defeat the Turks such that the Turks would be forced to withdraw from the battlefield; the recognised measure of defeat is that the defeated force withdraws or is driven from the battlefield.

There are not a series of dot point elements against which to "measure" victory and defeat. The crux of the issue is who holds the battlefield, the dominant position and the initiative at the end of the fighting. In terms of the old conventional battles the accepted military criteria of victory is when one Army either destroys the enemy force as an effective fighting force or forces it to break off the action and withdraw from the battlefield leaving the contested ground or area in the hands of the victor; leaving the victor in a dominant position and with the initiative to carry out further actions in accordance with his campaign plans. The accepted criteria for defeat is that the enemy has either been destroyed as an effective fighting force or they have been forced to disengage and withdraw, or retreat, from the battle area so as to avoid destruction or to preserve the force to fight at a later date and in another place. At Anzac neither side could claim victory as both forces remained in contact and in possession of the battlefield; although the Turks held the dominant position being in a significantly more advantageous position than were the Anzacs and they retained the initiative as to fighting the rest of the campaign.

When at the end of the fighting, if neither side retires from the field and both are prepared to offer battle on the morrow, then neither can claim victory until if on the morrow one of the Armies withdraws and quits the battle area. Thus at the Battle of Antietam (19 Sep 1862) at the end of the battle we see Lee refusing to withdraw that evening and offering to continue the battle on the 20th. McClellan did not attack Lee's line that day but remained on the field facing him. Lee withdrew that evening (night 20th/21st) and retreated back over the Potomac into Virginia thus ending the 1862 Maryland Campaign. McClellan could claim victory. Some historians claim Lee won a tactical victory and McClellan won a strategic victory - but that is splitting hairs. At the tactical level neither won a victory on the 19th and by withdrawing from the battlefield on the evening of the 20th Lee accepted defeat. Lee did the same thing on 4th July 1863 at Gettysburg, after having failed to drive the Union forces off Cemetary Ridge on 2nd and 3rd July, finally accepting defeat when he withdrew on the evening of the 4th.

There are two other related terms: success and failure. These are not necessarily the same as defeat and victory. They are a measure of whether or not a force has achieved its mission or the objectives it has been tasked with. Thus while the Anzacs were successful in drawing off a number of the Turkish reserves, they failed in achieving even their first objectives. The Turks were successful in containing the Anzac landings to the initial beach head. In the Antietam example above while Lee was successful in defending his line on the 19th, he could not claim victory over McClellan. McClellan remained on the field with a significantly larger forces and was quite able to attack Lee again on the 20th if he had chosen to. Lee was not in a position to drive McClellan away and, in fact, was in a very dangerous position with the Potomac at his back

In more modern battles, and particularly in the Great War, attacking forces may have been successful in breaking into the opposition line but in most instances they were unsuccessful in achieving their mission or indeed the objectives they were seeking to attain. Nor were they able to defeat the enemy or force him to withdraw.

I hope this clarifies the terms.

Cheers

Chris

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