Corporal Patrick Cotter RIR

[Pat Twomey]

I am doing some research into my wife's grand uncle and have a question that someone may be able to help me with. I have determined that Corporal Patrick Cotter of the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles was reported KIA on 26/10/1916. However according to Taylor's excellent book - the battalion on the 24th moved to the rear for some deserved rest.

Trying to find out how and where he was killed I noted that since the 21/10/1916 the battalion was used as supply and carrying parties to the remainder of the Brigade and in this period (21-23 October) casualties were two officers and six men killed while 87 were wounded and 6 were reported missing. The next day the battalion moved to the rear. The question is could my man have been one of the six reported missing and then on the 26th reported as killed in action or is it more probable that he was killed in some action in the rear?

I will be in London in a few weeks time and am wondering if the war diaries for that period could tell me something about the six missing soldiers and if any action occurred in the rear - or if someone has the war diaries for that period maybe they could let me know if the contents are relevant to my search.

Thanks in anticipation

Pat

[Pat Twomey]

Doing a search through Geoff's search engine for RIR's who were kia on 26/10/1916 there were 16 results. Fourteen of these were from the 1st Batt one from the 2nd (Patrick Cotter mentioned above) and one from the 11th Batt.

This leads me to believe that Patrick Cotter may have been attached to the 1st Batt at this particular time and was wondering if it was unusual for soldiers to transfer between battalions?

Would be grateful if anyone could let me know what operation the 1st Battalion were involved with on the 26th Oct.

Thanks

Pat

[Desmond7]

Excerpt from Falls history 1-7 Btns R Ir Rif in Great War

from October 9 to end October ... I see your dilemma.

On the 9th the 7th Brigade captured Stuff Redoubt, on the 74th Brigade's flank, holding it against counter-attacks next day. * On the 13th the Battalion took over a portion of the front line. The moment was unpleasant for the change, since our guns had begun to cut wire for the next advance to the Ancre Valley, and the German retaliation was considerable. The Battalion had, however, no more than eleven men wounded in the first twenty-four hours, and held itself lucky.

In the early hours of the 21st it was relieved by the three other battalions of the Brigade, which were to carry out the new advance. The trench which the Battalion evacuated and was to take over again as soon as the assault was launched was called Hessian Trench, and ran from the Courcelette - Grandcourt road, a thousand yards north-west of Courcelette, to the neighbourhood of the Thiepval - -Grandcourt road, due east and west. The objective was Regina Trench, which ran parallel to it, four to five hundred yards farther north. The attack was carried out by the 18th Division on the right and the 25th on the left. The 74th Brigade was in touch with the 18th Division, and had the 75th Brigade on its left. Immediately the attacking battalions had left Hessian Trench, two platoons of "A" and two platoons of "B" Companies of the Royal Irish Rifles filed into it to garrison it. The assault was successful., and the remainder of the Battalion at once began its work of carrying forward bombs and ammunition to Regina Trench. This work was of the greatest difficulty. The ground was literally ploughed up - there had been heavy rain of late - and it was no light task for a man to cross it with only his own rifle and equipment. To carry forward buckets or bags of bombs and boxes of small-arm ammunition, to say nothing of petrol-tins of water, in the face of heavy artillery fire, was a job for which many of the men would have not unwillingly exchanged that of advancing to the attack.

Fortunately, the great German bombardment did far less damage than might have been expected. The casualties of the Riflemen were light. * Those of the whole Brigade were less than a thousand, of which over 650 were wounded, while the Brigade had taken 4 officers and 474 other ranks. It had been one of those actions, not too frequent in the Somme fighting, of which we can say with certainty that the losses of the defenders must have been considerably in excess of those of the attackers. The 25th Division had added new fame to the high reputation already won in this campaign.

The Brigade was relieved next day, and on the 24th marched from Harponville to the coveted quarters of Beauval. Here it was inspected by the Fifth Army Commander, General Sir Hubert Gough, who complimented all the battalions upon their great work in the Somme fighting. This marked the end of the Battalion's sojourn in this part of the line, which, as the fates willed, it was not to revisit. On the 30th it marched to Candas and took train to Caestre, in Flanders, on the main road between Cassel and Bailleul.

[Pat Twomey]

Thanks Desmond 7,

Most of the information seems to be about the history of the 2nd Battalion RIR, which was part of the 74th Brigade of the 25th Division. This was the Bt. Patrick Cotter joined but because of the casualties of the 1st Bt. I was thinking maybe he was attached to this Bt. instead. The 1st Bt. was part of the 25th Brigade of the 8th Division and I would be interested if you had any information of the action they were involved with that day in which they lost at least 14 men.

Again thanks for your help.

Pat

[Desmond7]

Same source 1st Btn. relevant timescale - hope this helps.

The 1st Battalion Royal Irish Rifles was in an attack on the Somme on October 23rd, only two days after the advance near Grandcourt in which the 2nd had been engaged. This was, however, nearly eight miles from the scene of the former action, and at the other flank of the British front of attack. Here the Allies had bitten deeply into the German positions, the British right being ten miles from the old front line in the same latitude. All the three main German lines of defence which had existed in July had been penetrated, but, the advance having taken upwards of four months, the Germans had had time to dig and wire as they fell back, and now had equally strong defences in front.

The object of the attack in question was to get within striking distance of the village of Le Transloy, on the Bapaume - Peronne road, from the present position between Morval and Lesboeufs. The 8th Division was to attack with all three brigades in line, the 23rd on the right, the 25th in the centre, and the 24th on the left. The 25th Brigade had two successive objectives, the first partly represented by a trench known as Zenith Trench, and partly represented by an imaginary line prolonging this trench to the left (and north-west) to another trench known as Misty Trench. The second objective was three hundred yards beyond the first. The advance to these objectives was to be carried out by the 2nd Lincolnshire on the right and the 2nd Rifle Brigade on the left. Somewhat unfortunately, "zero," originally fixed at 9.30 a.m., was postponed five hours, till 2.30 p.m.

At the time appointed two companies of each of the leading battalions sprang forward so closely upon the heels of the barrage, which they had been instructed to hug, that a few men were hit by our shrapnel in the advance. On the Lincolnshires' front there occurred a curious incident, as a result of which, through the supreme gallantry of a single German officer, the Battalion's attack failed to win its section of Zenith Trench. Those who know anything of the war need not to be told that the psychological moment in an infantry attack following a creeping barrage is that when the barrage lifts off the trench

to be captured. However closely the leading wave has kept to the moving wall of the barrage, it is impossible to avoid giving the enemy opportunity to man his parapet to some extent before the attacking bayonets are on him - if he be resolute enough to take that opportunity. But men who have crouched in the shelter of a dug-out or have lain shuddering in the bottom of a trench upon which shells are crashing down often take longer to recover themselves than it takes for determined and well-led troops to cross the intervening ground. If they do, they are commonly lost. The moral and physical impetus of attacking, supposing the troops on either side to be of equally good quality, is worth a reinforcement of one hundred per cent.

At Ypres, in the following year, not only was the defence fluid, but the soil was also. Over and over again the most gallant men in the British Army lost the barrage at the last moment from sheer inability to drag their feet from the glue-like mud. On the Somme at its worst the mud was bad, but never so bad as this, and it was above all the close and resolute following up of the barrage that was bringing us our successes.

In this case, as we have shown, the troops had closed up as much as they dared, having even had some men hit by our shrapnel. Just as the barrage moved off Zenith Trench, a German officer was seen to spring up and run along the parapet, signalling to his men to line it. Almost immediately there burst out such an intense fire from light machine guns and rifles that the attack was stopped dead. If ever one man held up an assault by his own exertions, this German officer did so.

The incident has been described in detail partly because of its interest and partly because of its important after-effects. On the left the 2nd Rifle Brigade went forward with its accustomed dash. The platoon directed upon the junction of Zenith and Eclipse Trenches (the latter a communication trench running into the former at right angles) was beaten off by machine-gun and rifle fire; several of the Germans, doubtless inspired by the high example they had been given, had been observed to kneel upon their parapet. On the left of thin point, however, the objective was attained - that is, the line between Zenith Trench and Misty Trench was reached.

Now the 1st Royal Irish Rifles advanced by platoons, at fifty paces interval, in single file to take over Rainbow and Spider Trenches, from which the leading battalions had gone forward. The Battalion had to pass through a heavy barrage, and had serious loss, but went through with remarkable steadiness. It was in position at 3.15 p.m.; but it was found impossible to organize the speedy attack upon Zenith Trench which would have had the best chance of success. Not till 8 p.m. did orders arrive for the new attack, to be carried out by two companies of the 2nd Royal Berks on the right, and two of the 1st Royal Irish Rifles on the left, at 3.50 a.m. next morning.

This assault was likewise a failure. The two companies of the Royal Irish Rifles, A" in the lead, "B" following it at twenty-five paces distance, went forward well enough, but the assault was simply swept away, losing fifty per cent. of its strength in a few seconds. The line was thus left in a curious position, in which it was to remain for several days. On the right the 23rd Brigade held a considerable length of Zenith Trench; then came a gap of over two hundred and fifty yards held by the enemy; then a line of shell-holes, linked together in a few cases by now, held by the 2nd Rifle Brigade. The attack, it will be seen, had achieved a very limited measure of success.

The Royal Irish Rifles remained three more days in line, under heavy and continuous bombardment, and then, on the 26th, relief took them to no better place than Trones Wood, where the bivouacs were full of water. On the 28th they were back again in close

support in Spider Trench. A new attack to secure the still uncaptured portion of Zenith Trench had been planned for next day; the 2nd Devons, of the 23rd Brigade, and 1st Sherwood Foresters, of the 24th, being lent to the 25th Brigade for the operation. It had, however, rained incessantly, and the ground was becoming well nigh impassable. According to the report, the attack was for this reason postponed. Actually it would appear that the commanding officers in front line decided it would be madness and wanton throwing away of lives to attempt it under these conditions, and announced their respectful refusal to do so. It was necessary to leave the half-done job to be finished off by someone else. On October 30th the Battalion returned to the doubtful comfort of Trones Wood. It had suffered very heavily in numbers and in health and strength. Its losses were - 1 officer killed, 8 wounded * ; 20 other ranks killed, 143 wounded, and 43 missing, of whom the great majority must have been killed also. As for the other side of the case, the exposure, the cold, the wet of winter warfare practically without cover, beggar description. No man can long withstand them, and none can endure the period these had endured without an almost intolerable strain, which had frequently serious after-effects upon the constitution of individuals.

Citadel Camp, where the Battalion passed the night of the 31st, was no Elysium. It was a camp of tents, never very comfortable in winter, even when those tents have floor-boards, as in this case they had not. Here, about midnight, there arrived suddenly, quite unheralded....in accordance with that sense of humour for which the transport services were famous - and as it were "out of the blue," an enormous draft of 6 officers and 425 other ranks. Like everyone else, they were wet through; but, unlike everyone else, they had had neither tea nor supper. Those who have known its like will be able to call up for both ear and eye what followed among those clammy tents in the darkness, as food and accommodation were found for that forlorn and rain-sodden draft, half a battalion in strength.

[Pat Twomey]

"Not till 8 p.m. did orders arrive for the new attack, to be carried out by two companies of the 2nd Royal Berks on the right, and two of the 1st Royal Irish Rifles on the left, at 3.50 a.m. next morning. This assault was likewise a failure. The two companies of the Royal Irish Rifles, A" in the lead, "B" following it at twenty-five paces distance, went forward well enough, but the assault was simply swept away, losing fifty per cent. of its strength in a few seconds.

The line was thus left in a curious position, in which it was to remain for several days. On the right the 23rd Brigade held a considerable length of Zenith Trench; then came a gap of over two hundred and fifty yards held by the enemy; then a line of shell-holes, linked together in a few cases by now, held by the 2nd Rifle Brigade. The attack, it will be seen, had achieved a very limited measure of success. The Royal Irish Rifles remained three more days in line, under heavy and continuous bombardment, and then, on the 26th, relief took them to no better place than Trones Wood, where the bivouacs were full of water".

That's excellent information Desmond and thanks for the reply. If it wasn't unusual for soldiers to transfer between Battalions I would guess that this is where Pte Patrick Cotter met his death. The heavy casualties for the three days from the 23rd Oct was a huge price to pay for 'a very limited measure of success' but such was the reality for those involved in such a war. If this is indeed where he was kia then he was probably one of the:

'43 missing, of whom the great majority must have been killed also'

He would also seemingly have been killed hours before the Bt were relieved and sent to Trones Wood for some well deserved 'rest'.

I'm still hopeful that someone can tell me if it was possible that some members of the 2nd Bt were transferred to the 1st Bt?

Again thanks for your help

Pat