Inventing the Schlieffen Plan

[Chris Boonzaier]

....My informant states that the Servian Government will be required to adopt certain definite measures in restraint of nationalist and anarchist propaganda, and that Austro-Hungarian Government are in no mood to parley with Servia, but will insist on immediate unconditional compliance, failing which force will be used.Germany is said to be in complete agreement with this procedure....

....My informant said that he presumed that Russia would not wish to protect racial assassins, but in any case Austria-Hungary would go ahead regardless of results.....

You have to be of the GeorgeWB school of world affairs to seriously advance the opinion that anyone but Austria and Germany were to blame.

[Terry Duncan]

As I have already noted;

It is fair to say this view has very limited acceptance.

Maybe we should try making the argument that Germany had already twice violated the treaty, with the war on Austria in 1866 and France in 1870, therefore they fully expected everyone else to have such scant regard for other signitory powers as Prussia cleary had, or that all treaties only apply in a way to suit Germany/Prussia who also reserves the right to disavow them at a moment she sees fit, whilst holding all others to srupulous observance of the terms.

This would of course be just as stupid as your idea that states signing the 1839 treaty had somehow bound themselves to never fight again, though my suggestion at least has the merit it is not meant to be serious.

Note that the resolution of Grey's policy dilemma a vs. Britain's legal obligation to Germany under the treaty of 1839 is in Hardinge's minute about fingers.

There was hardly a dilema, self interest and common sense demanded that Britain would not declare war on an ally in order to aid an enemy, or that she would sit back and allow an enemy to violate Belgium.

However, it could just as easily be said that Grey did lift a finger when Germany acted in 1914 and did indeed give her that finger!

[Glenn239]

...<snip>...

If, as I believe, you wish to "prove" that Germany had no choice but to violate Belgian neutrality then say so, openly and clearly...<snip>.

What on earth does that actually mean, especially seeing as we've already established that Britain's only binding deal with Germany (or anyone else) was as a joint guarantor of Belgian neutrality,

Right – the treaty says if France invades Belgium then Britain must side with Germany against France. If Germany invades Belgium Britain must side with France against Germany. Notice the problem? If France invades Belgium then Grey's entente policy is smashed because Britain just allied with Germany. If France does not invade Belgium and Germany does not either, then the ententes are smashed because Germany goes east and shoves Brest-Litovsk down Russia's throat. Grey therefore refuses the obligation; he says no matter what France or Germany do, his hands must be free. He is telling Germany that if France invades Belgium, Britain very well may declare war on Germany. That action would constitute a massive breach of the 1839 Treaty. You might say it hasn't happened yet. I would say; look up the definition of perpetual.

With respect to Germany, Crowe's conclusion was that the treaty's obligations were individual and severe. France intended to attack Germany through Belgium, preferably after using British political maneuvering to put Moltke's mobilization into a fuddle, such that this clobbering blow falls in equal strength from east and west. This much is covered in strategy class Well Duh 101. But Germany's legal obligation was individual and severe; it existed even so. So the German violation of Belgium constituted a breach of the treaty regardless of whether all the other Powers had defected from it or not, and whether or not Britain had refused to admit it would abide by its future obligations.

...<snip snippy snip snip>...

Please tell us, openly and clearly, what "If Britain and Germany had wanted to do a deal, then each makes the offer. The legal stuff was irrelevant" actually means? And what relevance it has to Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality?

Salesie, I've joined the discussion because Terrence Zuber is here – I think it's awesome and I wish more historians did this type of thing. Discussing the nuances of Belgian neutrality isn't what I came here for. Arcane arguments to the principles of obligation with a poster apparently inclined to fly further off the handle at each exchange - even less of an incentive.

That being said, the 'legal stuff' was functionally irrelevant in 1914 because it had no bearing on the actual political situation to any Great Power in 1914. Russia didn't give a damn. Austria didn't give a damn. Germany didn't give a damn. France didn't give a damn. Britain didn't give a damn if France sinned, Britain did if Germany did so; ie, a pretext. Notice the pattern? No Power, Britain included, was willing to make its policy solely on the basis of the old treaty. Moltke, responsible for Germany's national security and the lives of millions of men, can't put weight on something that no one will pay attention to. If Britain offers her neutrality, then the German army sits up and takes notice. If Britain doesn't, then Germany rolls forward. Either way, 1839 is irrelevant.

[Glenn239]

Note that the resolution of Grey's policy dilemma a vs. Britain's legal obligation to Germany under the treaty of 1839 is in Hardinge's minute about fingers.

There was hardly a dilema, self interest and common sense demanded that Britain would not declare war on an ally in order to aid an enemy, or that she would sit back and allow an enemy to violate Belgium.

For Britain the question at hand isn't policy after the breach was made 4 August 1914, it was in the refusal to Germany prior to 4 August to admit an obligation existed for war against France should France violate Belgium. Secondly, the refusal to guarantee to Germany that Britain would not ally with or assist any future violator of Belgium. Grey wished to bind Germany's hands for the duration of the war, even if this is 10 years long, but in return will guarantee nothing on his own part one minute in the future - even actions on his part in violation of the treaty he is asking Germany to abide by.

That computes - Britain follows her Entente policy, not the 1839 Treaty. Strategy 101.

Grey's functional choices in 1914 were alliance with France or 1870. One or the other. Moltke was guilty of many things, but failure to read the power equations was not one of them.

[salesie]

Right – the treaty says if France invades Belgium then Britain must side with Germany against France. If Germany invades Belgium Britain must side with France against Germany. Notice the problem? If France invades Belgium then Grey's entente policy is smashed because Britain just allied with Germany. If France does not invade Belgium and Germany does not either, then the ententes are smashed because Germany goes east and shoves Brest-Litovsk down Russia's throat. Grey therefore refuses the obligation; he says no matter what France or Germany do, his hands must be free. He is telling Germany that if France invades Belgium, Britain very well may declare war on Germany. That action would constitute a massive breach of the 1839 Treaty. You might say it hasn't happened yet. I would say; look up the definition of perpetual.

With respect to Germany, Crowe's conclusion was that the treaty's obligations were individual and severe. France intended to attack Germany through Belgium, preferably after using British political maneuvering to put Moltke's mobilization into a fuddle, such that this clobbering blow falls in equal strength from east and west. This much is covered in strategy class Well Duh 101. But Germany's legal obligation was individual and severe; it existed even so. So the German violation of Belgium constituted a breach of the treaty regardless of whether all the other Powers had defected from it or not, and whether or not Britain had refused to admit it would abide by its future obligations.

Salesie, I've joined the discussion because Terrence Zuber is here – I think it's awesome and I wish more historians did this type of thing. Discussing the nuances of Belgian neutrality isn't what I came here for. Arcane arguments to the principles of obligation with a poster apparently inclined to fly further off the handle at each exchange - even less of an incentive.

That being said, the 'legal stuff' was functionally irrelevant in 1914 because it had no bearing on the actual political situation to any Great Power in 1914. Russia didn't give a damn. Austria didn't give a damn. Germany didn't give a damn. France didn't give a damn. Britain didn't give a damn if France sinned, Britain did if Germany did so; ie, a pretext. Notice the pattern? No Power, Britain included, was willing to make its policy solely on the basis of the old treaty. Moltke, responsible for Germany's national security and the lives of millions of men, can't put weight on something that no one will pay attention to. If Britain offers her neutrality, then the German army sits up and takes notice. If Britain doesn't, then Germany rolls forward. Either way, 1839 is irrelevant.

It appears you've gone full-circle, Glen239, back to Whatif-fantasies. So I'll make this post brief; I've neither the time nor the inclination to indulge you in your long-winded attempts to turn non-fiction into fiction.

You use as examples three alternate scenarios i.e. If France invades Belgium then...If Germany invades Belgium then...If neither invade Belgium then...to explain your view of the legal position under the treaty and its effect on the geo-political situation. Yet only one scenario actually happened, two are pure supposition on your part; these two are pure figments of your own imagination. And, once again, you say that the legal-stuff is irrelevant but you still write two paragraphs of your own definition of the legalities. For something that is irrelevant you seem extremely reluctant to treat it as such.

You also tell us that, "France intended to attack Germany through Belgium, preferably after using British political maneuvering to put Moltke's mobilization into a fuddle". Again, this is pure speculation on your part that completely ignores two facts:

1) France went to great pains to show that it would respect Belgian neutrality unconditionally; France gave unambiguous assurances to that effect which satisfied both Belgium and Britain.

2) Even after the German invasion of Belgium, France only sent Sordet and a cavalry force into Belgium to scout the German incursion. A force which reported back that the German Army had not crossed the Meuse in any force, consequently the bulk of the French army attacked Germany in other areas.

Only according to the German ultimatum to Belgium did France intend to invade Germany through Belgium in a clear breach of the Treaty - yet just two days after said ultimatum, and on the very day that German troops violated the Belgian border, von Jagow, the German Foreign Secretary no less, told the British Ambassador to Berlin the real reason why Germany had acted thus i.e. to facilitate a rapid penetration of France in order to secure a decisive victory against France before the Russians could put effective forces into the field.

Plus, let's not forget that nine months previously in November 1913, both von Moltke and the Kaiser had "advised" King Albert, on his state visit to Berlin, that he would be wise to side with them, the side of the strong, if Belgium wished to maintain its independence.

French words and actions clearly show that it did not intend to violate Belgium first, German words and actions clearly show that it had intended to commit such a violation for some time (before the actual Archduke assassination itself). I suppose that von Moltke could claim that he didn't have the benefit of hindsight (though evidence for his prior-intent is there for all to see) for his poor judgement calls, but you can't claim any such thing; you have the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight.

Whatifs are one thing - realities are quite another.

Cheers-salesie.

[bill24chev]

I may be misunderstanding, but we seem to have moved off the origional topic and are now chasing round in circles about Belgum and the 1839 treaty. However, it seems that there is a sense in some quaters of double standards by the UK regarding an invasion of Belgium by either Germany or Belgium.

To me the situation is simple if Germany invades Belgium then the Belgian ports become possible bases for a German fleet much closer to the UK,nearer to the Thames than the Grand Fleets bases at Scapa & Rosyth. A British Govenment could never accept this. A French occupation of theses ports was less of a threat. The Invasion of BElgium by Germany, provided the British Government the excuse to declare war on Germany. THe previuos assurance to France that the Royal NAvy would safeguard the ENglish Chanel on behalf of the French would have eventually crated an incident that would have meant war with Germany.

IF this scenario had occurred the BEF would not have been in a position to engage the German First Army at Mons & le Cateau and the French left would have probably been turned making for either a successful Schlieffen Type plan or a Cannae style double envelopment possible.

[salesie]

I may be misunderstanding, but we seem to have moved off the origional topic and are now chasing round in circles about Belgum and the 1839 treaty. However, it seems that there is a sense in some quaters of double standards by the UK regarding an invasion of Belgium by either Germany or Belgium.

To me the situation is simple if Germany invades Belgium then the Belgian ports become possible bases for a German fleet much closer to the UK,nearer to the Thames than the Grand Fleets bases at Scapa & Rosyth. A British Govenment could never accept this. A French occupation of theses ports was less of a threat. The Invasion of BElgium by Germany, provided the British Government the excuse to declare war on Germany. THe previuos assurance to France that the Royal NAvy would safeguard the ENglish Chanel on behalf of the French would have eventually crated an incident that would have meant war with Germany.

IF this scenario had occurred the BEF would not have been in a position to engage the German First Army at Mons & le Cateau and the French left would have probably been turned making for either a successful Schlieffen Type plan or a Cannae style double envelopment possible.

Not a viable scenario, bill24chev. It is true to say that the BEF would not have been at Mons/Le Cateau - but neither would the German 1st Army, because for Britain to have provided Naval security for the Channel only then the German Army would not have gone through Belgium.

Cheers-salesie.

[Terry Duncan]

Secondly, the refusal to guarantee to Germany that Britain would not ally with or assist any future violator of Belgium.

Given an outline of the German war plan had been obtained some years earlier where the German army moved through Belgium, Britain has no need to answer any question from Germany about what other powers MAY do, as Germany has already been caught out planning to violate Belgium neutrality - prohibited by the treaty from the outset.

I may be misunderstanding, but we seem to have moved off the origional topic and are now chasing round in circles about Belgum and the 1839 treaty.

Yes, it is somewhat distracting from the original subject, which was probably well worth following on with. If people are wishing to discuss the legalities or 'what ifs' that surround the subject of Belgium, I am happy for them to do so at The Axis History site where I am a staff member, as I am aware this subject can become a very long drawn out debate that will go way off the usual parameters here.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewforum.php?f=31&sid=a10624df4b8fc0853ea63c78416d8d3d

2) Even after the German invasion of Belgium, France only sent Sordet and a cavalry force into Belgium to scout the German incursion. A force which reported back that the German Army had not crossed the Meuse in any force, consequently the bulk of the French army attacked Germany in other areas.

Now now, you are letting reality get in the way of a theory. Somehow reality seems to matter little in these discussions if my experience is anything to go by.

[Wuerzburg]

Terence,

Your own post contains nothing that has not been available for almost ninety years, so you charge that I am relying on evidence available for fifty years would seem to indicate I am at least as up to date. You offered nothing significant or new, and then seem surprised that your post has not somehow changed everything. From your previous post;

So, nobody was really surprised by the contents of the Austrian note, all the theatre and playacting in that direction notwithstanding.

Jagow maintained he was, as he said he had no idea of the contents prior to its delivery. Admittedly we know he was lying as the Austrians admitted to supplying him an advance copy the day before, but other states were only given a very brief outline, and often this varied depending on what the nation in question was supposed to believe.

And you know what the French are telling the Russians after 21 August? Mobilize. Mobilize. We'll support you.

If am am correct this was actually detailed by Stieve in the 1920's in his work on Isvolsky, though it doesnt quite say it in the way you do here. From memory what was said was to the effect that 'if Russia mobilizes, France will support her' which should hardly come as the slightest surprise to you as the same situation is detailed in Moltke's memorandum which you describe as 'contingency planning' and seem to attach no significance at all to such comments when it arises in Vienna or Berlin.

And the Russians are not saying "We need to negotiate with the Austrians first!"

Why did Russia need to negotiate at all? Russia was not wishing to wage war on anyone at this point. Are you suggesting Russia should have made advances to Vienna to offer ideas for how Austria could attack Serbia? Usually it would be normal for the nation wishing to wage war to contact the state she desperately needs to remain neutral in the hope of finding a way forward. Austria did nothing like this. I am happy to challenge you to the same question I have offered to others with the same view. Please show Russia would have mobilized and gone to war if Austria had not tried to solve her disputes with Serbia by war.

Paleologue was not a loose cannon facilitating Russian aggressiveness, he was implementing French policy.

So prove it! This simpIe statement shows nothing and proves nothing too. I have never commented here on Paleologue, on if he was acting inside or outside French policy, though the consensus seems to be that he did excede his brief.

The Franco-Russians never actually considered negotiations.

Did not the last proposals for talks come from Sazonov?

As Schmidt says, under Poincare the Franco-Russian alliance had become militarily aggressive. Schmidt gets most of the military stuff wrong, which is normal for a young European historian, but my essay fixes that.

You say Schmidt gets the military aspects wrong, what is to say he has not got other stuff wrong too? I am not disputing the nature of the Franco-Russian alliance, as the evidence is at best contradictory, Franco-German relations from 1912 - 14 were described as the best they had been in many years by many sources.

[Following paragraph mine, not Schmidt] Defending Serbia was a pretext for war.

A 'pretext' Austria had predicted on 7th July and done nothing at all to avoid, indeed did much to encourage. I presume you have seen the minutes of the Austrian Crown Council meeting of that date?

The Russians began secret mobilization when the Austrians delivered the note.

Austrian intent was made pretty clear by the Note, and the embassy leak in Rome had been telling everyone that Austria wanted war, the Note confirmed it. Maybe you could tell us of the mobilization status of each of the German states and Austria as of 23rd July?

For a while the Russians toyed with the idea of a limited war against Austria, which would spare them having to fight the Germans, something they definately did not want to do.

This sounds very much like the Germans toyed with the idea of war against Russia alone as there was hope France would not support Russia over Serbia. Nations are often attracted to the easy win scenarios.

But the French firmly told them that if they went down that road the alliance was off (which might find them facing the Austrians and Germans alone anyway) so they went for general mobilization.

Interesting, but devoid of date and who is supposed to have said it, effectively of little value. This reads like France was somehow able to dictate Russian policy and force her to war even if Russia didnt want it. France certainly was not going to walk away from the alliance, she needed Russia far too much and knew it, so unless you can supply a way France was about to overcome her inability to defeat Germany in a 1 -1 war, this really makes very little sense at all.

So, all told only one very brief part that offers anything new at all, and that doesnt make too much sense. It also does nothing to adress points I and others have raised as counterpoints.

Terry

You haven't read Schmidt's book, have you?

Let me review the situation in St. Petersburg 20-23 August during Poincare's state visit. The French and Russians either never kept a protocol, or if they did, never revealed it. Or do you think you know what they said? If you did, you're only one. This failure to say what they discussed even worried Pierre Renouvin, but it doesn't worry you.

Courtesy of Schmidt, we now have a good idea what the French and Russians said to each other, and the French were encouraging the Russians to go to war and the Russians weren't saying no. Not something, obviously, that they wanted to make public.

Since I say Schmidt gets the military aspects wrong, you say what is to say he has not got other stuff wrong too?

If Schmidt gets the miliary stuff right, his case for the "aggressive Franco-Russian alliance" gets much stronger - probably too strong for his liking, as I show in my essay.

Read Schmidt. Or wait for my article. But don't say anything in ignorance that's going to make you look foolish later.

In addition, you answer every point concerning Russia and France with a reference to Germany and Austria. For example, you answer my comment

For a while the Russians toyed with the idea of a limited war against Austria, which would spare them having to fight the Germans, something they definately did not want to do.

With a non sequiteur:

This sounds very much like the Germans toyed with the idea of war against Russia alone as there was hope France would not support Russia over Serbia. Nations are often attracted to the easy win scenarios.

And my comment

The Russians began secret mobilization when the Austrians delivered the note.

With another non sequiteur:

Austrian intent was made pretty clear by the Note, and the embassy leak in Rome had been telling everyone that Austria wanted war, the Note confirmed it [sic: the Note showed the Austrians knew what the Serbs had done, and they wanted the Serbs to stop] . Maybe you could tell us of the mobilization status of each of the German states and Austria as of 23rd July?

In addition to demonstrating ignorance of German mobilization: The German states did not mobilize seperately, only the Kaiser could order mobilization, and on 23 August the Germans had taken no mobilization measures whatsoever.

This use of non sequiteur is just a smokescreen to cover the fact that you can't rebut my arguments.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

....My informant states that the Servian Government will be required to adopt certain definite measures in restraint of nationalist and anarchist propaganda, and that Austro-Hungarian Government are in no mood to parley with Servia, but will insist on immediate unconditional compliance, failing which force will be used.Germany is said to be in complete agreement with this procedure....

....My informant said that he presumed that Russia would not wish to protect racial assassins, but in any case Austria-Hungary would go ahead regardless of results.....

You have to be of the GeorgeWB school of world affairs to seriously advance the opinion that anyone but Austria and Germany were to blame.

The Serbs assassinated the Austrian heir.

The Austrians found this unacceptable.

Nor do the Austrians expect the Russians to protect terrorists.

Chris finds the Austrian attitude unreasonable!

Chris is right about one thing. Bush didn't find 9/11 acceptable either.

In Chris' view, both the Austrians and Bush should have said - "No biggie; can we talk?"

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

The Bunsen report is as follows,

(32282) No. 50.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.

Vienna, July 16, 1914.

D. 1:50 P.M.

R. 3:15 P.M.

Tel. (No. 85.)

Confidential.

From language held by Minister for Foreign Affairs to a friend of mine, who has repeated it to me, I gather that situation is regarded at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in a serious light and that a kind of indictment is being prepared against the Servian Government for alleged complicity in the conspiracy which led to assassination of the Archduke. Accusation will be founded on the proceedings in the Serajevo Court. My informant states that the Servian Government will be required to adopt certain definite measures in restraint of nationalist and anarchist propaganda, and that Austro-Hungarian Government are in no mood to parley with Servia, but will insist on immediate unconditional compliance, failing which force will be used.Germany is said to be in complete agreement with this procedure, and it is thought that the rest of Europe will sympathise with Austria-Hungary in demanding that Servia shall adopt in future more submissive attitude.

My informant states that Count Forgach entirely shares these views with his chief and that they are very generally held by all classes in this country.

I asked if Russia would be expected to stand by quietly in the event of force being used against Servia.

My informant said that he presumed that Russia would not wish to protect racial assassins, but in any case Austria-Hungary would go ahead regardless of results. She would lose her position as a Great Power if she stood any further nonsense from Servia.

This language is also held by a portion of the press, including the"Neue Freie Presse," which is now in touch with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The official "Fremdenblatt" is more moderate.

I hope to see Minister for Foreign Affairs Friday.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

Cf. Despatch No. 56. MINUTE.

Count Trauttmansdorf spoke to me (quite informally) at great length to-day, giving expression to very much the same views. R. A. C. July 16.

The minute is interesting because it references a second conversation on the matter, and this is the only mention of it in the British Documents. On a hunch I investigated whether or not this was Trauttmansdorf's first foray into lengthy unofficial conversations with high-level Foriegn Office staff. As it turns out, it was not. In flipping through other records, I found at least one contact report filed by Foriegn Office officials for off-the-record briefings given by Trauttmansdorf. No contact report is in the B.D. on the Crowe discussion - it seems unlikely to me he failed to file one considering the subject matter.

What I find fascinating about this is that, as far as I know, there were no consequences drawn, no further reference to this, no follow-up. This information just disappears from sight. Strange. Suspicious.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

You haven't read Schmidt's book, have you?

Not yet. But then from your highlights here it contains nothing more than the specualtion people have had in print since the 1920's.

Or do you think you know what they said? If you did, you're only one. This failure to say what they discussed even worried Pierre Renouvin, but it doesn't worry you.

When losing, build a strawman. As we do not know what was said, there is nothing to worry about. Anything is simply speculation.

In addition, you answer every point concerning Russia and France with a reference to Germany and Austria.

Yes, it is always worth considering what both sides were doing, not ignoring one and making all sorts of claims about the other.

In addition to demonstrating ignorance of German mobilization:

Contradictory to your comments earlier in this discussion.

The German states did not mobilize seperately, only the Kaiser could order mobilization, and on 23 August the Germans had taken no mobilization measures whatsoever.

Now you either misread my question, or you are dodging it. I asked the mobilization status of each state, not the date of mobilizing. For example, how many had their peacetime compliments assembled due to exercises, how many had cancelled leave or had recalled officers by 23rd July. Much the same moves that were taking place in Russia at this time too.

This use of non sequiteur is just a smokescreen to cover the fact that you can't rebut my arguments.

Pointing out parallels is a perfectly good way of showing you are avoiding looking at the actions of one side whilst looking at the other and making all sorts of claims. Germany and Austria plot how to engineer a war in the Balkans and thats just contingency planning, Russia prepares to face the rather all too obvious Austrian aggressive intent and thats war mongering. How balanced.

So far you seem to wish to skip any point that shows Austria and Germany were just as willing to seek war, and that they had anticipated the very war they ended up with almost one month earlier and done nothing to avoid it, simply hoping the French and Russians would back down - hardly a likely situation if France and Russia were even half as militaristic as you would have us believe.

They were all pretty much as bad as each other, and none were even close to being selfless. The July Crisis was played to the plans of two powers, and it was their decision that a war was a desirable result. The doctrine of localization was absurd as it required others to put aside their own interests, when Austria and Germany were both unwilling to put aside theirs.

[Chris Boonzaier]

Chris finds the Austrian attitude unreasonable!

Chris is right about one thing. Bush didn't find 9/11 acceptable either.

In Chris' view, both the Austrians and Bush should have said - "No biggie; can we talk?"

Terence Zuber

No, maybe I believe that you get the guy that did it, you dont impotently strike out at the next best or closest target.

If Terence believes that 10 000 000 dead are justified for saving national pride (irrespective of which individual was killed) then I would not want him in a higher command in my army.

But if I do understand Terence's comment above... it is indeed Austria and friends who started the war.... which contradicts what you were saying about it being Russia...

You are basically saying "Of course there will be war... they killed Ferdi! no talk is going to change that!"

Or do I understand Terence wrong?

[Chris Boonzaier]

Now you either misread my question, or you are dodging it. I asked the mobilization status of each state, not the date of mobilizing. For example, how many had their peacetime compliments assembled due to exercises, how many had cancelled leave or had recalled officers by 23rd July. Much the same moves that were taking place in Russia at this time too.

I think this will be ignored as it does not fit Terences theories.

Start of Mobilisation is the glove that does not fit.

You dont need to be a staff officer to know that different countries mobilise at different speads... it is dead simple. Depending on many, many things. And if you know your army needs a long time... you would be silly to wait too long.

"Who Mobilised first vs. Mobilisation Status"... Terry is scoring some big points there.

Best

Chris

[Chris Boonzaier]

So far you seem to wish to skip any point that shows Austria and Germany were just as willing to seek war, and that they had anticipated the very war they ended up with almost one month earlier and done nothing to avoid it, simply hoping the French and Russians would back down - hardly a likely situation if France and Russia were even half as militaristic as you would have us believe.

In his quote below, Terence seems to imply that war was the only possible way for Austria... In fact, given a choice between talking, and causing 10 000 000 dead... the 10 000 000 dead seems to be a no-brainer.

"The Serbs assassinated the Austrian heir.

The Austrians found this unacceptable.

Nor do the Austrians expect the Russians to protect terrorists.

Chris finds the Austrian attitude unreasonable!

Chris is right about one thing. Bush didn't find 9/11 acceptable either.

In Chris' view, both the Austrians and Bush should have said - "No biggie; can we talk?""

[yelob]

I have learned so much in this thread and especially the exchanges between Terry and TZ which are educational to say the least,thanks again to both.

One thing I don't understand with the suggestion that the Franco Russian alliance was aggressive is what

possible motive could there be for France and Russia starting a European war,I was under the impression that the 1892 agreement was a defensive alliance.I don't see what they could have gained by a war in 1914.

It is my understanding too that the Russians requested a 48hour extension to the ultimatum and were reluctant to go from partial to full mobilisation and wasn't there also a telegram from the Tsar to the Kaiser trying to put a brake on things?I don't see how that fits with Russian aggression.

Best/Liam

[bill24chev]

Not a viable scenario, bill24chev. It is true to say that the BEF would not have been at Mons/Le Cateau - but neither would the German 1st Army, because for Britain to have provided Naval security for the Channel only then the German Army would not have gone through Belgium.

Cheers-salesie.

You are of course right. Ihad spotted the poor logic of my senario after Ihad posted it but after a long day was tooknackered to edit it.

All the academic toing and rthrowing seems to resolve around who was guilty of starting the war. Was it PRincep, Serbia, Austria, Russia, or France?

For what my opoinion is worth , i dont think it realy maters who actually started it . All the countries involved wanted a confrontation and got it in cartloads.

Legal obligations have been memtioned in a number of posts but in a legal (criminal law) sense Did not Germany "Confess" to it, under duress, at Versailles?.

Terrance Zubers veiw seems to be as follows:-

In the school yard there are two factions the allies and the Axis.Trouble as been brewing between the two factions for some time.

One of the allies is a bit of a bad boy (Serbia)and he steals a toy from one of the axis (Austria).

Autria says " you dont buy me a new toy I will get out my stick that is bigger than you. Serbias best Freind Russia hears this and says if you(Austria) do that I will get my Bigger stick to hit you. Unfortunatly Russia left their stick at home and sets off to get it. GERMANY(AXIS) wHO AS A BIG STICK QUICKLY GETS IT OUT SO DOES fRANCE(AllIE) uFORTUNATLY A lITTLE GIRL (BELGIUM) IS STANDING BETWEEN gERMANY AND fRANCE. gERMANY THINKS FRANCE WILL PUSH BELGIUM OUT OF THE WAY TO HIT gERMANY SO gERMANY KNOCKS BELGIUM OUT OF THE WAY. brITAIN ,WHO ONLY AS A SMALL STICK BUT IS A BIT OF A MARTIAL ARTS EXPERTS JOINS fRANCE IN HITTING gERMANY BECAUSE THE LITTLE GIRLWAS ONCE WAS SAVED BY THEM AND THEY (AS HAVE gERMANY & fRANCE) PROMISED TO LOOK AFTER HER...

all GET A VISIT TO THE HEASDMASTERS OFFICE WHO TAKES AN EVEN BIGGER STICK TO THEIR POSTERIORS.

[Wuerzburg]

If you're amused by international relations, you don't understand them.

Maybe you need to read what was written again?

International relations hardly consists of arguing cases before the Hague. The only people that get tried there are the losers.

Are you saying its ok to commit war crimes as long as you win?

In 1914 few politicians were lawyers. Diplomats are rarely lawyers, either in 1914 or today.

Actually most politicians were from the legal profession in 1914. Asquith, Lloyd-George, Haldane, Bethmann, Jagow, Berchtold etc were all from that background. Diplomats were not even covered by what I said, though as they take their directions from the politicians it matters little.

Like I say, you have a lawyerly mindset. You even see them where they don't exist.

Maybe you need to look more. For example the legal profession has produced most MP's in Britain for almost 150 years, medical professionals are second iirc. As the main asset of a lawyer and politician is that they are able to convince people in discussion, it should hardly be a surprise.

I note that you neither dispute nor address that Austria had absolutely no information to implicate Apis in 1914, so pretending that this was why Austria had to go to war is at best confused.

"Actually most politicians were from the legal profession in 1914...Bethmann"

Let's just test one of these assertions. Bethmann was a state bureaucrat. He was never "from the legal profession" He went straight form university to the state bureaucratic service. He knew as much law as any German state bureaucrat. By the time he was 30 he was Landrat (District administrator).

He also had an officer's commission. Using your standards, it would make as much sense to call him a soldier as a lawyer.

Like I said, you see lawyers everywhere.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

You haven't read Schmidt's book, have you?

Not yet. But then from your highlights here it contains nothing more than the specualtion people have had in print since the 1920's.

Or do you think you know what they said? If you did, you're only one. This failure to say what they discussed even worried Pierre Renouvin, but it doesn't worry you.

When losing, build a strawman. As we do not know what was said, there is nothing to worry about. Anything is simply speculation.

In addition, you answer every point concerning Russia and France with a reference to Germany and Austria.

Yes, it is always worth considering what both sides were doing, not ignoring one and making all sorts of claims about the other.

In addition to demonstrating ignorance of German mobilization:

Contradictory to your comments earlier in this discussion.

The German states did not mobilize seperately, only the Kaiser could order mobilization, and on 23 August the Germans had taken no mobilization measures whatsoever.

Now you either misread my question, or you are dodging it. I asked the mobilization status of each state, not the date of mobilizing. For example, how many had their peacetime compliments assembled due to exercises, how many had cancelled leave or had recalled officers by 23rd July. Much the same moves that were taking place in Russia at this time too.

This use of non sequiteur is just a smokescreen to cover the fact that you can't rebut my arguments.

Pointing out parallels is a perfectly good way of showing you are avoiding looking at the actions of one side whilst looking at the other and making all sorts of claims. Germany and Austria plot how to engineer a war in the Balkans and thats just contingency planning, Russia prepares to face the rather all too obvious Austrian aggressive intent and thats war mongering. How balanced.

So far you seem to wish to skip any point that shows Austria and Germany were just as willing to seek war, and that they had anticipated the very war they ended up with almost one month earlier and done nothing to avoid it, simply hoping the French and Russians would back down - hardly a likely situation if France and Russia were even half as militaristic as you would have us believe.

They were all pretty much as bad as each other, and none were even close to being selfless. The July Crisis was played to the plans of two powers, and it was their decision that a war was a desirable result. The doctrine of localization was absurd as it required others to put aside their own interests, when Austria and Germany were both unwilling to put aside theirs.

Or do you think you know what they said? If you did, you're only one. This failure to say what they discussed even worried Pierre Renouvin, but it doesn't worry you.

When losing, build a strawman. As we do not know what was said, there is nothing to worry about. Anything is simply speculation.

This is rich! Do you know who Pierre Renouvin was? No? Let me help. Pierre Renouvin was the most senior French historian of WWI and the secretary of the committee that wrote up the Documents Diplomatiques Francaises. But according to you, apparently not a very important guy.

The French and Russians hide the results of their conference before the war and your attitude is "don't worry, be happy"! Renouvin worried, and he wasn't happy.

There is no longer any "specualtion" : the French were encouraging the Russians to mobilize, and mobilization meant war.

You've been doing this for 15 years? Too long. You've got too many markers down, and if new evidence comes up that contradicts your preconcieved ideas - as well as a decade and a half of mistakes - you've got a lot of crow to eat.

I get the same "don't worry, be happy" and denial from people who are on the record saying that there was a "Schlieffen plan"

.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

"Actually most politicians were from the legal profession in 1914...Bethmann"

Let's just test one of these assertions. Bethmann was a state bureaucrat. He was never "from the legal profession" He went straight form university to the state bureaucratic service. He knew as much law as any German state bureaucrat. By the time he was 30 he was Landrat (District administrator).

He also had an officer's commission. Using your standards, it would make as much sense to call him a soldier as a lawyer.

Like I said, you see lawyers everywhere.

Terence Zuber

What did Bethmann study at University? Strasbourg, Leipzig and Berlin iirc and got a doctorate in something, and I am pretty sure it wasnt bureaucracy. It really doesnt matter what he did after the age of 30, his background and training was not altered by his later career.

So far all you have done is to look at France and Russia and point out that they were militaristic - you dont get large empires by being nice, so that should really surprise nobody - but seem unwilling to look at the militaristic natures of Austria and Germany. There were no out and out good guys, and certainly no out and out bad guys, such polemics are best left to comic books, and a balanced viewpoint is what is needed.

Terry

[Wuerzburg]

I have learned so much in this thread and especially the exchanges between Terry and TZ which are educational to say the least,thanks again to both.

One thing I don't understand with the suggestion that the Franco Russian alliance was aggressive is what

possible motive could there be for France and Russia starting a European war,I was under the impression that the 1892 agreement was a defensive alliance.I don't see what they could have gained by a war in 1914.

It is my understanding too that the Russians requested a 48hour extension to the ultimatum and were reluctant to go from partial to full mobilisation and wasn't there also a telegram from the Tsar to the Kaiser trying to put a brake on things?I don't see how that fits with Russian aggression.

Best/Liam

From the beginning of the alliance, the French wanted the Russians to agree to attack Germany at the same time as the French. This would prevent the Germans from using interior lines to defeat one, then the other. The Russians were unwilling to do so because A) They wanted to bring up strong forces from the interior, beyond those on the border with East Prussia, and that took a long time, given the poor Russian rail net and The Russians wanted to fight the Austrians, not the Germans. Before the Russo-Japanese War the best the Russians would do is to agree to attack on the 40th day of mobilization - by which time the French and Germans would surely have fought a great battle. But from the beginning of the alliance the Russians and French recognized explicitly that "mobilization meant war".

In 1911 the Russians agreed to attack Germany on the 16th day of mobilization. They did so because since the Russo-Japanese War Russia had been enjoying a tremendous economic upswing, which led to massive improvements in the Russian army, rail net (more and better rolloing stock more so than additional track) and Russian self-confidence. In 1913 the Russians moved this up to the 15th day. The Franco-Russians would sieze the initiative and force the Germans to fight simultaneously on two fronts. This is what, to my mind, made the Franco-Russian alliance aggressive. When the Russians declared general mobiloization they started the alliance attack plan rolling.

[Wuerzburg]

What did Bethmann study at University? Strasbourg, Leipzig and Berlin iirc and got a doctorate in something, and I am pretty sure it wasnt bureaucracy. It really doesnt matter what he did after the age of 30, his background and training was not altered by his later career.

So far all you have done is to look at France and Russia and point out that they were militaristic - you dont get large empires by being nice, so that should really surprise nobody - but seem unwilling to look at the militaristic natures of Austria and Germany. There were no out and out good guys, and certainly no out and out bad guys, such polemics are best left to comic books, and a balanced viewpoint is what is needed.

Terry

The "militaristic nature of Austria"? You're kidding. Austria hadn't fought a war since 1866. Per capita she spent less on the military and conscripted fewer than any other Great Power. To be an army officer in Austria did not mean you were important - it meant that you were poor.

The Austrains did not run around the planet enslaving the natives like the Russians, British and French did.

Look at Vienna and show me where you see militarism. Nowhere.

What you see is great art (Klimt, Jugendstil, Wiener Werkstaette) Socialism (Karl Leugner, May Day parade) great architecture (Ringstrasse) Music (Musikverein, Wiener Oper) medicine (psychoanalysis) a turbulent ethnic mess and joie de vivre (Wienerwald, coffee house, Prater). But no militarism.

Perhaps the greatest irony of the 20th century is that central Europe is finally beginning to realize what a good thing the Hapsburg Empire was. Of all things, the Austrians and Hungarians are now friends. The Slovenes are practically an Austrian state.

Russia went to war in 1877 and 1904. The Russo-French alliance was initially directed at England more than Germany. Russia spent most of the period looking for a fight.

Terence Zuber

[cdr]

Still waiting to hear how militaristic France and Russia forced Germany to invade neutral Belgium, murder 6000 civilians, destroy historic towns (Leuven, Dendermonde), cause a massive flight of the population (about 1 million), destroy industrial infrastructure, introduce forced labor and put a precursor of the iron curtain on its border.

[Glenn239]

What I find fascinating about this is that, as far as I know, there were no consequences drawn, no further reference to this, no follow-up. This information just disappears from sight. Strange. Suspicious.

Terence Zuber

Judging from the importance of Crowe's meeting with the Chancellor to the Austrian Embassy on the 16th, and judging from the fact the Austrian had made other such visits that turned into contact reports filed by the F.O. official, I would suspect that Crowe did indeed file a report to his meeting that subsequently went missing. I validated the thesis by only looking for one such contact report. Finding all of them would take more time. But I would be interesting for some historian with the patience to compare British and Austrian records of all Trautsmansdorf visits to the F.O. to see whether or not the absence of Crowe's contact report is a smoking gun or not unusual. To my knowledge, no one anywhere has even noticed there is a potential issue. I for one would find it astounding that Crowe would recieve information that an Austro-Russian war could break out at any moment without a huge contact report being generated. But if so, where is it?

Bunsen's report was filed in three locations - the embassy register, the Belgrade ministry, and the Foriegn Office. An internal report would have no duplicate copy in an embassy register.

You have found with German war planning that traditional history has been pretty sloppy - my biggest shock in all of Myth of the Schlieffen Plan was just how lazy historians must have been for it to take 90 years for your book to be published. I think that lesson applies to the July Crisis in general - earlier I had made a connection between Poincare's example of violating Belgian neutrality being the reason Britain must not sign a treaty of conditional neutrality with Germany, and how this example found its way into Grey's citation the very next day why he was rejecting the Chancellor's treaty. It's all there in the British documents, and Albertini. But as far as I can tell, no historian ever made the connection. It's as if many general history historians are so lazy that when they covered, for example, the Haldane Mission, they didn't even bother reading the British Documents.

[Wuerzburg]

Now you either misread my question, or you are dodging it. I asked the mobilization status of each state, not the date of mobilizing. For example, how many had their peacetime compliments assembled due to exercises, how many had cancelled leave or had recalled officers by 23rd July. Much the same moves that were taking place in Russia at this time too.

I think this will be ignored as it does not fit Terences theories.

Start of Mobilisation is the glove that does not fit.

You dont need to be a staff officer to know that different countries mobilise at different speads... it is dead simple. Depending on many, many things. And if you know your army needs a long time... you would be silly to wait too long.

"Who Mobilised first vs. Mobilisation Status"... Terry is scoring some big points there.

Best

Chris

Do you know anything about peacetime training and mobilization?

I say again, the individual German states did not have a mobilization status. Mobilization was controlled at the national level. Got it?

Peacetime training is just that. The troops are out in the field training. What does that have to do with mobilization? The unit is at about half wartime strength.

Peacetime training is actually inimical to mobilization - to mobilize the training unit had to return to garrison.

At the maneuver unit level, which is the subject at hand, on 23 July no leaves had been cancelled, no officers had been recalled.

You say that the Russians were doing both.

At 0326 hours 26 July the Russians declared their "Period Prepatory to War" which was in fact a concealed mobilization. German intelligence learned of it almost immediately.

On 28 July the Germans ordered armed railway employees to guard critical rail installations and recalled from training areas units that were to serve on the covering force.

On 29 July all German units were returned to garrison.

On 30 July the Russians declared general mobilization against both Austria and Germany. German intelligence learned of it almost immediately

On 30 July five German infantry battalions took up defensive positions to guard the fleet

German Period Preparatory to War was declared at 1300 on 31 July, which deployed the covering force (in the west, elements of the corps stationed on the borrder - VIII, XVI, XXI, XV and XIV Corps, in the east elements of all active-army units - three corps and a cavalry division - plus reserve and Landwehr when mobilized). No reservists were called up, and no units moved from the interior.

31 July was the 1st day of Russian mobilization

The German mobilization order was issued at 1700 1 August, 1st day of mobilization 2 August.

2 August was the 3rd day of Russain mobilization.

I fail to see how Terry scores "big points" by loudly demonstrating his lack of knowledge concerning the German army

Terence Zuber