Royal Welch Fusiliers at Suvla

[Tunesmith]

Hi pals,

Can any Gallipoli specialists point me to original source material that would confirm or contradict the following passage from Robert Graves' 'Goodbye To All That:'

'The fact was that three of the four (RWF) territorial battalions failed signally in the Suvla Bay landing at Gallipoli.

One battalion, it became known, had offered violence to its officers; the commanding officer, a regular, had not cared to survive that day.'

 

How much truth is there in this?

I ask as a follow up to a posting I made on a thread in the books section:

 

Tunesmith

[Bryn]

Not sure if it fits exactly, but:

PHILIPS, Lieutenant Colonel Basil Edwin. C/O 1/5th Bn. T.F. The Royal Welsh Fusiliers. Mentioned in Despatches. Wife: Helena of Flintshire. Photograph in 'The War Illustrated' 11th September 1915. Killed in action 10th August 1915 aged 51 years. Comm., Green Hill Cemetery, Suvla.

Bryn

[Tunesmith]

Thanks Bryn

I think you're probably right. But the account in the official history gives no hint of Graves' version:

Lieut.-Colonel B. E. Philips of the 1/5th R. Welch Fusiliers, eventually passed through a trench held by the two missing battalions of the 159th Brigade, and penetrated to within a few hundred yards of Scimitar Hill. From this point Colonel Philips sent back a message to the officer commanding the 1/6th R. Welch Fusiliers: "Bring all the men you can find to where I am, 200 yards in front of the 159th Brigade trenches. We can rush the hill they are shelling as soon as they stop." But before this message could be acted on Colonel Philips had been killed and several of his officers wounded; his troops fell back in disorder, and the advance came to nothing. (Military Operations in Gallipoli, Aspinall-Oglander)

So did the official historian choose to gloss over a dishonourable episode, or did mutiny by the 1/5 RWF somehow go unreported but become a dirty secret kept within the regiment? Or was the whole thing based on a rumour that became exaggerated as stories spread to France of the chaos and failure at Suvla, and the commanders' claims that the territorial and new army troops weren't up to the job?

I know there are documented instances of units refusing or hesitating to go forward at Suvla, and Keith Murdoch famously reported that officers had been ordered to shoot any soldiers who lagged behind or loitered in an advance (though as Les Carlyon says, no such order existed), but I've not yet found any actual evidence to show that soldiers of 1/5 RWF - or any other unit at Suvla for that matter- 'offered violence' to their officers.

TS

[Andrew Hesketh]

There's no direct reference to anything suspicious in the divisional history, but probably enough to suggest an 'issue' if you would like to read it that way. The account therein is largely a verbatim (though probably edited) account by a junior officer of the 1/5th, Kenneth Taylor.

The account refers to the confusion that rapidly set in and the "unexpected" rifle fire from Turkish positions that shoud have been further away - "our original plan had evidently gone phut! The situation became more and more obscure..." Off again after some reorganisation, "that 50 yards accounted for a good many, and my only recollection of it was the splendid way the men behaved...I believe that our own Colonel and Colonel Jones of the 6th battalion RWF, were together at this time, about 100 yards to our right, and soon the order came to charge...but being split up into small parties by the scrub caused more confusion because so many parts of the line were out of touch and it was impossible to tell how things were going on in other spots...son we saw a retirement taking place on the right and it gradually crept closer to where we were [the Colonel was on the right it should be recalled - Andy]. I sent a officer to find out what was going on, and he returned with the information that the order had been given to retire, so I withdrew...I was wandering back slowly when I met Tom Parry who commanded B Company. He knew no more of the situation than I did...In a few moments [after reaching a trench full of Queen's men - Andy] the regimental adjutant, Captain F. W.Borthwick arrived and told us that the Colonel had been killed on the top of the ridge; he had raised himself on his hands to have a look at a road in front, and was killed instantly. So died a very fine man , leading the men he had trained in peace time...Borthwick went off in search of [Major] Head...Head I think knew less of the situation than we did and was beating up stragglers in the rear."

The divisional historian, Major C. H. Dudley Ward went on to comment,"The reports of this operation are very brief and non-commital...no one knew exactly where he was...one finds bewildered troops falling back on occupied lines and a paralysing mixing up of units...all were well nigh exhausted".

Good thread, I look forward to developments.

[Andrew Hesketh]

And, just for the sake of remembrance:

 

[Moriaty]

Andrew, thanks for adding that link, large numbers of the 5th, 6th, 7th RWF were killed within 24 hours of landing at Suvla, many didnt survive the march across the Salt Lake

Moriaty

[Tunesmith]

Andrew,

Thanks for sharing Taylor's detailed account of the action. The extract shown doesn't explicitly suggest any 'issues' to me beyond utter confusion and straggling.

Only the mention of Maj. Head 'beating up stragglers in the rear' conceivably suggests any 'violence offered'. I assume it meant that the officer was trying to round stragglers up and drive them forward - in the manner of beaters at a shoot, not literally beating them - though it is conceivable that he threatened some with force or shooting and was offered violence in return. However this can only be conjecture.

Evidently straggling was an issue and not confined to the 1/5^th RWF. The official history notes:

British casualties during the day except amongst officers, who had made conspicuous targets while trying to encourage their men, had not been heavy [The 1/5th Welch reported 9 officers and 124 other ranks; the 2/4

th

Cheshire, 11 and 250; the 1/5th R. Welch Fusiliers, 12 and 168. But these numbers included many stragglers who rejoined later], but the units of the 53rd Division were so scattered and disorganized that it was long before their actual losses were known.

The thing is, no official history, whether of a battalion, division or a campaign, would explicitly record shameful behaviour. No-one wants dirty linen aired - for years after the war it would have been inappropriate to malign the reputation of veterans who'd no doubt behaved honourably elsewhere, the sacrifice of the dead and the feelings of their bereaved. And that's what makes Robert Graves' statement in 1935 so surprising and shocking. And that's also why I think it's important to prove or disprove it.

If any direct evidence exists to do this conclusively, I guess it will only be found in privately-written documents. As an example, the Nat. Army Museum holds a letter written by Lt C.A. Elliott to his mother about an action at Suvla. This officer, who was in the 9th W Yorks, an 11^th Div battalion, gives a candid account of the fear, confusion, reluctance and disobedience of troops and officers across many different units, which paints a picture quite different from the battle described in the official history. Apart from Taylor's account, I wonder if there are any similar documents written by men of the 1/5th RWF or other 53rd units about the attack on Scimitar Hill.

Tunesmith

[Edited to correct a reference source]

[Andrew Hesketh]

Tunesmith,

I agree with your points. It would be nice to come across some 'unofficial' personal accounts. Quite a number of Abergele men, whom I'm researching, were with the 1/5th and, as yet, I've not encountered any personal testimony relating to the events of 10 August. Should any occur I will send them on.

Personally I wouldn't rate the reliability of Graves too highly. Apart from his fictitious leanings he obvioulsy wasn't there so at best his conclusions are based on second-hand evidence. In addition he was with one of the regular battalions so was probably part of a clique that already had a low opinion of their TF cousins so I am not overly surprised by his attitude.

[Tunesmith]

Andrew,

Thanks for your reply.

True, Graves was reporting a belief supposedly held by his Regular brother officers, and implicitly by himself, and I certainly don't regard him as reliable. Although I think Goodbye To All That is a great book, it was the careless throwaway nature of his remark about the 1/5 RWF at Suvla - unthinking of the feelings of those he was damning and of the relatives of those who died - that made me want to establish what truth there was in it, and therefore if it was defensible in any way.

In fact, from accounts, private and official, of those who were at Suvla in August, the whole thing reads like a classic bad dream which cannot be fully explained or understood by anyone who wasn't there.

TS

[geraint]

Hi folks. Just caught this thread today - just a few points which may (or may not) expand things. Philips was killed on 10th August with six other officers and 13 ORs. Major Head took over, and was killed himself on 13th August. In other words, two COs killed by snipers within three days - a high turnover, and probably worthy of a brief discussion in a regular battalion's mess. Sassoon is very derogatory of the new battalions relieving his at Mametz, and I'm certain that Graves would have held the same sort of view. I've also came across other derogatory comments made by officers of the Welsh service and territorial battalions men. The Saturday Soldiers were not held in high regard by these officers. It really wouldnt surprise me if a comment such as "they were probably shot by their own men; you know what these blah blah blah..."

Its the same attitude as that which appeared in the immediate aftermath of Mametz Wood -finger pointing, blame culture, not the right stuff, windy; and a semi permanence adheres to the allegation.

Philips was well liked by his men. He'd commanded the 5th since 1912, and 78% of the Flintshire Terriers volunteered immediately to accompany him overseas. The esprit de corps was there, they were not a panicky rabble waiting to shoot their officers at the first chance; and I think that Graves and his type are despicable in their attitudes towards those who they thought were a far more inferior soldier than they.

There! Got that off my chest!

Geraint

[petey]

What an interesting thread. At the moment i am trying to research a family member who had joined the t.f. 1/5 pre war and landed at suvla bay.

[Guest]

Not exactly hard evidence but certinly criticism of the Welsh TF Div The underlining is mine:

"Re “Gallipoli” 29^th Oct 1921. To Sir Julian Corbett.

Dear Sir, I enclose the narrative of the operations of the night of landings 6^th Aug 1915, Suvla Bay. The matter contained was official but abridged naturally in my report when I commanded the 6^th Bn of the YORKSHIRE Regt (Green Howards). Brig Gen HAGGARD 32^nd Bde 11^th Div being severely wounded the following day, seems to have resulted in the information not being dealt with at the time.

It is in my opinion, of some historical interest as it was the first occasion in which a unit of the New Regular Army was employed in an offensive operation. From my own knowledge it does not seem to be sufficiently put forward that the difficulties met with were owing to the very heavy loss in Officers, especially senior Officers in the initial fighting who could not be replaced. The 11^th Div and the two Bdes of the 10^th Div at Suvla were available for attack and took positions with heavy loss in Officers and NCOs. The two Territorial Divs 53^rd and 54^th were not as Divs “Troupes d’assault”. This meant in the first few days, original troops landed 11^th & 10^th Divs doing double duty. I know a number of Officers were sick [with] Gallipoli dysentery or fever and went on duty of themselves to land for attack.

More than two years later I acted as Officer in charge of training KANTARA Egypt. I found the Territorial Divs (from Gallipoli) still hopelessly untrained and reported this officially to GHQ/EE Forces. The must have greatly effected (sic) offensive operations in Egypt. The New regular Divs were effectively retrained six months after leaving Gallipoli. The 13^th showed it in Mespot [Mesopotamia] , The 11^th on the Somme in France.

Had the 53^rd and 54^th been of equal fighting value at Suvla it would have had a tremendous effect on that operation. There is another point that has always struck me: There were senior wounded Officers in Hospital Ships in KEPHALOS BAY, MUDROS who could have given information to the staff there had they been interrogated almost immediately after landing. The absence of information which seems to have hampered operations at Suvla was largely owing to casualties amongst senior Officers.

The final attack in that action the 20^th Aug failed owing to loss of direction. The 6^th Bn YORKS was the directing unit. They lost direction thro’ all the Officers becoming casualties in the first few hundred yards. The ground to be covered was some 1,000 yards. Only one was heard of again. Capt A C T WHITE who was wounded (VC at operations in Somme 1916) As the senior Officer of my battalion I went to a lot of trouble in obtaining all information from survivors, the Officers killed or died of wounds in my unit were a score. The attack here was a justification of Lord Kitchener’s policy in forming a New Regular Army. It was superior to the Territorial in general as shock troops.

There is a further point – we were on duty at 5:45 a.m. the day of the landing. The troops worked hard all that day on various duties. We landed seventeen hours later roughly. This accounts for some of the fatigue later noted. As is [was] very hot weather the water difficulty has been noted. The scrub bush country made contact very difficult in advancing and would have made it so even in a peace operation, for practice. I hope this information may be of some value. The constant change in Battalion command thro’ casualties also created difficulty.

To contain commissioned losses before the final attack my battalion had Officers lent from each unit in Bde and three or four NZ Officers who joined at night and had to lead without seeing their men in daylight. The battalion continued to advance after all Officers were casualties. This should merit commendation they had not sufficiently received.

W Boyd Shannon. Major, late 6^th Bn Green Howards

Naval and Military Club, Picadilly.

[Guest]

Tunesmith

CAB 45 had a significant amount of Correspondence between the author of the OH Gallipoli (Aspinall Oglander), as does the Isle of Wight Records Office. I have photographed most of the interesting stuff but not transcribed it all so it is difficult to serach for the comments in a large pile of handritten material. There are (if memory serves) a few accounts which include severe criticism of the 53rd Div Units (159th Inf Bde in this case). The Official History account that you quote on Post 3 is almost entirely based on one of these letters - from a chap called Maj Arthur Crookenden who was a Regular in the Cheshire Regt and a Staff Officer in the 53rd Div at Gallipoli - I think on the Div Staff rather than a Bde HQ. He later commanded the 1st Bn Cheshires

I will transcribe and post later...in the meantime some critical snippets:

" About noon [10th Aug] the 4th Welsh bolted. The 7th Cheshires did not.....the Welsh were stopped by Leared( Leaned?) a GSO3 on Div HQ with his revolver.......a nightmare of funking, bunking, skulking, hiding, thieving, abandoning arms and miserable cowardice such as no-one ever dreamt possible in an Army...."

As has already been suggested I think it will be nigh on impossible to find any published contemporary account that mentions Officers being shot by their own men. As you know the OH rather washes over some of these more unsavoury episodes. There are a few personal accounts from Gallipoli of Officers turning fleeing men back by threatening to shoot their own men and I believe there are examples of this actually happening (RND at Helles if I recall correctly). If Officers were prepared to shoot their own men in an attempt to change the course of a battle, I have little doubt that some men might have been prepared to do something similar to their Officers.

That said, Graves may well have been misinformed or could have picked up on a piece of apocrypha.

I have a transcription of a few accounts mentioning the 53rd Div on 9th/10th Aug - mostly from Officers of the 11th (Northern) Div as the 53rd Div was then operating in support of the 32nd and 33rd Inf Bdes of the 11th Div. These mostly describe the failure of the 53rd Div's attack on 10th Aug in a matter-of-fact way with nothing contentious.

MG

[gilly100]

Hi all

A very interesting and contentious topic. I wonder who the NZ officers were that came over, not heard of that before. One of the scouts from the Australian Light Horse that was sent to Suvla around 12 August commented on the timidness of some of the young troops there.

Personally, while one can recognise some units were seen as better than others at certain times, casualty lists sober me to the point of not daring to be too critical of anyone. ALL front line infantry had their share.

The Aust OH mainly by Bean no doubt glosses here and there also, or just plain makes no mention. Still a must have and towering piece of work!

Ian

[clive_hughes]

Interesting thread. I know that Martin counts Dudley Ward's History of 53rd Division as more fiction than fact (at least, as regards the Gallipoli operations) so won't base my contribution on that or the RWF Regimental History Vol IV, either of which could be open to accusations of sweeping the dirt (if there was any) under the carpet.

I do have Lord Silsoe (Malcom Trustram Eve)'s Sixty Years A Welsh Territorial published in 1976 the year he died. He was a junior officer with the Llanberis Company of 1/6th RWF at Suvla. He agrees that no proper open-warfare training had been given in the UK, and wasn't impressed by the lack of leadership shown by senior officers (usually absent) at Divisional level and above. The junior officers were not properly briefed on their objective for the initial attack, missing the point that the vital Scimitar Ridge lay beyond the visible Chocolate and Green Hills and should have been seized. Instead, his orders were to take Green Hill only. They then advanced in broad daylight across the open expanse of the Salt Lake under shrapnel fire, until reaching 11th Division's lines at Chocolate Hill. During this advance they shook out into open order, the one thing which had been practised in the UK, which he claims diminished their losses. With no more senior officers in evidence, he and his platoon reached the summit of Green Hill along with some Yorkshiremen of 11th Division.

Eve says he was on the Hill for some hours, and saw no enemy and heard no small-arms fire. They were, however, bombarded by the Navy's big guns: this didn't affect his men much, but the rest of the company & battalion were behind him and did suffer from this "friendly fire". He could not locate any other units or more senior officers to his flanks. He does note that at this time he (with others) was going down with dysentery contracted on Lemnos; that the unit had no real sleep on the previous night; had attacked over "bad ground"; and in tremendous heat. In the inter-war period he revisited Green Hill and noted that he walked on to Scimitar Ridge in a quarter of an hour: but that on the first day it wasn't physically possible to do it. His memory of what happened next was blurred, and he only notes that they got back into reserve behind the 11th Divison lines and the battalion was sorted out the next day. Morale was low and began to fall further.

The first night he lost his Captain to a random shot, and his company CO next day likewise wounded. Two junior officers disappeared somewhere, leaving only the other two (himself included) as the company's officers for the next 4-5 weeks - and he was so badly affected by the illness as to be carried round his lines by stretcher. Later he had a Corporal of the 2nd SWBs in 29th Divn. attached to his company "he taught me more in two or three days than I had learnt in my ten months in England". He was invalided to Egypt and the UK, but recovered to serve with the unit and the Divisional staff in Palestine. He says that only one officer from each of the 1/6th and 1/7th RWF were decorated for Suvla.

Contrary to Shannon's picture, when he rejoined in Egypt at the end of 1916 he was amazed to find a unit keen and trusting their leaders, and having recently been engaged successfully at Rumani. "I saw all my old friends as keen as they were before Gallipoli, but now trained and competent". Eve went on after the war to serve in the battalion, including as the North Wales Brigade commander in Ulster during WW2.

I did have a brief correspondence in the 1980s with one of his fellow 1/6th RWF veterans, QMS (later Lieut.) Walter P.Lines , but regrettably didn't know enough at the time to ask about discipline and morale at Suvla.

I haven't come across many personal accounts from the RWF concerning this action, so felt I should add it to the discussion. Nothing is said concerning disobedience, cowardice, suicides or anything else defamatory; make of that what you will.

Clive

[Hywyn]

Hi pals,

Can any Gallipoli specialists point me to original source material that would confirm or contradict the following passage from Robert Graves' 'Goodbye To All That:'

'The fact was that three of the four (RWF) territorial battalions failed signally in the Suvla Bay landing at Gallipoli.

One battalion, it became known, had offered violence to its officers; the commanding officer, a regular, had not cared to survive that day.'

How much truth is there in this?

I ask as a follow up to a posting I made on a thread in the books section:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...25&start=25

Tunesmith

Attached to the 1st 6th Bn RWF War Diary for Aug 1915 is a letter dated 1930 from Lt Col Frank Mills DSO (who I believe was a junior Officer 1st 6th at Suvla?) and seems to be directed to Brigadier General Oglander. It contains notes re his thoughts about Chapters 25 and 28 (of the 'Official Account?)

He starts with

" I do not think you are justified in blaming the troops. The Higher Commands are the ones to blame. The troops were splendid..."

He does not mention anything about offering violence to Officers (that I can see) which is the main thrust of the OP.

[Maricourt]

Lt Col Frank Mills, DSO [he was a Captain at the time of the Suvla landings], as Hywyn has pointed out, has written an extremely interesting letter to Brig-Gen Aspinall-Oglander in response to the OH account. Mills, who spent many years in Malaya and served in the Federation of Malay States Volunteer Rifles was a lot older than most officers in his battalion [42] and, as an engineer, had a practical approach to most things in life. He clearly places the blame on those in higher command and notes in his very long response that the men had already suffered three weeks at sea [including a terrific storm in the Bay of Biscay]; one week in Mudros Harbour where many, including the senior officers contracted dysentery; the lack of proper clothing and equipment - the nights were freezing cold and the days boiling hot. There were no maps or clear orders and most importantly the men had little water and food once the battle had commenced. With the exception of a few old hands, none of the men in his battalion [6/RWF] had seen battle before. In a short memoir, he writes about the terrible decision to cross the Salt Lake in daylight when the men were severely shelled by the Turks, who had, by this time, occupied the higher ground - Mills wrote - "I often wonder who was responsible for that terrible mistake, before we got across I had lost all of my subalterns, but one, and did not see him for three days. The men were splendid but the casualties were appalling."

General Stopford was not up to the task of co-ordinating or commanding the Suvla landings, and, without decent leadership from above, it is highly likely in the hell that was Suvla Bay [to quote the Eric Bogle song] that some men panicked - but I can find nothing to corroborate Robert Graves' statement - he wasn't there and it is likely that any story by the time it reached him on the Western Front was well and truly exaggerated - and unless prima facie documentation turns up in the future, we will never know. War is, indeed, Hell.

Maricourt

[Tunesmith]

Thanks to Maricourt, Hywyn, Clive, Ian, Martin and Petey for reviving this thread.

Nothing has yet emerged to support Graves story about one of the RWF territorial battalions at Suvla, and increasingly I think there never was anything.

Although a good deal of criticism was levelled at the 53rd Division at Suvla (and for that matter at the 54th - and at the New Army divisions too, from some quarters), I was never able to find a source for Robert Graves story. In fact I never found specific condemnation of any of the RWF battalions in the 53rd Division or of their brigade, the 158th.

Andrew Hesketh and Geraint (posts 8 and 10) flag up the snobbery of Regulars towards Territorials. Graves himself was a Special Reserve officer on a wartime commission, and I think he rather has his cake and eats it in his book when he paints himself as a victim of his narrow-minded pre-war Regular superiors, but later expresses similar prejudices himself toward other categories of soldiers.

His introduction to the 1957 edition of his book has apologetic tones. While acknowledging that it had made him a lot of money, he wrote: Reading Goodbye To All That again, for the first time since 1929, I wonder how my publishers escaped a libel action.

He ended his introduction with If any passage still gives offence after all those years, I hope to be forgiven.

[howie8865]

Does anyone of a diary events leading up to departure of 1/5 battalion left devonport docks to sulva bay with date and time of events.

Oh I mean 1/5 battelion of the rwf I mean...thanks

[howie8865]

Does any one have copy of these book called.d 'British Regiments at Gallipoli' by Ray Westlake, published by Leo Cooper, London ISBN 0 85052 511 X

[howie8865]

As someone could tell me what page its on and write the down here the diary of events with officers names etc from this book abt the 1/5 battalion of the rwf.

[howie8865]

Does anyone have dates when Major Bernard Head arrived in NZ and Egypt and any dates in April in 1915 when he arrived in uk.

[howie8865]

Hi there can someone explain what's the difference between 1/5 battalion ( t.f) welsh regiment and 1/5 ( flintshire ) battalion (t.f) royal welsh fulsiliers both battalion from 1914-1915 are they the same as I am in this information regarding embarking devonport and arriving at sulva bay. Thanks.

[LarsA]

Welsh Regiment and RWF are two different regiments. WR - 41st foot, RWF - 23rd foot.

Both embarking the same date in Devonport, and debarking at Suvla.

Lars