The "One Continuous Battle" Doctrine

[PhilB]

A post recently stated "It is well known that Haig formed his "one continuous battle doctrine" pre-war". This gives the impression (though the poster may not have intended it) that it was Haig`s theory. I have a notion, though, that it was actually the orthodox view before the war and that he had simply adopted it as gospel. Does anyone know where the theory originated, was it also the view of other nations and was it meant to cover wars of all magnitudes?

[Robert Dunlop]

It would be helpful to start with a clear definition.

Robert

[salesie]

As far as I'm aware, Phil, Haig's "one continuous battle" doctrine was all his own, formed when he served in India. However, I believe he formed his theory from studying volume 6 (the only volume translated into English) entitled, Modern Weapons and Modern War, being an abridgement of, The War of the Future In Its Technical, Economic and Political Relations, London 1900, written by I.S. Bloch.

Here's a brief summary:

"Completed sixteen years before the Great War, Bloch, a Jewish banker from Warsaw, approached his task with an open mind unfettered by theory or by past and inapplicable experiences (he was completely non-military). It took years of solid, painstaking devotion to write and was based entirely upon independent research, receiving neither encouragement nor financial support from any official quarter. Of this monumental labour, only the sixth volume was ever translated into English.

Neither the full version nor the single-volume translation ever seems to have gained any currency amongst the British military hierarchy, although in Russia the Tsar went so far as to make it recommended (but not required) reading for his Staff officers. What the General Staffs would have found was hardly calculated to inspire acceptance, for Bloch's hypothesis was that the war of the future would not be a replay of the Napoleonic Wars or even of 1870-1, to be decided in a matter of hours or days in a single clash on some obscure field of which no one had ever heard. On the contrary, Bloch argued, the array of fearsome modern weapons and the nature of modern society made such an outcome wishful thinking, since the armies would be unable to press their attacks to a conclusion. Instead he foresaw, with an icy logic based on an intensive study of contemporary weaponry, industry and society, a prolonged and devastating struggle which would drag on through ponderous and pitiless years, years in which no ravishingly clever stratagem, or splendidly timed and executed manoeuvre, could ever yield the victory so earnestly sought. The next great war, he predicted, would not be decided through the struggles of the fighting man, but its resolution would lie in the grim and indifferent hands of famine and social upheaval.

In Bloch's dire vision the soldiers in the line would be more preoccupied with survival than with victory, driven to seek shelter in the belly of the cold earth from the storm of metal which would fill the air and accordingly, 'Everybody will be entrenched in the next war. It will be a war of entrenchments. The spade will be as indispensable to a soldier as his rifle,' with the unlooked-for consequence that the act of fighting would have little in common with the traditional, straightfor-ward contest over open ground in which the soldiers would measure their skill, their physical and moral superiority against each other in the time-honoured way.

It appears extraordinary in its foresight. None of the General Staffs, for all their professional expertise and close concentration on the technical aspects of their profession, could discern the character of the coming cataclysm, with the exception of a few seers like Kitchener and Haig, crying in the wilderness.

Wars between great powers are only won quickly when there is a significant disparity between the opposing powers in society, weaponry, technique or, more rarely, commanding genius. In 1870-1 the decisive disparities lay in the facts that Prussia possessed a mass conscript army, a speedy mobilization and a modern General Staff, and Napoleon III did not. By 1914 everybody had taken urgent steps to ensure that they, too, possessed these attributes, and everybody was on a more or less equal footing."

Cheers - salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

salesie, who wrote the summary? Thanks. Also, do you have any evidence that Bloch's work was considered by Haig?

Robert

[salesie]

The summary is from Armour Against Fate, British Military Intelligence in the First World War, written in 1989 by Michael Occleshaw (a Dr of History) and published by Columbus Books, ISBN 0-86287-407-6.

This book is well researched and referenced, the author having access to all the relevant papers/documents etc, and Occleshaw states more than once that Haig's four-phase theory was pre-war and there is enough evidence of this to satisfy me, but he only strongly suggests that Haig was influenced by this book (as per the summary).

Cheers - salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, salesie. One further clarification, please. Did Occleshaw state that it was a four-phase theory of war, or of a battle, or both?

Robert

[salesie]

Thanks, salesie. One further clarification, please. Did Occleshaw state that it was a four-phase theory of war, or of a battle, or both?

Robert

Robert, Occleshaw phrases it both ways - here's one reference to Haig's theory (there are others) - pages 335, 336 & 337 discussing 1917. It should be noted though, Robert, for the sake of context, that GHQ's intelligence reports (Charteris's) were highly over-optimistic on the poor state of the German army, and the War Office's reports were at odds with this. The Director of Military Intelligence's reports were saying that the German army was far from beaten (as Haig himself was in May 1917 before optimism seemed to take over), yet Haig dismissed them on the grounds that the DMI himself was a Catholic and therefore his sources must be tainted - the DMI's reports proved to be highly accurate, unfortunately.

"...It will be helpful here to consider Haig's general theory and outlook on the war and the way he believed it would be fought, in order to assess how much Charteris's opinions may have influenced him and also how the information given him by Charteris may have affected his views.

Haig held the theory, developed while he was in India, that battle consisted of four necessary phases: 1. The manoeuvre for position; 2. The first clash of battle; 3. The wearing-out fight, of varying duration; 4. The eventual decisive blow.5

It seems that almost alone with Kitchener, he had foreseen a war lasting at least three years, which would place 'the eventual decisive blow' squarely in late 1917.

Haig maintained this view throughout the war, as is revealed by his directions to his Intelligence Branch: At the Council of War on August 5th [1914] he had pointed out that since Great Britain and Germany were fighting for their existence the war would inevitably be a prolonged struggle, and would require the development of the full force of the British Empire to achieve success. The Battle of the Aisne, which enabled him to gauge the fighting qualities of the German troops, confirmed his belief that man-power would ultimately decide the war, and he directed his staff to begin the study of the man-power which the German nation could effectively

1 Brigadier-General J. A. Charteris. At GHQ, London, 1931, p. 269.

2 Brigadier-General J. A. Charteris, Field-Marshal Earl Haig, London, 1929, p. 282.

3 Marshall-Cornwall interview, loc. cit.

4 Edmonds Papers, loc. cit., V/2, obituary of Major-General Sir John Davidson. 19 February

1954.

5 J. Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire, Myths and Anti-Myths of War 1861-1945, London,

1980, p. 58.

335

employ in the field . . . the studies of the man-power of the German Army - commenced during these early months at First Corps I quarters - were developed at each successive stage of Haig's progress in the war, and he rarely allowed more than a day or two to pass without himself inquiring into the developments of this investigation. 1

In his final despatch Haig argued that the great battles of 1916 and 1917 should be seen as part of the same continuous engagement. The war was inevitably long because: In the stage of the wearing-out struggle losses will necessarl heavy on both sides, for in it the price of victory is paid. If the opposing forces are approximately equal in numbers, in courage, in morale and in equipment, there is no way of avoiding payment of the price or eliminating this phase of the struggle. In former battles this stage of the conflict has rarely lasted more than a few days, and has often been completed in a few hours. When armies of millions are engaged, with the resources of great empires behind them, it will inevitably be long.2

Haig had formed his opinion on the way the war would be before it started. It would be a war of military exhaustion. In May 1917 he considered more time was required in phase three: The enemy has already weakened appreciably; but a long time is required to wear down such great numbers of troops composed of fine fighting material and he is still fighting with such energy and determination that the situation is not yet ripe for the decisive blow.3

There is no evidence of Charteris's optimism here. Yet a little more than a month later Haig's position had begun to shift: After careful consideration of all available information I feel justified in stating that the power of endurance of the German people is being strained to such a degree as to make it possible that the breaking may be reached this year. Despite the distress in Germany and the short rations in the German Army we must still reckon on desperate efforts being made by enemy to hold on in the hope of outlasting the determination of the Allies. But we have already overcome similar efforts on the Somme, onthe Ancre, and at Arras. We are able to do so again. Every success...

1 Charteris, Field-Marshal Earl Haig, op. cit., p. 110.

2 J. H. Boraston, Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches, London, 1919, p. 320.

3 OAD 428, 'The Present Situation and Future Plans', 1 May 1917, cited in J. Ti

Road to Passchendaele, London, 1977, p. 85.

336

...brings us nearer to the end of the long and desperate struggle and we are now justified in believing that one more great victory, equal to those already gained, may turn the scale finally, and, at the least, will have an even greater effect than previous victories in Germany and on the world's opinion generally. 1

One week later his view had become a degree more optimistic: According to reports, the endurance of the German nation is being tested so severely that discontent there has already assumed formidable proportions. The German Government, helped by the long disciplinary training of the people, is still able to control this discontent; but every fresh defeat of the German armies, combined with a growing realization of the failure of the submarine campaign, increases the difficulty of doing so, and further defeats in the field may have unexpectedly great results, which may come with unexpected suddenness. The German Army too, shows unmistakeable signs of deterioration in many ways and the cumulative effect of further defeats may at any time yield greater results in the field than we can rely on gaining.2

By the end of June Haig was beginning to believe the German Army could be defeated in the field that year, that it was possible to reach phase four. Harington relates that: Sir Douglas Haig warned us in a memorandum on 30th June shortly after Messines that the fundamental object of the operations was the defeat of the German Army and that this could not be achieved in a single battle and that we must make preparations for 'very hard fighting lasting perhaps for weeks' and that we must arrange to deliver a series of organized attacks on a large scale and on broad frontages.3

In short, Haig believed phase four was close enough to justify such an effort..."

1 Haig Diaries, op. cit., OA799, Haig to Army Commanders, 5 June 1917.

2 OAD 478, 'Present Situation and Future Plans', 12 June 1917, PRO W0106/312.

3 Major-General Sir C. Harington, Plumer of Messines, London, 1935, p. ]09,

337

Hope this helps?

Cheers - salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks very much, salesie. This looks like the definition of "one continuous battle", would that be right?

Haig held the theory, developed while he was in India, that battle consisted of four necessary phases: 1. The manoeuvre for position; 2. The first clash of battle; 3. The wearing-out fight, of varying duration; 4. The eventual decisive blow.

noting your point, and Occenshaw's, that the same principles were applied to the war as a whole.

Robert

[salesie]

I agree, Robert, this is clearly Haig's own definition of "one long continuous battle" as portrayed in his final despatch - and I believe that Occleshaw demonstrates that Haig held this belief pre-war.

What amazes me though, is Bloch's amazing foresight - a banker, with no prior military knowledge at all, out-thought the vast majority of the world's professional army staff, or is that only to be expected given the nature of the staff-beast in all countries at the time?

I suppose this is further proof that Haig, by understanding the exact nature of future war, was indeed the "Educated Soldier"? Note, I only said suppose; the jury's still out for me.

Cheers - salesie.

[PhilB]

Only Kitchener and Haig, among the Allies, have been mentioned so far as foreseeing the nature of the war to come. Is it possible that other senior military men, especially Gen French, saw it differently? Or was this the orthodox Staff College line of the pre-war years?

Does it have parallels with Grant`s strategy on assuming command?

I do have a slight problem with Haig as one of the few to see clearly the shape of the conflict to come. I may be mistaken, of course, but foresight, vision, & perception are/were not usually high on the list of virtues he`s credited with.