Baptism of Fire: The Second Battle of Ypres

[Al Parsons]

Have just finished this book this evening. Cannot recommend it too highly. While Mr. Greenfield is a Canadian, his focus is not limited to his own countrymen. Indeed, his ability to tell the story from both the German and the allied sides is quite remarkable.

My own great-Uncle was taken prisoner during this battle and sat the rest of the war out in various prisoner-of-war and punishment camps. Through the efforts of Mr. Greenfield, I can follow his progress on the battlefield until that fateful afternoon when his unit was surrounded. He came back to Canada a different man than the one that left and suffered from health problems for many years; a residue, I guess, from the poison gas, high explosives, shrapnel and machine gun fire that made those days in April a living hell. One wag evidently deadpanned that Dante, in his much earlier description of Hell, was - as it turned out - quite unimaginative.

This is an excellent book. If you're at all interested in the battle, you really should give it a try.

[armourersergeant]

Al,

Does he touch on the confrontation between General Snow and Brigadier-General Currie just after the opening of the German attack? Where Currie left his brigade to fetch help and stumbbled in to Snow's headquarters. A row ensued.

regards

Arm

[Al Parsons]

Arm, not to tease you but yes he does. I shall give you a full report later today. Al

[Tom Morgan]

Just in case anyone tries to order a copy of the book Al mentions, be aware that there are two books on the Great War with the title Baptism of Fire. The other one is by Mark Marsay and is an account of the 5th Green Howards at the Battle of St. Julien.

Tom

[Al Parsons]

Al,

Does he touch on the confrontation between General Snow and Brigadier-General Currie just after the opening of the German attack? Where Currie left his brigade to fetch help and stumbbled in to Snow's headquarters. A row ensued.

regards

Arm

Arm, rolling up my sleeves to type. There is more to it than what follows but this should give you a good flavour.

"In Snow's version of the meeting, Currie showed him a conditional order to withdraw soon after entering the dugout and told him that if his men were forced out of their trenches, they would retreat to the GHQ Line. According to the historian Tim Travers, Snow claimed that he tore up the order and then 'forcibally persuaded' Currie to maintain his line. The British official historian, Sir James Edmonds, who served under Snow in 1914, reported that the major-general later said that had Currie been 'an English officer I would have put him under arrest and he would have been shot'.

Currie's version of the meeting casts Snow as both a bully and a fool. As the noise of exploding shells echoed around them, Currie explained that a gap had opened on his left. Snow did not ask who had authored the withdrawal orders and assumed that the gap had opened because of Currie. Ignoring Currie's attempts to explain that the gap had opened because of the collapse of the Apex and Turner's decision to withdraw the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, Snow shouted, 'Give them Hell. Give them Hell'. In 1926, in response to Edmond's plan to include Snow's version of the meeting in the British official history, Currie wrote:

'When I considered the position of all the troops of the 2nd Brigade and my inability to move two battalions whom I thought had been sent to our assistance, I confess that at that moment, I thought that I had never heard a more stupid remark. I have thought of it many times during the past eleven years and am of the same opinion still'.

At no point it would seem did Snow tell Currie that he had been appointed to command the reserves, and that he had sent troops to Fortuin. Snow did agree to allow Currie to send Alderson a message. But no sooner had Currie started on it when Snow was shouting that the Canadian brigadier was taking too long to write it. 'That was an insult and so at variance with the treatment which one officer should receive from another of superior rank that I was dumbfounded, ' recalled Currie.

Is it possible to determine what happened in that dugout ? Fortunately, there was a witness, Lieutenant Edison F. Lynn of the 2nd Field Company Canadian Engineers, and he supports Currie's version of events. Just before Currie arrived at the dugout, Lynn saw an example of Snow's famous temper. Snow sent for Lynn after learning that he and several hundred Canadian stragglers he had collected ...were extending a nearly trench. As...(Lynn).... arrived near the dugout he saw Captain Paul Villiers...enter it. Lynn followed a moment later, and he heard Snow pepper Villiers with a series of disjointed questions concerning 'the location of each Battalion; the condition of the line; the strength of the forces against them; gas discharges.' Because of the way Snow put the questions, Villier's 'replies were at times vague and unsatisfactory.' He lacked the information, for example, to be able to trace the 3rd Brigade's line on Snow's map, which caused the brigadier to shout, 'Are your men a hundred yards away or are they a mile or miles away?' When Villiers was unable to clarify the situaiton, Snow began cursing him for his stupidity, and then went on to curse 'the Canadians and all connected with them'. The tirade concluded with Snow shouting, 'Get out of here. Get back to your brigade and, when you have some definite information to pass on, send someone with intelligence, if you have such a one, capable of expaining the situation'.

Before Snow had a chance to turn to Lynn, Currie entered. Lynn, who had been shocked by Snow's abuse of Villiers, watched as the senior British general responded to Currie with a tirade that included 'such words as incapable, rotten troops, fools, dictators, and nurses.' Currie told Snow that the Germans were pressing his men hard and pointed to the map to show where Snow could best deploy the reserve troops under his command. As soon as Currie finished saying that Snow's men were fresh and could be of great value, the almost apoplectic major-general started shouting, 'Have you come here to teach me my profession and dictate how I shall handle my division?'

The exchange continued with Currie pointing out that his men had been in the line for ten days and had 'resisted every attack without relinquishing a foot of ground.' But they had 'been fearfully cut up,' he said, and were tired and hungry. Even given the pressures of war, Snow's response is shocking: 'Do you expect me to wet-nurse your brigade? You have got yourself and your men into a mess and you will get them out of it as best you can.'

Given Currie's reputation for handling expletives, it is likely that Lynn's memory cleaned up his response to Snow. 'I am not in a mess, nor are my men, ' he declared. 'My men and I have held out against fierce onslaughts and will continue to hold out as long as any of us are left....The support of some fresh troops is essential for the safety of the line.' Snow's response was probably also somewhat more pungent than 'Enough of this. I have heard enough. Get out of here. Take care of your own line. You will get no help from me.'

****************************************************

In the end, Edmonds dropped all mention of the Currie-Snow meeting in his official history. He could not find anyone to corroborate Snow's version of events, and more important, his political masters told him that including the incident would 'ruin his (Currie's) position in Canada - where he is...a staunch supporter of the Imperial connection.'

Whew, that's it for now. I shall go back to correct typos. There is more but this should give you the drift.

Al

[armourersergeant]

Thats excellent Al, I have some info but this adds alot and clearly corroborates other bits that I have. I thank you for taking the time to type this info out for me. It will help flesh out my bio talk of snow.

regards

Arm

[Al Parsons]

Arm, you're quite welcome. If you have any specific questions that Mr. Greenfield's book may answer, please let me know. Also, if you have questions about the author's sources.

Al

[armourersergeant]

Al,

I have heard that Currie actually left Colonel Lipsett, an Englishman, in charge and went in search of help. He would have been better in letting Lipsett go, who as an Englishman and a less senior officer would perhaps have been better recieved. Not that it excuses Snow's mood. It does seem a strange thing for the senior commander to go in search of help, not that I suggest that Currie had other motives to do so.

Snow did have a blustering nature, a firy temper etc so I do not doubt the account given, though Snow was suffering from a broken pelvis recieved the previous year that he had not fully recovered and ,IMO, this could have influenced his temper on occassions. That said it is also fair to say he probably was suffering from stress and pressure. He had been given local command, the bunker from Snow's account was a small affair, having moved there in the grounds of Potizje chateau, when the shelling became bad. He had sent many of his staff away as the room was too small for all his staff.

I am sure he saw Currie as a colonial who knew not his job and to boot one who had left his command, for what ever reason. Given that Currie was a firey chap himself I am guessing that his temper was not the best given he was in grave need of re-inforcements. I can not see him entering the dugout uttering please and thank yous etc.

I have never seen an account that contradicts Currie, nor seemingly one that contradicts Snow. I am inclined to think that Snow was the most in the wrong yet can not see that Currie did not 'add' something of his own to the confrontation!

Does it mention wether Currie actually ordered the withdrawl of his brigade, but that they did not actually carry out the order? I recall reading this in another account. I also believe that Snow had already sent two battalions of to help the situation, is that confirmed?

Sorry to go on.

Many thanks

Arm

[Al Parsons]

Al,

I have heard that Currie actually left Colonel Lipsett, an Englishman, in charge and went in search of help. He would have been better in letting Lipsett go, who as an Englishman and a less senior officer would perhaps have been better recieved. Not that it excuses Snow's mood. It does seem a strange thing for the senior commander to go in search of help, not that I suggest that Currie had other motives to do so.

Arm, the most relevant quote on this subject seems to be as follows:

"Thinking that Bell might move his troops into position on his left if asked by a senior officer, Currie decided to take the bold, almost reckless action of leaving his headquarters and going back to the GHQ Line. After the war, Sir Sam Hughes sought to discredit Currie by casting aspersions on this decision. Even Currie's biographer, Hugh Urquhart, who served at 2nd Ypres in the 16th Battalion, characterized the action as 'well intentioned if ill advised.' Urquhart's phrase is worth considering. Both Lipsett and Tuxford approved of Currie's plan. But senior officers cannot excuse questionable decisions by showing that junior officers agreed with them. Still, given the praise for Tuxford and, especially, Lipsett, it seems off that Currie's decision has been depicted as 'ill advised'.

John Dixon's recent criticism of Currie is also unwarranted, not to mention misleading. 'His (Currie's) absence could have brought about the loss of the Brigade,' the British historian wrote, 'if it had not been left in the competent hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Lipsett.' But Lipsett did not just happen to end up as interim commander of Currie's 2nd Brigade. Currie ensured that Lipsett would be its commander by appointing him, even though Tuxford outranked the former British regular. Further, Lipsett and Currie (with Tuxford's knowledge) agreed that were the two battalions to be seriously threatened by a renewed German attack, Lipsett would act under Currie's 12:45 pm order to retire. 'As he was the man on the spot, I left it to his judgement, and Lipsett and myself had a very clear understanding,' Currie wrote in 1927.

Currie's decision to walk through ground pockmarked by shapnel and crawling with uncounted Germans amply demonstrates his sang froid. Captain Ross Napier, ..., then a scout on the outskirts of Wieltje, must have done a double take when he saw the familiar pear-shaped man appear. 'The roads were being heavily shelled and the open was searched by rifle, machine gun and shrapnel.' Napier remembered. 'As he drew near, a salvo of heavies intended for the road burst limmediately in his line of approach, but he reached the comparative shelter (from the rifle fire at least) of the ruined cottage where I was - making, as he did so, a jocular remark as to the comparative salubrity of Salisbury Plains.'"

************************************************

Thus writes Mr. Greenfield.

He doesn't seem to let Currie off the hook completely. He recognizes that Currie's decision was bold and almost reckless. And it might be thought that "almost reckless" decisions like this ought not to be made in circumstances such as this.

On the other hand.....perhaps not. Perhaps a disastrous situation such as this, with potential repercussions affecting the entire British forces in the salient, might be fair grounds for taking an unusual, almost reckless, decision when the stakes were so high.

As for going himself and leaving Lipsett in charge, Currie's suggestion that leaving the man on the spot in charge makes a certain amount of sense to me. Certainly, it may well have been the less disruptive and dangerous alternative. I'm just talking to myself here, Arm, but on the surface at least, it looks to me that Currie may have had a case.

As for sending Lipsett because he was British, hmm.....At this point in the war, I don't know whether or not Currie knew Snow from his left elbow, let alone by reputation. I am not sure that Snow's reputation for being a somewhat irascible fellow should have been a factor in the decision, but what the heck do I know. Certainly he was having a bad day. On the other hand, so was everyone else.

By the way, remind me to urinate on Sam Hughes's grave, will you please. Arming my great-Uncle with a rifle that jammed, just when thousands of Germans were walking towards him, alone warrants this. But Hughes's vendetta against Currie just because he refused to give junior a division really takes the cake. Yes, I think I shall google the silly old ****** to see where he is buried.

Have a good day, Arm. I shall research the other points made in your message and get back to you later.

[Al Parsons]

Note to moderator. Sorry about that. I didn't know that that word was automatically censured. That's another reason why I like this board: its so polite. We colonials are a rough hewen lot. Will be more careful next time.

[armourersergeant]

Currie's decision to walk through ground pockmarked by shapnel and crawling with uncounted Germans amply demonstrates his sang froid.

As for sending Lipsett because he was British, hmm.....At this point in the war, I don't know whether or not Currie knew Snow from his left elbow, let alone by reputation. I am not sure that Snow's reputation for being a somewhat irascible fellow should have been a factor in the decision, but what the heck do I know. Certainly he was having a bad day. On the other hand, so was everyone else.

Al,

I think the first part should put to bed any doubt, not that I had any, of his courage. You tend to think he wandered aimlessly back in the sunshine etc, not this torrid scrambled affair it obviously was.

You are of course correct. Currie had probably never heard of Snow and why should he. I am not sure that Snow even at that time had a reputation for being 'grumpy'. He should given some of the things he innovated prior to WW1 have had a rep of being open to ideas. However his day probably was bad. I think I take my lead from his injury and his probable 'doubt' of the abilty of not just a colonial but an ameteur to boot turning up. a brigade commander asking for help having left his command!! He should of course have listened and kept his council, this he obviously did not.

You could be right, Currie made a decision based on the facts he had to hand, In my opinion it was the wrong one, I would have sent Lipsett and stayed myself. However hindsight is a great thing and I make this based, I guess, in no small part on what I know happened.

I wonder if there are other examples during the war where a commander went in search of help in place of a 'runner'?

Many thanks with your help on this matter.

Regards

Arm

r

[armourersergeant]

al,

Just a thought, I wonder given the journey back that Currie had if his apperance and manner were a little dishevelled and thus Snow thought he looked as though he had the wind up? He certainly must have looked a bit the worse for wear.

regards

Arm

[Al Parsons]

Al,

You tend to think he wandered aimlessly back in the sunshine etc, not this torrid scrambled affair it obviously was.

Regards

Arm

r

Arm, I honestly don't know what this means or where it came from.

As for whether or not it was a good idea, it may well have been a bad idea. After all, you are quite right, this is what they had runners for, isn't it.

Interestingly enough, Mr. Greenfield has some pretty descriptive words on what Currie must have looked like upon arriving at General Snow's headquarters. After 2 days of no sleep, little food and much tension, he must have looked pretty rough indeed. I will provide you with more quotes tomorrow.

Bye for now, Al.

[Al Parsons]

Al,

You tend to think he wandered aimlessly back in the sunshine etc, not this torrid scrambled affair it obviously was.

Arm, I need an explanation of this.

At best, it is inexplicable.

At worst, well, we won't say.

For three days, the Canadians' corner of the Ypres Salient was an inferno of poison gas, high explosive, shrapnel, machine gun fire and rifle bullets. It was pure and unadulterated hell.

How anyone could think that anyone wandered around aimlessly in the sunshine is beyond me.

I cannot fathom how anyone could draw this conclusion from anything that I said.

Al

[armourersergeant]

My apologises, I think I have confused the issue, it will not be the first time. It is nothing you have said, the word 'you' was used much as in the royal "we".

What I meant to say is that the impression that could be drawn, if you do not think about it with all the facts, is that from leaving the front line it was an easy trip back to the divisional lines. It was of course not the case and that the journey would have been fraught with danger. The idea possibly to many would not be that Currie spent many dangerous moments in 'touch' with the enemy and the shells etc falling about him.

I am not sure I have explained myself any better. My intention was to show that his journey was not easy. I appear to have done the opposite.

Apologises again

Arm

[Al Parsons]

Good evening, Arm. Thanks for the words. I'm a bit sorry myself that I replied the way I did, rather than send you a private message. The royal "we" should have suggested itself to me. In fact, I think I theorized about it a little bit but clearly - and unfortunately - couldn't get beyond being frazzled by the sentence. This is actually one of the disadvantages of this kind of medium; without the facial expressions to guide us and the nuance in the voice, it is all to easy sometimes to misunderstand a perfectly sensible comment. My apologies too.

OK, with that out of the way.....onward and upward.

al,

Just a thought, I wonder given the journey back that Currie had if his apperance and manner were a little dishevelled and thus Snow thought he looked as though he had the wind up? He certainly must have looked a bit the worse for wear.

regards

Arm

Funny thing, Mr. Greenfield comments on this as well.

"When Currie climbed down into Snow's dugout, he cut quite the figure - stubble on his chin, boots caked with mud, uniform streaked with dirt and sweat, and smelling like cordite. Nearing a hundred hours awake, he would have had bloodshot eyes and his face would have been drawn; indeed, just a few hours later he wrote of his condition, 'I had no sleep for days and nights and didn't care what happened.' His own headquarters at Pond Farm had been set alight by shells. Twice during the morning, he had been told that help was on the way; twice he was disappointed. Over the previous few hours, commander after commander had refused his pleas for reinforcements. And just minutes before he entered Snow's dugout (where he hoped to telegraph his own commander, General Alderson), Currie had learned that Brigadier-General Turner had ordered the 2nd and 3rd Battalions to withdraw to the GHQ Line. He immediately realized that Turner's blunder had 'increased the gap and increased my anxiety to find troops to fill it.'"

****************************************************

Arm, I think its safe to say that Mr. Greenfield has written a pretty darn good book. I know he is on this board so I hope he doesn't mind the extensive quotations. All we need is a little reminder about copyright infringement!!!!!!

Will get back to a couple of your other points tomorrow about troop orders.

Al

[armourersergeant]

Thanks Al,

I have to say I have often looked at this encounter in isolation to all else that happened. I had realised what had transpired prior to Currie setting off yet had failed to realise just what condition and appearance he would have turned up in at Snow's dugout. This passage puts that firmly into perspective.

Gen. Alderson was an old friend of Snow's from the Sudan expedition of 1884/85. They had been part of the mounted infantry (on camels) and had remained friends after. I wonder if Currie tried to report the incident higher and if Alderson 'killed' it at the time. Or whether Currie decided to let it drop. More to the point I wonder if Snow, who if I recall from his papers, had a conversation just after 2nd Ypres with Alderson about the battle and mentioned this to him. It may be of course that both decided not to follow it up. In his memoirs Snow mentions it in passing but, again from memory, he pays only a passing reference to it and does not mention the officer concerned by name.

I did not understand that the author was a member of the forum and I thank him for hopefully accepted indulgence with our use of paragraphs of his book. It has/is helping me to understand an incident that I am really get to grips with for a change.

Regards

Arm

[Al Parsons]

I wonder if Currie tried to report the incident higher and if Alderson 'killed' it at the time. Or whether Currie decided to let it drop. More to the point I wonder if Snow, who if I recall from his papers, had a conversation just after 2nd Ypres with Alderson about the battle and mentioned this to him. It may be of course that both decided not to follow it up.

Arm, I think you may be on to something with the suggestion that both may have decided not to follow it up. The entire incident does not seem to redound to the credit of either party.

With respect to Currie, I am beginning to think that he made a mistake (ie; sending a runner would have made a lot more sense) and I even wonder if later in the war he might have literally winced at any thought of his earlier behaviour. Certainly I have trouble seeing him make the same type of decision in 1917 or 1918. In April 1915, he was still learning his craft - in a hurry and under extremely adverse conditions - but learning none the less.

With respect to Snow, it may well be that after the event he was somewhat embarrassed by his own behaviour. If he did harbour any feelings of guilt, however slight, this certainly would have encouraged him to drop the whole affair. I wonder if he did speak to Alderson after the battle. If he did, perhaps he mentioned the incident within the overall context of extreme strain and then dismissed it with a little honest philosophy; ie. who amongst us has never said anything that he later regretted. Might have happened this way, I guess but who knows?

Have a great weekend. (I'm retired, so everyday is a holiday).

Note to Mr. Greenfield: Nathan, if you are following this wee discussion about Generals Currie and Snow, we would love to have your input. Thanks.

[armourersergeant]

There have been some discussions on this incident previously on the forum, but I have to say none has added this much information to the actual events that took place, especially from the perspective of the visual conditions both men may have been in or seen before them.

I find it more 'reasonable' to see how both men may have contributed to this scene that unfolded. Snow with his injury and recent assumption of command, stuck in a dugout of a small nature, Snow was 6'3" which I bet did not help. He is then confronted by an ameteur (his eyes) and a colonial to boot, haggard and tired in apperance, who has 'deserted' his command to go and fetch help. Who he believes has come to demand of him men to help his brigade.

Currie has been without sleep for days, he has had a hard time of his journey, he has left his men to hold and gone to get help, he can not let them down, he has to get help. He finds an old man who is perhaps berating a junior officer, he sees an old stuffy General, who he thinks has not seen action for many a year, which is almost correct. Currie has a short temper and perhaps this rises in body language if not in voice. He has perhaps realised that he should not have left his command and is worried about that. The General then implies or even says he has left his command, which hits a nerve he has been feeling for tha last few hours etc etc....

It has all the ingredients waiting to happen.

Any other input would be great.

regards

Arm

[Nathan Greenfield]

Sorry it has taken me so long to join this discussion; I've been dealing with a death in the family.

First, let me say how much fun it is to see my book being enjoyed and being so helpful to the members of this forum.

As for Currie's decision to leave Lipsett in charge on Gravenstafel Ridge. Though sometimes Lipsett is referred to as Colonel, both he and Tuxford were in April 1915 Lt. Colonels. Tuxford actually outranked Lipsett by virtue of seniority in the Canadian Army. Lipsett, however, had more experience than did Tuxford; Lipsett had been a "cool British regular," to quote historian Desmond Morton. Lipsett's HQ was also better positioned than was Tuxford's, since it was a bit back from the line.

Currie's decision to go looking for troops may have been a bit reckless, but it was not foolhardy. Twice his adjutant had found troops that refused to move for him. Currie's hope was that they would move for a senior officer.

There is no indication in the records that Currie knew who Snow was until he ended up in his dugout. Nor is there any indication that Snow knew who Currie was until sometime on the 24th. The Canadian general most reponsible for the battle, Brig.General Richard Snow, was not aware of who Snow was until late on the 24th --and Turner had been in almost constant contact with his own commander, General Alderson.

Interestingly enough, the question of Currie's search for troops comes up in the libel action Currie brought against a local Ontario paper in the late 1920s. The paper had repeated the late-Sir Sam Hughes's charge that by ordering his men into action on the morning of Nov. 11, 1918 at Mons Currie was responsbile for several needless deaths in his own serach for glory. Currie was successful in his suit. During the trial, his decision to go search for troops in 1915 became and issue. He was exonerated on this point too.

[Al Parsons]

Nathan, hurray! you're here. Thanks for replying. It is really cool to have the opportunity to talk about a book with its author!

I envy you and other Canadian historians like Tim Cook who are doing so much to bring our past to life. I will be turning shortly to Mr. Cook's recent first volume on the Canadian Corps. It promises to be as comprehensive and expert as your own volume on 2nd Ypres.

Well done.

Al

[Nathan Greenfield]

Al:

Thanks again for the kind words.

Tim is a good friend and his book is an achievement of the first order. I regularly review books for the Times Educational Supplement (UK) and am very sorry that I could not review Tim's; I give it two thumbs up.

Cheers,

Nathan

[ianw]

I look forward to reading Nathan's book - it's certainly appropriate that a Canadian pal should be in the vanguard of a fresh look at 2nd Ypres where their forefathers (and ours) fought so valiantly.

My Grandfather fought there with the Cavalry Division - and the friends he lost are now listed high on the inside of the Menin Gate

As for Currie's behaviour , it must be difficult to condemn him. Desperate times need desperate measures.

[Al Parsons]

Ian, because your grandfather fought there, I suspect that you will get particular "enjoyment" from reading Nathan's book. "Enjoyment" because putting ourselves in our grandfather's shoes, when the poison gas was visibly approaching and high explosives were rending the air, also adds a very real element of melancholy, as you well know.

Anyway, the book is great. What you may be particularly interested in is that Nathan covers all the units involved in the battle: German, British, French and Canadian. Without going back to reference the book, the role of your grandfather's unit is very probably well addressed.

For your information and others, the ISBN is apparently 0002007274.

[armourersergeant]

Nathan,

Glad to see you join in. This encounter has intrigued me for a few years now. The only info I have gathered is from two sources really. Snow's personel papers and a online document, the name escapes me, this discussion, particularly the state of his apperance etc has really helped to put flesh on the bones.

I come at this 'event' from Snow's perspective. I have been researching him for a few years now and want to get the good and bad of his character. I have always tried to see this from both sides. I think Snow over reacted and believe that Currie was wrong to go himself, though your point about lower rank officers not getting the desired effect has a lot of merit and I will consider this. That is to say, i believe, that Currie had anything other thought than of helping the position. I have never doubted the 'honesty' of his actions just the correctness. But as I say this has given me completely different angles to consider.

It s easy to see that Currie, with rest and a clear head, rather than no sleep for days and battle weary, may have considered a different approach. Though I have failed to consider that he may already have done this as a last resort, exhausting all other options. I have thought he should have sent Lipsett, rather then himself, but this may be due to hindsight and lack of my considering other factors as mentioned in other posts above.

Your book does sound a good informative read and I shall endevour to get a copy.

You mention that this incident was brought up during the trial. Was it infered that Currie had tried to 'quit' the field? Are you aware id Alderson ever passed a comment/judgement on Currie or Snow in regard to this incident? Snow mentions a conversation where he and Alderson felt they may get the sack for thier part in the battle, so Snow must have felt he had done something wrong, though I am sure he felt not in the Currie incident.

regards

Arm