British Trench Raids

[salesie]

It seems that by February 1915, the powers that be wanted to make raiding an organised matter of policy. Here's a copy of a GHQ memorandum taken from, Armour Against Fate, British Military Intelligence in the First World War, by Michael Occleshaw. I found section 4 particularly interesting; not exactly written by a donkey leading lions.

Cheers-salesie.

"General Staff.

GHQ British Army in the Field,

Operations Section, No. OA 447

Date, 5th Feb. 1915

First Army.

Second Army.

Cavalry Corps.

Indian Cavalry Corps.

1. The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief desires me again to draw attention to the importance of constant activity and of offensive methods in general in dealing with the enemy immediately opposed to us.

2. For reasons known to you, we are for the moment acting on the defensive so far as serious operations are concerned, but this should not preclude the planning and making of local attacks on a comparatively small scale, with a view to gaining ground and of taking full advantage of any tactical or numerical inferiority on the part of the enemy. Such enterprises are highly valuable, and should receive every encouragement, since they relieve monotony and improve the morale of our own troops, while they have a corresponding detrimental effect on the morale of the enemy's troops and tend in a variety of ways to their exhaustion and general disquiet.

3. Further, as you are well aware, enterprises of this nature constitute the most effective form of defence, since by throwing upon the enemy anxiety for his own security, they help to relieve our own troops from the wearying and demoralising effects produced by expected attacks on the part of the enemy.

4. These minor operations should, of course, not be of an aimless character but should be based on a specific object, have a reasonable chance of success and be commensurate with the losses likely to be entailed. They should be methodically initiated in accordance with the instructions of the Army Commanders, and must invariably be well thought out beforehand, and careful preliminary arrangements made for their execution.

5. By the publication to neighbouring troops of short accounts of successful and meritorious work, by promptly bringing to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the brave deeds of individuals, and by other similar means, the endeavour should be to create throughout the different formations and units of the Army a keen spirit of rivalry and emulation.

6. The Commander-in-Chief would be glad if you would give this matter your special attention, and issue the necessary instructions to give effect to his wishes.

W. R. Robertson.

Lieut.-General.

Chief of the General Staff."

[truthergw]

Very interesting quote Salesie. Like you, I was immediately struck by Para. 4. The whole document gives the lie to the notion that raids were just another example of Staff keeping the men busy or that raids were dreamt up by local commanders to get themselves noticed. There is of course encouragement for that point of view in the last Para. but it was obviously not the original or the main intent. There is an opposite point of view, generally practised by the French, that when major offensives were not in progress, it was a waste of effort, lives and materiel. Would it be off topic to discuss that here?

[sjustice]

Haig's memo (not the only example) was a reaction to the live-and-let-live pacts that had developed in some areas of the line viz. the Christmas truce et al.

These did, in fact, continue to be locally 'agreed' throughout the war.

Kind Regards,

SMJ

[salesie]

Haig's memo (not the only example) was a reaction to the live-and-let-live pacts that had developed in some areas of the line viz. the Christmas truce et al.

These did, in fact, continue to be locally 'agreed' throughout the war.

Kind Regards,

SMJ

Haig's memo may well have been such a reaction, but I can't comment on it never having seen a copy. However, the one I posted, by the then C-in-C, Sir John French, was a bit more than a memo - when a C-in-C makes such a "request" to his Army and Corps commanders they tend to regard it as a direct order to be acted upon, whatever it may be in reaction to (well they do in the British Army at least).

Cheers- salesie.

[sjustice]

French's reasoning was the same and, to be fair, the original source. He actually went a lot further in explicitly decrying fraternisation with the enemy.

Should have checked the date and title of the signatory.

Cheers yourself.

[salesie]

French's reasoning was the same and, to be fair, the original source. He actually went a lot further in explicitly decrying fraternisation with the enemy.

Should have checked the date and title of the signatory.

Cheers yourself.

The signatory was actually Robertson, but, no matter, it was on behalf of French, and I still can't see the point you're making - why wouldn't a C-in-C decry fraternisation, that would be an obvious part of his job, wouldn't it? Care to elaborate?

Cheers-salesie.

[sjustice]

I read 'Chief of the Imperial General Staff'; therefore 1916; therefore Haig. Total disconnect. Didn't check.

Most GOC/C-i-C orders and 'memoranda' were issued via the respective CGS...

The point I'm making is that the point at this time, from the C-i-C's view, was exactly to keep the men 'busy at war' and in offensive mode.

The 'specific object' was left to the local commander to decide. Before the summer of 1916, especially, this was very often as simple (and explicit)as:

1. Kill Germans

2. Something else

3. Etc.

Kind Regards,

SMJ

[salesie]

I read 'Chief of the Imperial General Staff'; therefore 1916; therefore Haig. Total disconnect. Didn't check.

Most GOC/C-i-C orders and 'memoranda' were issued via the respective CGS...

The point I'm making is that the point at this time, from the C-i-C's view, was exactly to keep the men 'busy at war' and in offensive mode.

The 'specific object' was left to the local commander to decide. Before the summer of 1916, especially, this was very often as simple (and explicit)as:

1. Kill Germans

2. Something else

3. Etc.

Kind Regards,

SMJ

Still don't get your point, I'm afraid - the "edict" I posted was dated 5th February 1915, well before summer 1916, and even a cursory glance will show that the C-in-C's intention wasn't as simple (and explicit) as 1. Kill Germans 2. Something else 3. Etc. And, I'm still bemused as to why a C-in-C wouldn't decry fraternisation with the enemy, and how it is relevant to this particular matter?

Cheers-salesie.

[sjustice]

Still don't get your point...

<snip>

I was responding to Tom's comment on your posting of Robertson's memo from Occleshaw's 'Armour against Fate'.

Tom's view, reasonably, is that paragraph 4 demonstrates that the higher command had a definite objective in ordering a practice of hostile defence, other than 'keeping the men busy'. I take a slightly counter view; that the higher command's sole purpose in this, especially prior to the summer of 1916, was to keep the men 'busy at war' on the premise that position warfare promoted inactivity and a live-and-let-live ethos. French, was explicit in NOT promoting a specific aim for these raids, leaving that to be decided by the local commanders. It was they who, in giving orders for a raid, tended to list objectives they felt was a best fit for what was being asked of them - i.e. to display aggression and kill Germans.

I didn't allude to any lack of opposition to fraternisation. I said that French was more explicit in this respect.

I hope that helps.

Kind Regards,

SMJ

[salesie]

I was responding to Tom's comment on your posting of Robertson's memo from Occleshaw's 'Armour against Fate'.

Tom's view, reasonably, is that paragraph 4 demonstrates that the higher command had a definite objective in ordering a practice of hostile defence, other than 'keeping the men busy'. I take a slightly counter view; that the higher command's sole purpose in this, especially prior to the summer of 1916, was to keep the men 'busy at war' on the premise that position warfare promoted inactivity and a live-and-let-live ethos. French, was explicit in NOT promoting a specific aim for these raids, leaving that to be decided by the local commanders. It was they who, in giving orders for a raid, tended to list objectives they felt was a best fit for what was being asked of them - i.e. to display aggression and kill Germans.

I didn't allude to any lack of opposition to fraternisation. I said that French was more explicit in this respect.

I hope that helps.

Kind Regards,

SMJ

Doesn't help much. The whole document shows a definite intent, and, in my view, para 4. shows that some thought had gone into it vis-a-vis the benefits of properly planned raids versus the disadvantages of carrying these out in an ad-hoc manner - that raids made good military sense. I pointed out that, in my opinion, this was not an instruction from a Donkey to his Lions.

As for "displaying aggression and killing Germans" and keeping the men "busy at war" - are we talking about the same thing? Talking about an army at war in the field? Why wouldn't an army be aggressive and try to kill and beat its enemy? It seems to me to be an oxymoron to suggest otherwise. Was the BEF there to fight 'em or love 'em?

Cheers-salesie.

[Bernard_Lewis]

A link to an original report on a trench raid by a participant:

http://swanseabattalion.net/index.php?opti...6&Itemid=66

Bernard

[clive_hughes]

My memory was jogged by reading this topic, into looking up a short article by Hal Giblin in the Journal of the Orders & Medals Research Society, Winter 1977 p230 (see also Dudley Ward's Regimental Records of the RWF Vol.III, p.365)

He had a DCM & MM medal group to 45758 Pte J Trodden of the 19th (Bantams) RWF, and discovered that the MM was awarded for a raid in the Gouzeaucourt sector on the night of 5/6 May 1917. The action was a large-scale affair involving the 17th Welsh Regt. and the 12th S.Wales Borderers in an attack on La Vacquerie village (ref. R15 Central) and Sonnet Farm. The 19th RWF in the same 119th Brigade were to provide 200 men armed with "bombs and sticks" to support this venture as "moppers-up". The 121st Brigade on the left and a brigade of the 8th Divn on the right were to act in conjunction.

According to Giblin's quote from the battn. war diary, the flank brigades were held up early on, but the attacking "Bantams" of 119th Brigade were able to break into the Village "and do considerable damage therein". Unfortunately there were masses of unexpected wire there which then held them up - but not the lightly-armed moppers-up, who following on somehow passed through the struggling attackers.

Two of the 19th's men, Trodden and 29201 Pte J.Cudden, led the right-flank company of "moppers-up" past the attackers and penetrated the uncut wire, entering an enemy strongpoint. Without their bombs (all used) these two, unsupported, then took on the garrison with their "sticks" (??clubs, broomsticks) and inflicted "severe loss", putting the enemy to flight!

The raid was apparently not an unqualified success, but the regimental historian claims that "a good deal of damage" was inflicted and identification secured. Trodden and Cullen were awarded fairly well-earned MMs for their part.

LST_164

[hadfield]

Have not really come across discussion of hatchets (similar to machetes I guess?) but any decent weapon would have found it's way into a raiders armoury. There is a pic of a Great War machete in this weekends 'billhook' topic. Lots of discussion on trench clubs in year's gone by - a search should bring up lots on those. Here is a nice pic (reference to Chamber's 'Uniforms & Equipment of the British Army in WW1') of a group of RF raiders - fancy a Stokes mortar being chucked down your dugout?!

Hi Max,

I have just recently come across this fascinating picture, many thanks for posting it. Do you or anyone else have any idea why they have cut-off trousers? Is it to reduce their chances of getting snagged on wire etc?

Regs

Brimstone

[markus]

Hello.

Just a quick line relating to the subject of various forms of hand-weaponry utilised in the trenches. Certainly in the case of my great uncle, sergeant Albert Wyatt DCM (Beds Rgt), being the son of a farrier/blacksmith he carried and used a 'Norfolk' style bill-hook made for him by his father.

All the best,

Markus.

[JMB1943]

In terms of who started trench raids, the book "Raiding on the Western Front', A. Saunders, 2012, p.1 describes.....

FIRST RAID: morning of Nov. 9, 1914; 2nd Black Watch; Capt. R.E. Forrester + about 20 men; daylight raid to silence MG post in a trench at La Bassee; this was achieved.

SECOND: night of the 9-10 Nov. 1914; 1st & 2nd Bns. 39th Garhwal Rifles, Indian Corps; 2 x 50 men parties; enemy trench 50 yds away "posed a real threat....with the aim of making the trench unusable to the enemy"; partially achieved.

Paraphrasing, "notwithstanding the first raid, the second is usually considered to be the first trench raid of the war (darkness/surprise/ damage/casualties/ not holding ground) as it set the pattern"

Regards,

JMB

[seaforths]

In terms of who started trench raids, the book "Raiding on the Western Front', A. Saunders, 2012, p.1 describes.....

FIRST RAID: morning of Nov. 9, 1914; 2nd Black Watch; Capt. R.E. Forrester + about 20 men; daylight raid to silence MG post in a trench at La Bassee; this was achieved.

SECOND: night of the 9-10 Nov. 1914; 1st & 2nd Bns. 39th Garhwal Rifles, Indian Corps; 2 x 50 men parties; enemy trench 50 yds away "posed a real threat....with the aim of making the trench unusable to the enemy"; partially achieved.

Paraphrasing, "notwithstanding the first raid, the second is usually considered to be the first trench raid of the war (darkness/surprise/ damage/casualties/ not holding ground) as it set the pattern"

Regards,

JMB

I have mixed feelings about that book. At the time of reading, it annoyed the hell out of me because I found so many inaccuracies within it's pages which I complained about in another thread. Raiding is, without a doubt a very interesting topic and it seemed that as the war progressed the urgent need for intelligence gathering seemed to be the driving force behind many raids and patrols. Interesting too are the diary accounts of prisoner interrogations when they appear.