British Trench Raids

[Tom A McCluskey]

Tony,

Thanks for the wee gem of information. Here is another raid carried out by the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, the details of which can be found in the History of the Fifty First Highland Division by Maj Brewsher DSO MC. Note the use of some different tactics:

The raid carried out by the 6th Seaforth Highlanders on 15th September 1916. This raid is therefore now described in detail.

The area selected for the operation was a most prominent salient formed by the German front line. Through the apex of this salient, and running at right angles to the fronts of the opposing forces, ran the Armentieres-Lille Railway. Across the base of the salient ran a well defined entrenchment.

The general plan was as follows: The raiders were divided up into two parties, each consisting of one officer (Lieutenants J. Sainter and D.F. Jenkins). One Sergeant, one Corporal, and ten privates, with a blocking party of one NCO and three men.

The scheme was that each party should cut the wire at its own point of entry by means of Bangalore torpedoes, while the wire was to be cut for a point of exit by the 2-inch mortars.

The two parties were to enter the salient from opposite sides and close to its base. They were then to leave their blocking parties to cover their rear, while they worked forwards to the apex. By meeting at this point it was hoped that the entire garrison of the salient would be accounted for.

The Bangalore torpedoes, both seventy-five feet in length, were to be placed under the wire thirty minutes before zero, Lieutenants Sainter and Jenkins, each with two men, being responsible for placing the torpedoes in position.

The raiding parties were ordered to leave their and form up in No Man’s Land about thirty yards away from their torpedoes, ready to rush through the gap in the wire as soon as the explosions took place.

The actual trench area to be raided had been reproduced exactly to the scale in a large pasture close to Armentieres. It was thus possible to practice the men continually over the course, so that they acquired a true sense of direction, and the distances they would have to traverse during the raid.

The parties paraded for the raid with their faces and knees blackened, with their bayonets covered in mud, and with their steel helmets encased in sandbags to which grasses and weeds had been sewn. These precautions were necessary, as the men had to lie out in No Man’s Land, where they would be in danger of being observed by a German sentry, so that they could enter the trenches immediately the torpedoes were exploded.

Ropes were also carried, as it was anticipated that there might be some difficulty in getting the prisoners out of the deep breastwork trenches, and it might be necessary to drag them out.

The men wore Dayfield body-shields to protect them from bomb splinters.

The arms carried were as follows: Officers, 1 revolver, 6 bombs, and 1 electric torch; NCOs, 1 revolver, 10 bombs, and a bludgeon; 4 bayonet men, rifle and bayonet, 6 bombs, electric torch attached to rifle, 30 rounds of ammunition; 8 throwers, 10 bombs and a bludgeon; 8 spare men, a bludgeon, 10 bombs, and a wire-cutter; blocking party, rifles and bayonets, 30 rounds of ammunition, and 10 bombs.

In the first instance the success of the raid was dependent on the gaps being adequately cut in the wire. At the time many persons thought that General Burn’s scheme of using torpedoes seventy-five feet long was too ambitious. Certainly when the torpedoes were constructed and were seen for the first time, they looked awkward things with which to have dealings in No Man’s Land, being as they were considerably longer than a cricket pitch. When the time arrived the torpedoes were hoisted out of the trenches, and the torpedo parties set off with them. Lieutenant Jenkins had little trouble with his; he reached the selected point in the German entanglement without incident, and placed his torpedo in position. This was difficult work. Here were two parties, each of three men, within 70 yards of the German sentries, forcing a metal tube 3 inches in diameter, 75 feet long, and loaded with ammonal, underneath the German entanglements. Very lights were fired by the enemy continually, illuminating the whole countryside and making the work more hazardous than ever.

It was further impossible to place the torpedoes in position without a certain amount of noise being made, which the German sentries might at any time hear. The whole wire entanglement stood in a mass of rank undergrowth, through which the nose of the torpedo had to be forced. The posts supporting the entanglements were not placed in regular rows, so that occasionally as the torpedo was pushed forward its movement was brought to a standstill by a wooden post standing directly in its way, and its course had to be altered. The lower strands of wire also scraped along the upper surface of the torpedoes, and made a horrible grating noise.

In spite of these difficulties, Lieutenant Jenkins placed is torpedo in position exactly as arranged , and in sufficient time to return to the trench and to lead his party out to a point about thirty yards from the German wire. The party followed the fuse which connected the torpedo to the firing mechanism in the trench, so as to ensure joining up in the right place.

Lieutenant Sainter, on the other hand, was completely out of luck. His torpedo came apart at several of its joints on three separate occasions, and had to be repaired by him in No Man’s Land. Sainter reported that had it not been for the German Very lights, he did not think that he could have managed to repair it. Having finally arrived with it intact at the right place, he had forced it nearly through the German wire when it stuck and could not be moved forward no farther. He therefore had to extract it and make a second attempt at a different place. On this occasion he was successful. The operation, however, had taken so long that no time was left for Sainter to return to the trench and lead out his party. The party was therefore ordered to advance, following the fuse as Jenkins’ party had done, until they came upon Sainter. This was done, and the party had joined him and was in position just ten minutes before zero.

At zero the two torpedoes were fired almost simultaneously, leaving gaps clear through the German wire 15 feet broad and 25 yards deep. At the same time the barrage opened. Major A. G. Graham, M.C., commanding the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, writes in his account of the operations: “The barrage opened punctually, and can only be described as perfect. All ranks taking part in the raid were unanimous in their praise. The efficacy of the barrage is borne by the fact that no German machine-gun fired for forty minutes. The casualties caused by the barrage must have been heavy, as both parties report that on entering the trenches parties of the enemy were seen rushing out of the salient into our barrage.”

Immediately the torpedoes exploded, the raiders rushed through the gaps in the wire and into the enemy’s trenches. The enemy was taken completely by surprise. The first sentry encountered by Sainter’s party was bayoneted in the back, while still staring over the parapet in blank amazement at the curious explosion that had just occurred in front of him.

From now onwards all the luck came to Sainter, Jenkins meeting with considerable difficulties. Sainter’s men acted exactly as they had done in the practises. They entered the trench at the point intended; there they killed a couple of sentries. They then found a large dug-out containing four Germans, which they bombed and all were killed. At the next dugout two Geramsn came out, one being immediately shot by Sainter, the other being killed by a bayonet man. Other Germans were killed in the dug-out with bombs. Four Germans were found hiding in the trench; three of these were killed and the fourth kept as a prisoner. Later he refused to leave the trench and was also killed. A lasso had been put round him to assist in hauling him out the trench. At this he became so terror-stricken that he became incapable of movement, and so had to be despatched. Unfortunately, his remains were left lying in the trench with the rope around them. The party then searched the point of exit, where they found the wire well cut by the 2-inch mortars, and returned to our lines, having been in the German trenches six and a half minutes.

Lieutenant Jenkins’ party entered the German trench according to plan; the first fire-bay they entered contained arms and equipment but no sentries. There was a dummy parados to this trench made by boards, behind which dug-outs were found. Four of these were bombed until all sounds within them ceased. The party then proceeded another ten yards along the trench, where they encountered an organised German bombing party. A bombing fight lasting some two minutes then ensued, the Germans apparently being all knocked out. Lieutenant Jenkins’ party sustained five casualties in the encounter, three men being seriously wounded, and two slightly. Orders were therefore given to retire by the gap at which the trench had been entered. As the retirement was being carried out a second party of Germans attacked. These were heavily bombed; many were killed, the remainder running away. Three Highlanders had, however, caught one of them alive and hurled him bodily over the parapet, and then jumped after him and pinioned him in a shell-hole. He was finally taken back to the British lines as a solitary prisoner.

On a bugle sounding the two parties began their withdrawal. Sainter’s party regained our trenches without having sustained a casualty. Jenkins on his return found that three of his men were missing. He therefore returned to the German trenches three times with Private A. MacDonald, and each time succeeded in bringing in a wounded man.

The Dayfield body-shields were found to have numerous splinters of bombs sticking into them, and undoubtedly saved the raiders from several casualties.

The German trenches were formed of enormous breastworks 12 to 15 feet wide, and were revetted with brushwood. Let into the parapet were numerous concrete dug-outs, each capable of holding from four to six men. The floor of these dug-outs was level with the bottom of the trench. The effect of a Mills bomb inside these confined spaces was devastating, and there were is no doubt that German inside them was killed. One of the Jocks was asked how he had dealt with these dug-outs. He replied. “Och, we just bombed yon stone boxes until they stopped their blether, and then went to the next one.”

The barrage for this raid was worked out to the minutest detail. All weapons were employed, the following amounts of ammunition being used: 2-inch mortars, 228 rounds; Stokes guns, 981 rounds; Vickers guns, 29,500 rounds; 18-pounders, 1200 rounds; 4.5 howitzers, 100 rounds; and several hundred rounds of rifle grenades.

Every weapon had a particular task given to it. These were arranged

a. so that no fire could be opened by the Germans which might be brought to bear on the men crossing No Man’s Land;

b. so that no troops could run away from the area being raided to the rear;

c. so that no troops could counter-attack the area raided over the open either from the rear or the flanks;

d. so that no movement could take place in the German trenches within about 800 yards of the raid. Every trench junction and every known trench mortar position on a front of 1500 yards was steadily bombarded throughout the operation.

The results were beyond all expectations. No Germans were able to reinforce the salient, so that the raiders could deal with its garrison without fear of interruption. The Germans who broke the from the salient and fled to the rear ran into a barrage of 18-pounders, 4.5 howitzers, Stokes guns, and 2-inch mortars. Not a single round was fired by the enemy occupying the trenches on the flanks of the salient.

The barrage thus cut off the troops in the area raided from any support which their neighbours might have given them, and enabled the raiders to despatch them just as had been planned. Many of the Germans on the opening of the barrage had left their arms in the trenches and run into the dugouts. When the raiders arrived and began bombing a panic seems to have set in. The Boches ran about in terror on seeing the Jocks with their blackened faces and knees and with grasses in their helmets, holding up their hands, crying, “Kamerad Kaffirs, Kamerad Kaffirs!” They had apparently mistaken the Jocks for some species of native troops. This impression and the sight of the ropes reduced many of them to such a condition that they were even too terrified to be carried off as prisoners, and refused to move. In consequence many had to be despatched who might otherwise have been taken back to our lines alive.

As a result of the gallant conduct on this raid Lieutenants Sainter and Jenkins were awared the Military Cross and four men the Military Medal.

Hope this is of interest

Aye

Tom McC

[A.A.Savery]

A gripping story that Tom. Well done!

I can't help feeling sorry for the poor Germans who were stiff with fear.

One thing that I can't get my head around is the size of those torpedoes. Are there any pictures of them?

How were they operated and did they actually skim along the ground?

It seems hard to imagine them being positioned without the Germans destroying them.

Thanks,

Tony

[Tom A McCluskey]

Tony,

At this level, war is as personal as it gets, and IMO I think there is a bit of 'do as you have been done to'. The scribe seems more concerned about leaving the dead German tied up as opposed to the actual dispatching of him. I think it has to be judged by trying to imagine the prevailing conditions and the mindset of the soldiers during stressful times and great trials - what the men have experienced, seen, and what they have fundamentally set out to do (their mission). A lot of the high-ranking officers actively encouraged the killing of Germans, because in an over-simplified scenario the more of them that were killed, the sooner you got home (in reality it was not quite as simple as this).

I think for a lot of the men life was tough before they even got into the army (physically & mentally). Killing your own animals and butchering them yourself was a lot more common, as a lot more people lived rurally and chicken did not come in a cellophane wrapped carton from the supermarket. I do not get too analytical about the issue and I am sure that the Germans could act in a similar manner. I have read witness statements of what we would consider disgraceful behaviour by German soldiers to wounded British soldiers.

The last point from a military point of view, there is a limited time of mission within the German line. At some point uncooperative and hysterical prisoners may be putting you or your mucker's life on the line, and prevent you from achieving your mission. At the time, I am sure they thought their main priorities were their own lives and that of their buddies. Plus, if you left them alive, they could shoot you in the back on the way home. Getting shot in the back by Germans not 'cleared' from dug-outs was problematic at Loos and on the first day of the Somme.

Anyway, back to the raid, did you notice slight differences.

2 Parties instead of 3

As you have mentioned the Bangalore to establish a breach

Steel helmets worn, and camouflage put in the cover

Ropes carried, remember I mentioned the dimensions of the German trenches previously

Dayfield body shields

Torches attached to rifles

The use of the full range of indirect fire weapons

The amount of ammunition expended

From this you can see that it has to be well planned and coordinated

Also, I have to mention the tremendous courage and leadership of the officers in these raids. I think it is noteworthy of their dedication to their men, in trying to and recover them no matter what, often more than once.

Bangalore torpedo. There are 'Hollywood' accounts of this going off in: The Big Red One and Saving Private Ryan. It comes in sections I think 5 foot or so with an adaptor that allows you to join individual sections of the torpedo, to make the torpedo the length you require. The nose section was similar in shape to a 9mm bullet (a blunted ogive-like shape) that made it easier to ease forward.

Looking forward to reading and learming more

Aye

Tom McC

PS -

[bob lembke]

Tom;

A very interesting account of a properly prepared and led trench raid. Quite different than the other example of a company of men told to stand in knee-deep cold water for (hours or days? trench foot?) no apparent purpose.

Treetop;

Yes, my father's unit was very special, but it is remrkable that a NCO had the right, backed up by written orders from Hindenburg and Ludendorff, to tell a three star or a two star that his attack plans were bad and, unless they were changed and the NCO signed off on the revised, his platoon would refuse to participate. Can you imagine that in the Brit Army of 1916?

Those orders were specific to that unit, but the German command doctrine allowed and perhaps encouraged the officer at the spot to carry out his task in a fashion quite different to his written orders. (But, it would be better if this led to a successful outcome!)

Another important doctrine was that German officers were supposed to be given orders as to the goal that he was to attempt to accomplish, not orders that specified what was to be done. It was left to the officer at the spot to determine the details of how to best accomplish the assigned goal.

I understand that, in 1916, the British unit of command and manuver was the infantry battalion, typically commanded by a lt.-col. (However, I read of a lt.-col., in combat, having to get a runner sent to a brigadier to get written permission to move two MGs whose emplacement was specified in written orders.) In my father's unit, the unit of independent manuver and command was the Trupp of ten men, usually led by a junior NCO or a senior private. My father led a Trupp, although he was a junior private, never promoted, as he had shot and killed the company CO (a thief and a coward), had shot another sergeant in the ass, and kicked another sergeant in the face with the bottom of his hob-nailed boot, badly altering it. In the latter case the sergeant was disciplined. So Pop was not popular with the company brass, never got a promotion, and only got his EK II in 1921. (He also had a big, sarcastic mouth.)

Also, the doctrine called for the officer actually on the spot to command any troops committed in his area. In the extreme case, in a defensive situation, the captain or even first lieutenant commanding a front-line battalion could theoretically command one, two, three, or even four regiments that came to his aid in an attack. And the divisional commander was expected to observe his performance, buy not to butt into the decision-making process, unless the front-line officer was clearly screwing up.

Obviously, in practice these doctrines might blur, but they were the basic doctrines of command, and I postulate that they would tend to lead to more successful local actions.

As to German soldiers sent into reckless attacks, I am sure that every combatant in WW I managed to do that. Within weeks of the beginning of the war, the German command realized that the MG and quick-firing field piece had radically shifted the battlefield (which in 1914 was largely following Civil War (1861-65) tactics). Orders trying to throttle back impetuous charges were sent about within weeks. One problem they had was the tendency of elite troops to charge in a reckless fashion despite orders, a notable was the attacks of Prussian Guard regiments against the Brit forces in western Belgium late in 1914, where those units were decimated, but also almost destroyed the smaller British army sent to the continent.

Bob Lembke

[saberhagen427]

The 1/5th Lincoln raid I posted before was somewhere in the area of Monchy-au-Bois/Berles-au-Bois. Only A Company were involved and the rest of the battalion was resting at Le Cauchie. I hadn't thought about it before but it does seem strange that the trenches were so narrow despite being well constructed and up to 10 feet deep. There are more reports of the same raid from other officers and NCOs involved but I picked what I thought was the most exciting one.

The battalion history mentions that the company had received special training beforehand. They were supported by artillery and MGs, and there were also REs with Bangalores, but they weren't used as there were already gaps in the wire in No Man's Land (although the right hand party then found they couldn't get into the German trench because of wire blocking the parapet). It's frustrating that there isn't much detail of how the parties were armed. He just says they "fired" but doesn't say what they fired. You'd have to assume pistols as there wouldn't be much room for rifles in those trenches but there's no definite evidence.

[Tom A McCluskey]

Hi all,

Found this little extract from: A Yankee in the Trenches, about an American in the British Army - R. Derby Holmes. What is interesting is the use of the Stokes mortar bomb:

In the morning the members of the raiding party were taken back a mile or so to the rear and were given instruction and rehearsal. This was the first raid that "Batt" had ever tried, and the staff was anxious to have it a success. There were fifty in the party, and Blofeld, who had organized the raid, beat our instructions into us until we knew them by heart.

The object of a raid is to get into the enemy's trenches by stealth if possible, kill as many as possible, take prisoners if practicable, do a lot of damage, and get away with a whole hide.

We got back to the front trenches just before dark. I noticed a lot of metal cylinders arranged along the parapet. They were about as big as a stovepipe and four feet long, painted brown. They were the gas containers. They were arranged about four or five to a traverse, and were connected up by tubes and were covered with sandbags. This was the poison gas ready for release over the top through tubes.

The time set for our stunt was eleven P.M. Eleven o'clock was "zero." The system on the Western Front, and, in fact, all fronts, is to indicate the time fixed for any event as zero. Anything before or after is spoken of as plus or minus zero.

Around five o'clock we were taken back to Mechanics trench and fed--a regular meal with plenty of everything, and all good. It looked rather like giving a condemned man a hearty meal, but grub is always acceptable to a soldier.

After that we blacked our faces. This is always done to prevent the whiteness of the skin from showing under the flare lights. Also to distinguish your own men when you get to the Boche trench.

Then we wrote letters and gave up our identification discs and were served with persuader sticks or knuckle knives, and with "Mills" bombs.

The persuader is a short, heavy bludgeon with a nail-studded head. You thump Fritz on the head with it. Very handy at close quarters. The knuckle knife is a short dagger with a heavy brass hilt that covers the hand. Also very good for close work, as you can either strike or stab with it.

We moved up to the front trenches at about half-past ten. At zero minus ten, that is, ten minutes of eleven, our artillery opened up. It was the first bombardment I had ever been under, and it seemed as though all the guns in the world were banging away. Afterwards I found that it was comparatively light, but it didn't seem so then.

The guns were hardly started when there was a sound like escaping steam. Jerry leaned over and shouted in my ear: "There goes the gas. May it finish the blighters."

Blofeld came dashing up just then, very much excited because he found we had not put on our masks, through some slip-up in the orders. We got into them quick. But as it turned out there was no need. There was a fifteen-mile wind blowing, which carried the gas away from us very rapidly. In fact it blew it across the Boche trenches so fast that it didn't bother them either.

The barrage fire kept up right up to zero, as per schedule. At thirty seconds of eleven I looked at my watch and the din was at its height. At exactly eleven it stopped short. Fritz was still sending some over, but comparatively there was silence. After the ear-splitting racket it was almost still enough to hurt.

And in that silence over the top we went.

Lanes had been cut through our wire, and we got through them quickly. The trenches were about one hundred twenty yards apart and we still had nearly one hundred to go. We dropped and started to crawl. I skinned both my knees on something, probably old wire, and both hands. I could feel the blood running into my puttees, and my rifle bothered me as I was afraid of jabbing Jerry, who was just ahead of me as first bayonet man.

They say a drowning man or a man in great danger reviews his past. I didn't. I spent those few minutes wondering when the machine-gun fire would come.

I had the same "gone" feeling in the pit of the stomach that you have when you drop fast in an elevator. The skin on my face felt tight, and I remember that I wanted to pucker my nose and pull my upper lip down over my teeth.

We got clean up to their wire before they spotted us. Their entanglements had been flattened by our barrage fire, but we had to get up to pick our way through, and they saw us.

Instantly the "Very" lights began to go up in scores, and hell broke loose. They must have turned twenty machine guns on us, or at us, but their aim evidently was high, for they only "clicked" two out of our immediate party. We had started with ten men, the other fifty being divided into three more parties farther down the line.

When the machine guns started, we charged. Jerry and I were ahead as bayonet men, with the rest of the party following with buckets of "Mills" bombs and "Stokeses."

It was pretty light, there were so many flares going up from both sides. When I jumped on the parapet, there was a whaling big Boche looking up at me with his rifle resting on the sandbags. I was almost on the point of his bayonet.

For an instant I stood with a kind of paralyzed sensation, and there flashed through my mind the instructions of the manual for such a situation, only I didn't apply those instructions to this emergency.

Instead I thought--if such a flash could be called thinking--how I, as an instructor, would have told a rookie to act, working on a dummy. I had a sort of detached feeling as though this was a silly dream.

Probably this hesitation didn't last more than a second.

Then, out of the corner of my eye, I saw Jerry lunge, and I lunged too. Why that Boche did not fire I don't know. Perhaps he did and missed. Anyhow I went down and in on him, and the bayonet went through his throat.

Jerry had done his man in and all hands piled into the trench.

Then we started to race along the traverses. We found a machine gun and put an eleven-pound high-explosive "Stokes" under it. Three or four Germans appeared, running down communication trenches, and the bombers sent a few Millses after them. Then we came to a dug-out door--in fact, several, as Fritz, like a woodchuck, always has more than one entrance to his burrow. We broke these in in jig time and looked down a thirty-foot hole on a dug-out full of graybacks. There must have been a lot of them. I could plainly see four or five faces looking up with surprised expressions.

Blofeld chucked in two or three Millses and away we went.

A little farther along we came to the entrance of a mine shaft, a kind of incline running toward our lines. Blofeld went in it a little way and flashed his light. He thought it was about forty yards long. We put several of our remaining Stokeses in that and wrecked it.

Turning the corner of the next traverse, I saw Jerry drop his rifle and unlimber his persuader on a huge German who had just rounded the corner of the "bay." He made a good job of it, getting him in the face, and must have simply caved him in, but not before he had thrown a bomb. I had broken my bayonet prying the dug-out door off and had my gun up-ended - clubbed.

When I saw that bomb coming, I bunted at it like Ty Cobb trying to sacrifice. It was the only thing to do. I choked my bat and poked at the bomb instinctively, and by sheer good luck fouled the thing over the parapet. It exploded on the other side.

"Blimme eyes," says Jerry, "that's cool work. You saved us the wooden cross that time."

We had found two more machine guns and were planting Stokeses under them when we heard the Lewises giving the recall signal. A good gunner gets so he can play a tune on a Lewis, and the device is frequently used for signals. This time he thumped out the old one--"All policemen have big feet." Rat-a-tat-tat--tat, tat.

It didn't come any too soon.

As we scrambled over the parapet we saw a big party of Germans coming up from the second trenches. They were out of the communication trenches and were coming across lots. There must have been fifty of them, outnumbering us five or six to one.

We were out of bombs, Jerry had lost his rifle, and mine had no "ammo." Blofeld fired the last shot from his revolver and, believe me, we hooked it for home.

We had been in their trenches just three and a half minutes.

Just as we were going through their wire a bomb exploded near and got Jerry in the head. We dragged him in and also the two men that had been clicked on the first fire. Jerry got Blighty on his wound, but was back in two months. The second time he wasn't so lucky. He lies now somewhere in France with a wooden cross over his head.

Did that muddy old trench look good when we tumbled in? Oh, Boy! The staff was tickled to pieces and complimented us all. We were sent out of the lines that night and in billets got hot food, high-grade "fags", a real bath, a good stiff rum ration, and letters from home.

Next morning we heard the results of the raid. One party of twelve never returned. Besides that we lost seven men killed. The German loss was estimated at about one hundred casualties, six machine guns and several dug-outs destroyed, and one mine shaft put out of business. We also brought back documents of value found by one party in an officer's dug-out.

Blofeld got the military cross for the night's work, and several of the enlisted men got the D.C.M.

Altogether it was a successful raid. The best part of it was getting back.

Aye

Tom McC

[BottsGreys]

The attached links are to the War Diary of the 29th Battalion CEF and also illustrate the details that went into a trench raid, this one took place June 2/3, 1918.

http://data2.collectionscanada.ca/e/e039/e000974290.jpg

http://data2.collectionscanada.ca/e/e039/e000974291.jpg

http://data2.collectionscanada.ca/e/e039/e000974292.jpg

http://data2.collectionscanada.ca/e/e039/e000974293.jpg

http://data2.collectionscanada.ca/e/e039/e000974294.jpg

http://data2.collectionscanada.ca/e/e039/e000974295.jpg

http://data2.collectionscanada.ca/e/e039/e000974296.jpg

http://data2.collectionscanada.ca/e/e039/e000974297.jpg

Chris

[Tom A McCluskey]

Chris,

Thank you very much for introducing this thoroughly gripping, and interesting account of the raid by the 29th Vancouver Battalion CEF.

It was also good to read of evidence of the Germans using the "Retire" ruse. Which in this case obviously did not work. Also, some evidence of the keenness to use the bayonet.

Again, great stuff!

Aye

Tom McC

[PhilB]

A couple of points. In the picture in post #2, the guys wear shorts but some with white wrapping round their knees. Tom McC`s Scotsmen blacked their knees, so presumably they wore kilts. Why do you reckon some of the RF men would choose knee wraps but not others and wouldn`t they all be better in long trousers? Crawling across nomansland in a kilt can`t be very ergonomic! Phil B

[Robert Dunlop]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Feb 17 2007, 11:31 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Crawling across nomansland in a kilt can`t be very ergonomic!

Well put, Phil. I have never heard it described that way

Robert

[PhilB]

I really mean ergonomic, Robert! (Though there are other apparent drawbacks!). I must make it plain that I have never crawled in a kilt, though I have in longs. I would have thought that every time you bring your knee forward you risk pressing down on the kilt and preventing yourself from moving forward?

And crawling backwards in a kilt doesn`t bear thinking about. Phil B

[Simon R]

RE workshops for 1st Army produced technical drawings for the No. 1 Knobkerrie for entrenching tool and the No. 2 Knobkerrie for Bombers clubs.

Are these drawings published? Or do they lurk in the archives?

[Robert Dunlop]

Yes, it conjured up an image of someone in a white coat with stopwatch and tape measure, making notes on a clipboard while a 'subject' crawls across various terrain types. My Grandfather wouldn't have volunteered - I can just hear him muttering in his Glaswegian accent, something about - can't quite make it out but probably does not bear repeating.

Robert

[truthergw]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Feb 17 2007, 11:58 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I really mean ergonomic, Robert! (Though there are other apparent drawbacks!). I must make it plain that I have never crawled in a kilt, though I have in longs. I would have thought that every time you bring your knee forward you risk pressing down on the kilt and preventing yourself from moving forward?

And crawling backwards in a kilt doesn`t bear thinking about. Phil B

I never crawled in mine either. The recommended form of crawl involved pushing from the sole of the boot with the inside of the leg against the ground. No reason to catch the kilt if you do it this way. You could crawl on hands and knees O.K. I think the main drawback was catching on wire or picquets etc. Highlanders fought in them for hundreds of years even when trews were available. They coudn't have been too bad. Although, there is some suggestion that they threw them off before the Highland charge. Now that would be scary.

[PFF]

Why would ID tags and cap badges be removed from trench raiders?

A bit superfloueus trying to "confuse" the enemy as to the ID of the "raiders"?

[Chris Henschke]

Are these drawings published? Or do they lurk in the archives?

Archives

Chris Henschke

[truthergw]

Why would ID tags and cap badges be removed from trench raiders?

A bit superfloueus trying to "confuse" the enemy as to the ID of the "raiders"?

If captured, Name, rank and number. Not unit. ( in theory) Also cap badges may catch light. or physically catch on wire or other obstacle.

[Tom A McCluskey]

Hi All,

Hardy lads those highlanders . Crawling backwards has to be a man test! If you go back a couple of pages in the 4/5th BW orders for the raid to be carried out, I don't know if you noticed that they signed out trousers, which has to be more practical. It was probably easily done as they were in a predominantly English Division (39th), the QMs from the other battalions within 118 Bde possibly had a bit of empathy (especially if you mention crawling backwards ).

Aye

Tom McC

[PhilB]

I`ve mentioned this before, but it`s worth repeating. An ex WW1 kilted soldier I spoke to mentioned some of the disadvantages of the kilt. One was that in trenches it picked up wet sand/clay and was highly abrasive to the knees as it swung to and fro. The other was that the quickest way to get back into a trench was to jump to a sitting position on the edge and to slide on in. Unfortunately the trench side often had sharp bits embedded in it. I`ll leave the rest to the imagination. Phil B

[Chris Henschke]

Why would ID tags and cap badges be removed from trench raiders?

A bit superfloueus trying to "confuse" the enemy as to the ID of the "raiders"?

Why give the enemy any information when every piece of information gathered goes towards the big picture? It is fairly important to know the identity of enemy units in your own Area of Operations.

[BottsGreys]

Chris,

Thank you very much for introducing this thoroughly gripping, and interesting account of the raid by the 29th Vancouver Battalion CEF.

It was also good to read of evidence of the Germans using the "Retire" ruse. Which in this case obviously did not work. Also, some evidence of the keenness to use the bayonet.

Again, great stuff!

Aye

Tom McC

Tom:

Yes, I liked that too: "Retire, retire." Interesting how I found it. Last month, I purchased a WWI photograph on EBAY from a fellow in California. He and I got to discussing the War, and he mentioned that his grandfather (below) was KIA on 3 June, 1918, as a member of 29th Bn, CEF (Tobin's Tigers). He didn't know about the CEF War Diaries online. I went in and checked, hoping to find just a little something mentioned that might give an idea of how his grandfather died, and wow--here was this entire appendix file regarding this raid. As you said, great stuff--he was very excited to receive it (as I was to find it).

Private Francis John Furlong

No. 2137548

29th Bn, CEF (British Columbia Regt)

Born: Oct. 4, 1885

Died: June 3, 1918

Chris

[Max Poilu]

Are these drawings published? Or do they lurk in the archives?

Here is a drawing - not very clear I am afriad. As posted above a French friend of a friend was re-making these in his blacksmiths shop, along with French 'Nails' - both very good copies indeed...

[Tom A McCluskey]

Hi All

Just been on this site:

http://plowshareforge.blogspot.com/2006/11...ch-raiding.html

The chap is explaining that troops never wore helmets on trench raids, and that a bayonet would be useless. Looking at the facts presented it, he looks like he needs to adjust the facts he has asserted. Also, it looks like mainly the bombers carried some form of knobkerrie and the rest of the men were generally comfortable and useful with their rifle - which was ultimately being used as a spear (or could be fired - if necessary). Of course, this is going by the facts from raids conducted in 1916.

Concerning the raids conducted in 1916. They look like they are against well prepared German positions that were deeper and wider than the British trenches.

However, was wondering if any of the pals have an account of a 1917 raid conducted against the Hindenburg Line:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindenburg_Line

Aye

Tom McC

[Tom A McCluskey]

Hi all,

Just been browsing through some sketches of the 51st Highland Division by Fred Farrell [official Highland Division artist] when I chanced upon this picture. It is of a daylight raid of the Gordon Highlanders, and I am assuming they have a supporting barage keeping the enemy's heads down.

However, what is interesting is the bucket of grenades that has been mentioned a few times. The chap stepping up onto the parapet has the aforementioned bucket in his left hand.

I thought this would be of interest.

Aye

Tom McC

[Tom A McCluskey]

Hi All,

Just found this interesting piece in The History of the Fifty First Highland Division 1914-1918, from pages 106 to 108

The article refers to the considerable use of Knife-rests in front of the German positions at Beaumont Hamel and also Pte Thomson killing a German with an entrenching tool:

During the fortnight preceding the attack [successful attack on Beaumont Hamel, 13 Nov 16] patrolling and raiding were carried out with great activity, both with a view to gauging the strength of resistance likely to be encountered and to inspect and damage the enemy’s wire. This activity disclosed the fact that the German was using knife-rests made made of either heavy timber or of iron, to fill the gaps caused by our artillery and trench mortars in his entanglements.

Knife-rests are not easily damaged by shrapnel sufficiently to give the infantry a free passage through them. Efforts were therefore made to locate the places where they were in use, and to destroy them with 4.5 howitzers.

The fire from enfilade machine guns and Lewis guns was then employed to prevent fresh knife-rests from being put in position to replace those which had been damaged. Twenty thousand rounds of S.A.A. were frequently fired in a single night for this purpose.

At the end of October it was realised that these knife-rests were being employed by the enemy in the most formidable numbers, and were becoming a serious proposition.

A number of Bangalore torpedoes were therefore made and carried up to the trenches. Raiding parties then carried the torpedoes into No Man’s Land with them, and blew gaps in the rows of knife-rests. On 1st of November a particularly good raid of this nature was carried out. Lieutenants Booth and Carnie of the 6th Gordon Highlanders with a party of men placed four torpedoes under the enemy knife-rests. These were exploded, and after a short interval the officers led the party through the gap caused by the explosions. They then exploded four more torpedoes under the double row of knife-rests. The party returned without a casualty, and reported that still a third row of knife-rests existed beyond the last one they had damaged.

Raiding parties had also been employed to enter the enemy’s trenches to gain identifications—that is, to return with evidence as to what units were holding the line in front of the Division.

On the 26th October both the 6th Black Watch and the 7th Gordon Highlanders of the 153 Brigade entered the enemy’s front line, the latter capturing a prisoner of the 62nd Regiment. On the same night the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of the 154th Brigade made a similar attempt, but could not find a passage through the enemy’s wire. In the raid of the 7th Gordon Highlanders, Lance-Sergeant Morrison killed four Germans and disarmed a fifth, who was taken prisoner. At this point Sergeant Morrison had expended all his ammunition and bombs, and was faced with two more Germans with fixed bayonets. Appreciating the situation, Private Louis Thomson rushed past Sergeant Morrison and killed the first German with his entrenching tool. He then picked up the fallen German's rifle and with it killed the second. For this exploit Sergeant Morrison and Private Thomson were awarded the Military Medal.

On 29th October a patrol of 154th Brigade entered the enemy’s front line and proceeded to the second line, which they found protected by an impassable belt of knife rests. This patrol encountered none of the enemy. The absence of the Boche on this occasionproved rather disconcerting. In consequence, the 4th Gordon Highlanders and the 9th Royal Scots carried out further raids. In each case they found the enemy holding the trenches in strength, and were unable to affect an entrance. This was partly due to the fact that the ground was so sodden that the troops found it difficult to keep up with the barrage.

A further raid attempted on 4th November by the 6th Gordon Highlanders also met with strong resistance, and made no progress. It was therefore impossible to form an impression of the strength in which the enemy was holding the line.

On 31st October a deserter entered our lines. He was a miserable creature, described officially as “undersized and of poor physique.” He stated on examination that the battalion was holding a front of only 700 yards, and that the rifle strength of the four companies was about 180 each. His statement, if it was accurate, meant that the enemy was holding this position in greater force than was probable. In view of his apparent poverty of intellect, it was considered that his evidence was unreliable. It, however, transpired during the attack that his statements were not exaggerated, and that the enemy was indeed very thick on the ground.

Hope this is of interest

Aye

Tom McC