Loyal North Lancashires in East Africa

[bushfighter]

Looking up the Pangani River at German Bridge

THE ACTION AT GERMAN BRIDGE, 30 MAY 1916

(OH Sketches 31 and 32)

The British had predicted a German defensive position just north of Bwiko where the Pangani River swings eastwards close to the Pare Mountains. A bridge known as German Bridge was being built across the river at this point.

Hannyngton’s Column was expected to outflank the enemy defence by moving east of the mountains, but Shepherd’s River Column, alerted by air reconnaissance, reached the vicinity of German Bridge before Hannyngton’s infantry had moved south of Gonja.

[bushfighter]

The battleground at German Bridge looking north.
The Pangani River is only 25 metres to the left and the railway is following the curve of the river.
The slopes of the Pare Mountains rise to the right.

Shepherd decided to attack immediately and ordered 2nd Rhodesia Regiment, now numbering around 300 men, to seize the enemy trenches. 29th Punjabis were placed in support.

130th Baluchis, 27th Mountain Battery and 5th Battery South African Field Artillery were ordered to move into the mountains to turn the German north flank. However 5th Battery SAFA could not get through the thick bush, but the Baluch and the Mountain Gunners with their mules could.

Four German FKs were in the area, but Kraut’s orders to them were to delay the British and not to hold ground.

2nd Rhodesia Regiment conducted a very professional attack, seizing the enemy trenches for the loss of 1 African scout killed and 2 officers and 8 other ranks wounded.

The winning factor was the Baluch and Mountain Gunners’ climb up the side of the Pare Mountains to good fire positions where they dominated the battlefield.

[bushfighter]

The ground just east of the Pangani River looking south.

A German counter attack was mounted against the British left flank but the Rhodesian machine guns and the screw guns broke it up, the Mountain Gunners also silencing an enemy field gun firing from the plain.

[bushfighter]

Bwiko Station looking west.

Next morning patrols found that the Germans had withdrawn to Bwiko.

(Francis Brett Young, who as 2RR MO treated the wounded after this fight, writes descriptively of the battlefield in Chapter VIII of “Marching on Tanga”.)

[tonyblackpool]

hope you had a great time Harry, PM ON ITS WAY,tony

[bushfighter]

The bend in the Pangani River at German Bridge


REORGANISATION AT BWIKO

(OH Sketch 32)

General Smuts now halted his force, GHQ and Sheppard’s River Column at Bwiko and Hannyngton’s eastern column at Mkomazi.

There was no option except halt because supply arrangements had virtually broken down and the troops were on half rations.

The withdrawing Schutztruppe had thoroughly wrecked the railway line and although the 25th, 26th and 28th Railway Companies, Indian Sappers and Miners worked round the clock on reconstruction, achieving from one to two miles of new track each day, the railhead dumps were always north of the troops.

Motor transport was used to move supplies forward from the dumps and to evacuate the wounded and sick, but a general shortage of spares and the condition of the rough dusty tracks being used meant that many vehicles were off the road each day.

If Kraut had mounted a serious attack at this time then the British might soon have run out of ammunition.

Engineers completed the partly built bridge at German Bridge, in the meantime using a pontoon bridge to allow Sheppard’s Column to move across to the west bank of the Pangani.

After delaying incidents with mules and horses on the pontoon bridge the animals were swum across the river on an endless rope.

[bushfighter]

Early morning in the Pangani Valley

General Smuts went north for a week to visit van Deventer and his 2nd Division at Kondoa Irangi.

The Kasmir Rifles Composite Battalion was now separated into its two original units. 2nd Kashmir Rifles, a complete battalion, was allocated to Sheppard’s column which was now titled No 3 Column.
3rd Kashmir Rifles, a half battalion, went to Hannyngton’s Column.

No 1 Column (FitzGerald and his 3 KAR) disappeared as they were incorporated into Hannyngton’s command which was named No 2 Column.

No 2 Column now contained:
King’s African Rifles Mounted Infantry Company
40th Pathans
129th Baluchis
3rd Kashmir Rifles
3 KAR
One section 27th Mountain Battery (2 x 10 pdr with pack mules)
No 6 Battery (“Logan’s Battery”, 2 x 12 pdr 8 cwt with Reo lorries)
No 7 Battery (4 x 15 pdr with oxen and carts)
One section East African Pioneers
Medical and Supply units.

This reorganization was effective until early August 1916.

[bushfighter]

Mkalamo trolley line bridge looking west


THE FIGHT AT MKALAMO, 9th June 1916

(OH Sketches 32, 33 and 67)

Before the war the Germans had constructed a civilian trolley line (guage 23 and a half inches) from Mombo to Handeni. Trolleys used manpower to move produce and goods up and down the line.

British air reconnaissance informed General Smuts that Kraut’s force was making maximum use of the trolley line to move military supplies down to Handeni. From there porters carried the stores south to Morogoro on the German Central Railway.

Smuts believed that if both his force and van Deventer’s division at Kondoa Irangi advanced south simultaneously to seize Dodoma and Morogoro respectively, then the Germans would be brought to battle or else would surrender.

Dar Es Salaam could also be taken and its port used to considerably shorten lines of communication.

[bushfighter]

Mkalamo bridge looking east. Mafi Hill in the left background.

General Smuts started his move south by ordering the bombing of the Mkalamo bridge, where the trolley line crossed the Pangani River, and four aircraft of 26 Sqn RFC attempted this mission dropping two 100 lb and sixteen 20 lb bombs on the German camp by the bridge.

Meanwhile No 3 Column (Sheppard) less the 17 Cavalry squadron, 5 Battery SAFA and Ammunition Column, struggled south in two echelons through the often dense and swampy bush west of the Pangani.

On the evening of 8th June 1916 3 Column's advance troops (29th Punjabis, 130th Baluchis, one company of 61st Pioneers and one section of 27th Mountain Battery) under Lt Col P.H. Dyke, CO of the Baluch, camped on the Pangani above Mkalamo Bridge. Dyke's orders were to capture the bridge on the next day.

[bushfighter]

Looking north up the Pangani from Mkalamo Bridge.
The German trenches started on the left bank of the river beyond the huts and swung left in a half circle.

(A local man said that years ago a pile of cartridge cases had been found under a tree on the right bank opposite the huts.
This is a good indicator that a Schutztruppe machine gun was positioned in one of those trees.)

However Kraut was aware of British intentions and he had issued his orders also. His rearguard was left to withdraw from Mombo down the railway line towards Tanga, whilst Abteilung Doring (1, 3 and 16 FK plus one platoon of 5FK) defended Mkalamo Bridge.

Doring positioned himself west of the Pangani above the bridge, with his right hand trenches against the river and his left hand trenches ending 800 metres away to the southwest in extremely dense bush. 1 FK manned the trenches and 3 and 16 FK were in reserve near the bridge along with the 5FK platoon.

A detachment with two light guns was on Mafi Hill to the east overlooking the trolley line running up to Mombo.

[ShirlD]

Good to see you are back safe from the bush! It means we can continue the fascinating journey in East and Central Africa,

Cheers

Shirley

[bushfighter]

The thick thorn bush where the fighting took place

On 9th June Lt Col Dyke resumed his advance along a narrow muddy track edging the river swamps.
The German light guns on Mafi Hill engaged British aircraft that were overhead and Dyke’s troops.

Perhaps this gunfire motivated Lt Col Dyke to move away from the river slightly, where his men soon became hampered by a maze of extremely thick thorn bush.

Around 1300 hours as they struggled forward against the thorns 130th Baluchis bumped into the left-hand end of 1FK’s trench line. The Schutztruppe machine guns opened fire at close range before the Baluch were aware of the enemy presence. As the Baluch held their ground and rallied several of their junior leaders were identified and shot down by the German troops in the trenches.

2/Lt L.B. Myers and Lt R.S.R. Porter, 130th Baluchis were both shot in the head and died shortly afterwards in the dressing station. Seven sepoys were also killed in the fierce fire fight. The Baluch also lost another British officer, one Indian officer and 17 Sepoys wounded.

Lt Col Dyke now sent forward two companies of 29th Punjabis on the right of the Baluch and the remainder of the Punjabis on the left in an attempt to determine the extent of the enemy’s defences.

Doring used 1 and 16FK to extend his line to the left, and when those units left a gap between them that was penetrated by 130th Baluchis Doring sent his last reserve, the platoon of 5FK, to close the gap which it did successfully.
At around 1515 hours the Abteilung commander mounted a counter attack around the British left flank that over-ran the British dressing stations.
A company of 2nd Kashmir Rifles came forward from reserve to meet and drive back the German attack.

The British column commander Brigadier Sheppard had come forward to command the action, and as there was only an hour of daylight remaining he ordered his troops to withdraw a short distance and to dig-in for the night.

Total British casualties that day had been 15 killed and 33 wounded.
Although both sides nearly expended ammunition holdings, lack of visibility in the thick bush had meant that most shots were aimed too high.

[bushfighter]

The route of the German trolley line running south from Mkalamo to Luchomo and Handeni.

Abteilung Doring made maximum use of the night to evacuate Mkalamo and move men and stores down the trolley line towards Handeni.
In the morning British patrols found only one elderly German slumbering in the bush.

The Schutztruppe had ripped up the trolley line as they withdrew.

The British considered building a branch of the metre-guage Usambara railway line from Mombo to Mkalamo, but decided to reconstruct the trolley line instead.

Within three weeks the Bridging Train, 3rd (Bombay) Sappers and Miners and the Faridkot Sappers and Miners had made the trolley line useable by producing improvised materials such as wooden fish-plates.

Brigadier Sheppard and his No 3 Column followed the Germans down the wrecked trolley line towards Handeni.

(Francis Brett Young describes treating the wounded and fleeing with casualties as his dressing station was over-run in “Marching on Tanga”.)

[bushfighter]

Mafi Hill viewed from the route of the trolley line below it.

[bushfighter]

The grave stones of Second Lieutenant L.B. Myers and Lieutenant R.S.R. Porter in Tanga European Cemetery

[KONDOA]

Jambo Harry, good to see you back.

Roop

[bushfighter]

Looking towards the South Pare Mountains from Bwiko.
Langata Ridge is behind the telegraph pole.


No 3 COLUMN’S ADVANCE DOWN THE USAMBARA RAILWAY

(OH Sketch 32)

Although the main German force had withdrawn down the trolley line towards Handeni Kraut had left troops behind on the railway line to harass and delay the British advance.
There were over 40 Germans and 700 Askari in this group, armed with 10 machine guns, and they were to become a serious problem for the British Lines of Communication.

On 4th June 1916 the KAR Mounted Infantry led the 129th Baluchis down the road from Mkomazi towards Mombo.
They encountered 300 Schutztruppe troops defending the Ngoha River.
The Germans wanted a fight and the Baluch were not strong enough to beat them without artillery, so the British withdrew to Langata Ridge on the South Pare Mountains.

[bushfighter]

Mombo Station with the South Pare Mountains looming up on the left.

On 7th June Brigadier Hannyngton advanced all of his No 2 Column down the railway and took Mazinde the next day after light opposition.

The KAR MI followed by 40th Pathans approached Mombo on 9th June and were met with effective German machine gun fire from entrenched positions on the lower mountain slopes.

A screw-gun from 27th Mountain Battery scored a direct hit on one of the enemy machine guns, which was abandoned.

After a Schutztruppe advance on the west flank had been stopped by artillery fire the enemy withdrew from Mombo by 1600 hours, moving down the line towards Korogwe.

No 6 Field (Logan’s Battery) was also in action, firing 15 rounds shrapnel in support of 40th Pathans.
The battery then changed position twice, first to fire in support of the KAR MI and then to fire at the smoke of a moving train leaving Mombo station. Another 13 rounds shrapnel were fired, wounding at least one German on the train.

[bushfighter]

Looking north into the Pangani valley from the Wilhelmstal road.
Mombo station is just to the left of the picture..

High in the South Pare Mountains above Mombo was the German hill-station of Wilhelmstal (now named Lushoto).

[bushfighter]

The road up the South Pare mountains to Wilhelmstal

The German Bezirksamtmann (District Commissioner) was summoned to Mombo on 10th June to surrender Wilhelmstal which contained 500 German civilians and 70 male non-combatants, mostly recovering from wounds.

[bushfighter]

The German church in Wilhelmstal.

Fifty Askari from 3KAR were sent to garrison Wilhelmstal.

The pleasant location and macademised approach road – the only one in German East Africa - ensured a steady stream of sightseers, including General Botha when he visited from South Africa.
(The General left the town a happy man in possession of an old smooth-bore elephant-gun that had been surrendered by a German civilian.)

(In his book “African Crossroads” Sir Charles Dundas describes the seizure of Mombo and the surrender of Wilhelmstal.
Dundas, a BEA administrator and a war-time staff major, was then placed in charge of the hill station for a time.)

[bushfighter]

Mauri railway bridge, dropped by the Germans.

THE FIGHT FOR ZUGANATTO BRIDGE

(OH Sketch 34 on page 298, and Sketch 14 on page 307 of Moyse-Bartlett’s “The King’s African Rifles”)

Brigadier Hannyngton now wished to seize the road and railway bridges across the Pangani intact, if he could. This task was allotted to 3KAR with the KAR MI scouting ahead.

On 13 June 1916 the KAR MI approached Mauri and took 3 casualties from the Schutztruppe rearguard. 3KAR moved up and reached the railway bridge to find it demolished.

[bushfighter]

The Pangani below Mauri railway bridge.

3KAR were now ordered to seize the Zuganatto road bridge at Korogwe.

The battalion crossed the Pangani by a local crossing point (a rickety swinging bridge and a few slippery tree trunks) a mile below Mauri on the night of 10 June, taking several hours to cross the fragile structure.

At dawn the CO, Lt Col T.O. FitzGerald, decided to press on with the two companies that had already crossed the river.

[bushfighter]

The site of Zugunatti Bridge today. An old pier support can be seen on the far bank.
The dominating high ground can be seen in the background.

The advance guard met a 12-man Schutztruppe patrol at 0600 hours, one mile west of Zugunatti Bridge. The enemy patrol dispersed rapidly.

Half a mile further on the battalion came under fire from 2 machine guns and 25 rifles entrenched either side of the bridge, taking 8 casualties, one of whom died later.

“A” Company and half of “D” Company seized a hillock that commanded the bridge from 400 yards distance and shot the Schutztruppe defenders out of their south bank trenches, three dead bodies being found later.

A third company came up to the bridge at 0700 hours causing the Schutztruppe to withdraw into Korogwe. The wooden bridge had been prepared for burning but the speed and direction of 3KAR’s night advance had caught the Germans by surprise.

The capture of this bridge was important as it was the only crossing point over the Pangani that Hannyngton’s No 2 Column could use for moving to Handeni.

One 3KAR signaller was missing, believed drowned in the Pangani.

[bushfighter]

Baron Eric von Otter MC
His Askari called him “Risasi Moja” – “One Shot”, as that was all he ever needed.
He died whilst serving in Turkanaland in 1924.

Lieutenant Baron Charles Eric von Otter, 3KAR, was awarded a Military Cross for his actions at Zuganatto Bridge.

His citation reads:
“For conspicuous gallantry in action. In face of heavy machine gun fire he carried a wounded man on his back across the open to cover. He then returned to his machine guns, and silenced one of the enemy's guns which had caused many casualties.”

(The Earl of Lytton’s book “The Desert and The Green” contains an account of the Zuganatto Bridge fight and detail on Eric von Otter.)