Loyal North Lancashires in East Africa

[bushfighter]

Mkomazi Station, looking south

CHASING A TRAIN : THE MOUNTED INFANTRY COMPANY REACHES THE USAMBARA RAILWAY NEAR BWIKO,
late May 1916

(refer to OH Sketch 31)

(follow on from Post 672)

On 28th May 1916 the Mounted Infantry Company and the 17th Cavalry East Africa Squadron, under Captain Duncan McLauchlan Slater, left camp at Mambosasa (near where the Pangani swings eastwards) to secure a prominent feature named Hill 900, and a watering point on the Pangani at Mhesa. Both were secured without opposition.

After a night in a village empty of inhabitants but full of mosquitoes the two units plus Wilson’s Scouts moved forward under Lt Col G.M. Orr (the column Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General) to seize Mabirioni. This was achieved without opposition and a signal station was left there under Lt Crosby.

A German train was then seen leaving southwards from Mikocheni Station. The force trotted forward to intercept the train but was just too late. A Schutztruppe picquet in the thick bush beside the railway line opened fire, wounding a sowar and hitting a few mounts. The MI Company lost a rifle in this exchange. The British retired, then crossed the rail line to the north and cut all the telegraph wires.

An enemy picquet withdrew south, out of range, and four explosions were heard as the line was demolished near Mikocheni. When the British mounted troops re-crossed the line westwards enemy observers were waiting and Schutztruppe guns shelled the crossing point, but without scoring any hits.

The mounted troops returned to Mabirioni for the night. River Column’s transport had come under enemy shell fire all the afternoon, but the Mounted Infantry carts and mules had not been hit.

On 29th May 2/Lt Holmes’ troop of the MI had been scouting for the column commander, and for the next two days this troop escorted the guns of No 5 Battery South African Field Artillery as far as Bwiko.

As the Schutztruppe was reported to have withdrawn from Mikocheni during the night of 30 May, the next morning Captain Slater with his Lancers and the MI followed up on a broad front, observing the enemy halting at Mkomazi station that evening. Culverts had been demolished on the railway track and cattle cleared from the villages.

CSM Hewitson’s MI troop encountered an enemy picquet holding a small wooden bridge over the Mkomazi River. As the troop advanced to engage the enemy they were forced to abort the manoeuvre because they came under fire from the 17th Lancer’s machine-guns positioned to the rear which were also engaging the bridge picquet – a common problem when operating in thick bush where friendly forces could not see each other clearly.

The MI Company withdrew to Bwiko for the night and were shelled by enemy guns positioned further south down the railway line. During the retirement the MI heard volley-firing to the rear. This was Wilson’s Scouts engaging enemy snipers at long range.

On 1st June the Mounted Infantry Company with a strength of 4 officers and 40 Rifles advanced to Mkomazi. The enemy rearguard withdrew quickly, firing as they went, and the MI occupied the station.

The MI Company’s task now was to make contact with Hannyngton’s Centre Column which was approaching from the north.

As the transport units could not bring forward supplies quickly enough from the British railhead the MI Company was put on half rations.


WILSON'S SCOUTS

Wilson’s Scouts were raised in 1914 as the Magadi Defence Force from European employees of the Magadi Soda Works, near Kajiado. Initially they operated in the Longido area until they were absorbed into the East African Mounted Rifles where they became the Regimental Scouts.

Captain F. O’B. Wilson, CMG DSO, commanded the sub-unit and it was known as Wilson’s Scouts.

During the advance down the Pangani River Wilson’s Scouts, never numbering more than 12 men, were detached from the EAMR. The scouts were mounted on the best horses that were available in British East Africa.

After the advance this elite subunit was dispersed.
(Appendix A of The Story of the East African Mounted Rifles briefly describes the scouts.)

[KONDOA]

Noah's Ark was one of the coastal defence battery fortifications on false bay.

A quick Google gives the following position

Noahs Ark Battery - 34° 11' S 18° 27' E

Roop

[ShirlD]

http://rapidttp.com/milhist/vol011df.html

This page of the South African Military History also makes mention of the Cape Garrison Artillery manning batteries at Noah's Ark among other locations.

Cheers

Shirley

[bushfighter]

Dido Valley Cemetery, Simon's Town. CWGC photograph,



THE DEATH OF MAJOR H.A. ROBINSON
At The Cape, 31st May 1916

The CO of the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, Lt Col C.E.A. Jourdain DSO, rested his men at The Cape but also kept them occupied with appropriate training activities.

On 31st May 1916 the 2nd Bn officers were in the hills overlooking Simon’s Town taking part in a Regimental Exercise between 1000 and 1300 hours.

At about 1315 hours the Senior Major, Major H.A. Robinson, who had been mentioning that he had rheumatic pains in his arm, suddenly died of heart disease. He was buried the following day with a military funeral in Dido Valley Cemetery, Simon’s Town. A grey memorial in the shape of a cross marks his grave.

Harold Arthur Robinson, the son of Major-General D.G. Robinson Royal Engineers, was 46 years old at his death and was a popular figure both within the Battalion and with other units who worked alongside the Battalion. As the Senior Major he was the Second in Command and the CO’s right-hand man. He appears to have possessed a relaxed temperament, and was an ideal 2IC as Colonel Jourdain was often over-fussy and always conscious of his dignity. Harold Robinson’s death was a bad loss for the Battalion.


THE DEPOT IN BANGALORE, INDIA

It had been decided to send The Depot of the 2nd Bn The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment back from Bangalore to England, to be absorbed into The Regimental Depot at Fulwood Barracks, Preston.

At Bombay on 11th June 1916 the families of The 2nd Bn Depot embarked on SC Caledonia for England.

Three days later the Depot itself embarked on the Ekma at Bombay for England.
The Battalion had left India but still retained its Indian Followers on strength.

(The Depot sent the 2nd Bn a message on 4th June 1916 advising of the imminent move to England. This message finally arrived at 2nd Bn HQ in Egypt on 2nd April 1917.)

[bushfighter]

A BE2c aircraft in East Africa armed with rifle grenades as bombs.


AIR SUPPORT FOR GENERAL SMUTS’ ADVANCES
May 1916

In February 1916 26 (South African) Squadron (Royal Flying Corps) arrived at Mbuyuni, British East Africa. The squadron brought eight BE2c aircraft plus supporting vehicles, workshops, light tenders and spares (the aircraft packers had omitted the BE2cs’ propellers but odd spares were adapted successfully). The Official History comments that 26 Squadron was formed in England on a nucleus of South African personnel who had served in German South-West Africa. The first BE2c was flying on 9th February.

The Royal Naval Air Service personnel and equipment in East Africa were now split into two squadrons. 7 Squadron (RNAS) flew up-country and 8 Squadron (RNAS) operated on the coast from Zanzibar. Up-country personnel, now worn out by disease and illness, were moved to 8 Squadron and fresh men from the coast were sent to Mbuyuni.

7 Squadron (RNAS) was selected to support van Deventer’s advance towards Kondoa Irangi with Voisin aircraft. Lt Arthur Gallehawk marched behind the South African troops with 5 mechanics and 1,000 porters, making an intermediate airstrip at Lol Kisale as he passed. Three weeks after starting out Gallehawk’s men commenced constructing an airfield at Kondoa Irangi.

Two Voisins left Mbuyuni for Kondoa Irangi on 29th May but both got lost due to over-reliance on poor maps and force landed in the bush, the pilots walking back to Ufiome. (An excellent account of this flight and others in East Africa is made in “Early Bird” by Major W.G. Moore, Putnam 1963.) After being checked and re-fuelled both aircraft reached Kondoa Irangi on 6th June and commenced operations. Here they came to respect the German anti-aircraft machine-gunners, who often scored hits on the Voisins.

26 Squadron (RFC) was tasked with supporting the advance down the Pangani River and the Usambara Railway. On 29th April Captain C. Bruno and Flight Sub-Lieutenant Cecil Roy Terrenau RNAS failed to return from a long reconnaissance flight down the Usambara Railway. It is believed that Schutztruppe Askari killed them after their BE2c plane came down. Captain Bruno is buried in Moshi Cemetery and Flight Sub-Lieutenant Terrenau is commemorated on the Nairobi British and Indian Memorial.

By mid-May 26 Squadron were based at a new landing ground at Kahe. As the three British columns advanced the BE2cs flew ahead of them, reporting on Schutztruppe movements and on the “going” (ease or difficulty of movement) on the ground below.

Another landing field was brought into use at Marago-Opuni on 27th May, but two days later a 30-mile move forward to Old Lassiti was made. Hannyngton’s deployment of Centre Column, joined by Eastern Column, east of the North Pare mountains had successfully outflanked Abteilung Kraut, causing the German commander to withdraw quickly.

The Official History “War In The Air : Volume Three” quotes a typical observer’s report of the river southwards from Bwiko to Makalamo that 26 Squadron submitted:
“The area is covered with thick bush, except along the banks of the river. A passage can be found for troops and transport along the right bank keeping close to the edge of the bush to avoid soft ground . . . .thence thick bush down to the river bank for four miles . . . .the river flats then appear again . . . .there are pathways on the left bank here but they run through thick bush . . . .The passage along the right bank appears to be the easier . . . .no bridges . . . .the river changes from fast-running stream to slow-running stream.”

General Smuts appreciated the different uses of military aviation, and the East African theatre allowed a commander much more scope for using aircraft, especially for reconnaissance and bombing ahead of advancing columns, than did other more static theatres. When later in the war General Smuts assisted in the formation of the Royal Air Force he could comment from practical experience.

[bushfighter]

The reverse of this Raphael Tuck and Sons "Oilette" postcard from "In the Air : Series III" says:

The BE2c biplane was designed by the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough, and is fitted with an 8-cylinder air-cooled engine, for the design of which the RAF is also responsible. This machine has been very much in evidence at the Front, at first (1914 and 1915) as a fighting machine, and later for patrol, artillery and photographic work. BE signifies Bleriot Experimental.

[bushfighter]

Lake Manyara area. Wikipedia image


2nd DIVISION’S ADVANCE : THE NORTHERN ROUTE
April 1916

(refer to OH Sketch 29)

(Follow on from Post 670)

Whilst van Deventer was concentrating on following the route past Lol Kisale springs he ordered that another route lying to the north be followed.

From Arusha a squadron of the 2nd South African Horse, commanded by Captain E.P.W. Green, rode through Njanja and Mkuyuni, then skirted the southern end of Lake Manyara to reach Madukani.

Captain Green left on 2nd April 1916. On 7th April the 50-strong Brigade Scouts, known as de Jager’s Scouts after their commander Major H. de Jager, followed Green’s squadron. The next day saw three squadrons of 4th South African Horse under Lieutenant Colonel F.A.H. Eliott, plus a supply convoy, also heading for Lake Manyara.

Green had to skirmish with a Schutztruppe detachment before he could occupy Madukani. The Germans withdrew and split their force. A detachment under Lieutenant Kampfe marched south to Ufiome to block the Lol Kisale route, and the remainder marched west to defend Mbulu. The 45 miles between Madukani and Lol Kisale could luckily on that day be bridged by heliograph, and so Green reported Lt Kampfe’s move southwards.

Lt Col Eliott was ordered to push on westwards and cut-off the enemy defending Mbulu. As reinforcements the 10th South African Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J.W.V. Montgomery, and the 28th Mountain Battery (Indian Army) marched from Kumbulin, west of Arusha, on 13th April for Madukani. Major (local Lieutenant Colonel) L.M. Davies RA commanded these reinforcements.

On 12th April Green’s scouts had determined that most of the German troops in Mbulu had moved towards Ufiome. Green was ordered to Ufiome, as were de Jager’s Scouts and 4th South African Horse, once those units had arrived at Madukani.

However 28 Mountain Battery stayed in Madukani for three weeks, along with 10th South African Infantry. Heavy rain fell flooding much of the land, supplies did not get through on time, the men lived on half rations or less resulting in much sickness and debilitation, and tsetse-fly killed many mules. (At the time 28 Mountain Battery was the only Indian Army unit subordinated to the South Africans. The Indian gunners were never able to get their correct dietary requirements as per Indian Army ration scales.)

A check on seniority positions found that Lt Col Montgomery was the senior officer, and he took command of all the troops at Madukani.

On 2nd May 2nd Division HQ ordered Lt Col Montgomery to attack Mbulu, and sent as reinforcements a composite mounted squadron, mainly from 2nd South African Horse, under Major J.C. Carroll. Major Carroll’s route was up the Bubu River to Masagolada and then north to Mbulu.

Montgomery moved his force on 7th May, made reconnaissance on 8th May and started an attack on 9th May. Because of mule losses one section of 28 Mountain Battery remained in Madukani. Lt Col Davies floated his four mobile guns across the Bubu River on improvised rafts.

Montgomery’s plan was for Davies with two guns and one infantry company to make a holding attack up the Inaku Pass on the steep-sided Rift Valley escarpment. Montgomery and the remainder of his force made a wide detour south hoping to cut off the enemy.

Davies ran into 60 of the Schutztruppe well entrenched above his line of march but he deployed his screw-guns in the direct-fire role and the enemy withdrew at dusk. The 10th South African Infantry company lost 1 man killed and 1 man wounded in this engagement. It took Davies the remainder of the night to get all his men and guns onto the top of the escarpment.

Montgomery joined Davies at 1230 hours on 10th May, rested and then occupied Mbulu on the 11th May. The 200-man Schutztruppe garrison had withdrawn towards Tabora. Montgomery blamed Davies’ advance for being “too rapid”, but doubtless the Germans were aware of Major Carroll’s mounted troops coming up in their rear and so withdrew before they were trapped.

Carroll arrived at Mbulu at 1130 hours on 11th May, missing the withdrawing Germans by only six hours. Many of Carroll’s horses were sick from tsetse and from temperature change, as it was cold on top of the plateau. He was ordered to remain at Mbulu where his troops were used to stop cattle-raiding and tribal unrest. (Once the very strict German civilian discipline was removed from tribes in remote locations, raiding and general lawlessness often broke out.)

But Montgomery and Davies had achieved van Deventer’s objective – the occupation of Mbulu secured 2nd Division’s northern flank. Montgomery’s force was now ordered to Kondoa Irangi via Monumananga and Masogolada. Davies and his gunners, less one section remaining at Mbulu, arrived there on 20th May, Montgomery’s infantry following on 22nd May. The mountain gunners had lost 48 ordnance mules to horse sickness during May.

[bushfighter]

Same Station looking north. North Pare Hills on the right.


CENTRE AND EASTERN COLUMNS ON “HANNYNGTON’s LOOP” May 1916

(refer to OH Sketch 31)

(Follow on from Post 666)

When Centre Column reached Same unopposed the British appreciation was that the enemy were likely to defend the area to the south at Bwiko where the Pangani River swings eastwards against the South Pare Mountains.

If British troops moved down the east side of the South Pare hills then they could take any defensive position at Bwiko in the rear.

[bushfighter]

Looking east from Same Station towards Hannyngton's route between the North and South Pare Hills. The South Pare Hills are on the right.

Brigadier-General Hannyngton was ordered to leave his ox-drawn transport and artillery at Same and to move east between the North and South Pares, with his foot soldiers and No 6 (Logan’s) Battery, and to join up with Eastern Column.

Hannyngton was to then continue his advance, with the South Pare hills to his right, down to Mkomazi. This diversion was named “Hannyngton’s Loop.”

[bushfighter]

Looking north from Mandi towards Lake Jipe and Mbuyuni.
Eastern Column moved towards the camera using the foothills on the left.

On May 27th Hannyngton’s force left Same at 1400 hours, arriving at Mandi at 1730 hours. Here Fitzgerald’s Eastern Column joined it, having established contact by heliograph as the two columns converged, and came under Hannyngton’s command.

Logan’s Battery War Diary states that at Same the men were on half rations but now they were down to quarter rations.

[bushfighter]

Dense woodland on the road to Gonja.

The column, with 3 King’s African Rifles as advance guard, then used the track along the Mkomazi River which guaranteed them fresh water.

The withdrawing Schutztruppe troops often felled large trees across the track.

[bushfighter]

On the road to Gonja. The South Pare Hills are on the right.

On May 29th the column camped at Gonja where two destroyed bridges were re-built, using 3 KAR’s acetylene signal lamps for night illumination.

Some marching was done at night but Logan’s Battery found that night movement with Reo lorries, along an unknown track, was difficult.

The Loyal North Lancashire regimental history states:
“All this time the Reo lorries with drivers from South Africa had done excellent work; the South African drivers, though certainly not used to discipline, behaved well and soon became interested in their work and the Battery never had a breakdown.”

Staff officers also had a tendency to suddenly allocate the Battery’s lorries for other tasks.

[bushfighter]

The road that was "Hannyngton's Loop" passing through a village. Crops dry on the ground.
Apart from the overhead cables little has changed since 1916.

[bushfighter]

Lake Kalimawe from the road running past Gonja.
The troops moved from left to right on the far side of the lake.

Just south of Gonja is a small lake named Lake Kalimawe.

On the river running out of the southern end of the lake the Schutztruppe had effectively demolished the bridge at Shegulu.

Hannyngton did not have the engineer resources to to re-bridge this gap, and he now moved on tracks east of Lake Kalimawe towards Lasa Hill’s eastern flank.

[bushfighter]

Lasa Hill is above the road (with the demolished bridge further on). Hannyngton's route went round the left (east) side of Lasa Hill.

On 31st May 3 KAR killed an enemy sniper and drove an enemy picquet off Lasa Hill, and a few German 4.1-inch rounds were fired at the column without doing any damage.

(At this stage the Schutztruppe had a Konigsberg gun transported on a railway wagon up and down the Usambara Railway line.)

[bushfighter]

Mkomazi Station looking north to Lasa Hill. Hannyngton's troops moved round the right (eastern) side of the hill.

On 1st June at 1030 hours the column reached Mkomazi Station and made contact with the Mounted Infantry Company from River Column which was halted at Bwiko.

The men were still on quarter rations.

All columns now halted for a few days whilst supplies came forward.

Note
"Hannyngton's Loop" runs through a quiet and seldom visited part of Tanzania on the Kenyan Border. Just to the east of the Loop lies the Mkomazi Game Reserve.
If you feel like a little seclusion for a time, then this is a good place to visit.

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Harry

Mate, this thread gets better and better. While I do not have much to contribute, I have enjoyed every post. Thanks for your work and fabulous effort Harry.

Cheers

Bill

Australian Light Horse Studies Centre

http://alh-research.tripod.com/Light_Horse/

[bushfighter]

Gold Coast 2.95 inch mountain gun and gun team.



THE GOLD COAST REGIMENT

Once operations in West Africa were over, and the Cameroons had been seized from the German forces there, West African troops were nominated for the East African theatre.

On 26th July the Gold Coast Regiment landed at Mombasa and joined General Smuts’ forces. The Regiment was 1,428 men strong and had 12 machine-guns. Also it incorporated two 2.95 inch mountain guns into its ORBAT, and brought 177 specially enlisted and trained gun-carriers for the artillery section and machine-guns. 204 other general carriers supported the companies.

The “Gold Coasters”, who wore a green-knitted forage cap on operations, were the type of troops that the East African theatre needed. They adapted to the climate and the bush conditions, and fought hard. When the warning order for East Africa was received in West Africa the Regiment celebrated with war-dances.

Lieutenant Colonel R.A. de B. Rose DSO commanded the Regiment which contained four double-companies and a Pioneer Company. He had 36 British officers and 15 British NCOs, 905 African Rank and File, 11 clerks, 1 store-man, the carriers mentioned above, and four officers from the Royal Army Medical Corps. This was a very self-contained and effective unit, with replacement drafts being trained and prepared back in the Gold Coast.

The three-week sea voyage from Sekondi aboard the Aeneas was broken with calls at Cape Town and Durban. The troops went ashore at Durban to parade and be inspected by the Mayor, and more importantly for them, to see for the first time a “movie” cinema film.

The landing at Mombasa was eventful, a sudden downpour drenching the Regiment. The Kilindini dock-workers had disappeared, it being Sunday, and so the troops unloaded their baggage and re-loaded it into two waiting trains (one train was of covered goods wagons).
During the three-day journey through Voi, Taveta, Kahe Junction and down the Tanga line to Ngombezi the men, all coming from the interior of the Gold Coast (now named Ghana) north of Ashanti, experienced severe cold for the first time. This climate combined with strange rations of cold bully-beef and very cold water (the brief train halts prevented the organization of central cooking) and the fact that the troops’ uniforms had not dried out, resulted in cases of pneumonia, some of them fatal.

At Ngombezi the Regiment was inspected by the Inspector-General of Communications, Brigadier-General W.F.S. Edwards, who, pleased with the physique, smartness and military bearing of the men, commented that no other unit which he had inspected had arrived in the country so well and efficiently equipped.

Before long the Gold Coasters would be operating in the same actions as the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment Machine Gun Company in landings on the southern coastline of German East Africa.

The Gold Coast Regiment sailed for home in late July 1918, leaving behind 215 men killed in action, 270 men dead from disease and 11 men missing. 725 others had been wounded in action and 567 invalided out of theatre.

Two DSOs and a Bar plus 11 MCs and 4 Bars were awarded to officers.
Five DCMs and a Bar plus one MSM were awarded to British NCOs and WOs.
Twenty DCMs and 2 Bars plus 24 MMs and 2 MSMs were awarded to Africans.


Note
The Gold Coast Mounted Infantry Company was a separate unit.

Free Download
“The Gold Coast Regiment in the East African Campaign” by Sir Hugh Charles Clifford can be downloaded free at:
http://www.archive.org/details/goldcoastregimen00clifuoft

[bushfighter]

A fallen Sepoy in the Pare Hills


LAST POST

Hear you the call of the night-wind,
Over the land and foam,
Calling, yet hushed in its calling,
Calling them home ?

Hear you the wind with the morning.
Hark ‘tis calling again.
And now ‘tis the long reveille,
Wakening the slain.

Calling, now louder, and calling,
Squadrons, troopers, and all ;—
Trumpeter, sound the last rally,
Sound them their call.

Let it break over the billow,
Call it over the plain,—
Trumpeter, know you no sounding,
Wakening the slain ?

Hear you no weeping of women ?
Lift your trumpet and blow.
Have you no call they will answer ?
Trumpeter, blow.

Answered that trumpeter grimly,
I blow to a sleeping host,
There is only one call, they will answer at all.
Last p—o—s—t, last post.

By G. Murray Johnstone, South Africa

[bushfighter]

Kondoa Irangi German Fort and Barracks


2nd DIVISION’S ADVANCE : THE OCCUPATION OF KONDOA IRANGI

(refer to OH Sketch 29)

After capturing Lol Kissale General Smuts ordered 2nd Division to press on and capture Kondoa Irangi. Smuts was relying on the false information given to him near Moshi by his local Boer weather expert, and he trusted that van Deventer’s men would not be much affected by the rains.
Fendall in “The East African Force 1915-1919” comments on how the staff argued strongly for 2nd Division to halt at Lol Kissale until after the rains so that the Division could be supplied effectively, but Smuts ignored these arguments.

On 7th April 1916 200 South African horsemen under Lieutenant Colonel P.L. de Jager set out from Lol Kissale, reaching the Tarangire River the following day. They camped there, where water and grazing was good, reconnoitring forward and rounding-up some Schutztruppe escapees from Lol Kissale.
The remainder of the Division’s mounted troops, whose horses were fit to march, joined them there on 9th April and rested for a few days.

3rd South African Infantry Brigade, minus 10th South African Infantry, now started to march from Arusha. Rain bucketed down and the men tramped and slid through thick mud. The bodies of over 300 unburied horses and mules lined the route polluting the atmosphere (the Division claimed that picks and spades were unavailable and that the bush was too green to burn).
Lions and other predators gorged themselves on the carcases at night. Supply lorries broke down in the mud, needing teams of oxen and mules to pull them free.
Communications were maintained by stationing mounted orderlies at 10-mile intervals to relay messages back and forwards.

Van Deventer ordered his mounted troops forward and they reached Ufiome on 12th April, skirmishing with a Schutztruppe group (this was Lt Kampfe’s detachment from Madukani, see Post 683, with the 80 mounted men of 1 Schutzen Kompagnie from Kondoa Irangi, and some Askari from Lol Kissale) for 20 miles across the sodden steppe to Salanga.
Whilst waiting here for supplies tsetse-fly killed more mounts – 140 horses and 50 mules had died since leaving Lol Kissale.

On 16th April the Mounted Brigade, now down to only 650 men, advanced and were within 7 miles of Kondoa Irangi the following evening. On 18th April van Deventer attacked the enemy who were holding high ground north of the town, his dismounted horsemen receiving excellent fire support from Nos 2 and 4 Batteries South African Field Artillery. Schutztruppe counter-moves against the South African flanks were repulsed, one of these actions being fought by General van Deventer and his 12-man escort (see South African Official History page 71).
The Germans knew that they could not survive in the town against artillery firepower and they evacuated Kondoa Irangi after demolishing the radio mast and other structures, retiring south on the Dodoma road for 5 miles to a range of hills that could be more easily defended. Casualty figures on both sides appear to have been low.

Once he heard of the action at Lol Kissale Lettow had ordered a concentration of troops at Kondoa Irangi. However at the time of van Deventer’s capture of the town the German garrison consisted of around 400 men – Captain Peter Langen’s 13 Feldkompagnie, veterans of successful battles at Tanga and Jasin, had arrived on 18th April from the Usambara Railway after a tough forced-march across the steppe, to support part of 2 Feldkompagnie and also the mounted 23 Schutzen Kompagnie that was in the process of arriving, plus the remnants of Kampfe’s detachment and 1 SchK.

However this did not detract from the South African success. Smuts felt justified in having used a thruster such as van Deventer instead of a plodder such as the sacked Stewart. But 2nd Division was fast losing men to malaria and horses to tsetse fly. Van Deventer’s supply situation was bad and was only going to get worse (according to Fendall a second supply route was discovered which allowed 2nd Division to just get through the rainy period).
Smuts, through his disregard for military logistics, had placed 2nd Division in a vulnerable situation.

Lettow was now moving towards Kondoa Irangi, planning a battle there.

[bushfighter]

57th WILDE’S RIFLES (FRONTIER FORCE)

The 57th Wilde’s Rifles (Frontier Force) was a single-battalion regiment with its Regimental Centre at Dera Ismail Khan. It was composed of a company each of Sikhs, Dogras, Punjabi Musulmans and Afridi Pathans. It was linked with the 55th Coke’s Rifles and the 58th Vaughan’s Rifles, both fellow Frontier Force units. Dress uniform was Drab coloured with Prussian Blue facings.

The 57th Wilde’s Rifles was in Ferozepore in August 1914 when the Ferozepore Brigade was ordered overseas. The 57th quickly absorbed a draft of 1 Indian Officer and 80 men from the 55th Coke’s Rifles and embarked on the transport Teesta which had been hired from the British India Steam Navigation Company. The Teesta left Karachi Harbour on 29th August 1914 carrying half of the 9th Bhopal Regiment and the complete 57th : 6 British officers and a Medical Officer, 18 Indian Officers and the Sub-Assistant Surgeon, 809 Rank and File, 16 Cooks, 8 Sweepers, 8 syces (to groom the 14 officers’ chargers) and 10 Private Servants (2 of them belonging to the Officers’ Mess).

At Suez orders were received to disembark and proceed to Cairo, which was reached on 16th September. Three days later new orders arrived to entrain for Alexandria and re-embark on the Teesta for Marseille, where the regiment disembarked on 26th September. New rifles were issued in Marseille Docks. The 57th then entrained for a long journey to Orleans, losing Sepoy Khan Zaman for a time when the half-opened door he was leaning on was swept fully open by a passing express train, but he was not badly hurt (a relay of buglers had to call “Halt” up the length of the train until the message reached the front). At French stations the citizens greeted the Sepoys, exchanging fruit for regimental buttons and badges.

At Orleans two weeks training with the new rifles and in the operation a four-company system was completed. The regiment then moved forward to join the 2nd British Cavalry Division and on 21st October the Afridi and Dogra companies entered the trenches at Wytschaete – the regiment claims that they were the first Indian troops to do so in the Great War (the 129th Baluchis being a very close second).

During its service in France and Belgium the regiment and attached personnel lost:
Killed: 10 British Officers, 8 Indian Officers, 216 Rank and File
Wounded: 12 British Officers, 11 Indian Officers, over 540 Rank and File
Two men were reported missing and were subsequently found to be prisoners

One Indian Officer, Subadar Mir Dast, 55th Coke’s Rifles attached, was awarded the Victoria Cross for:
“On 26 April 1915 at Wieltje, Belgium, Jemadar Mir Dast led his platoon with great bravery during the attack, and afterwards collected various parties of the regiment (when no British officers were left) and kept them under his command until the retirement was ordered. He also displayed great courage that day when he helped to carry eight British and Indian officers to safety while exposed to heavy fire.”

On 12th December 1915 the 57th embarked on the City of Glasgow at Marseille and 12 days later disembarked at Suez. For the next six months the regiment was employed on Canal defence duties. In an interesting incident in the Mitlah Pass on 14th March 1916 the 57th’s machine-guns were part of a British force attempting to recover a crashed enemy plane. The gun-limbers had to halt when a deep nullah blocked their route, and the security detachment of 4 men left with the limbers was attacked by Bedouin raiders, only one sepoy escaping. The enemy meanwhile removed the plane.

In East Africa the 29th Punjabis, who had arrived in theatre in September 1914, needed recuperation. India HQ offered to exchange the 29th for the 57th, and on 1st July 1916 the 57th embarked on the Ingoma at Suez. The Ingoma stopped for a few hours in Aden Harbour and arrived at Kilindini, Mombasa on 12th July.

Two companies of the 57th were immediately entrained and arrived at Korogwe two days later, where Schutztruppe elements from the Tanga area were threatening the British line of communication. On 15th July the remainder of the regiment reached Mauri, the British railhead west of Korogwe.

Over 70 men of the regiment and attached personnel were to die in East Africa.

[bushfighter]

Roop

KONDOA IRANGI FORT AND BARRACKS

1. A photo between pages 40 and 41 of "Die Deutsche Schutztruppe 1189-1918" by Werner Haupt (Dorfler. ISBN 3-89555-032-9) identifies the structure.

2. On page 225 of "The Imperial Protectorate Force, German East Africa, 1889-1911" by Colonel Ernst Nigmann (Battery Press. ISBN 0-89839-335-3) a brief history of Kondoa Irangi Military Station verifies the post.

3. The British Official History on page 275 states that the withdrawing Germans "evacuated the place, leaving some of the houses in flames".

4. The South African Official History on page 71 states "the enemy could be seen evacuating Kondoa Irangi . . . where the bigger buildings were in flames".

5. Paice's "Tip and Run" on page 200 states "Langen torched the boma and huge quantities of supplies".

Maybe you got there too late!

Harry

[bushfighter]

Schutztruppe Askari move across rough country


2nd DIVISION’S DEFENCE OF KONDOA IRANGI
May to June 1916

(refer to OH Sketch 30)

(Follow-on from Post 696)

The 3rd South African Infantry Brigade trudged through the mud on the trail from Arusha, 11th South African Infantry arriving at Kondoa Irangi on 30th April 1916 whilst the 9th SAI and 12th SAI arrived on 1st May.

Also arriving on 1st May were the East Africa Volunteer Machine Gun Company (four machine-guns) and the 12th (Howitzer) Battery, Royal Artillery. (Prior to 1st February 1916 this battery was titled No 4 South African Howitzer Battery, it was equipped with two 5-inch howitzers, it was manned by Royal Garrison Artillery personnel from the Cape, and it used mules as draught animals.)

The 4th Light Armoured Car Battery (four naval armoured cars under Lt Comd W. Whittall) had also expected to arrive at this time, but the cars became so continuously bogged that they needed another three weeks to arrive, and then only two cars got through. The Official History quotes an observer commenting on the road:
“Its state was indescribable, wet black cotton soil poached to a morass. It was hard work for an unladen man to go two miles an hour. . . I saw a telegraph lorry do 800 yards in four hours, laying out an anchorage ahead and then warping up to it with a steel cable.”

Lettow and his Schutztruppe, knowing the ground and knowing how to commandeer relays of porters, so allowing the Askari themselves to march fast and light, closed in on Kondoa Irangi. By 8th May the Schutztruppe was within 5 miles of 2nd Division, and on 9th May a German gun was firing onto the British outposts on Rock Rabbit Ridge, forcing a withdrawal. (Apparently this incoming fire had a marked effect on the South Africans’ attitude towards digging-in – they now saw the need for it and applied themselves to it.)

Three Abteilungs were formed for the German attack launched from the valley between South Hill and Range Rock Hill:
Abteilung Otto: 9 FK, 12 FK and 24 FK.
Abteilung Bock: 15 FK, 19 FK and 6 SchK
Abteilung Kornatzki: 18 FK, 22 FK and 27 FK

Four more Abteilungs were positioned in support:
Abteilung Stemmerman: 8 FK, 11 FK, 21 FK (on South Hill)
Abteilung Klinghardt: 13 FK, 23 FK, 25 FK (also on South Hill)
Abteilung Chappuis: 4 FK, 10 FK, 14 ReserveK (on Range Rock Hill)
Abteilung Meyer: 8 SchK, 9 SchK, Arusha Detachment (on the eastern flank)


Lettow attacked at night noisily, advancing at around 1930 hours on 9th May. He had a quarter-moon for visibility, and his Askari charged up to the hills to their front, cheering and blowing bugles.

The enemy they attacked was the entrenched 11th South African Infantry, which stood its ground. The British Artillery fired star-shell and other units put flares up, giving the infantry a good shoot. There was little cover available for the Schutztruppe attackers and the South African machine guns were decisive in stopping each German assault.

A German machine gun set up near the south end of the lake was rushed and captured by 11 SAI whilst 12 SAI counter-attacked on the eastern flank. After seven hours of fierce night-fighting the Germans withdrew around 0215 hours, having lost over 150 men killed or wounded. Captain von Kornatzki was dead and Lt Col von Bock was severely wounded.

It may be that Lettow, for once, had mis-appreciated the ground due to patrol reports received. He thought that the range of hills that he attacked was not strongly held and that he could quickly occupy it. What he had not appreciated was that the main British defensive position lay on another ridge a short distance further on. The firepower from the main British position shot Lettow’s Askari off the first hills. This was more of an unexpected than a carefully-planned operation, but nevertheless Lettow had learned that the South Africans could fight well in defence.

The Schutztruppe commander did not want to lose more men at this time, as Smuts was obviously going to attack down the Usambura Railway towards Tanga soon, so Lettow decided to close down the 2nd Division’s ability to advance by defending the hills to the south of Kondoa Irangi. His seasoned Askari quickly dug-in and erected wire obstacles.

In fact van Deventer’s losses in horses in the 1st South African Mounted Brigade (1,639 dead and 718 hospitalized by the 23rd May), combined with the exhaustion of 3rd South African Infantry Brigade and the serious shortage of supplies, had immobilized his Division, and he was ordered onto the defensive.

For the next month the British and the Germans sparred with each other to the south of Kondoa Irangi through the use of fighting patrols and ambushes.

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Kondoa and All Others

Please feel free to add images and comments about respective artillery actions.

[bushfighter]

2nd Battalion THE WEST INDIA REGIMENT

In 1914 the only British regiment recruited from the Caribbean was The West India Regiment. The majority of the soldiers were recruited in Jamaica. The regiment had two battalions, one of which was usually in West Africa whilst the other was in the Caribbean.

In August 1914 the 1st Bn The West India Regiment was stationed in Sierra Leone, West Africa but the 2nd Bn relieved the 1st Bn in October 1915. The 2nd Bn deployed detachments of signallers and machine-gunners and two rifle companies to assist with the Cameroons campaign.

The regiment had earned previous battle honours in West Africa and had experience of bush warfare. During the fighting in the Cameroons 5062 Signals Serjeant L. Jordan, 1st Bn, had been awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal :
For conspicuous gallantry and initiation in taking command of troops and repelling an attack. On a subsequent occasion he maintained signalling communication under heavy fire.


After the Cameroons had been captured from Germany it was decided to send the 2nd Bn The West India Regiment (2WIR) to East Africa to reinforce General Smuts’ forces.

At the start of July 1916 2WIR embarked on the transport Heneas and after a three and a half-week voyage disembarked in Mombasa. The battalion strength was: 16 British Officers, 7 Warrant Officers and 492 Other Ranks.

As the Official History comments:
The local natives were puzzled by this battalion of negroes, indistinguishable in appearance from themselves, yet treated as white and speaking English.
Its men came to be called Wazungu Waeusi (black Europeans).

2WIR had to face the racism of the time, especially from some South African troops, but the battalion had a cordial relationship with the Loyal North Lancashires serving alongside them in coastal areas of German East Africa.

[bushfighter]

2nd Bn The Rhodesia Regiment cross the Pangani


MARCHING : EAST AFRICA

Holding on by the hair of your head,
Holding on when you are well-nigh dead,
Nothing to eat and nothing to smoke,
All fever-ridden and well-nigh broke,
Yet holding on.

Footing it hard through the bush and flood,
Footing it hard knee-deep in the mud;
Helping oxen and helping the carts,
Soldier, carrier, ****** in parts,
Yet holding on.

Marching alone right out in the blue.
Cursing, sticking, and seeing it through;
Lost to every one, saving your God,
Poor little soldier man, poor little sod.
Yet holding on.

Just holding on and doing your bit;
Just holding on and just sticking it.
So cheero, sonny, fever or flood.
Rain and bush and the oxen and mud,
No feather-bed and no eider-down quilt,
With the whole bang lot fed up to the hilt,
Yet holding on.


By G. Murray Johnstone, South Africa

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Lads and Lasses

Thanks for the contributions.

See you in a few weeks - the African bush is calling!

H