Michael Ofensive

[Jim Gordon]

The opening Barrage of the Michael Offensive of March 21, 1918 is often described as one of the most intense and ferocious ever to be employed. Can any one enlighten me as to whether this Barrage was "registered" or not ? If it was "unregistered" had the Germans learned from the successful tactics of the British used at Cambrai in Nov. 1917?

Regards

Jim Gordon

[paul guthrie]

My memory is that it was unregistered, as to Cambrai being the basis of the artillery plan I have not read that. Was the artillery guy in this Bruchmuller?

[Greenwoodman]

Zabecki's "Steel Wind" states that the policy for the Michael barrage was 'abbreviated registration'. The abandonment of precision registration was resisted by many artillery officers, but enforced by Von Kuhl and Ludendorff.

Zabecki also states that 18th Army did not use 'abbreviated registration', and that there is evidence to support the fact that Bruchmuller used the predicted registration method developed by Pulkowski (adjustments made by met conditions, and gun calibration).

The above may make me sound like an artillery expert - I'm not! Just read the relevant chapter!

[Ste]

According to John Mosier (The Myth of the Great War, p315) no prior registration took place before the offensive. He says that the Germans used this tactic 'for the first time on a large scale' at Riga in 1917, having worked on it earlier in the year (p293). This throws doubt on Cambrai as its inspiration, but it might well have further propelled them down the train of tactical thought.

I have certain reservations about the arguments and conclusions Mosier reaches in this book, but no reason to doubt these particular statements.

Ste

[David_Blanchard]

Using Zabecki again page 116, ' The British also used their system of of predicted fire for the first time[referring to Cambrai] . The decision to do so was prompted by Riga.'

[Greenwoodman]

To add a little clarification, I hope.

Precision, abbreviated and predicted registration were all used by German artillery units in Michael. Many 17th Army units registered as "normal", most units used abbreviated (registering DURING phases 2,3 & 4 of a 7-phase preparation bombardment) and certain 18th Army units used predicted registration.

If Zabecki is to be believed (and his book is about Bruchmuller's tactics) registration was carried out before the attack. P.77 "Many Seventeenth Army units did actually register, thereby compromising the surpise of the attack in the north". Zabecki points to personal conflict between artillery commanders, and 17th Army's "waffling" on the issue of registration as the reason for this apparent failure.

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

The majority of the artillery preparation was done by calcualtions. The battery targets were determined by location and then weather (humidity, wind, etc.) was used along with the condition of the gun tubes. All of the variables were used to determine elevation, etc. of the guns for their particular targets. The entire preparation allowed for very accurate fire on numerous targets without the normal preparation fire of earlier battles.

I believe I have a map showing the various stages of the bombardment on 21 March.

Ralph

[Adam Harland]

It sometimes appears that Bruchmuller is the only gunner from a war dominated by the artillery. The legend of Bruchmuller is somewhat akin to that of the stormtroopers ie only the Germans were clever enough to think of these things. The origin of the Cambrai fireplans were the ideas of Br Gen Tudor of 9th Division. Tudor was a career gunner of the highest order, who had already proved innovative ( see the 9th Div use of smoke during the Battle of Arras) and who believed that 'reliance be placed upon survey methods of gun-laying instead of allowing preliminary registration by the usual method of trial and error with ground and air observation' (OH, Vol3 1917 p6) This was prior to Bruchmuller's fireplan for Riga in Sept 1917...or at least prior to it arriving on the Russians and becoming known to the western allies. Incidentally there is a note about Bruchmuller and the German registration approach on p16 of the same volume.

Bruchmuller certainly convinced his army commander ( von Hutier), but did not carry his convictions throughout the German army. It might also be noted that precision registration is somewhat less necessary in fireplans that include heavy gas saturation, as used at Riga, and a hallmark of the german offensive fireplans of 1918.

Here's hoping that one day names like Tudor and Uniacke will be as well recornised at Georg Bruchmuller; not that Georg was a bad gunner, just that he was not the only good one!

[Will O'Brien]

According to John Mosier (The Myth of the Great War, p315) no prior registration took place before the offensive. He says that the Germans used this tactic 'for the first time on a large scale' at Riga in 1917, having worked on it earlier in the year (p293).

I understand this method of artillery preparation was known as 'Firewaltz' or 'Feuerwalze'. The object of Firewaltz was not just to destroy specified targets but also to neutralise the ally’s ability to resist & respond. It was the brain child of Lt Col Georg Bruchmuller who set out the objectives of Firewaltz as 1, the break the morale of the enemy 2, pin him down in his position & deny him movement 3,cover the pending assault on the enemy.

The method used a mixture of shells - Various gas shells (Bruchmullers favourite combination was Mustard gas, Chlorine gas & Arsine Gas), high explosive & shrapnel all attacking first command posts then communication systems, then enemy artillery positions & finally the infantry positions. The German artillery was organised into different grouping each with a specific task to attack one of the above mentioned elements

The final element of Firewaltz was surprise (no registration) & as previously mentioned Erich Pulkowski produced the German solution which made this possible.

This method was tried & tested in Riga in September 1917

[paul guthrie]

I would not rely on anything Mosier says. he is neither an historaian nor a soldier and has little knowledge of WW1. He consulted no original sources at all. His book is a very bad joke.

[egbert]

I love controversial books, they are the salt in the wound, without them life would be boring normal. For this reason I repeat: it's (Mosier) worth reading it!

[Ste]

I am deeply suspicious of most of Mosier's book - I annotated it more than any other I own! He makes sweeping generalisations based upon small pieces of evidence and frequently contradicts himeslf. For example, on p310 he says the American 3 inch field gun was 'barely sufficient even by pre war standards'.

On the very next page he says it was 'a perfectly satisfactory weapon'.

Schoolboy error!

Ste