Haig and Nivelle

[Martin Bennitt]

Just been watching a programme on the French history channel about the Nivelle offensive and its aftermath -- not badly done apart from such anachronisms as using the 'fake' Somme footage to illustrate the Battle of Arras -- but one thing made me wonder: it was stated that Haig was so put out at being put under Nivelle's command in February 1917 that "he resigned, but King George V refused it." I would have thought that a) it was not up the King and if he had resigned Lloyd-George would have accepted it immediately. But did Haig intimate privately to the King that he was contemplating resigning and the King dissuaded him, and the French documentary has misinterpreted it? Grateful any illumination.

cheers Martin B

[PhilB]

I look forward to any illumination on this, Martin. But I suspect the King/Haig relationship is still a fairly unknown factor in WW1. The King was nominally C in C though, and the court/miltary system may have given him great influence. It is surprising, and possibly not in the Army`s best interests that a commander can threaten to resign at a time like that because he doesn`t like who he`s to work under? Phil B

[Gibbo]

The proposal to which the British generals (not just Haig) objected was to place the British army under the command of the French. If I understand it correctly, it would have made Haig effectively equivalent to a French Army Group commander & left Robertson, the CIGS, with no authority over British troops in France & Belgium.

Some relevant quotes from the Haig Diaries, edited by Gary Sheffield & John Bourne are:

'Monday 26 February

General Kiggell took part in [Robertson and my] discussion and we agreed we would rather be tried by Court Martial than betray the Army by agreeing to its being placed under the French. Robertson agreed we must resign rather than be partners in this transaction.' p. 272.

Monday 12 March

'I went to Derby House and had a long talk with Lord Derby, Secretary of State for War...He...said Government had treated me disgracefully...I assured him...that I wanted nothing more in the way or reward and that if the Government had anyone else whom they wished to put in my place, let them do it at once - and I would try and retire gracefully without causing the Government of the country and trouble of loss of prestige. He (like the King) assured me that the last thing they wanted was that I should retire.'

p. 274.

It reads to me as if Haig & Robertson indicated that they would resign if the proposals were accepted but they were modified so neither man actually resigned.

[PhilB]

The proposal to which the British generals (not just Haig) objected was to place the British army under the command of the French.

Though they did so in 1918? Isn`t this rather childish behaviour, seeing the situation in terms of personal prestige at a time of great National sacrifice? Phil B

[Martin Bennitt]

It reads to me as if Haig & Robertson indicated that they would resign if the proposals were accepted but they were modified so neither man actually resigned.

As I understand it the terms were modified so that Nivelle took nominal command for this one operation, which turned out to be a disaster, at least on the French side, and Nivelle was booted out. In 1918 the circumstances were different: the Germans were running riot, a unified command had become essential and presumably Foch was much more acceptable to Haig than Nivelle was. DH could not have resigned when Britain has its back to the wall.

cheers Martin B

[Jonathan Saunders]

Just a couple of observations.

Surely as a serving officer in time of war he could not resign his Command, although he could be sacked.

As a Field Marshall neither could he retire.

As I see it, he could ask to be relieved of his command but he could not leave of his own free will.

[PhilB]

This seems to be a grey area, Jonathan. We often read of (usually) generals threatening to resign for some perceived insult to their person. I don`t think it`s been established on forum exactly who could and who couldn`t do this. One can`t imagine a subaltern theatening resignation! Phil B

[Gibbo]

As I understand it the terms were modified so that Nivelle took nominal command for this one operation, which turned out to be a disaster, at least on the French side, and Nivelle was booted out. In 1918 the circumstances were different: the Germans were running riot, a unified command had become essential and presumably Foch was much more acceptable to Haig than Nivelle was. DH could not have resigned when Britain has its back to the wall.

cheers Martin B

As well as the serious of the situation, another difference between 1918 & 1917 was that in 1918 Foch was appointed to command the Allied forces with Petain remaining the French C-in-C. Nivelle's 1917 proposal would have effectively made the British Army part of the French Army. In 1917 the BEF would have been commanded by the C-in-C of the French Army, in 1918 the C-in-Cs of the BEF & the French Army (& also the American Army) were all put under Foch's command.

On the subject of who can & can't resign, I think that the way that it would work at Haig's level is that he would say that he disagreed with the policy that he was being asked to implement so strongly that it would be best for the country if he were replaced by someone who supported the policy. I've no idea at what levlel in the command structure it would be feasible to do this. I'd guess that men who did this would effectively be ending their careers, on the basis that being inconveniently right is often worse for you than being wrong.

[PhilB]

As well as the serious of the situation, another difference between 1918 & 1917 was that in 1918 Foch was appointed to command the Allied forces with Petain remaining the French C-in-C. Nivelle's 1917 proposal would have effectively made the British Army part of the French Army. In 1917 the BEF would have been commanded by the C-in-C of the French Army, in 1918 the C-in-Cs of the BEF & the French Army (& also the American Army) were all put under Foch's command.

I`m sure you`re right, Gibbo, but it sounds a fine distinction to me. In both cases, the British would be temporarily serving under a foreign commander for what their superiors considered to be the welfare of the Allied coalition. I suspect egos were involved in deciding who and when it was "honourable" to serve under! Phil B

[Greenwoodman]

Its worth reading up on Phil. In 1917, the original arrangement was a stitch-up of the British Army high command by Lloyd George. At the Calais conference, ostensibly on Transport, LG ambushed his senior military men (undermining their authority over the army) with a pre-ordained plan already discussed with the French. It was described by Cyril Falls as “the most unsavoury episode in British political-military relationships”. The resulting compromise was never fully implemented.

In 1918, it was supported by Haig because Petain was threatening to abandon the British right flank. Haig proposed Foch, because of Foch's fighting reputation, believing that Foch would not allow the armies to split. So it proved.

[duckman]

"In 1918, it was supported by Haig because Petain was threatening to abandon the British right flank."

That's drawing a pretty long bow, Greenwoodman. Petain had already placed something like 20 French divisions on Goughs right in the week after the Germans attacked, and ultimately almost half the salient that "Michael" formed was covered by French troops. Petain did say that he would need to deploy his reserves with a view to guarding Paris, but that is the same as Haig saying he would have to deploy his reserves with a view to guarding the Channel ports.

The point being that they were close to where their immediate operational interests would diverge. No "abandoning", please - both would follow their own interests when the situation required, but would co-operate until then. Fortunately, it never reached that point.

Haig and Petain had an excellent relationship at the individual level. Foch's elaborate plans for forming reserves proved rather hollow, when the practical measures put in place by Haig and Petain to meet the German threat in 1918 proved effective. It worked because the two trusted each other and remained firmly fixed on the business at hand, free from politics.

Adding to Gibbo's point, Foch was initially appointed to "co-ordinate" allied action on the western front, but was not appointed as "commander" until later. Strictly, his role was advisory and to ensure that the allies were not operating divergently (as per the above). But his only "command" was by influence through the respective governments. Petain had to comply with Foch's "commands" - the alternative was replacement, and he was (in his opinion and mine) the only general capable of leading the French army in the field to victory. Lloyd George was also a supporter of this system, and Haig had little choice but to fit in with it. At least it would not generate the "placing British troops under a French commander" angst of a year earlier. The national forces remained independent but acted in concert, which was a big step forward.

By the time he did become Generalissimo, the players had established a suitable working relationship. Even with his shiny new title, Foch did little more than encourage his commanders and co-ordinate their activity. Thus we see him pushing Haig in the days after Amiens to continue hitting the Germans. Haig - rightly - pointed out that there was better success to be had elsewhere. Foch allowed himself to be guided by his "juniors", who carried on their battle in their way. I guess its like Eisenhower in WW2.

It is also worth noting that Haig and Foch had a long association through the difficult days of late 1914 and 1915 in Flanders and Artois (Arras).

[Greenwoodman]

That's not my reading of the situation, based on a number of texts, and the following in particular:-

Official History 1918, Vol. 1, pp. 297-298.

Blake Private Papers, pp. 297-298.

Callwell Wilson: Diaries, Vol. 2, pp. 74-77.

Lloyd George War Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 1730-1732.

Liddell Hart Reputations, pp. 228-229.

French The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, pp. 224-225.

George A. B. Dewar and Lieut.-Col J. H. Boraston Sir Douglas Haig’s Command 1914-1918 Vol. 2, (London: Constable, 1922), pp. 132-137.

General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall Haig as Military Commander, (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1973), pp. 264-265.

Foch Memoirs.

Petain records his first priority as covering Paris which may have caused him to split from the British, and which may have resulted in “the British [being] rounded up and driven into the sea!” Haig was alarmed at this prediction, and when it was confirmed late the next day – “I at once asked Pétain if he meant to abandon my right flank. He nodded assent……"– Haig requested the intervention of CIGS (Wilson) and the Secretary of State for War (Lord Milner) at this abrupt alteration in French strategy. Quotes from Haig's diary.

The result of Doullens was that Petain's interest was re-awakened in the "AMIENS MUST BE COVERED AT ALL COSTS" (Haig's capitals in his diary) policy, and thus the maintainance of contact with the British right flank. While a number of individuals (Haig and Wilson for a start) credit themselves with the plan for Foch to co-ordinate the effort around Amiens, Foch himself in his memoirs credits Haig with widening his remit to cover all British and French armies in France & Flanders.

The point here being that the two situations between the proposals for Nivelle and Foch to be CinCs were entirely different. The Calais proposal resulted from the political machinations of Lloyd George, and ran counter to the British chain of command. Doullens was born of necessity, and Haig was instrumental in its delivery. The first shows Lloyd George as interested only in being rid of his senior generals who did not agree with his strategy for the war (and which was proved wrong by results). The second that senior military commanders were happy to hand co-ordination and then overall command to a French general to ensure that the war continued to be prosecuted in a coalition rather than as two separate armies.

So from the above you can no doubt deduce that I think "abandon" is fair. Despite three years of Allied war, Petain was happy to leave his Allies to sink or swim on their own. Doullens, and the British and French heavyweights involved, changed his mind. Petain placed 15 divisions initially on the British right flank. Apres Doullens he increased it to 24.