The Great War

[Dolphin]

I bought this book, by the author of the well-respected Gallipoli, today but I haven't had a chance to read it yet. It's been passed on to Santa to be delivered in late December.

However, I thought that I'd advise the Pals in Australia that while the recommended retail price is $39.95, the price in Target stores is $33.00, and that those same stores are having a 15% off everything sale this weekend, which brings down the price to $28.95!

It looks like excellent value.

Gareth

PS Alas, it appears that the 15% off everything sale ended on 3 November. The book still looks like very good value at $33.00.

G

[michaeldr]

Quote from Paul Reed [Oct 2003 see http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...&hl=carlyon]

"Les Carylon is currently working on a follow up book about the AIF on the Western Front. He is a nice bloke, and agood historian. Jacky Plateeuw and myself recently had the pleasure of taking him around the Australian sectors in France and Flanders, and from what he said the new book looks even more promising than the Gallipoli one."

Gareth,

Is this the same book? If it is, then it seems to have taken much longer than expected. Having enjoyed 'Gallipoli' and found it really useful, I have been keeping my eye open for the next Carlyon book and thought that I might have missed it - thanks for the heads up

Regards

Michael

[Dolphin]

Michael

Yes, this is the book in question. There was a lengthy excerpt from it in today's paper, and it looks to be as good as Gallipoli.

Regards

Gareth

[michaeldr]

Gareth,

You'll have to let on which paper your reading

I've found a review and the PM's comments but no 'lengthy excerpt' yet

http://www.smh.com.au/news/books/a-fallen-...1749315151.html

http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/pm-...2056928137.html

Thanks again for your help

Michael

[Esskay]

Gareth,

You'll have to let on which paper your reading

I've found a review and the PM's comments but no 'lengthy excerpt' yet

http://www.smh.com.au/news/books/a-fallen-...1749315151.html

http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/pm-...2056928137.html

Thanks again for your help

Michael

It was in the Good Weekend magazine of Saturday's Sydney Morning Herald - unfortuntely it doesn't look as if this can be accessed on the web - though I'd be happy to be proved wrong!

I've got a copy - but not sure if it can be posted - size/copyright etc?? If someone wants it mailed I'd be happy to tear it out and send it - a small thing I can do in return for the incredible information I've got from the forum in the short time I've been reading it.

Just got his Gallipoli book from the library which I'll make a start on once I've finished "All the Kaiser's Men" by Ian Passingham - a very interesting read from a different perspective

Cheers

Sue

Hunter Valley NSW Australia

[Andrew P]

I look forward to getting this book, but for those interested in the author, the following links takes you to a transcript from an interview he gave on the Andrew Denton 'Enough Rope' show last week.

http://www.abc.net.au/tv/enoughrope/transcripts/s1777008.htm

[Michael Molkentin]

I saw this one in the book shop today....its certainly a tome of a thing (850+ pages!!!)

Judging by "Gallipoli" I think that Carlyon is an exceptionally talented story-teller. He paints tremendously evocative pictures of ordinary men at war (much like Charles Bean did), but I am not so sure that he has a grasp on the wider issues of command, tactics and strategy. And according to his new book's press release, he delves into this stuff quite a bit.

Take for example this line from "Gallipoli": "Birdwood's observation [of the 200 pound Monash not looking good on a horse] tells us much about how the British saw war in the new century. Horses and bayonets: they were still what it was all about". (p. 121)

This is a fairly dated generalisation that really doesn't stand up to the majority of modern scholarship on the BEF.

Still...perhaps he has done some more work in this area for "The Great War".

[michaeldr]

Thanks to Sue and Andrew for the leads

Michael,

I have to agree with LC regarding both Birdwood [and Birdwood on Monash] in 1915; this is how they thought [and looked] at that early stage of the war

Birdwood is not the only example from Gallipoli which can be mentioned; see Travers on both Hamilton and Braithwaite [p.222 and 262/3]

Basically they had a belief in 'moral' superiority over 'material forces'

Later, thank goodness, people like Birdwood and Monash learned from the earlier mistakes and developed as modern commanders, employing modern methods and modern equipment as soon as they became available

They were not the same generals in 1917/18 as they had been in 1914/15

Alas this learning process took time

Regards

Michael

[Ozzie]

"""This is a fairly dated generalisation that really doesn't stand up to the majority of modern scholarship on the BEF. """

Taken in context, it is how they saw it back then. Michealdr sums it up nicely.

Kim

[Michael Molkentin]

Thanks for your comments Michael and Ozzie.

Indeed, I agree that the BEF of 1915 was no where near as tactically or technologically established as it would become after the Somme battle. That said, to sum up the army's entire tactical approach as "horses and bayonets" does very little justice to the active advances in artillery, machine gunnery, musketry, air power and signals that had taken place between the Boer War/ Ruso-Japanese War period and 1915. Even a cursory glance at "Infantry Training 1914" (and its 1911 predecessor) will demonstrate that British infantry were developing small unit tactics involving fire and movement and bombing.

The fact that the British attempted -albeit crudely- a truly modern looking multi-arm campaign (naval, aviation and ground forces) at Gallipoli in 1915 is remarkable, and an indication that their tactical scope was a little broader than cavalry and cold steel.

Further, Carlyon's suggestion that we can draw a sweeping conclusion about British tactics based on Birdwood's comments is a gross error of source analysis that I hope an average Year 9 history student could avoid. It says more about Carlyon's understanding (or indeed, misunderstanding) of British tactics than it does about the source. Birdy's observation that Monash didn't look too flash on a horse (which he probably didn't in truth) can only suggest the following:

1. That Monash did not fit the mould of a 'typical' general officer.

2. That, in Birdwood's mind at least, officers and horses went hand in hand (or bum in saddle perhaps). But this doesn't lead to the conclusion that "the British" were all about "bayonet and horses"- it just means that he recognised that to fulfil their duty properly, command staff required mobility. And, in the context of 1915, the horse was the obvious choice.

Others have made a similar error by derriding Haig over the vast quantities of horse fodder (and horses) shipped to France during the war. It was not because he was all "horses and bayonets" either- it was because, in that time and place, the horse was a key logistical tool, hauling the unpreecedented mass of guns, munitions and people around.

It is often said, quite correctly, on this board, that historians can make the sources say what they want to say when it comes to the competency of British command. That said, there is a marked difference between reading sources critically with a historian's understanding of context, and reading our post-war values (eg- the Generals were incompetent) into sources,in a manner that is completely anachronistic.

[Michael Molkentin]

Firstly, my opinion of Carlyon is based entirely on "Gallipoli"- I do not know the man, and have generally only come across positive reviews of his work thus far. I had no prior agenda before reading his work. As stated above, I think that he is a great storyteller and presents an evocative picture of men at war that is rivalled by few. His grasp of the "military" part of his "military history" (i.e. tactics, operations and strategy) is not so strong. That said, his new book may represent a few years of extra reading and experience in handling the official records (my understanding certainly change from year to year!).

Secondly, your suggestion that "He might have... merely used the Birdy incident to illustrate, not prove, his opinion" proves my point precisely. Historians who are in control of their sources tend to link their statements with their most convincing evidence. If Carlyon wanted to convinve me of something as significant as his charge that "Horses and bayonets: they were still what it was all about" he should have presented some evidence, not a flimsy and irrelevant "illustration". In the event, I remain unconvinced at this stage that

"Birdwood's observation [of the 200 pound Monash not looking good on a horse] tells us much about how the British saw war in the new century. Horses and bayonets: they were still what it was all about". (p. 121)

[michaeldr]

Michael

quote: "the army's entire tactical approach as "horses and bayonets" does very little justice to the active advances in artillery, machine gunnery, musketry, air power and signals that had taken place between the Boer War/ Ruso-Japanese War period and 1915."

Indeed you are correct; the lessons had been there to be learnt. Not only that, but Hamilton himself took an active part in the South African war and was an official observer in the far-east conflict. He should have understood the lessons better than most.

But none of this means that at Gallipoli war was conducted according to those lessons.

Three examples:

Aircraft: the first to arrive on the Ark Royal were 'sadly inefficient' per the OH. They could not take off from a choppy sea and when they could get up, their engines could not develop enough power to gain sufficient height for efficient spotting.

Artillery: at no time on Gallipoli were there enough guns, the right type of ordnance or enough ammunition; 'one round, per gun, per day, perhaps' as someone put it at the time

Hunter-Weston's tactics - Frontal assaults by waves of infantry against entrenched positions after an ineffectual barrage, and usually timed at mid-day - no night fighting and no creeping barrage. Remember his remark to General Paris - 'Casualties?... What do I care for Casualties?'

The lessons had been there, but they were not applied in the early years of the war and certainly not at Gallipoli

Regards

Michael

[Michael Molkentin]

Hi Michael,

Thank you for your valuable and obviously well developed insights.

I overwhelmingly agree with your conclusions.

My problem with Carlyon's 'donkeying' of British tactics in 1915 is that it is too simple, too sweeping and liable to propagate the old myths among the popular readership that so many of us spend so much energy trying to debunk. It is also not based on sound evidence. Indeed, the points mentioned in your post would have gone a much, much longer way in building a sustained case that British tactics were defective at Gallipoli.

Again, thanks for raising those points.

So back on topic...has anyone actually read his new book yet? I am waiting for Christmas to fit in its rather large girth.

[Andrew P]

So back on topic...has anyone actually read his new book yet? I am waiting for Christmas to fit in its rather large girth.

Nope, I haven't read it yet. I've still got Adrian Hellwig's bio on Major Dallas and Wes Olsen's 'Gallipoli The Western Australian Story' to read before I tackles Les Carlyon's hefty work.

Regards

Andrew

[Auimfo]

I just managed to buy Les carlyon's "The Great War" for $35. Everywhere else I've only seen it for $55 so I'm happy with that!

If it's anything like his "Gallipoli" it should be a fantastic read.

Having said that, I have found a small error when initially skimming through the plates. One of these is a photograph taken by Denise Carlyon of Chateau Delacour, otherwise commonly known as "Red Chateau" and is captioned:

"This chateau, wrecked by shellfire in 1918, still stands on the outskirts of Villers-Bretonneux, where it shows it's wounds to the world"

As many of us know, this chateau was demolished in 2004 to make way for a supermarket.

Obviously Carlyon's photo was taken prior to this and he is unaware of the chateau's eventual fate.

Tim L.

[mcderms]

Anyone know when this comes out in the UK?

[nige]

mcderms and all interested buyers,

I can arrange purchase and postage of the book from Aussie for the grand total sum of 62 english pounds per book.

Nige

[frev]

Don't want to make you guys jealous - oh, okay - yes I do. Picked up a copy for $27 today. Hubby had told me I wasn't allowed to buy it because he was going to get it for me for Christmas - but I had this discount voucher for Borders that was going to run out tomorrow - and I couldn't let it pass.

But I did the right thing when I got home & handed it over to him - so I won't get to read it till after Christmas either!!

Cheers, Frev

[Ian Underwood]

Hi all, Yesterday Carlyon was interviewed on ABC radio for the 'conversation hour' and gave a 50 minute uninterrupted account of the genesis of the book and spoke of some of the characters that feature within its pages.

For those with the technology and know how, it can be Pod-casted or streamed direct from this webpage. I'm lucky to have a car stereo that can play MP3s, so I had a pleasant drive home from work today and heard the whole thing.

Those in blighty with an interest in his previous book may like to hear the man speak, aside from the actual content of the interview, he has such a great speaking voice and that old style Australian accent!

Looking forward to reading the book, I have it reserved at the local library and hope also to find it in my Christmas stocking as well.

Ian.

[DaveMurphy]

G'day All,

Picked the book up for $55 at Sydney Airport last week, nearly had to pay excess baggage!

I have found it to be an excellent read thus far, am about 300 pages in. I'm afraid I would have to agree with the previous posts on Carlyon; an excellent historian and story teller (better than his contemporary mainstream australian war story writers), but a bit light on for strategic thought.

We should not be disappointed by this though, as his books are superb, with an excellent personal touch. As long as you know what you get with Carlyon, just enjoy the read!

Dave

[tim_oz]

Im about 600 pages into it and its a great read. I agree with Dave that his strategic thought is sometimes a little light on and he sometimes leaves the Australian actions sitting in a vacum to the events around them. However it does rate as one of the best books I have read for some time.

If you want to hear more of Les speaking in addition to the ABCinterview there is a talk he did at the Australian War Memorial on Gallipoli which you can get through iTunes under Australian War Memorial talks Im sure its on the web site as well but Ive not ben able to find it.

Tim

[harribobs]

i'm lucky enough to be one of the first in the UK with the book, courtesy of an australian friend's generosity, (Thanks Phil )

i have made a decent start on it and i'm very pleased with it

[michaeldr]

quote: For those with the technology and know how, it can be Pod-casted or streamed direct from this webpage.

Many thanks Ian,

That was terrific and what a nice surprise to hear the voices of the veterans too.

Very interesting to listen to Mr. Car-lyon [how come I couldn't work out for myself how to pronounce his name?] in particular, his opinions on Monash, L-G, Haig, Murdoch and others

Really looking forward to getting hold of the book

Thanks again

Michael

[DavidAE]

Similar to other comments I thought this book was very good, Carlyon is an excellent story teller. It is primarily a story about Australian soldiers experiences but he provided a good sprinkling of information about the political and strategic backdrop, (I must read more about Billy Hughes the colourful Austrailan PM). Sometimes I was left wanting for more detail on the battles but that is probably beyond the scope of what is a very big book.

At the end however, I was left somewhat exhausted and depressed. Every battle, great victory or otherwise resulted in the death of few more thousand men. The lack of replacements meant that units were significantly under strength yet still expected to do their duty. It is probably Carlyon's skill that the book so evocatively illustrates the sacrifice and waste of the "Great War."

[Dolphin]

The book finally made it to the top of my post-Christmas reading pile, and I've now got through it. I think that 'excellent' is the appropriate description, as Les Carlyon certainly gets across the skill, bravery and mindset of the AIF. At the same time, he gives praise where it is due to the British and other Empire forces, including the Canadians under Currie.

Like much Great War literature, the book is essentially a very sad one, as the continual loss of men who could have achieved so much - had they survived - is a constant theme.

However, I was puzzled by the absence of any reference to the Australian Flying Corps. One Australian pilot (Lt W Palstra – who died in the crash of the airship R.101 in October 1930) is mentioned, but it isn’t clear that he was in an Australian unit. The AFC's three squadrons weren’t a major force on the Western Front, but the AFC was a reasonably-sized part of the AIF, and I think that it deserved mention.

A curious point is the author's frequent use of English when he means British; I'm sure that Haig, being a Scot, didn't regard himself as an "English gentleman".

Like the author's Gallipoli, The Great War is essential reading for anyone interested in Australia's part in the Great War.

Gareth