Map of the Bald Hill area of Israel

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

G'day mate

This confusion of Point 265 should be sorted out immediately. So that there is no confusion, I have converted all the high points on the 1918 map from Imperial to Metric. Using the points mentioned in your commentary, try to describe your idea of trench layout and movement. We are all working from the same maps with the same information.

The main confusion lies with there being two Point 265's in near proximity.

I thought about attributing the sketch map Point 265 as Lone Tree and that would make sense in your description. Certainly if you look at the North South orientation, it could only be Lone Tree.

If that is Lone Tree, then the move of the 2nd LHBde needs to be harmonised. Let us not forget that they commenced with Point 275 and moved 1/2 mile south. Now if we take Point 265 which is mentioned as the pivot between the ICC and 2n LHBde as Lone Tree, then the move of the 2nd LHBde would have been 1/2 mile WSW, assuming Point 275 is Bald Hill.

Now if Point 275 is not Bald Hill, then we need to locate another high point similar to that of Bald Hill and there is none. So we must come back to the conclusion that Point 275 must be Bald Hill. 1/2 south of Bald Hill is Point 265 and yet 1/2 WSW of Bald Hill is Point 265.

Which is it?

I might have to go with the idea that the 2nd LHBde diarist meant WSW rather than due south which then harmonises with your information Steve.

NB: I have sent Jeff the copies of all the maps and information to help him - by his very nature and fresh eyes I have no doubt that we will have some good new insights.

Cheers

Bill

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

Just to deal with the location of the 2nd LHBde HQ, here is the War Diary entry:

While it does clearly say south of Point 275, as in my above post, I am happy to concede that this could mean any sort of south so long as it was south of Point 275.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

I think the Pt 275 of the 2nd LH Bde HQ may be confuzing you here.

By the 28th Nov the Bald Hill postion was overrun and held by the Turks and now moved to the area of Pt 288.

The 2nd LH Bde HQ like the Camel Bde HQ may not be on this map. I say that because the Camel Bde HQ was near Ibn Ibrak and Sakia, so If we take that veiw then your Pt 275 maybe some where else off the map.

Bill, I am unsure about the conversion of the heights as it now adds more confusion, since Pt 265 is Bald Hill we can agree now on that, and only the Pt 265 on the raid map needs to be confirmed.

This as we can now agree could be Pt 288 Lone Tree Hill, this would seem to be right by the map, but as the copy of the raid map is poor we can only be half right till more evidence comes out.

But as I was saying after the battle on the 27th Nov and the morning of the 28th Nov the front line junction of the 2nd LH Bde and Camel Bde was Pt 288 Lone Tree hill, with the 4th Anzac Bn having the southern side and the 6th LHR the Northern side. This can be seen in the raid map as all the 4th Bn companies are on the southern side of that hill, and the 6th LHR carried out its raid on Bald Hill from the northern side as per its history.

Cheers

S.B

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

G'day mate

To hold that Point 265 is Bald Hill flies in the face of the trench map of the 4th Battn which shows Bald Hill and Pt 265. You need to explain this before settling upon your conclusion that Bald Hill is Pt 265.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Bill,

Yes mate see my last posting awith the War Diary entries of the 4th Anzac Bn.

It clearly gives what the Bald Hill is called in the entries which is Pt 265.

The (Brackets) are theirs and as in the War diary and are not mine. They clearly show what they believed at the time and I am willing to agree with them as they were there.

Also the AOWH also confirms this as page 499 as the following;

"displayed activity against Hill 265 (afterwards known as Bald Hill)."

The (brackets) are still theres not mine.

Cheers

S.B

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

G'day mate

Thanks for the outline but there are major problems with it.

Mate, what I am trying to say is that regardless of what the extract says, there is some harmonisation required.

If you look at the map below, taking the assumption that Bald Hill is Pt 265, then you need to explain away the Pt 265 on this map, produced by 4th Battn and included in the WD. When you can explain this contradiction, then you can assert that Pt 265 is Bald Hill.

I believe that 275 is Bald Hill and it appears to fit in with all other explanations.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Bill,

I can only agree, that this raid map has Pt 265 but why its so marked, well I dont know, but can we agree here that on the 27th Nov Pt 265 was Bald Hill but by the 3rd Dec Pt 265 has how charged to some where else most problly Pt 288 Lone Tree Hill.

This has been a sticking point for some time and was the main reason from the start that I believe that Lone Tree Hill was Pt 265 and the AOWH was wrong but now after all we have gone threw I am ready to change my mind that Pt 265 was in fact Bald Hill and the AOWH got it right.

So we are left with this raid map which is the only problem which untill more come out can not be ignored.

Cheers

S.B

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

G'day mate

I am finding it conceptually difficult to accept Pt 265 as Bald Hill - this is because of the additional evidence of the 2nd LHBde and the 6th LHR who both talk about Pt 265 and Bald Hill but as different places. In essence, if Pt 265 is Bald Hill then it is impossible for 6th LHR to abutt 4th Battn ICC since the position was occupied by the turks, something that we both agree upon.

It is just too conceptually difficult to accept Pt 265 as Bald Hill despite the comments of AOWH - a document that we have demonstated is suspect in a great many places. Indeed, ever since I have begun these dialogues with you Steve, my faith in the accuracy of Gullett has plummetted to an all time low. Our discussion has only tossed it further down. It would be an understatement to say that I am disappointed. If it came to a competition between agreeing with Gullett or otherwise, it would be a tough ask to get me to accept Gullett. Think about our air raid casualty discussion, Es Salt, Grant's orders at Beersheba and a few other items. When it comes to verifying Gullett, he has been proved wanting. This is just another illustration.

So you can accept my cynicism as a consequence of your challenges ... it's all your fault.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Bill,

What can I say you are correct that there is conterdictry evidence from all the sourses that are confuzing the whole thing.

Now the 7th LHR History mentions that Bald Hill was about 1000 yards east of Pt 265.

It also mentions that it was garrisoned by the 6th LHR in a trench system built by the 5th LHR.

It also mentions this, "On the 28th (incorrect should be 27th Nov) the enermy commenced to shell the line from post 7 to Wilhelma very heavily, Bald Hill held by a Bn of the Camel Bde was especialy singled out....... drove the Camel Bn off Bald Hill and appeard to threaten our postions at 265".

Of cause both the 6th and 5th LHR don't mention this at all in there histories, what do all three Regt's say in there war diaries for the period is it possible to get copies of them and the Bde HQ. Can you get copies for me mate, when next your at the AWM.

I did check the war diaries of the other Camel Bn's and the 2Bn which took over the line Yahudiyeh to Pt 265 from the 2 LH Bde on the 22nd Nov makes this coment that the 5th LHR was next (left flank) to 10th Company holding Pt 265.

But all the 4th Bn war diaries show they (15Co) were on Pt 265 so if they were driven off this on the morning of the 27th Nov and all records say that they were driven off Bald hill not Pt 265 then we have a problem.

If we say that your map with the converstions to metric is right then Pt 265 must be Lone Tree hill. If so other sourse don't follow this line so we always go round in circles untill I am unsure which is what here.

(Brackets are mine)

Mate I have about ten sourses here in front of me all telling me all the above that there are at different times different names/numbers for the hills they are on. And what you have found has added to the sourses but also the confusion as they also contradict other sourses. What I mean I hoped an offical map of the area would sort out which hill was named/number what but this is not the case and has led to more confussion.

Cheers

S.B

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

G'day mate

I have already got copies of 2nd LHBde and 6th LHR WD's. The 5th LHR Wd entries for that period are unreadable and need to be obtained in the original which is impossible because they are embargoed from access due to the digitising program going on at the moment. As for the 7th LHR, they took no part in this action so while I have viewed their entries, they are not helpful.

However, the stuff that I do have, I will email you today.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Bill,

Thanks mate I await with interest.

What is funny about this that the 7th LHR has the best and most detailed account of this battle from the LHR side, but as you say they were not there, while the 6th LHR has a small bit but only relating to the raids they did with the Camel Bn on the 29th Nov and 3rd Dec. While the 5th LHR has none at all.

Does the 7th LHR war diary mention much about there help on the 30th Nov to the 6 LHR where they (C Sqn 7 LHR) destroried the turkish raiding force into the 6th LHR lines.

Cheers

S.B

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

G'day mate

I have re-oriented the 4th Battn ICC map on the North South Axis - that makes it easier to understand why I was okay with the notion that Pt 265 was Lone Tree Hill.

Once this orientation is seen, all the rest of the data falls into place without any conflict.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Bill,

Yes I agree, and was my original belief that these two features had been mixed up or missed numbered

In fact I both in my story at the start untill better info comes out, and I then stayed away from any ref to Pt 265 and referered to these feathures by their names Bald Hill and Lone Tree Hill to stop any further mistakes.

Below is the story for your checking:

BATTLE OF BALD HILL

By the end of November 1917 the Camel Brigade had been in constant movement and action since the 29th October having advanced from Beersheba to Jaffa in about four weeks and both animals and men were worn out. The camels unused to the hard rocky ground in Palestine then to the soft sands of the Sinai were tormented from sore feet which had crippled them by the hundreds and camel itch (a type of septic sore) had broken out and the good old mange dressing was all that was keeping most alive but many had to be destroyed. All companies in the Brigade were suffering and they were now so reduced in both men and animals by disease and casualties that they were a shadow of their former selves.

The Brigade at this time consisted of the following Troops;

Camel Bde HQ Gen Smith VC

2nd British Battalion LtCol Buxton

7th Co Capt Gregory

8th Co Capt Peterson

9th Co Capt Newsom

10th Co Capt Wilkinson

3rd Anzac battalion LtCol DeLancey-Forth

11th Co Lt Dixon

12th Co Capt Norris

13th Co Capt Nobes

14th Co Capt Ranclaud

4th Anzac Battalion LtCol Lee

15th NZ Co Capt Davis

16th NZ Co Capt Yerex

17th Co Capt Hampton

18th Co Capt Howard

26th MG Sqn Maj Millar

Camel FA LtCol Arnold

On the 22nd November the Camel Brigade was attached to the Anzac Mounted Division and ordered to move to Bald Hill to cover the right flank of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division under General Chauvel. This feature was 8 miles northeast of Jafa and the 2nd Battalion relieved the 7th Light Horse Regiment at 10 am and occupied a line from Yehudiyeh in the south tying in with the 1/4th Northamptonshire Regiment of the 54th Division and the 2nd Light Horse Brigade in the north around Mulebbis who supplied and maintained mounted patrols covering the area around Bald Hill to the north and east.

The 2nd Battalion started to dig positions around Bald Hill which lay between Mulebbis and Yehudiyeh. The ground needed to be covered was extensive and only the Brigade Machine Gun Squadron arrived as support for the remainder of the Camel Brigade were still on the move up from the Plains of Sharon.

On the 25th November the 4th Anzac Battalion arrived, taking over the Bald Hill defences at 8 am which relieved the 2nd Battalion which moved to Selmeh into reserve and was placed under orders to support the Anzac Mounted Division, while the balance of the Brigade bivouacked between Ibn Ibrak and Salmeh. The Camel Brigade was still without the support of artillery as the Hong Kong and Singapore Battery had been attached to the Yeomanry Division on the 17th November and was now making their way to Jerusalem.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Lee Commanding the 4th Anzac Battalion deployed one section of the 17th Company on a commanding position to the extreme right in post 1 on Point 249 overlooking Yehudiyeh, the 15th NZ Company under Captain John Davis was placed on the left flank around Bald Hill with two section each in posts 5 & 6 with post 5 on Bald Hill or Point 265, the 16th NZ Company under Captain George Yerex provided three posts 2, 3 & 4 between these flanks taking in Yafa Hill and Point 266 and Point 286. The 18th Company under Captain Stan Howard with three sections of 17th company under Captain John Hampton and Battalion HQ were held in close reserve and dug in around and to the rear of Point 288 also called Lone Tree Hill or One Tree Hill and Point 265, about 400 yards southwest of Bald Hill. No patrols were placed by the 4th Anzac Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Lee instead relying on the 2nd Light Horse brigade to inform him of any enemy movement to his front by their standing patrols.

Bald Hill was a large open whale-backed feature which dominated the surrounding area, it was exposed to all sides and little cover was available but for a strip of cactus on the northern side, there were also a number of large Almond tree orchards around the area in front of Bald Hill which units of the Light horse were garrisoning. The main feature was broken by a re-entrant between Lone Tree Hill and Yafa Hill while a number of small wadis cut the surface between Bald Hill and Lone Tree Hill which was to its rear. Bald Hill was an important position in the defence of Jaffa as its loss and an enemy breakthrough there would expose the Allied defences along the Nahr El Auja and force General Chauvel to retire south of Jaffa, and so it was vital that Bald Hill had to be held.

By the end of November the Allied offensive around Jaffa was now wearing down as the threat moved towards Jerusalem. The German Commander General Von Falkenhayn was committed to relieving the pressure on his Seventh Army. So the Eighth Turkish Army was ordered to counterattack the exposed Allied line along the Northern flank. As new Turkish Divisions began to appear these enabled him to plan an attack along the Nahr El Auja and the 20th Turkish Division was given the objective of Bald Hill and the surrounding area to cut off the allied troops in the Nahr El Auja.

The 20th Division and its Regiments completed their assembly into the area of Ras el Ain and Mejdel Yaba by the 25th November and then began to filter into the area around Mulebbis. The 2nd Light Horse Brigade had quickly detected them and engaged small groups of Turks on the 26th and a force of four thousand Turks were observed moving in the area north the old Jewish colony of Mulebbis but the ground was cut by orchards and the main force was skilful enough to build up undisturbed for the attack.

When the 4th Battalion had taken over its new area they commenced to dig their defences but tools were short and all but the superficial of trenches had been dug. The departing British 2nd Camel Battalion had informed them that the village to there front was full of eggs, milk and oranges but patrols from the NZ companies failed to locate any, little knowing that the enemy had filtered into the town. For the last few days indications were seen that the enemy was planning something big as columns of transport could be seen in the distance but no Turks were seen in front of Bald Hill and escaped detection.

At 6.15 am on the 27th a violent concentrated barrage of Turkish artillery fell on Mulebbis, Bald Hill and on the 54th Division in the area of Wihelmia, the 4.2’s and 5.9’s forced the troops to their trenches allowing a large force of around four thousand Turks mostly of the 48th and 125th Turkish regiments, to overrun and capture the town of Mulebbis from the 6th Light Horse Regiment who retired in front of them inflicting casualties on the Turks as they left an Almond orchard around the village. The Turkish artillery could be seen firing from the plain below while the movement of the enemy could be followed. By 8.30 am a strong force of about 400 men using this orchard as a forming up point attacked the exposed left flank of the 15th company on Bald Hill around Post 5, the New Zealanders held their posts with difficulty as the Turks worked their way along both flanks as an intense cross fire and a bomb fight developed but in the end the section posts 5 and 6 were overrun or in the words of one kiwi “were compelled to retire” some time around 9 am.

At Post 5 during this fight Lieutenant Clifford Gorringe 15th Company soon found he was driven out by this sudden attack but at once counterattacked with the survivors, he directed fire on the exposed enemy and inspired his men with his bravery as this contest lasted for some time till he was shot in the head and wounded. The fighting was fierce around these posts and Sergeant William Trott was shot in the thigh and Private Tom Boyd in the back while others were hit by shell fire of whom Sergeant George Parsons was hit by a splinter in the arm and Private Victor Wright in the leg while Private Charles McArthur was seriously wounded and died later in the day. The garrison was slowly reduced by casualties then fearing encirclement the company was forced to retreat. At another post Sergeant Leslie Purves soon found him self cut off by both shell and machine gun fire and carried the seriously wounded Lieutenant Sam Gooding to the rear when the company was ordered to retire. This retirement happen abruptly and the company abandoned much equipment which could not be recovered as the men quickly moved to the reserve positions on Lone Tree Hill carrying their wounded and fighting as they moved.

The sudden retreat by the 15th company put the entire Brigade defences in danger as the Turks were energetic to take advantage of the collapse around Bald Hill and the withdrawal of the 15th company which quickly exposed the 16th company who now had to fight the enemy attacking on their rear and flanks, no request for reinforcement or to retire was sent by Captain John Davis to Lieutenant Colonel Lee and their collapse happen within half an hour of the first assault and they appear to be not expecting attack.

With the left flank of the 16th Company now exposed they continued to fight in which Sergeant James Adams of 16th company was prominent in the action holding post 4 against heavy odds suffering 50% casualties, among the casualties was Private Ash Giles who was shot in the arm and leg and Corporal Percy Coxhead shot in the arm but they continued to fight as the long morning dragged on.

Around 12.30 pm Lieutenant Colonel Lee became aware of the serious trouble with his command and realized that the 16th company was about to be surrounded and captured regardless of holding on all morning, he now ordered posts 2, 3 and 4 held by the 16th company and survivors of the 15th company to be abandoned before they were cut off. Despite the valiant defence by the New Zealanders its withdrawal resulted in a running fight in trenches and along a cactus hedge as the troops struggled to retire to the 18th Company positions in rear of Bald Hill near Lone Tree Hill.

On arrival Trooper Robert Maxwell of the 16th company found his mate missing during the withdrawal and returned the 500 yards threw the Turkish positions found his mate and rescued him under the eyes of the Turkish troops and regaining the 18th company trenches to the cheers of his comrades.

Part of the reason for the disaster that day was due to the lack of any artillery attached to the Camel Brigade, this had tragic consequences as the companies had been unable to break up the exposed enemy concentrations before they reached our lines and when they reached our posts the overused New Zealand companies had little to stop the heavy flanking attacks on their exposed positions. Five enemy Taubes were constantly over head observing for their guns which pounded our trenches continuously, by 12.30 pm all posts had been abandoned but for the one section of the 17th company in post 1, casualties thought were not heavy with only one man killed and two officers and 27 men wounded in the action.

As our troops reorganized the Turks quickly occupied the vacant posts and turned Bald Hill into a fortress contending themselves with this valuable position instead of advancing towards Jaffa to complete their victory.

At Corps headquarters the loss of Bald Hill caused considerable alarm and much finger pointing at the Camel Brigade and forced General Chaytor to order its immediate recapture, this was in part due to the problems on the right flank with the 1/4th Northamptonshire who was under heavy pressure due to the withdrawal of the Camel Brigade on their left and was in danger of being overrun. General Smith was insistent that as a matter of honour an attack is put in before dark by Lieutenant Colonel Lee and the 4th Battalion was ordered to recover the ground abandoned during the day.

Lieutenant Colonel Lee was ordered to organize this counterattack, but to carry out his plan he had only the well-used 16th company but it was familiar with the objective and was more then willing to regain its former posts, also the attacking force had with two sections each from the 17th and 18th company and a detachment from the newly arrived 7th company to carry out the attack while the remainder of the battalion was needed to occupy the defences. The 2nd Battalion had been released from the Anzac Mounted Division reserve at 10 am and ordered to move from Selmeh to the Camel Brigade’s exposed right flank to cover the area south from Yafa Hill and Willimina this allowed the 4th Battalion to concentrate for their counterattack. The 10th company relieved the lone section of the 17th company at post 1 on Point 249 at 3 pm while the 7th company moved to support the 4th Battalion as the remainder of the 2nd Battalion dug support and reserve lines, the brigade machine gun squadron was committed to support the battalion and Private William Gordon was killed by shell fire. By 7.30 pm patrols had reported the Turkish positions around the objective and the attack went in at 8 pm in darkness.

The 16th NZ Company was after blood since it was one of there own companies who had lost the Hill but what followed during the night was confused and bloody fighting. Both 16th and 18th company advanced in line on section fronts of two lines supported by the 17th company and quickly overran the first line of enemy posts which were held by only a thin skirmish line but the higher the troops advanced the more exposed they became, the 17th company recovered post 2 on the right and the 16th company regained posts 4 and 3 below and to the right of Bald Hill at the point of the bayonet and much butchery. Sergeant James Adams was conspicuous in this work leading a bayonet charge but was stabbed in a fight with a Turk and despite his wound consolidated the positions won and a prisoner and machine gun were taken, he died later from his wounds, Private Carroll Sandford was also seriously wounded during the melee and also died as did Private Bob McSkimmer. As the men gained their 1st objective having retaken the posts lost earlier in the day it left only post 5 and 6 around Bald Hill to be recovered, but any advance to the top of the hill was meet with an overwhelming fusillade from hidden machine guns and riflemen where Sergeant Hunter Finlay was shot through the knee and Private Vic Coleman was shot in the head, he continued for awhile as if nothing had happened but suddenly died. Lieutenant James Archibald led the section of the 7th company in the assault and helped regain one of the southern posts from the enemy near Yafa Hill.

The cameleers found that the enemy’s position was to well defended, and they were exposed to the enemies cross fire, but the men struggle for over an hour lead by Lieutenant Arthur Mackenzie to gain this last post and to regain their honour but it was for naught until about 9.15 pm when the troops were ordered back to the positions already won. By 9.30 most of the lower trenches were cleared having recaptured most of our lost posts but the main positions on Bald Hill held out against all efforts by the 4th Anzac Battalion and with casualties mounting Lieutenant Colonel Lee ordered all companies to hold what had been gained and to await the dawn. The Turks counterattacked during the night but never in overwhelming numbers and with the help of their captured machine gun keep them at a distance.

Once the warming rays of the mornings sun came out, patrols soon discovered that Bald hill was now occupied by more than 500 Turks entrenched with Machine guns and was now too strong for the 4th Anzac Battalion to capture alone. Casualties in the 17th and 18th company numbered around 30 wounded while the losses in the 16th company were not recorded.

General Smith realized that the hill and the enemy penetration could just as well be contained and controlled by fire from three sides and rather then risk more lives in a direct assault against the salient in our line he instead proposed to hold his present positions provided that he was given some artillery support, this was agreed to by both General Chauvel and Chaytor and the Camel Brigade took measures to hold what had been regained with artillery batteries from the 54th Division and the 2nd Light Horse Brigade.

While the battle was going on around Bald Hill on the 27th the Turks had attacked in other areas along the front constantly probing for a weak spot along the Allied lines but all positions held and only Bald Hill was reported lost that day. The position of the 1/4th Northamptonshire at Wihelmia was controlled late in the day by a counterattack by its Brigades reserves and with the help of all batteries of the 54th Divisions artillery.

In the morning of the 28th the battle had quieted down until 10.20 am when post 1 was heavily shelled till 11.30 am while the rest of the posts continued to be shelled through the day but the Turks did not attack contending themselves on working on their defences and resting after a bitter night. At 8.50 pm that night the 4th Anzac Battalion was relieved by the 3rd Battalion which had been waiting in reserve, its companies had been hard hit in the fighting at Tel el Khuweilfeh but despite the reduced strength of its companies it occupied all posts and extended the old trenches as well as exchanging fire with the ever observant Turks.

The Camel Brigades position now had the 2nd Battalion south of Yafa Hill holding the right flank while over looking Willimina, next in line was the 3rd Battalion holding the old defences of the 16th company along the south-eastern part of Bald hill, then the 4th Battalion now concentrated around One Tree Hill. All battalions had dug both reserve and support trenches in depth and barbed wire were delivered and over the next few days the position was developed and extended. The 2nd Light Horse Brigade continued the line from One Tree Hill towards the Auja River and Tel Abu Zeitun.

On the 29th November while the Turks again remained inactive during the day but for their artillery which again shelled our posts searching with his artillery along our trenches, at the Camel Brigade HQ General Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Lee planned a raid for that night to bomb Turkish work parties which were active on the defences of Bald Hill, this in cooperation with a raid by the 6th Light Horse Regiment who were to assist with two troops (A and B Troops) from A Squadron under Captain Stuart Tooth and would advance from the north while the cameleers attacked from the south. The 2nd Battalion was asked to assist and Captain Fleming Gregory Commanding the 7th Company was ordered to send 2 sections to support the 4th Anzac Battalion by occupying the vacant posts, Captain Gregory instead decided to bring his whole company to help and was relieved the 9th company that morning. During the afternoon the 7th company was hit by shell fire and one shell fell on a section of trench occupied by Fleming Gregory a well liked British officer killing him and wounding Lieutenant James Archibald forcing Lieutenant John Bell-Irving to assume command.

The reduced 15th company (about 60 men) was chosen to carry out the raid and during the dark moved up to the 3rd Battalion trench near post 4, which were the closest to the enemy works on Bald hill. At 10 pm an artillery barrage from B Battery HAC and the Inverness Battery fell on Bald Hill and under cover of this fire the New Zealanders of the 15th company moved forward at the rush with the bayonet and were met by the Turks with bomb and bayonet as a desperate fight developed as the New Zealand troops drove the Turks up the hill where stores lost on the 27th by their company were recovered but once near the top of Bald Hill they found Turkish resistance growing.

It appears at the same time the cameleers and Light Horse had attacked Bald Hill a Turkish force of 300 men were about to commence their own attack and the 6th Light Horse ran into them forcing both forces to go to ground as they became strongly engaged firing at each other in the dark, two other ranks (Ray Bloodworth and Henry Christie A Troop) were killed and Lieutenant Robert Ronald A Troop with a number men wounded as the 6th Light Horse was forced back on their supports exposing the 15th company which despite its success had been ordered to retire at the completion of its task, the company retired back to their trenches as fighting went on during the night as the Turks shelled the 2nd Light Horse brigade and our own defences and the night sky was lit by the flashes of exploding shells and flares till around midnight when the firing died down. All of the 15th company where safely back in the 3rd Battalion trench by 2.20 am having suffered few casualties during the night.

In morning of the 30th the troops stood to arms but the enemy made no attempt to attack but artillery fire on both sides increased and any movement attracted the keen eye of Turkish spotters on top of Bald Hill. To the north the night battle between the 6th Light Horse and the Turkish forces continued and the Turks who had gained a number of posts from the 6th Light Horse during the night now found themselves exposed and with help from C Squadron 7th Light Horse counterattacked capturing more than 150 Turks and four new Bergman machine guns and winning Lieutenant Gilbert Finlay DCM the Military Cross.

The afternoon pasted with little fire as the enemy appeared demoralized by the night and morning battles this respite allowed our men to continue working on the defences and allowing the companies to be relieved as the terrain around Bald Hill took on the appearance of the Battlefields of France with large areas of trenches and wire began to appear as our companies pushed forward constructing new lines and tying in all posts held. The night of the 30th November pasted without any major fighting instead both sides contending to improve their positions as snipers ruled the dark.

The 1st December was also quite but for Turkish snipers and between 4.30 and 6 am the men stood to before commencing the day’s activities. The odd burst of artillery fire which all to offend betrayed that intrepid person trying to move around the battlefield was all to be heard as the work continued on the defences which around Lone Tree Hill was turned into a redoubt and new works were commenced during the day and those men not working tried to rest in the shade of their trenches from the burning sun.

Turkish aircraft were active helping their long range artillery by spotting and one salvo scored hits on the camel lines near Brigade HQ at Ibn Ibrak and Sakia killing Lieutenant Horace Hallam R.A.S.C the Brigade Admin Officer and a large number of animals which were barracked in close formation near the watering point. The 3rd Battalion still working on the new works was shelled heavily late in the day wounding a number of men and damaging the posts and once night came the enemy was heard working on their defences as snipers came out to snipe at our men of whom Private John Currie of the Brigade machine gun squadron was killed by this fire.

The 2nd December was again quite but for the irregular shelling of all posts as most of the troops tried to rest after a night of work parties which had kept most busy doing what work could not be done during the day, Lieutenant Leslie White 11th company was wounded during this. Turkish long range artillery was used to keep our supply columns under fire disrupting the resupply of the forward companies. The Camel Corps Field Ambulance was kept busy over the week administering and recovering the wounded while doing this valiant work under fire, two of its doctor’s Captain’s Henry Dolman and Sam Seccombe along with Private Edward McMahon a stretcher bearer were themselves wounded on the 27th November when an enemy plane came over machine gunning the wounded around the Field Ambulance where because of over crowding a number of our wounded were recovered to the 2nd Light Horse Field Ambulance who had set up a clearing station for both Brigades. The night was quite as the work continued on the defences repairing damage extending and improving the posts.

On the 3rd December after stand to another raid was ordered to take place that night, Lieutenant Colonel Lee alerted the 17th company as it was the strongest company left in the Battalion to move up to post 9, in the 3rd Battalion trench that afternoon and the 18th company was alerted to support if needed. The plan was for the company to discover how strongly the enemies position were held and three officers were attached to inspect the defences and report on them as the force was only to be in the enemies trenches for 10 minutes before returning. The attached officers were Lieutenant Richard Camm sent to see how many men could be held in the enemy trenches, Lieutenant Vic Adolph to see at what stage the enemy were at in their construction and Lieutenant Edward O’Keefe to check their observation posts.

The attacking company could muster only 6 officers and 100 other ranks (with the three attached officers) to carry out the raid, the foray was to attack from the south, the same direction used on the 29th Nov, and a similar raid was once more planned by the 6th Light Horse to support, this force was composed from C Squadron under Captain Doug Close with 5 officers and 100 men. Lieutenant Adolph the 4th Anzac Battalion intelligence officer carried out a reconnaissance of the Turkish position in the afternoon and at 7.40 pm the17th company left its trench moving up a small nullah from post 9 to a form up point within 300 yards of the Turkish line allowing the troops to line a nullah till the artillery fell at H Hour.

At 7.55 pm after a 10 minute bombardment, Captain John Hampton signalled to attack allowing the men time to reach the trenches before the guns would be switched to cut off the enemy’s escape to the rear while the Brigades machine guns would support the main attack. The 17th company started to advance in line on a section front in three waves, the Battalion Padre Captain Ignatius Bossence joined with the attacking force setting a fine example to the men, but again things began to go wrong from the start.

The Turks quickly recognized that an attack was coming and moved out of their trenches into no mans land to escape the worst of the shell fire which allowed them time to prepare for our attack. The attacking company ran straight into a prepared Turkish defence and a bayonet fight ensued as a line of spider holes were found 50 metres from their front line containing a skirmish line of Turks, they showered our men with bombs inflicting a large number of casualties before they were all killed but not before disorganizing and delaying the assault. Meanwhile on the left flank the 6th Light Horse found they had been blasted out of their positions by what they believed to be a defective gun which was short shooting, they lost 23 men wounded before the barrage lifted disorganizing their attack.

The main Turkish line was then attacked but the enemy opened with shell fire onto their own position and the cameleers could make no head way against a stiffening Turkish line which by chance we had missed the intended point of entry and so lost the full benefit of supporting artillery and machine gun fire. The cameleers tried moving along the line to find a weak spot to break in and capture the Turkish posts but no where could we gain a foot hold.

Adding to their problems that night was two officers attached to look at the Turkish defences, now found themselves wounded during the wild fight along the outer trenches and two sections of the 18th company were committed until we at last gained an entry into our objective which allowed only a brief inspection before the whistle was blown to order our retirement. With the raid now completed Captain Hampton ordered all troops back to the start point with the 10 minutes allowed for the raid long passed, and as the troops retired machine guns from the 3rd Battalion opened on the enemies defences which prevented the recovery of all our wounded. Captain Hampton stayed to help with these wounded and his direction of the withdrawal enabled all of the wounded to be recovered with the help of Sergeant Lionel Towner who rescued a number of men in front of the Turkish trenches, they were the last men to return with the Padre who went among the troops and wounded keeping their spirits up and by 9.40 pm all had returned but for Lieutenant Adolph who stayed to complete a final check on the enemies works before arriving back carrying a wounded man, only one man was believed left in the enemy’s trenches and he had been killed and could not be recovered. The Turks still alarmed by the raid continued to shell the area till 10 pm when all fell silent. The 6th Light Horse to the north had still advanced at H hour plus 10 and reached their objective bayoneting 20 Turks where they stayed long enough in the enemy’s trenches to capture four prisoners and some rifles before returning with the required information with the loss of one officer (Owen Tooth) and one other rank (Brian Barton) killed and one officer and 22 men wounded.

The loss to the 17th company was reported as two other ranks killed (Albert Cox and James Fairbairn) and Corporal Henry Johnson died of wounds on the battlefield and 4 officers and 32 men were wounded, from the 18th company Sergeant Albert Chard was killed hit in the head by a piece of shell fragment while waiting in support and 16 men wounded. Captain Graham Shipway the Battalion medical officer worked tirelessly throughout the night dispatching the casualties back to the rear, clearing all the wounded by 2 am but a further four men died of their wounds that night and over the next few days (Bill Bryce, Archie Duncan, Elias Pryor and Harry Punshon).

The 4th December passed quietly but for the odd shell fire, when at 3 pm three-enemy planes appeared overhead bring a storm of fire on all posts along the line till it eased off at 5.30 pm. One gun continued to fire during the night at post 10 in the 2nd Battalion area with one shell every 10 minutes and Turkish snipers were out in force but at 11 pm all went quiet.

The 2nd Battalion in the meanwhile had spent the last week covering Yafa Hill and but for suffering heavily artillery fire had not been attacked, the Battalion had supported the 54th Division on their right with fire during the emergency late on the 27th but most of the time contending themselves with holding three posts with only half companies and providing fire support for the 4th Battalion on the left.

On the 5th of December the front line was relieved at 11 pm by the Auckland Mounted Rifles as the Brigade exchanged with the New Zealand Mounted Brigade. That night as the led camels were brought up and we prepared to leave the Turks on the alert detected our movement and shelled the positions of whom three men were reported killed but only two can be confirmed as died (Arthur Peace 18th Company and Tom Bedelph Canterbury Mounted Rifles) with a number of animals. While waiting for the relief Private John Romaro was sent from the 3rd Battalion HQ with a camel and Cachalot to pick up two wounded men and during his movement to the front missed our posts and wandered lost into the enemy’s defences and soon found he captured by a German Staff officer and Staff on a reconnaissance.

The Camel Brigade once relieved moved back passed Jaffa through thick mud as it had now begun to rain in buckets and the men and animals struggled passing the plains of Sharon and Gaza back to Shellal arriving 2 pm on the 11th December of a well errand rest.

One of the sad results of this battle happened two days after the Brigades return to Shellal when a Court of Inquiry was held into the loss of Bald Hill, its loss had caused some concern at GHQ and held Lieutenant Colonel Lee the Commanding Officer of the 4th Anzac Battalion responsible for its capture, Lieutenant Colonel Langley said its loss had been due to Lee not putting out patrols or forming an outpost line from the main posts on the 27th November to warn of the enemies approach while others said that there was the problem of the tactical position occupied by the battalion in that the posts were not properly dug or wired allowing the enemy to drive the garrisons out by strong artillery fire. Whether he was to blame for the loss or not is hard to say but the court of inquiry found Lieutenant Colonel Lee responsible and he was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel A.J Mills MC who was promoted and posted from the 1st Battalion and took command on the 14th December 1917 while Lee was returned to Australia.

On the 1st of January the 3rd Battalion now reduced through illness and casualties were sent back to the Canal, the 13th company not having been heavily engaged over the last month was sent to the 4th Battalion on the 30th December replacing the reduced 15th (NZ) company which returned with the 3rd Battalion. The 1st Battalion arrived from the Canal on the 16th January with strength of 23 officers and 660 other ranks.

Total Brigade casualties for the month of November were recorded as five officers and 23 other ranks killed, 12 officers and 109 other ranks wounded and two missing, most of these losses were at Khuweilfe earlier in the month.

The Battle casualties for December at Bald Hill were reported as two officers and five other ranks killed, seven officers and 44 other ranks wounded and three missing.

The brake down of casualties for the Battalions is harder to uncover for the 2nd Battalion reported only one officer (Major Gregory) and one man killed and one officer and six men wounded with one other rank dying of wounds but either were they heavy engaged over the two months.

New Zealanders of 15th and 16th company reported only one other rank killed and two officers and 16 men wounded of which one officer (Lieutenant Gooding) and six other ranks died of wounds, this would seem wrong as 27 men were reported casualties on the 27th November and probity many of these stayed with their units.

The Australians of the 3rd and 4th Anzac Battalions had lost six other ranks killed while six officers and 67 other ranks were reported wounded of whom 11 other ranks died of wounds, two other ranks were reported missing of which one was known captured.

The 26th Camel MG Company reported two men killed and one officer and three other ranks wounded of which one died of wounds.

From the Camel Brigade HQ 1 officer was killed (Lieutenant Hallam).

Cheers

S.B

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

G'day mate

Thanks for posting this. I am in the process of scanning the 6th LHR WD for you, although that will not make any difference to your commentary but more likely shore up your certainty.

As to the content, it will take me a little bit to absorb your comments and then I will give you some thoughts.

I then stayed away from any ref to Pt 265 and referered to these feathures by their names Bald Hill and Lone Tree Hill to stop any further mistakes

That is an excellent way of overcoming an obvious problem. Hats off to you Steve.

Cheers

Bill

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

G'day mate

As mentioned abpve, I would read your account carefully and give some comments.

As this is a first draft, I will leave any editorial comments out since they will be dealt with on subsequent drafts.

The story you tell is compelling in terms of the fellow on the ground. We were projected onto the battlefield with all its consequences. This indicates a great scope of understanding borne on the back of intense research. The story reads well and is a credit to your abilities Steve.

One thing I would have liked to have seen in greater depth - and this is no more than a paragraph at most - is the analysis as to why Lee was made the scapegoat. You mention: "its loss had been due to Lee not putting out patrols or forming an outpost line from the main posts on the 27th November to warn of the enemies approach while others said that there was the problem of the tactical position occupied by the battalion in that the posts were not properly dug or wired allowing the enemy to drive the garrisons out by strong artillery fire." While you give an apology it actually doesn't answer each of these allegations. There are two allegations here are not answered by "his battalion didn’t expect to stay long in the position".

What I would like to know are the orders Lee received when he took up the position. I would also like to know why the 2nd LHBde was not ordered to undertake any screening work which would have inevitably led to the discovery of the troops hidden around Mulebbis, especially with aggressive patrolling, none of which took place. While Lee may have failed in protecting his men on that occasion, it appears as though he has been unfairly scapegoated for many other systemic failures over which he had no control.

Lieutenant Colonel George Langley is fair enough in that it deals with issues directly under his control but the rest appear more systemic Corps failures rather than anything that can be pinned on any one man. However, I am curious as to whether the prescription of Langley would have worked. The Turkish force was still hidden and would remain so regardless of the quantity of spade work - for fit men, 16 cubic metres a day.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Bill,

Thanks mate and for those on this site I've got a problem with LtCol Lee's inquiry as all documents have disappeared.

The only sourses are soldiers accounts/books or as mentioned LtCol Langley in his book.

There is little mention in War diaries and such, only there was an inquiry into this so we are left with "here say" evidence as to why Lee was return home.

Lee as I mentioned on the other site was a well conectted New England polition who gave up his seat in parliment to go to the war and he hoped to return to it when he did, is that the reason for the lack of documents in this, well we may never know now.

So I kept to the known sourses and that is little and want I understanding on the battle and Lee's part in it and not go so far into what I can not back up.

As to the orders we are left with only an outline from the Camel Bde HQ which because of the postion taken they couldnt cover the distance out from of Mulebliss to the east and the LH were in a better postion to do this in cooperation between both Bde's.

The failure to understand and find the build up of the Turks was a major problem but also shows how good the Turks can be at times. This was not the first time the Turks had done this and was not the last either.

Also as mentioned I think Chauvel and Chaytor's attention was drawn north above the Auju River by the Turks by there actions over the last few days and we almost complety missed this build up on our right flank.

Cheers

S.B

[wroclaw]

Steve

G'day mate

The OBWH does not carry a map showing Bald Hill - the map that comes close to this area has Bald Hill cropped out.

My issue of the official history, does include a map that shows the location of bald hill (it used to belong some time in the past to the "1st Bn. The Essex Regiment"), as well as other locations. Cant say however, if it adds much data on that coming from Bills maps.

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Thank you for the map as it does show the areas out side the Bald Hill and puts the action in more perspective.

I like all the maps they each give a different veiw of the terrin which only adds to my/all knowage.

Cheers

S.B

[wroclaw]

Hi Steve and all

Knowing that the sq mile or so still remaining of the "bald hill" battlefield is getting close to be vanished, I decided to take some pictures of it before it would be gone. Since the open wasteland had been locked between 4 towns for decades, it was changed and parts of it became a partisan dumpster of construction waste. Still the "bald hill", the highest natural spot in the central low lands is there.

I believe that while surrounded by urban areas, it is hard to see the hill in its original context, but still you could see with your own eyes why that rather flat hill was considered as a key point.

Bald hill, now covered by 3 concrete water reservoirs, is just a peak of a rather extensive elevated plateau including also points 86 and 87 (the last is marked on Bills map as 000) and I wont be surprised if they were all connected into one big post. Its slopes were rather steep (compared to the "standard" coast line plains hills) to the north (facing Petach Tiqva-Mulleibes) and East (totally dominating the basin between the Samarian western slopes and the bald hill area), but rather shallow to the south (facing point 89 or 286 on the old map) and to the west. The peak is located on the east part of the extended hill. I don’t know where Brian Barton's' memorial stone had been located originally or where it was found, but I was told by a local "nature loyal" it was located actually on bald hill, but had vanished in the early 1990's and no one knows where to or by whom. I know of an article written about it in 1974 and I'm trying to find a copy of it.

Bald hill as seen from the west, from a point located some 500m north of "lone tree hill" (point A). On the right, the area where the Cypress trees are planted, is point 87-"000" and on the left, where the antenna is, its point 86. All 3 form the entire hill (although it might be that just the part with the reservoirs was THE "bald hill").

The "lone tree hill" is the point where the cylindrical water tower is. It’s the highest point in its near surroundings and the natural position to be held when facing bald hill.

[wroclaw]

Bald hill, looking west towards "000" and the "lone tree" on the left margin.

A look from bald hill to the west. The front line stretched towards "tell abu Zeitun" which was well behind the buildings on the right edge. The highest building in the horizon is just near the "Sarona Bridge", close to the Gerisha area where the Auja was crossed in both operations.

Looking north towards the old center of PTq, about a mile from this point.

Looking south towards point 286, where the yellow tower is now. According to bills map, the trench line must have been located on this hardly seen line between two drainage basins.

Looking east towards the Samarian mountains.

[wroclaw]

I could only get some 1000m north of yafa hill. It’s the highest point in its surroundings, but today it does not look anymore then an elevated point. That is the hill covered by the trees in the horizon (seen here from point 62).

The elevated ground stretching between bald hill and point 89/286 (and also further to the south west, to point 266-old map) is well seen from the east (here from point 62-modern map). This British 1930s "pillbox" was located on the same high ground, facing east.

1917 dirt roads in red. Speculated trench lines in green

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Wroclaw

G'day mate

Once again I have to say thank you very much for a great display of photographs. It makes the site "live" so to say. Thanks for taking the time to take these pix and more expecially to share them with us. As usual your generosity leaves us in your debt.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Yes Mate,

Great photos of the area.

I didn't think there was so much open area in between the main points,

I can see how there was an opertunity to sneak around in the dark.

Cheers

S.B

[wroclaw]

Thanks, my pleasure.

Just some final notes about Brian Templer Barton. I had got a copy of an old article written after its memorial stone was rediscovered in 1972 and its discovery was published by the Australian press. The writing on the stone says that B. Barton had been killed at the place that stone is located. The stone, if indeed it remained on the same spot it was placed after the war, was some 300m east of the summit of bald hill, still on the high ground forming the expanded bald hill (some 100m north of point 87). On the other hand in the article, relaying on the Barton family sources, that stone was placed by Barton's brother after the war on its brothers former grave after it was moved to Ramleh, actually replacing the wooden cross that was taken to the family farm, "Nanima" (my spelling) near Wellington. I don’t know much about the way battlefield burials were located, but I assume that proper burial wouldn’t have been placed so near the enemy lines. On the other hand, if the article writer did not get the story correctly and the stone was put on the first place on the place Barton and one officer were killed by friendly fire, then we might have some clue of the location of the enemies trenches at Dec. the 3rd, meaning that the bald hill post was by far larger then the limited knoll of point 94.

Brian Barton according to the article, had served in Gallipoli but in dec. 1915 suffered from Typhus and returned to Australia. After he recovered he returned to service and sailed to Egypt in 1916, participating in all the major battles.

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Wroclaw

G'day mate

If you want a copy of the whole Barton story regarding the tombstone etc - it was deposited in the AWM as a file - email me and I will send it to you.

goodelyfe at hotmail dot com

Cheers

Bill