Guest Ian Bowbrick Posted 9 October , 2003 Share Posted 9 October , 2003 Sorry to go on about this particular Naval engagement, but in my opinion the British Navy had the German Navy on the run, and this was their best opportunity to cause some serious losses. I wonder if any of our Naval Pals (rum swilling, bearded folk and that's probably just the girls ) know if the Royal Navy improved their signalling systems in light of the misinterpretation and confusion at the end of the engagement. Sinking the Blucher was a poor return for the position they were in! Ian Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Hussar Posted 9 October , 2003 Share Posted 9 October , 2003 Ian, Being a bearded (check), Rum swilling (occassional check) type I will attempt to answer your question in context. With Lion's wireless out, and most of signal yardarms shot away, she was limited to signaling by flag. This was further complicated by the Flag Manual which had not been adapted to the new form of warfare. The best she could signal was, ' Attack rear of enemy.' However, there was a complication in Lions signals as she still flew flags indicating, ' Course NE '. The Blucher was standing between Hipper and Moore in New Zealand, who, seeing this signal, swung the remaining battlecruisers onto a course that would take them back to finish the Blucher. Beatty in Lion, seeing this, searched his flag manuals for a better signal but all he could find was, ' Keep nearer to the enemy '. By this it was too late as Moore had passed the Lion and could no longer see the signals, so the battlecruisers swarmed around the helpless Blucher. In the aftermath, considerable time was spent in improving signalling technique and updating the manuals to the detriment of more important concerns such as dealing with the causes of flash fires from magazines. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
bmac Posted 9 October , 2003 Share Posted 9 October , 2003 There is a fascinating book 'The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command' by Andrew Gordon which shows how British admirals were constrained by a system of command and communication set up in the Victorian/Edwardian eras partly as a result of the sinking of Admiral Tryon's flagship Victoria in the Mediterranean in 1893. Though it concentrates on the effect this had on the conduct of the Battle of Jutland (which is fascinatingly reconstructed using different timings and headings from those previously accepted) I don't doubt that aspects of what he writes applied also to the conduct of Dogger Bank. Even if they don't it is an excellent read and well worth the effort. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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