armourersergeant Posted 24 September , 2003 Share Posted 24 September , 2003 Having first fought at Loos as Army Commander and then been CinC at the Somme was Haig wrong to put so much reliabilty in the Artillery damaged that was expected to crush the wire and destroy the German trenches? (even ignoring the fact that intelliegence raids etc did show that the wire was not cut prior to 1st july.) Also given that Loos failed in part to reserves being held too far back did he take care to make sure that his subordinate commanders got there reserves foward to be of use? blimey i'm spoiling you , two questions for the price of one. Arm. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jonathan Saunders Posted 24 September , 2003 Share Posted 24 September , 2003 I understood Haig had two major objections to French's tactics at Loos. The first obviously keeping the Reserve to far to the rear to be of any use, but the other was that due to a munitions shortage, the German positions could not be adequately shelled. In fairness he did try to rectify this at the Somme but many of the shells were defective or were not HE, thus large parts of the German wire remained in tact. Certainly his intelligence was aware of this well before 7:30am on 1 July. Using shrapnel shells that passed through the wire and not HE that would rip it open, together with the high number of dud shells is why the wire did not cut. As C-in-C Haig is at best culpable for this. Regarding placement of reserves I will have to think about this, but basically if you were in the northern sector of the battlefield on 1 July I dont think you could have been placed back far enough! Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
armourersergeant Posted 24 September , 2003 Author Share Posted 24 September , 2003 i am assuming that the Wire was one of if not the most important obsticle they were going to come across and that alot of time and energy and shells were put into destroying this. So what back up plan did they have for getting over this if the shells did not work. I cant see the old throw yourself on it and your buddies climb over you working! though they may have felt it would considering they thought that the resistance would be light! Arm. before anybody corrects me i of course realsie that maching gun and artillery fire are pretty important obsticles to over come but i am refering to things that physically stand in your way Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Chris_Baker Posted 24 September , 2003 Share Posted 24 September , 2003 It is easy to be critical and objective 80+ years on and armed with the facts. I try to put myself in their shoes, and actually in many ways it is difficult to avoid coming to the same conclusions and taking the same actions. From what I can tell there was a definite air of confidence, a "buzz" about the BEF on the Somme prior to 1st July, at all levels. The huge amount of new artillery, shells, reserves, etc was simply awesome, especially to soldiers who had been through the much leaner times in say early 1915. Even in those Divisions that had been over the top at Loos, there was this confidence. When the barrage fell during those seven days before the infantry went over, it fell principally on the wire and the front line trenches and strongpoints. There was little if any of the suppression and destruction of the enemy artillery* (surely the real killer of 1st July and all subsequent days), little interdiction of supply. The battlefield was not deep at this time, as it became later. *except in XIII Corps area next to the French XX Corps, where this was done most effectively and must have been a strong contributor to success on that front. Let's look at the wire. XIII Corps (30th and 18th Divs) found the wire "exceedingly well cut" "there was none left"(OH). XV Corps (7th and 21st Divs) do not seem to have encountered much of a barrier of wire either, except for some in a hollow facing 2/Gordons near Mansell Copse. The chief problem here was unsuppressed machine guns at Mametz and at Fricourt Tambour. In front of 10/KOYLI, annihilated here, the "wire had been well cut". III Corps (34th and 8th Divs). The advancing lines do not seem to have encountered to much of a problem with intact wire. It might have been a problem had more men actually reached it. At La Boisselle the problem was unsuppressed machine guns and lines of men moving at the walk coming over a skyline and down a long gradient. The position at Ovillers appears similar, it was not intact wire that was a problem but an advance across 800 yards on no man's land, some of it into a depression where men were facing direct fire and enfilade fire from both sides. X Corps (32nd and 36th Divs). Again, wire is not the real problem except in spots. Here the Germans had not been cowed by the bombardment. In fact they had been retaliating on the British artillery and were very lively. In front of the 17/HLI at Leipzig Redoubt the wire had been "effectively cut", but next to them the 16/HLI ran into undamaged wire. On their left, the Northumberland Fusiliers of 96th Bde did not get as far as the wire, so the point is academic. Next left, the 15/Lancs Fusiliers suffered as badly but some men got into the front line, so it does not sounds as though wire was a real problem. So, mixed story here, and surely that may have been affected by the artillery battle before the assault itself? The Ulster Division did not encounter too much difficulty with wire, the advanced units "crossed the debris of the wire". VIII Corps (29th, 4th and 31st Divs). Here, the wire was "believed to have been effectively cut" - but it was not. The wire was not destroyed in front of 29th or 4th Divisions except in a few places. Problems here were also due to unsuppressed machine guns and heavy enemy artillery, especially after the early blowing of Hawthorn Redoubt mine. Facing the 31st Div at Serre "the heavy bombardment had not been successful, but the wire had been effectively cut and blown into thick heaps". The northern pals were not killed by being held by wire. They were killed by unsuppressed machine guns and a heavy enemy artillery barrage falling across no man's land. So, what's my point? The failure of the British artillery bombardment was not the failure to destroy the barbed wire. Given the unsuitable armaments available to the gunners for doing that, on the whole it was done effectively apart from those places where the enemy had been retailiating heavily in the days previous to the asault. No, the real trouble was the failure of heavy artillery to make an impression on the strongpoints and deep dugouts of the front lines, and the failure to keep quiet the enemy artillery. There was still not enough heavy artillery! I have sympathy with the commanders position here. There were tons of heavy artillery, more heavy artillery than they had ever dreamed of. More weight of shell would fall on the German line on the Somme than anything before. It made Loos look like we had been using pop guns. Anyone would have said it was going to be enough. One of the main lessons from Loos was that the British artillery was just insufficient. That had been made good. The everlasting pity is that it was still nowhere near enough. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
bmac Posted 24 September , 2003 Share Posted 24 September , 2003 I am not sure I entirely agree with the conclusion that "on the whole (cutting the wire) was done effectively". The Official History (p. 307) states that wire was cut better in the south (where the attacks were broadly successful) than in the centre and north. Also there were highly localised variations with 29th Divisonal reports stating that in front of Hawthorn Ridge wire was "very much damaged" and "not much damaged". Wire in front of Thiepval was reported to be intact and very thick. 8th Division (opp Ovillers La Boiselle) reported wire "not properly cut". Two battalions in 31st Division (opp. Serre) reported no clear gaps and the Sheffield and 2nd Barnsley battalions were badly caught up on the wire. In front of Gommecourt there were big variations. The Rangers were badly affected by uncut wire and the London Scottish found gaps difficult to find. The 46th Division was also badly caught up by wire but not German wire, French wire that had lain undetected in the thick grass from the actions of 1915. Cutting wire was a difficult job until the instantaneous contact fuze was introduced. The shrapnel shells used had to be timed to explode at the correct height so that the cone of shrapnel still had sufficient impetus to cut the wire. Even then, the wire was not removed but instead had a tendency to coil up. If the shells exploded too high then they failed to do the job. Too low and the exploded in the soft earth. Aerial photographs show the scouring of the ground in the more chalky areas where the shrapnel had been used. However, having said that, the main problems were the twin failures to deal with the formidable German dugouts and the inadequacy of the counter-battery programme. To deal with the former a great concentration of heavy howitzers was required and this was just not the case (though a big improvement over Loos). Because Haig harboured hopes of a great 'break through' battle, the 1st July attack was spread over a wide area as was the artillery. Rawlinson favoured a more conservative 'bite and hold' approach which would have allowed for a far greater concentration. His approach bore fruit in the attack on the Bazentin ridge in mid-July. Consequently, the seemingly enormous concentration of artillery brought to bear on German lines was actually thoroughly diluted by the overall strategic approach. Also, the artillery available was disproportionately of the 'gun' nature rather than the 'howitzer'. Spread over 25,000 yards were: 808 18 pdr guns 32 4.7" guns (obsolete) 128 60 pdr guns 20 6" guns 1 9.2" gun 1 12" gun Total: 990 guns of all sorts 202 4.5" howitzers (field artillery) 104 6" howitzers (many obsolete and of short range) 64 8" howitzers 60 9.2" howitzers 11 12" howitzers 6 15" howitzers Total: 447 howitzers of all sorts In addition, but almost wholly on the southern end of the battlefield, were 16 220mm howitzers, 60 75mm guns and 24 120mm guns from the French army. In other words there was only one howitzer per 56 yards of front line (and only one 'heavy' howitzer per 100 yards). Also, of the just over 1.7 million shells fired in the bombardment, something over 70% came from the 18 pdr field guns. Apart from the inadequate numbers of heavy howitzers available, five other factors worked against the attempts to destroy the German defences: 1. The shell shortage of 1915 had led to a vast increase in production under Lloyd George. Quality though was a problem. Some 9.2 " howitzers shells varied in length by up to 6", a factor that played havoc with accurate firing. In addition, the fuses were unreliable and a large number of 9.2" shells were found on the battlefield, the fuses having fallen out in flight. Many others just failed to explode. 2. Attitudes amongst senior artillery officers were also blinkered. Offered wind and temperature measurements at different altitudes by the RFC these were turned down and it was not until 1917 that these variables were properly taken into account when planning a bombardment. 3. Co-operation with the RFC was very difficult because of the weather and many attempts to check accuracy were aborted when the observers could not make out the results of firing. 4. Many of the artillerymen were very inexperienced. For example, the vast majority of the heavy artillery on the Gommecourt sector only arrived in France in early June and they were given hardly any time to identify and register targets before the bombardment began. 5. The sustained use of the artillery placed an enormous strain on the equipment with guns regularly being out of commission because of wear to the barrels and hydraulic systems as well as others failing because of premature bursts. This issue particularly affected the 18 pdr quick firing field guns and, on 1st July, when these guns were partly to be used to assist the infantry by supressing localised resistance, many failed as a result of over use. But I have figures showing that the heavy guns failed to fire over 20% of their bombardment allowance because of technical problems. Add to that the large number of 'duds' and the proportion of shells that actually exploded (leaving aside the issue of accuracy) could well have been at least a third less than planned. So, whilst the howitzers failed to do any appreciable damage (except in the south where they were supported by the French) the other failure was in the counter-battery programme. This fell mainly to the 'long' guns, i.e. 6" and bigger, of which there were only 150 (i.e. one per 170 yards of front). These were also given the task of interdicting the rear areas. Over the previous two years the Germans had built numerous artillery positions using the many wooded areas as cover and they were very adept at moving batteries from one to the other without being spotted. Generally, German artillery retaliation was relatively low key during the seven day bombardment and it was not until it was clear that the attack was imminent that many batteries revealed themselves. The counter-bombardment that was then unleashed on 1st July was of an unexpected ferocity, none more so than in the area around Gommecourt on which fire from Serre (once the attack had collapsed) and Adinfer Wood (beyond the northern end of the assault) was concentrated in addition to that immediately opposite. The last 'failure' of the artillery bombardment was caused by the weather. The two day delay in the attack caused by the heavy rain had a significant impact on the intensity of the bombardment. Compared to Y Day, the original day before the attack, I have figures showing that howitzer fire fell around Gommecourt by 80% on Y1 and 70% on Y2. In other words, the German defences had two days of relative calm before the 1st July attack where men and material could be moved around and trenches and wire repaired. And the weather had one last effect: with the ground so soft because of the unseasonably wet weather, the explosive effect of the heavier shells was much diminished as the shock waves were absorbed by the sodden ground. Whilst some of these factors were beyond the control of senior officers, others, such as the dilution of the artillery's power by an over-extended front, were crucial in the many failures of the attack. I suspect that British planners had been given false encouragement by the initial successes of the German artillery around Verdun in early 1916 but had not learnt the proper lessons about concentrating artillery power so as to overwhelm the enemy's defences. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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