Tanks in Palestine

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Gerald

G'day mate

Thanks for those really good pix and your explanations. I have appreciated them a great deal. The pic of War Baby does give an excellent view of the plains - it certainly makes it very clear as to the problems faced by the British infantry when attacking Ali Muntar.

Thanks again mate.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Bill,

My readings of the only time tanks were used with the Camel Corps is that they killed more men then they saved.

This enemy fire broke up the formations of the 1st Camel Bn at 2nd Gaza forcing two companies to follow the tank in the mistaken beleif that it would provid some protaction from the fire, instead it (the tank) became the focal point for every Turkish gun that could lay down fire.

This fire was very heavy by the losses in both the Camel companies and the two British Bn's on the other side of the tank (5th Norfolks and 8 Hants).

Now as mention what good did the tank do?

What was the strenght of the Tank redoubt and did it (the Tank) make all their Turkish soldiers run away?

My chapter of this battle gives Turkish strenght around the Tank Redoubt at about Bn strenght, from the 165th Turkish Regt say bwteen 300 to 400 men. How many were in the redoubt is open to debate but possible around 300 men.

Now the tank did force an entry into the redoubt , this is plan from all readings but as soon as it did, it was quickly KO'ed and ditched in the first trench but remained a focal point for the enemy for some time, but that was enough to allow us to get into the redoubt. The 50 men mentioned was from the aussie camel companies, what the numbers were of the two British Bn's is not recorded but must have been more then 50 men.

Now the Turks didn't just run away as all reports mention, they retired to their secondary defences within the redoubt and took up the fight again. This secondary trench was still on highter ground then our soldiers in the front outer defences and put a heavy fire into us. Our hold on the redoubt was tenouis at best as we cleared only the front outer trench never having the men to clear more, our hold was haphazard and the aussies camel soldiers formed a post defence at certain points to hold and retire to along the captured part of the trench.

We held for over an hour or two untill the withdrawal order was given and we retired out of the redoubt or at lest that was surpose to happen as many men didn't get that order or were to wounded to retire or acted as part of the rear guard. A officcer, Lt Roberts 8 Hants had about 20 men near him when we were over run around 1400 (2 pm) later that day.

If you look croos the battle field to the Jack and Jill redoubts we see some thing diferent. a single Camel company (about 100 men) charged and took both redoubts from about 200 turks, there only suport was by two Troops of the 11th ALHR about 60 men who joined in for a short peroid before leaving.

They (12th Camel Company) held both redoubts untill 1600 when we were forced to retire when the Turks out flanked them.

No tanks there just guts and a bayonet. The 12th Camel Company lost only three killed and 40 WIA in the fighting at Jack and Jill redoubts while the two Camel companies (2nd and 3rd) at the Tank redoubt lost 180 men KIA and WIA from about two hundred and ten comitted.

Cheers

S.B

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

Thanx heaps for that information. It is this very day that I am working on the first draft of the Gaza2 battle and this is first class information. while the information here is extensive and well researched, in relation to the 9th it will end up as only a paragraph as Darley mentions that the 9th observed this fight from Atawineh Ridge.

I have also the account of 666 Sgt DW Harris of 12th ALH which is quite impressive in its depth of description regarding actions occurring near the 9th so I am getting a good idea of the specific action in that region.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

No worries what ever I can do to help.

The strenght of the Turkish defence as you know has been dicussed at lenght and what the final total could be is still open.

The Turks had at lest a Bn in the area of Tank Redoubt with an attached MG Co, but was all that force in the redoubt and how many manned the flanking defences is unknown. But what strenght this Bn was with its attatch MG Co is not known, but Turkish companies and Bn's were never the same strenght as our/British Bn's were and some 4 to 500 men per Turkish Bn may be to many or to little and were they all in the redoubt and did they keep a reserve near to counter attack?

As we have seen Turkish reinforcements arrived during the morning as there were well placed for such, and these were seen entering the rear and flanks of the Tank redoubt during the morning.

On the J and J redoubt area the strenght of the unit holding it is unknown but must have been at lest a reinforced company of a Bn of the 165th Turkish Regt, weather this company was part of the Bn in the Tank redoubt or another from some where else is conjecture at present and the strenght I give of two hundred is a guestament of such.

What is know is the Turks at J and J redoubt collapesed very quickly as the assult forces didn't allow them time to reorganize and pushed them (turks) out of both redoubts in 15 to 30 minutes, if not quicker.

I think we were just as stunned by our success as the Turks were at there loss. As no reinforcment arrived to help the 12th company all day but for two sections of the 11th campany which took at position to cover the waddi and stop turks using it to out flank the 12th company.

It took the Turks some time to organize any counter attack against the J and J redoubts as the ground didn't allow much covered approch unless by the main Waddi which they used to later force our retreat but also included a number of trenches in between the J and J redoubts and the Attawaine Redoubt by the maps.

Cheers

S,B

[Gerald Moore]

Thanks for you well-informed comments, Steve. I have used H.S. Gullett's "The AIF in Sinai and Palestine" , a work that you are undoubtedly familiar with, as my main source for information on this engagement. The map, also from Gullett, is attached to help those less familiar to follow the thread. It was not my intention to suggest that the action of HMLS Nutty was the sole cause of the Turkish retirement at Tank Redoubt - as you have noted this did not occur until after fighting by the British and ICC troops within the Redoubt.

Gullett makes the following points: 1) The Tank Redoubt was about 2 acres in extent. Nutty crossed the first trench, and was knocked out at the high point of ground in the centre of the Redoubt. 2) The Redoubt was entered by about 20 British troops and 30 ICC men. There were about 600 Turkish troops, with German and Austrian officers, in the Redoubt at this time. About 40 Turks were taken prisoner. 3) Roughly 500 Turks retired to their main position, about 600 yards from the Redoubt.

Your comparison with the less costly action at Jack and Jill Hills is quite interesting - if I take your point, you suggest that the lack of anti-tank fire was crucial here. I wonder if other factors (which you are surely better informed about than myself) such as the degree of cover on the approach to the position, the relative strength of the fortifications and garrisons, and. indeed, the diversion of Turkish fire towards Tank Redoubt might also be important.

How reliable is Gullett as a source?

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Gerald

G'day mate

Thanks for your usual well informed comments.

Just a couple quick points.

1. Gullett is a great primer - if you want a quick description of an event that is fairly accurate, then Gullett is your man. You can do no better.

2. Gullett was a man of his time and thus he wrote a history that was politically acceptable for the time. He knowingly suppressed information that was considered to be contraversial or went against the held opinion. So he needs also to be taken with a grain of salt. He is not the last word in history of the Palestine campaign.

With these two thoughts, Gullett is the first source I go to on any subject.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Yes you pose questions that have been ask before.

Gullett didn't take part in this battle so all coments came for men who had been there and their accounts.

As to what the Turks had at this battle, I think his sourse were a little limited to British Intell reports rather then Turkish sourses.

But let's take a look at the map from the Offical history there are a number of points there make this map totaly incorrect.

First - The fighting in the Tank redoubt, the troop placment shows us in half the redoubt, occupying it. This is incorrect, our forces held only the outer defences or the half moon shape of that redoubt. All reports don't give the impresion we penetrated as far as the map shows the that postion would best discribe where the Turks retired to then where our men were.

As to numbers of our men who entered the redoubt is still not confirmed, 50 men is the number I read also 30 aussie and 20 British. But is that confirmed? Now the names of officers I've seen in the redoubt show men from the 5th Norfolk Bn and the 8 Hants Bn. And given that eleven aussies surrendered to the Turks under Lt Roberts (8 Hants Regt) no mention of any British soldiers with him? and that twenty two camel corps soldiers were captured all up and that Capt Campbell and other numbers of men had retired form the redoubt how many were there.

Mate, what I am saying, the report given of this battle was from Capt Campbell, post war he mentioned that around him was 50 men but what number did the British have either then or in any follow up who made it to the redoubt, that were not known to Capt Campbell, so far no figures have come to light from the British side of what numbers they may have reached the redoubt to confirm the figure of only 20 british soldiers.

The map in the J and J redoubt area has to many Troop markings, only one company crossed the waddi to assult the redout no other company followed it. the Sqn of the 11 ALHR was not as shown but where the 4th LH Bde is shown, two troops of B Sqn moved across to attack some MG's who as Gullebt said were going to engage the Camel company, only how would the 11th LHR know or see what the Camel Co was doing as it hid from the Turkish fire in the waddi before launching that assult. There were no orders before this battle for a single company alone to assult the J and J redoubts and only the orders of LtCol Forth sent them at the redoubt who was on the spot.

Mate there is a lot to this battle but I am called away and will have to get back to you.

Cheers

S.B

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Sorry I was called away but to go on.

The two Troops of B Sqn 11 LHR attacked roughly from south to north against the J And J redoubts, not east to west as per that map, there is no record of any intention of suport from the ALH in Camel Corps records, particularly those of the 12th Company.

So this attack happened without the Camels knowing of it. Did Maj Bailey 11 LHR who sent the two Troops see that the camel company had lunched its assult, then comited his two Troops, well yes, thats my reading of the offical history and 11th LHR Regt History.

The 12th Company had or was attacking the 1st Redoubt (Jack) from the waddi and the Two Troops were then sent in to clear some MG's, but did they arrive in time to help the 12th company assult the 2nd redoubt (Jill) which quickly followed the fall of the Jack Redoubt. There was no pause by the camels but an almost continuous action in pushing the Turks and not allowing them to reorganize. This was I think the main reason that the 2nd Redoubt (jill) fell so quickly.

Also how much help were the ALH Troops in there capture, as reports only mention there being seen around the time of the Jill redoubts capture before they were quickly withdrawn by Maj Bailey.

But no dought their attack did split the enemies fire and help disorganize the Turks by being attacked on two fronts.

But post war a number of accounts have gladly mentioned that the Camels and LH men had attacked together almost hand in hand, this is pure romance and don't bear anything like the facts as recorded at the time.

Cheers

S.B

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

G'day mate

I really appreciate the effort that you have put in to give such a lucid andwell researched account. Thats for sharing it.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

No worries I like this battle having done a lot of reseach on it.

The number 600 for Turkish soldiers in the Tank Redoubt given by Gullet is also interesting, this figure I have used before in my first draughts of this battle but how close to the true strenght is it, as I now have discountiued useing it.

Since Gullet didn't know the true figure, he is using either the same approximate as myself or an Intell report of the probible strenght.

If that a Bn had between 4 to 500 men and a MG Co of around 100 + men giving him 600 + men more of less.

But as mentioned how many were in the redoubt and did the Bn commander keep a ready reserve for any counterattack.

Was some part of this Bn in the J and J redoubts?

Was the Bn at full strenght?

I have after some time reduced that figure by two hundred men to around 400 men only because I believe that the commander didn't keep his reserve in the redoubt but in a postion to counterattack either the Tank and J and J Redoubts.

This reserve was committed after the fall of the Tank redoubt as accounts discribe Turkish reserves arriving soon after its capture, and since the reserve had been used at the Tank redoubt there were none for any counterattack at the J and J redoubts after their capture, so the Turkish commander had to wait untill the reinforcemnts from the Turkish Regt in reserve were released and arrived.

This is seen by the late arrival and movment of the Turks against J and J redoubts as mentioned by the 3rd Anzac Bn accounts. And why the Tank redoubt was the main focal point of the Turks effort.

The Camel troops or British command didn't use this captured (J and J redoubts) to out flank the Tank or Atawine Redoubts, instead we still attacked these is fresh head on attacks.

Could the allied cause be served if it was?

Most reports of this battle mention that highter commmand didn't believe that the camel company had in fact captured these redoubts, was that the reason for no reserves being sent to suport them or its use for other actions against the Turks?

Cheers

S.B

[Gerald Moore]

Thanks for sharing the results of your research, gentlemen. I agree that a garrison of 600 would seem to be too large for a redoubt only about two acres in size. As a point of interest, I think a faint remnant of the Tank Redoubt can be discerned in images from Google Earth, just west of the Gaza-Beersheba road, about a mile NW of Netivot. Have you seen any 1917 aerial reconnaisance photos of this position?

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Gerald

G'day mate

Just to add to the moment, the below pic was posted on this site during another discussion.

It gives a great impression as to the lay of the land around Tank Redoubt. Although the human geography has changed a tad, it is difficult to entirely alter the natural geography.

One thing that is very clear is the problem of holding Tank Redoubt on capture. The high ground some 1,000 metres behind the redoubt is sloping ground with a clear view into the redoubt itself. That would have been hell on earth in there after the capture.

Cheers

Bill

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Mates

Earlier on I asked Steve to put on map the action of the camel corps and Nutty on a map. He agreed to do so and subsequently sent a copy to me. The map is below.

I can only take my hat off to you Steve for the extraordinary detail in this map which comes from many hundreds of hours of research. It is breathtaking in scope and detail.

Thanks very much Steve.

Oh and the reason why I am posting it? Steve is a self confessed Luddite who is more comfortable with a pen in his hand than a computer. More power to you mate.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Mates,

The commander of the 3rd Anzac Bn LtCol De Lancey-Forth made some interesting coments about this in his book.

"I have often thought if we had some weight behind us that day we could have rolled up the Turkish left flank. It was not thought at the time the reports I sent in from the hospital was taken as accurate as to the postions we got to and held untill we were ordered to retire."

This makes plain as I said we achived a breakin at the J and J redoubts but due to lack of credit no one acted on this.

Cheers

S.B

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

G'day mate

Just looking at 3rd Anzac Bn LtCol De Lancey-Forth's comment, I am just wondering how he thought that with reinforcements they could have rolled up the left flank? In hindsight, how would you have done it.

I tend to be a bit cynical of the post battle "If only you had ..." comments by commanders. Let me give you examples -

1. At the Nek Reynell told Antill that he knew how to beat the Turks in a charge and begged Antill to send him out with a 5th wave. At Hill 60 he found out that even with great leadership, a poor plan just chews up men.

2. Again, McLauren from the 8th LHR said this about the Rejm el Atawineh episode:

Had a small mounted force, say 2 Troops, been available just at this juncture there is little doubt that none of the enemy would have escaped. At the same time this small force may have run under the fire of the enemy artillery and suffered in consequence.

At first he says exactly the same as De Lancey-Forth about troops rolling up the Turks but in the next breath realises that they probably would have been wiped out as a force.

The day was dead in the water right at the beginning. Even if De Lancey-Forth had been given all the troops he needed, there was no more ammunition for artillery support so I am wondering how they would have achieved the next objective over the landscape in the photograph of Tank Redoubt. And let us assume they achieved their next objective, the fight at Ali Muntar went so badly that they would have had to retire that evening anyway. The bell weather point on the Ali Muntar situation was th diversion of the 125th Regiment from Gaza to Atawineh Redoubt for the 1630 counter attack. If they could spare these men, the order came to divert them much earlier as they were marching which meant the Turks had no fear of being overwhelmed at Ali Muntar. So any gains would have been senseless sacrifices.

Cheers

Bill

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

I think he was saying that his Bn had achived an important victory that because of the lack of reserves came to nought.

He was thinking maybe that if the 3rd and 4th LH Bdes would have been sent to go threw the J and J redoubts area to out flank the Atawine Redoubt and the fresh attack by the 161st Brigade of the 54th Div against the Tank Redoubt around 1400 or 2 PM, should have been directed there also.

But what is plain is that its capture was not planned by highter staff for any follow on, unlike the Tank and Atawine Redoubts while Bdes were in Reserve ready to break threw while the one place they did get that break threw there was no one to use it.

What is interesting about LtCol Forth is that he didn't committ reserves to the J and J redoubts also, the 14th Company remained to the rear as did the 15th NZ Company by all the records I have appears not to have advanced at all or not very far from its start line. The 11th Company remained struck out in the open under fire and the 12th Company hung on to both redoubts with a falling strenght as more and more men fell.

Cheers

S.B

[Robert Dunlop]

there was no more ammunition for artillery support ...

This was the key. It would not have mattered how many troops there were. Without adequate artillery used in the right way, the attack was doomed.

Robert

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

Your right, all Camel Corps records bare that out.

This mainly happened in the afternoon as both Bn Commanders requested suport from the batteries of the 54th Div, who the Camel bde had been attached to.

But no guns suported them and so they could not break up enemy formations gathering to counterattack, including infantry and Field Batteries to suport the Turks.

The guns of the HK and S Baty were now in an AAA role being to light to engage the redoubts and short for range.

The plan on the Camel front was a mess and didn't brood well for any British General the next Camel soldiers meet.

Another General Murray masterpiece.

Cheers

S.B

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Steve

G'day mate

If LtCol De Lancey-Forth is lamenting the fact that he had done something special and not been given the recognition for it, I would have to agree with his plea. It was wrong of the higher ups to have ignored him in the wash up.

However, if he is suggesting that he could have single handedly rolled up the Turkish defences from this point, then I am not sure how he had intended on doing that. Yes there was a gap created in the Turksih defences due to geography. To exploit that was a different matter. At the moment, all the sources indicate that the area around Wadi Sihan and Atawineh Redoubt was well surveyed by Turkish artillery with firing markers located throughout the killing zone. That indicates an intricate plan of defence that has been well thought out on their behalf. In other words, the problems in this area were not accidental but well planned events. There is nothing to indicate that this part of natural geography had not been planned for either which then makes his cry rather moot.

Cheers

Bill

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Mates

Just to let you know, the spin doctors were alive and well in 1917.

Here is the London Times version of the story.

This is part 1, part 2 to follow in next post.

Cheers

Bill

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Mates

Here is the rest of the article.

Commentary to follow in next post.

Cheers

Bill

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Mates

Apart from the "... trenches filled with dead" bravado, the comment "The positions we had to attack on the Gaza front could not not be stonger is the whole country had been built up for defence" says it all. No sensible planning or no intelligence which means that the planning was even more stupid. There is nothing in this report to redeem the behaviour of Dobell or Murray despite the spin.

Cheers

Bill

[Gerald Moore]

Hi Steve;

From reading through some other threads, it seems that you have a copy of the war diary for E Company, Tank Corps, attached EEF. If so, does your copy contain an Appendix No. 1 for November 1917? This appendix is missing from my copy. Thanks for your help,

Gerald

[stevenbecker]

Mate,

I was sent the war diary entries for April 1917 only.

This was from an inquiry from the Tank Museom at Bovington UK.

I was only after details on 2nd Gaza but didn't think to ask about any other times.

I would think you may still be able to send them a message to inquire.

Cheers

S.B

[stevenbecker]

Mates,

If I may explan the mud map I did for Bill show to movement of the Tank "HMLS Nutty".

The Tank formed up in between the 1st Camel Bn and 5th Norfolk Bn at 0730 the force began to advance but after going a few yards the tank ran into a waddi which cut across its front.

The tank had to move down to its right and cross the waddi behind the 1st Camel Bn and then move back to its position in between both Bn's.

This movment atracted the fire of at lest two Turkish batteries who laid down fire on the tank and the 1st Canel Bn during it move back across the front of the Camel Bn to realign its self between both Bn's.

This fire continued all the way up till then tank was seen to be hit and disappeared around 0815 about 300 to 500 yards from the redoubt in a small waddi. The troops, both Camel companies and British Bn's took cover near this waddi and a small sand hill from the fire for over 30 minutes as the surport camel company (3Co) arrived and elements of the 8 Hants Bn also arrived.

Around 0840 the tank was again seen moving towards the redoubt and all men around the hill prepared to advance, about one hundred men is given in accounts charged after the tank and about 50 of those one hundred made the redoubt as the tank made the first trench.

The one hundred men that advenced is from the account of Capt Campbell OC 2nd Camel Company who lead the two Camel companies in that attack, he states that 50 men that made the redoubt were 30 assuies and 20 British soldiers with him but what the true number was can not be known as he never saw what numbers were out of his view.

The tank on reaching the first trench was seen to be hit by three HE shells which broke its track and bust in fire and ditched in that trench. The crew were said to have escaped and they were captured or killed later that day, the commander 2/Lt FC Carr later dieing of wounds in captivity.

Once in the redoubt Capt Campbell began to clear the right side of the redoubt but there is no accounts of how he did this with so few men, but most of the Turks there had withdrawn on the arrival of the Tank and our men in the follow up so most of the front trench would have fallen without a shot. There is no record of any clearing of the left flank, since that is were accounts show British soldiers under a British officer were, he must have cleared that ground but untill an account comes to light only the asussie area is known.

The forces stayed there untill after 1100 when it was clear no suport had arrived to continue the fight and with many wounded and no ammo it was time to retire. Capt Campbell states he gave the order to retire and it was passed to the British and the aussies retired to the east two wards the 4th Camel company not to the rear, the way they had come because of the fire.

What the British did is not recorded but may have retired to the rear in a different direction then the aussies.

The problem is there still remained many men in the redoubt who continued to fight, these included Lt Roberts 8 Hants and about 11 aussie soldiers most wounded and Lt Fender 1st Camel Bn. These men held on till they were over run around 1400.

There are no accounts of any other British soldiers holding on till that time but must have included many not recorded.

Thats the sad story, I am still to confirm where the Tank did brench the front trench, the area I believed was in the left part of the redoubt shown in Gullets Offical history but again I am open to other views.

I am particarly after acounts by British soldiers on this battle to flesh out some of their story. The 8 Hants needs some sorting out as it was in suport of the 5th Norfolks but many of its men ended up in the redoubt when I can find no one sending them there. I belive this maybe because ots commander was killed.

Cheers

S.B