Townshend and Kut

[withcall]

You're probably aware of it, but there's a good book by Liman von Sanders, who was a kind of German 'minder' to the Turkish army. I read it (in translation) years ago, but I don't know if it's still in print. I am sure someone will advise in greater detail.

[bob lembke]

You're probably aware of it, but there's a good book by Liman von Sanders, who was a kind of German 'minder' to the Turkish army. I read it (in translation) years ago, but I don't know if it's still in print. I am sure someone will advise in greater detail.

Thanks for the lead. He was actually the commander of the Turkish Army at Gallipoli. The book has probably (at least in German) been out of print for 70 years. I read it a couple of years ago; I can't remember if in English or in German, probably the latter.

However, thanks again. I have also read Kannengeisser, which was quite interesting. (He was, if memory serves, a divisional commander at Gallipoli.)

Bob Lembke

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Bob

G'day mate

I then, inpolitically, mentioned that I have seen a number of accounts of Aussies also treating Turkish and German POWs badly in the Middle East theatre of operations. It probably was an unneccessary comment (although my actual observation). Again, I appologize if I have offended anyone. I really like the Turks (my father loved and really respected them), I have visited there three times recently, and I guess I was being protective or something, reacting to a charge that was not actually clearly uttered.

I am not quite sure to whom you addressed this comment. If you thought I was offended or something - not in the least. We are all old enough to understand that no field force in history is perfect in their behaviour. Some Australians could be as callous with their treatment of the wounded or POW's as anyone else. Others could show great compassion. In the main, most people accept the humanity of their opponents and treat them accordingly.

That being said, there are many entertaining stories about Turkish POW's told by Australians - not officially - but in their diaries. Here is one from Rouget of the 13th ALHR:

"We have to take our turn guarding the Turkish prisoners at Mahdi it is a bit of a change for us but plenty of polishing to do we take them out to work in the mornings and evening and their work was extending their own prison one morning 9 men escorting over 1000 to their work without a cartridge in their rifle someone forgot to see that we were loaded before we started we soon got over that one man sneaking away at a time and loading so as not to let the Turks know that we had not loaded before we started."

Apart from the obvious comedy of the empty guns - the fact that the Australians felt that they could safely escort over a 1,000 Turkish POWs with 9 guards. It should be realised that there was a great deal of sympathy for the Turks within the local Egyptian community so if they felt like escaping, they could with almost impunity. The fact that they didn't and more expecially that they didn't attempt to overwhelm their guards speaks volumes about mutual respect and treatment. This mutual respect was also reflected in 1918 at Ziza where the Turkish POWs retained their weapons and intermingled with their captors to such an extent that they shared their meals around the campfire.

I suppose what I am saying is that while there were examples of Australians mistreating Turkish prisoners - there were more than a few court martials on this account - and that in Damascus, through sheer neglect by the AIF, Turks died in great numbers of cholera, I would not accept mistreatment as a generalisation.

Cheers

Bill

[Geoff S]

Bill Woerlee said:

and that in Damascus, through sheer neglect by the AIF, Turks died in great numbers of cholera

Bill

Gidday Bill,

Stuck my head out of the bunker with a quick Q for u mate

I agree with the general sentiment reflected in your post , but I am not sure about the cholera bit. I think the AIF was not in a very healthy postion by the time in reach Damascus (as I am sure you were probably aware)- So many of it's own men were suffering from severe illness that required significant attention from it's own medical corps. What more could the AIF have done to assist the Turks suffering from cholera? I am guessing that you must have read of a particular event involving the AIF to have made this kind of motherhood statement.

With this in mind could you please elaborate on what you mean by your quote when u get some time. And please quote your source documents.

Bob the issue of the treatment of POW by the Turks has been briefly discussed in the past on this forum. Here is the link...you might find of interest

Cheers

Geoff S

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Geoff

G'day mate

So this thread is not hijacked, could you start a new thread with the very same question. No probs with answering you in all aspects - you probably already knew that.

Cheers

Bill

[wig]

Did you see "Passionate about Churches" on BBC last night. Very nice old Norfork Church with memorial to Townsend of Kut.

wig

[bob lembke]

"We have to take our turn guarding the Turkish prisoners at Mahdi it is a bit of a change for us but plenty of polishing to do we take them out to work in the mornings and evening and their work was extending their own prison one morning 9 men escorting over 1000 to their work without a cartridge in their rifle someone forgot to see that we were loaded before we started we soon got over that one man sneaking away at a time and loading so as not to let the Turks know that we had not loaded before we started."

Apart from the obvious comedy of the empty guns - the fact that the Australians felt that they could safely escort over a 1,000 Turkish POWs with 9 guards. It should be realised that there was a great deal of sympathy for the Turks within the local Egyptian community so if they felt like escaping, they could with almost impunity. The fact that they didn't and more expecially that they didn't attempt to overwhelm their guards speaks volumes about mutual respect and treatment. This mutual respect was also reflected in 1918 at Ziza where the Turkish POWs retained their weapons and intermingled with their captors to such an extent that they shared their meals around the campfire.

Cheers

Bill

Hi, Bill;

After my father's school closed and he was taken into the army in 1915 my father worked on a Rittergut (noble estate) to replace men at the front. They had a lot or Russian POWs, and one old Landsturm man to guard them. He had an old (probably Model 1871) probably single shot rifle, and as he was old, the rifle was large and heavy, and there were lots of Russians, so one of the POWs was detailed to carry his rifle for him.

When the war was over the Russians were sent home, and then, say six months later, one by one, many of the Russians showed up again. They had never lived as well as when they were in German captivity (they slept between white sheets, which they had not even ever seen), and they had walked perhaps 1000 miles to return to the farm and ask to be taken in again, to work on the farm again.

Bob Lembke

[PMHart]

The thing that really irks me about the revisionist argument is that the inescapable logic of their case is that no-one is ever to blame, ever, ever. There's always an excuse. OK, so attributing blame doesn't bring one soldier back to life or regain one lost mile of ground, but it seems plain daft to elevate the Great War above any other human endeavour and decree that no-one above the rank of Colonel can ever be wrong. Fine, being wrong doesn't make someone a villain. Everyone (outside of WWI Staff) makes mistakes, and at some point everyone, in real life, should be accountable.

Hi,

Why don't you let the revisionists argue for themselves instead of asserting blindly what they may or may not be thinking! Try and carry your own arguments forward without the expression of blind prejudice and irrational hatreds! (My editor told me that but I've never managed it!)

So Terraine, Sheffield, Pryor and WIlson etc etc have never criticised Haig or any other senior Western Front officer! Jesus wept have you ever even looked at any of their books? First and foremost they are an attempt to explain what was really happening, why so many things went wrong, how difficult it was to fight against the enormously powerful German Army that itself was constantly improving its tactics. There is an acceptance that generals made mistakes, but a reasoned attempt is made to see why they made them and, more imortantly, whether they learnt anything from them. They certainly point the finger of blame when justified far more effectively than a lot of aimless ranting and noises off!

Your post is just utter twaddle and I really do hope you accept full responsibility for it!

Pete

[Trevelyan]

I'll take the bait!

As I understand it, the cloud over Townsend's reputation to this day is as a result of his behaviour in Turkish captivity rather than his Generalship in the field. His behaviour while under seige was also somewhat controvercial, but in my opinion largely defendable given the circumstances.

Up to the retreat to Kut, while in command of the 6th Division, Townsend proved to be confident, aggressive, bold, professional, and creative; winning fight after fight against considerable odds. If Townsend was relieved at Kut, and continued on with even a fraction of the skill he showed as a field commander prior to the seige, he would have gone down in history as one of the greatest generals the British had during the Great War, perhaps even in modern history.

How's that!

Take Care,

Christopher

[withcall]

Sounds good to me - it's nice to have a reply from someone civilised and well-mannered!!

[egbert]

 

 

[armourersergeant]

I wonder if much of Townshends reputation as a donkey comes from not his ability to habdle troops and certainly not his own bravery but from the way he lived in captive comfort while his men died in misery?

regards

Arm

[withcall]

How accurate are these casualty figures for the Kut campaign(includes actual siege plus relief attempts)?

Empire troops: 23,000 casualties from 30,000 combatants. Ottoman troops: 10,000 casualties from 50,000 combatants. (source:-Wilkpedia)

[BMoorhouse]

I wonder if much of Townshends reputation as a donkey comes from not his ability to habdle troops and certainly not his own bravery but from the way he lived in captive comfort while his men died in misery?

I have yet to see any real evidence that he was aware of the treatment of the POWs from his division. As I understand it the only 'evidence' that he should have been aware of the 'death march' that followed the capture of the Kut garrison was the opinion of one Turkish officer who says that the officer's party on the boat came near to some of the soldier prisoners after their march and would have been aware of their pitiful condition.

While I do not propose to suggest that IF Townshend had been aware of the state of his men that he should have tried to do something about it, but... how many officers that were captured in WW1 (by any side) were in a position to check on the welfare of the soldiers that had previously been under their command, let alone change their conditions?

It is my opinion that Townshend - once isolated in captivity - became a perfect scapegoat for the senior officers and politicians that should have shouldered their share of the blame for what had happened.

It is interesting that Townshend was very popular amongst the men that he led, even in the accounts of those written after the war.

I would welcome anyone to point to accounts/real evidence (as opposed to comment by authors) that shows that Townshend was aware of what was happening to his men. (I for instance have seen a report by a British doctor who visited some of the POW camps and found the men to be in reasonable health - which clearly was not universally true given the very high mortality rate - but if that is what Townshend was told, then how would he be expected to know any different?)

Regards,

Brendon.

[ericwebb]

Of some interest: Dr. Mark Harrison of the Wellcome Insitute for the History of Medicine is currently working on a medical history of the 'Mespot' campaign. He gives a good talk on this, as recently at the Spring Day School at the University of Birmingham.

No revisionist! He fully acknowledges what a colossal mess it was. However I think he might have half a kind word to say for Townshend. He is certainly highly critical of the higher chain of command.

I have a nice little book - can't lay my hand on it for a moment - by a medic. who was involved at the latter [more succesful] end of events, complete with some nice reproductions of his original water colours. I'll see if I can post 1 or 2 up.

[Ron]

Of some interest: Dr. Mark Harrison of the Wellcome Insitute for the History of Medicine is currently working on a medical history of the 'Mespot' campaign. He gives a good talk on this, as recently at the Spring Day School at the University of Birmingham.

No revisionist! He fully acknowledges what a colossal mess it was. However I think he might have half a kind word to say for Townshend. He is certainly highly critical of the higher chain of command.

I have a nice little book - can't lay my hand on it for a moment - by a medic. who was involved at the latter [more succesful] end of events, complete with some nice reproductions of his original water colours. I'll see if I can post 1 or 2 up.

Battles on the Tigris: The Mesopotamian Campaign of the First World War ~ Ron Wilcox -- (Hardcover - April 20, 2006)

Just published

Ron

[droberts]

I have recently aquired General Townshends Book " My Campaign in Mesopotamia. It is a mine of information of the actions and units involved in the tigris advance and retreat to Kut. It mentions many officers by name and has useful appendices showing the sequence of use of troops during the different actions.

Most interesting was the use of aircraft which gave good intelligence on the turkish positions.

I am willing to check this for anyone seeking specific information. I dont know if this is a common book. its about 2" thick.

regards

david

[bob lembke]

I was just researching very different material, and came across a reference written by a German Jaeger entrailed from Istanbul to Alleppo in Syria in 1917. At the Taurus mountain range, over 1000 meters altitude, (and also at the somewhat lower Amanus mountains) he found a great number of men of every description working on the completion of the railroad over these high passes. Some of them were Brits taken prisoner at Kut El Amara.

The reference is Rehbein, Arthur ; Ehrenbuch der gruenen Farbe , Schulz u. Pasche, Berlin (Verlag "Deutscher Jaegerbund", Berlin SW 14), 1926. The specific article was: "Aus dem Tagebuch des Reserve=Jaeger=Bataillons Nr. 11 - Durch Asien zur Kriegszeit 1917" ("Out of the Diary of the Reserve Jaeger Battalion Nr. 11 - Through Asia War-time 1917") . The author of the article was von Menges, the specific sub-article is on pages 398-401.

This is not of narrow interest to me, but I thought that someone might be working on tracking down the history of these prisoners from Kut, and that this was a source that one would not think of looking in. It is a large-format book of over 600 pages containing many articles on the experiences of Jaeger ("hunter" or "riflemen" units) units in WW I.

Bob Lembke

[erickson]

For the latest revisionist thinking on Townshend and Kut --- see Edward J. Erickson, Ottoman Army Effectiveness in WW1, A Comparative Study (London & NY: Routledge, 2007).

The books presents four case studies of: Gallipoli (early phases), Kut, Gaza-Beersheba, and Megiddo.

It basically tries to address what the Turks did right and why their army was still on its feet and fighting in October 1918.

Someone was also interested in Ottoman storm troops? The books also contains (for the first time in the west), details of the origins, structure, training, and employment of Ottoman hucum taburlari.

Best regards, Ed

[bob lembke]

Ed;

I just called my wife to see if her library could obtain your book, and she said "of course", but when I gave her the citation she said that they almost certainly have it or will automatically obtain it under a comprehensive approval plan for such materials. If not, we can engineer it. I am sure that there is nothing like it, in English, at least.

Step two of this self-serving manuver is my wife's delicious faculty 13 month loan status, with unlimited renewal. However, I try to have things out for reasonable periods for people who browse the stacks but do not work the catalog.

Bob Lembke

[erickson]

Bob -- If can get a hold of it, I'd appreciate your comments! Ed

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Ed and Bob

G'day mates

Without wishing to poach interested people, but a group of us from Turkey, Britatin, the US and Australia have been putting our collective heads together and working through the issues raised by you Ed although not as a consequence of your work but it seems we are all going in the same direction. Perhaps you both might feel comfortable enough to contribute your expertise to the discussions.

The dedicated site is at:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewforum.php...4f632edc666eead

This is strictly a discussion board on the last days of the Ottoman empire. The heading of the board is:

"The end of the Ottoman Empire 1908-1923"

We would like to see you there mates.

Cheers

Bill

[3rdID]

I felt Ronald Millar was pretty fair to Townshend in his book Death of an Army: The Siege of Kut 1915-1916. There were a lot more battles during that campaign than I realized.

[Neil Clark]

I would urge any one with an interest in Kut to go and have a look at Google Earth...

This area has been very clearly mapped out.... It's interesting to compare old sketches with the data on Google earth...

Neil

[mick_ryan]

Having just come across this thread, I am truly amazed at some of the comments.

OVer the years, I have tried to specialize in the actions and events leading up to and including the loss of Kut Garrison. I have read extensive reports from other ranks through to Townsend himself.

To state that his real mistake was not retreating from Kut, further South to Basra belies the fact that the men would not have made it, in the state they found themselves directly after Ctesiphon. They were severely mauled, and were very lucky to make it intact to Kut, let alone Basra, with the Turks in full pursuit.

Townsend, on balance performed admirably in the Defence, as he did in Chitral, years before. If we are arguing fault, perhaps his, and others misreading of the true position of the aftermath of Ctesiphon, and had he seized the very small window of oppurtunity there, MAYBE, Kut would have been avoided.

Indeed, there has been no comment as to the plainly incorrect information fed to Townsend on the relief efforts. To last as long as the Garrison did is a very remarkable thing. The first information to reach him was that relief was to be expected in December !!.

His actions whilst a POW are to be questioned, rightly, but as are most other officers accounts, when compared and contrasted with the plight of the other ranks.

Mick