TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[Crunchy]

Bill,

Thanks for that information and I take your point that it confirms none of the 27th Regiment's machine guns were captured that day. I think we all agree that maxim guns were in action at Anzac later in the morning. According to the same commander the machine gun company attached to the 27th Regiment was with the 1st and 3rd Battalions at Maidos on the morning of the 25th April and followed the 3rd Battalion in the march to the Anzac area. (See post # 70 above). Apparently it came into action on Third Ridge around 0830 - 0900.

The issue I'm still not sure about is whether maxims were in action against the initial landing at the Cove early that morning, although I am increasingly inclined to think there were none. If maxims were employed against the initial landing, where did they come from? It appears certain the 27th Regiment did not deploy their guns as part of the coastal defences and it seems unlikely that maxim guns from another unit would have been attached to the 2nd Battalion. We know Nordenfelt guns, which have a high rate of fire, were at Kapa Tepe and were in a position to engage the right flank of the initial assault, albeit at very long range (about 2500 yards or perhaps even a little more).

Cheers

Chris

[Bryn]

Thanks Bill,

"Unfortunately that article is printed in Ottoman Script which unless there is a translated version, will remain hidden. In 1928 the Turks began to use the Latin alphabet.

But despair not."

I've followed the discussion over on the Axis forum as well. I don't despair. The fact that a copy of this article is not to hand right now in no way makes it something that can just be disregarded. The British official historian knew of it - it's not necessary to produce the original for that to remain true. In other words I don't feel that it's invalidated merely because we can't check that Aspinall-Oglander was telling the truth. I'll assume he was telling the truth and if the article turns up and proves otherwise, will change my opinion then.

I'll also continue to assume that those officers at Anzac who reported machine-gun fire from the direction of Fisherman's Hut knew what they were talking about. I don't intend to dismiss anybody's experience of battle conditions, but that also includes theirs. The fact that one person, in one situation is or is not able to distinguish MG fire from rifle fire in no way translates to every person in every situation; it does not prove a rule either way. I have never read any account of the Landing in which it was claimed there was such a 'wall of noise' that individual sounds could not be distinguished. The only instance I know of this being reported at Anzac was during the 3rd LH Brigade's attack at The Nek on 7 August. If it had been the case during the Landing it would have been commented on.

[green_acorn]

Gentleman,

I hve just acquired a copy of the Handbook of the Turkish Army 1916 complied by Intelligence Section Cairo, the base document was the Fifth handbook produced by the General Staff War Office in 1912. Though it is a document that post dates the period in question, it would not be significantly different, only having line, text and section amendments as reports were collated and analysed. Having said that unfortnately without the originals it is hard to identify specific amendments, though there is a tendency to use footnotes updating the book.

Anyway and most importantly, it describes TWO different machine gun companies and the information appears to have been written pre-war:

Machine Gun Companies- At present nearly all regiments have machine gun companies. The number of machine guns to the company varies greatly.

The peace establishment of a machine gun company is :-

Hotchkiss 52 all ranks, 3 pack animals per gun, plus one spare animal per company. Therefore 4 Hotchkiss MG's.

Maxim 61 all ranks, 3 pack animals per gun, plus one spare animal per gun. Therefore 4 Maxim MG's.

The war establishment is:-

Hotchkiss 123 all ranks

Maxim 160 all ranks

The significant increase in manpower relates to the addition of an ammunition section (column).

I also note from the establishments that there are only two LT/2LT, 2 SGT, two buglers and most importantly two Range Taker Corporals per company, one would assume it was Turkish doctrine to employ the MG's in pairs/two MG's in close proximity wherever possible. Which in employment terms makes sense as fire could then be managed by the LT/2LT to keep MG fire constant, when one gun was being repaired or serviced.

Unfortunately the handbook does not state what model MG's the Turkish Army was equipped with, but for the Hotchkiss one assumes the Mle 1897, Mle 1900 or Mle 1908, not the 1914.

Unfortunately the Handbook doesn't have examples of the Turkish military symbols.

I realise that this doesn't answer the question of disposition on the 25th of April, but it partly answers the original question and adds the Hotchkiss machine guns to the equation.

cheers,

Chris H

[Peter Doyle]

Thanks for the information about the article, Bill, and for this continuing thread!

Peter

[Crunchy]

Bryn,

If I can clarify a few issues from my perspective for your consideration.

I have never suggested that there was a "wall of fire" at the Landing comparable to that faced by the 3rd Light Horse Brigade at the Nek. That is something you have assumed. The points I was making were, firstly, that the ability to distinguish between machine gun and rapid rifle fire when a lot of troops are firing is not as easy as some people assume it to be, especially when the firers are some considerable distance away. Nor does it have to be a "wall of fire" before the difficulty in distinguishing sets in. Secondly, it is common for people under fire to assume that a machine gun is firing at them in such situations, so I agree with you that a good number of men believed they heard machine guns around the beaches. Thirdly, the Australian commanders at the Landing, let alone the troops, were not as experienced at that time, as you assume they were. The senior officers may have had many years as part time soldiers and built up a level of experience in some fields, but that does not make them experienced commanders able to accurately determine the weapons firing at them in all situations. We don't know whether or not those who served in South Africa were exposed to any large amounts of fire, although Clark's record suggests not.

If I am correct in interpreting what you are saying, I think our relative positions are: you believe that because a number of people, including some senior officers, heard a machine gun firing from the area of the Fisherman's Hut not all of them could be wrong and, therefore, a machine gun must have been there. My position is that these are pieces of evidence that certainly have to be considered. However, none of these men were infallible and they may have been mistaken in their assumption for reasons I have given previously. One has to consider all of the available information, the characteristics of the weapons, the doctrine employed at the time and what LTCOL Burne called Inherent Military Probability (IMP).

IMP would suggest that the Fisherman's Hut was a very suitable place for machine guns to be employed to cover the beaches either side of the position. It also suggests that the Fisherman's Hut and its environs made it an unlikely, although not improbable, area for a landing due to the very difficult terrain that would be encountered inland from the beach and to the north of the main range. Indeed the general dispositions of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment covering the area suggests the Turks believed the same thing. Given the scarcity of maxim guns available to the Turks, IMP suggests that other areas would have had a higher priority for their employment. Could a rifle platoon of between 50 and 90 men (the latter figure being Lt İbradılı Ibrahim's number) armed only with rifles provide the level of destruction inflicted on the three boats Bean says landed in the area - they certainly could.

The reason I haven't come down firmly on the side of no machine guns being there is that there is no conclusive evidence either way. I don't regard Clark's or the other's assumptions as conclusive evidence that machine guns were at the Fisherman's Hut or in the area north of the Cove; nor is Lt İbradılı Ibrahim's account conclusive evidence that there were no machine guns there. Nonetheless, while I still have an open mind on the issue, considering all of the information currently available to us the balance is tipping towards no machine guns and that those who say they heard them may have been mistaken in their assumption. There is general agreement that those who say they faced machine guns in the Cove (and accounts use the plural) were incorrect in their assumptions, so why could the same not apply to those who "heard" machine guns from a significantly greater distance away? Rafferty who was sent by Clark to silence the said gun and who reached an area just short of the enemy entrenched at what became the Old No 1 Outpost, made no mention of one in the area he traversed. I feel sure if he had seen, heard, encountered or captured one during his advance along the beach or in the area of the Fisherman's Hut he would have mentioned it and Bean would have included it in his detailed account of the Rafferty/Strickland foray. My reason being that the closer one gets to a machine gun the more obvious it becomes.

The final question I have is - if the machine gun company of the 27th Regiment was in reserve at Maidos, what organisation provided the machine gun (or guns) at the Fisherman's Hut? Can you suggest an answer that we may have overlooked?

Regards

Chris

[green_acorn]

Gentleman,

Further to my last, the War Establishment of a Turkish infantry company was two hundred and sixty five officers and men, the PE was 123, given events of March it would be logical that the companies at Gallipoli in April were at their full WE. The Feb 1916 Handbook has a footnote to the WE figure stating "At the Dardanelles efforts have been made, as far as can be judged from captured documents, to keep up the company strength at from 200 to 250. In the Caucasus and elsewhere they have not been so particular."

In listing the manpower of the company in Peace and War, there was 1 Captain, 1 LT and two 2LT, the table describes NCO numbers and the soldier specialist functions in detail for peace, then lists for peace 90 more men and for war 216 men. Which probably gave each company three platoons of junior 1 offr, 1 SGT, 6 CPL and 72 men at the time of the landing.

cheers,

Chris H

[Bryn]

Yes Chris, I can suggest an answer that nobody else seems to want to consider - maybe the Turkish record is inaccurate. Let's face it. If there were MGs at Fisherman's Hut and V Beach, and the records say there weren't, then the inescapable conclusion is that the records are wrong.

I have not 'assumed' there was a 'wall of noise' theory being put forward here. If someone suggests that rifles and MGs were always firing together, such that neither could be distinguished from the other, that's what I'd term a 'wall of noise' no matter what terminology is being used.

I note that you wrote: "Rafferty who was sent by Clark to silence the said gun and who reached an area just short of the enemy entrenched at what became the Old No 1 Outpost, made no mention of one in the area he traversed." What account by Rafferty is this based on?

Bean states that there "... appeared to be two machine guns and many rifles at work" as the 7th Battalion came in, while Rafferty and Strickland were approaching along the land.

I have fired, and been in the target butts while others fired in my direction (as well as while on exercises using blanks), the .303, the SLR, the Bren LMG, and the GPMG M-60. I have fired a Browning 9mm, an F1 sub-machine gun and an M-72 grenade launcher. And I was only in the Army Cadets and Reserve Army. To suggest that a Lieutenant-Colonel of 35 years' service, rising through the ranks from Private, and including service in the Boer War, would not have heard weapons fired at some time during those years, seems to me to require a major suspension of disbelief.

[green_acorn]

Bean states that there "... appeared to be two machine guns and many rifles at work" as the 7th Battalion came in, while Rafferty and Strickland were approaching along the land.

I have fired, and been in the target butts while others fired in my direction (as well as while on exercises using blanks), the .303, the SLR, the Bren LMG, and the GPMG M-60. I have fired a Browning 9mm, an F1 sub-machine gun and an M-72 grenade launcher. And I was only in the Army Cadets and Reserve Army. To suggest that a Lieutenant-Colonel of 35 years' service, rising through the ranks from Private, and including service in the Boer War, would not have heard weapons fired at some time during those years, seems to me to require a major suspension of disbelief.

Bryn,

The problem in the texts like Bean, is the term "appeared", that does not say that there were MG's, rather that the fire being received and "probably" the sounds made those receiving it believe there were MG's. In Bean's case it is an (excellent) interpretation of events on a day when much was confused, written and published well after the event.

I won't comment on your experience, yours, mine and Chris's different experience of fire is not the point, the evidence is the only thing we as amateur or for some, professional, historians can look at and then interpret to fill in the gaps. Confirmed reporting, collated against other evidence from the British side (ideally in the ops log, int log, war diary), or the operational orders and documents from the Turkish side are really the only truly valid evidences, personal diaries written often after the event (days later) or recollections can be tested against the more formal and authoritative evidence and can have their validity confirmed but you wouldn't trust them by themselves. And that is not implying that the writer is trying to be anything but truthful, just the vagaries of memory, particularly when it is merged with the opinions and competing interests of others.

May I suggest the only valid start point from the British side is the Turkish Army Handbook I wrote about, as it (in previous editions to the one I have) was the sum of knowledge available to the Landing Force and it states each Regiment had a MG company with different numbers of Hotchkiss or Maxim MG's, but interpreting that information identifies that a Regt could only have a maximum of four MG's. Now from the Turkish viewpoint, operational orders, I believe, say that the 27th Regt MG Coy was held in reserve. That in itself is sensible, if you can't confirm exactly where the enemy is going to land you would want the MG's held ready for despatch to the most critical and useful site after the landing.

Which brings me to another observation, it would be reasonable to assume that the Regt Comd, his MG Coy Comd and Bn Comd's had well and truly surveyed the prospective battlefield and decided on various options for the employment of the MG's. In which case they would have decided on primary and secondary positions for the MG's at each likely landing zone and the MG Coy would have prepared those sites (dug the weapon pits), guides would have been made familiar with the route to each MG's position and liaison maintained with the local Infantry Company Comd's.

The unknowns are the time the MG's were released by the Regt Comd and how that directly relates to British (including 1 Div and the A&NZ Div) deployments and actions and most importantly where the MG's subsequently deployed to. In the case of ANZAC Cove, I would suspect that they were released some time during the landing of the second wave, which means they still would have taken some time to get to their positions (about an hour?). Where those MG positions were who knows!

cheers,

Chris H

[Crunchy]

To suggest that a Lieutenant-Colonel of 35 years' service, rising through the ranks from Private, and including service in the Boer War, would not have heard weapons fired at some time during those years, seems to me to require a major suspension of disbelief.

Bryn,

With respect, I have never suggested that and you know it. In relation to Clark I stated in post 94 above. "Given his experience he would have known the difference between a machine gun and a rifle firing in a light action but I doubt he would have been able to distinguish between them if the fire they were receiving, at a range of 900 to 1100 yards, was as heavy as is reported." So please, let's not stoop to misrepresenting what I actually said.

If you feel your experience gained on the rifle range and on exercises gives one the ability to identify any weapon under the majority of battlefield conditions that's fine by me. I don't intend getting into a p***ing competition so let's accept we have differing experiences and views on the matter.

The comment on Rafferty is based on Bean's account which I previously mentioned at post #98. You missed the point which was about Rafferty's lack of comment on machine guns in the area having been sent to silence them, and if Rafferty had mentioned machine guns I feel sure Bean would have recorded it. Nonetheless on your point, Bean actually wrote "Jacksons own boats were not advancing into shrapnel fire but into rifle fire. They saw it cutting the water ahead. There appeared to be two machine guns and many rifles at work. After what seemed an endless time in approaching it, they gradually rowed into the field of fire. " Not there were two machine guns but there appeared to be two machine guns. Again an assumption rather than an actual sighting. Nor did this particular passage or section of the chapter relate to Rafferty or Strickland or even mention them.

Maybe the Turkish accounts are incorrect on the subject and the Australian accounts are infallible. But that is the sole basis of your argument at the moment.

It seems you have made up your mind on the subject and you may well be correct. I'll still keep an open mind, albeit leaning towards the opposite view.

Thanks for the discussion.

Chris

[Crunchy]

I hve just acquired a copy of the Handbook of the Turkish Army 1916 complied by Intelligence Section Cairo, the base document was the Fifth handbook produced by the General Staff War Office in 1912.

Anyway and most importantly, it describes TWO different machine gun companies and the information appears to have been written pre-war:

Machine Gun Companies- At present nearly all regiments have machine gun companies. The number of machine guns to the company varies greatly.

Chris H

Thanks for this information. My original reply to it appears to have gone missing in action.

I had asked why you thought the 1916 pamphlet appeared to have been written pre-war. I also mentioned that the pamphlet showed that in 1916, some nine months after the landings, not all regiments had machine guns companies and thus, as another source, it also demonstrated the scarcity of machine guns in the Turkish army even at that date, assuming it had been updated to correct as at 1916.

I note in your reply to Bryn that you say" it states each Regiment had a MG company". This appears to be in conflict with the statement in your original post that "At present nearly all regiments have machine gun companies.". which infers that not all Regiments did have machine gun companies at that date. Can you please clarify the situation?

The Handbook as per your initial post tends to confirm the view expressed in Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War by Edward J Erickson. Erickson based his history on research of extensive Turkish sources. What emerges throughout the initial chapters of the book is the relative unpreparedness of the Ottomans for a modern war, particularly the shortage of machine guns, artillery and artillery ammunition. The following quotes addresses the shortages: In discussing the situation just prior to the outbreak of war p7 In material terms, the army was ill-equipped to fight a modern war. p 8 Overall the Army needed two hundred and eighty field artillery pieces to bring itself up to war establishment. … The machine gun situation was much worse. Each Turkish Infantry Regiment was authorized four machine guns. Some regiments were short and the army needed two hundred to equip the regiment force to standard. At battalion and company level, there were simply no machine guns and the army estimated that it needed several thousand more to fill all requirements. ..

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

The unknowns are the time the MG's were released by the Regt Comd and how that directly relates to British (including 1 Div and the A&NZ Div) deployments and actions and most importantly where the MG's subsequently deployed to. In the case of ANZAC Cove, I would suspect that they were released some time during the landing of the second wave, which means they still would have taken some time to get to their positions (about an hour?). Where those MG positions were who knows!

Chris,

The available Turkish sources (based on the account of the 27th Regiment Commander) say the MG company of the 27th Regiment departed Maidos third in the order of march, following the 3rd Battalion, and arrived in the area of Third Ridge around 0830 hours on the 25th April.

regards

Chris

[Chris Henschke]

I thought I would join the ping-pong match.

I know that this has been partly mentioned before but there is a copy of a document (IWM) in the AWM I have been meaning to look at for some time. Crunchy has probably already looked at it in detail. It appears to have been reprinted in later publications but the original is always worth checking, especially as it is quite big.

The Dardanelles [manuscript] : the Ariburnu battles and 27 Regiment written by the CO, Sefik Aker in 1935. 100 pages.

940.4259 C224 no. 40

Another document worth checking in the AWM is a 1: 100 000 map showing Turkish dispositions, April 25th 1915. G7432.G1 S65 XXVI.9.

Chris Henschke

PS I apologise if this information has not been overlooked by everyone concerned.

[michaeldr]

I would like to second Chris H's recommendation of the Handbook of the Turkish Army 1916.

It is authoritative and presents an (I hesitate to use the word unique) example of agreement here

Appendix VII, page 219 agrees with Crunchy & Bill S. in that the 9th Division did not have the full establishment of three machine gun companies (or one per regiment) but rather it had only two.

Nevertheless our problems remain: where were those companies deployed on the morning of the 25th April 1915?

And what alternatives were deployed in the field by the Ottoman forces which could account for the allied reports of machine guns?

The presence of Nordenfelts and the Pom-Poms are again something that is agreed upon by both sides. They appear with the 9th Division in the Organization Chart; Note, not under infantry but rather along side their artillery. One was captured at Helles and is on display. The German officer, Prigge, refers to them being with the Ottoman forces in the Gaba Tepe area.

I disagree with Bill W, and I think that these guns make quite good sense. Yes, they are cumbersome and no, they are not mobile, but for defensive positions meeting an amphibious landing force they would (and did) serve very well. Meanwhile one kept one's 'modern' machine gun companies in reserve and awaited confirmation of exactly where the enemy had landed in force, before ordering them hither.

What muddies the water more than a little is the confused nature of the historical record. I would like to think that every time a Nordenfelt is referred to it is indicating a 25mm. But my guess is that because of the changes in the company name we are coming across references to 37mm Pom-Poms under that name too. Not to mention so called 'old style maxims' which could mean several different things.

regards

Michael

[green_acorn]

Chris,

Thank you for identifying the errors I made in my post #183, you are correct in identifying that the Handbook states that nearly all Regiments had MG's, not that they all had MG's an important error! I have not read the thread since your post, but left my part finished reply, so I will continue and catch up.

With regards to the Handbook's provenance, it states on the inside cover of the reproduction (from Battery Press), in the original text and font:

The original frame of this Handbook was the 5th Edition of the Turkish Army Handbook prepared by the General taff War Office, London, in 1912.

Many of the changes made in Army Legislation, etc., since, and consequent on the mobilization of 1914, were embodied in the Cairo Edition of 1915 by Mr. Philip Graves.

1st Cairo Edition ... January 1915.

2nd Cairo Edition ... March 1915.

3rd Cairo Edition ... April 1915.

4th Cairo Edition ... June 1915.

5th Cairo Edition ... August 1915.

6th Cairo Edition ... October 1915.

7th Cairo Edition ... December 1915.

8th Cairo Edition ... February 1916.

The cover describes the Handbook as being the Eighth Provisional Edition. February 1916. Intelligence Section, Cairo. Handbook revised to Feb. 10, 1916. "Ordre de Bataille" revised to Feb. 10, 1916.

In interpreting the Handbook as having elements of text that may be from the original 1912 document, I am reliant on some experience of trying to keep a complex document like this up to date in the pre computer era and the original flyleaf description to the reader of the time, that it is based on the "frame" of the 1912 War Office Handbook. Chapter 2 Central Administration also has the year 1912 in brackets, it appears to be the only chapter (6 pages) which has not had quite a lot of amendment, though it does have a footnote added about the return of von der Goltz to Turkey.

I have only had it one day and am madly skimming it, dwelling at points of interest to this discussion. But it has been written as a "living document" in that Mr Graves has made additions to it, describing agent reports and so forth. Where he has made additions he has written in the present tense and occasionally included the date.

In my comment to Bryn that documents like this that should be the start point for these sort of conversations, I make it from the point of view that it is the sum of intelligence (collated and integrated information, interpreted against previously collected information on the enemy) available to the commander planning the operation. And the information is sparse. But it is the skeleton or frame to build from.

As to the strength of forces, it does discuss how the Dardanelles was a priority over places such as Syria and The Yemen. I would assume therefore that in the statement "At present nearly all Regiments have machine gun companies. The number of machine guns varies greatly." the machine gun companies at the Dardanelles would have been at, or very near, full war strength with the full complement of machine guns.

For Chris Henschke,

Thank you for the references to the maps at the AWM.

cheers,

Chris H

[Bryn]

Both Chrises imply that Bean's observation that there "... appeared to be two machine guns and many rifles at work" indicates only MGs. It does not. It clearly states there appeared to be two MGs AND many rifles. So because it was not possible to state exactly how many machine guns OR rifles there were firing, he has used the word 'appeared' for both. Once again, the fact that an exact number could not be determined does not automatically mean there were none. Besides, that's not the only account of a machine gun on the northern flank.

Crunchy,

I avoided as far as possible getting involved in what you refer to as a "p***ing competition" by not even mentioning that I'd even served, as I don't feel my service is relevant to what soldiers reported at Gallipoli in 1915. I don't believe anyone's experience is relevant except their own. And I never said anything about MY experience with weaponry meaning I could easily distinguish different sounds. I still haven't said that.

The implication that, unless a machine-gun fires at you numerous times, you may not be able to tell what it is, prompted me to point out my own experience as indicative of what officers such as Colonel Clarke, DSO, Boer War veteran and Commanding Officer of 12th Battalion AIF, would also have had. Except that his experience was far longer and more varied than mine. If I handled the weapons I did during my service, I see no reason to assume that he got through 35 years without doing the same and much more. In any case it's not possible for us to judge that he did not know the sound a machine-gun makes.

As for Bean's account, he clearly does indicate Strickland's and Rafferty's parties were moving towards Fisherman's Hut at the time that included that at which the 7th Battalion boats were approaching the shore.

Here are the relevant pages from the Official History:

[Bryn]

During the French landing at Kum Kale, on the Aisatic shore, 25th April 1915:

""The fort was not occupied, but the artillery and machine-guns of the Turkish infantry at the south of the village spread death in our ranks. One machine-gun situated in a mill was most fortunately destroyed by the cannon of the fleet."

('Uncensored Letters from the Dardanelles', 1916, p62).

[Crunchy]

Have been chasing down Turkish accounts and maps at the AWM. The Dardanelles [manuscript] : the Ariburnu battles and 27 Regiment written by the CO, Sefik Aker in 1935. 100 pages is a nice published book. Only problem is I can’t read Turkish. It is being translated as an AWM project but the transcripts are not available to the public at the moment. I have taken photos of the first few chapters and will ask Eceabat if they can be translated regarding the 27th Regiment’s defensive deployment on the 25th April. The book has a three good maps at the end, which depict deployments and movements at 0830, 1100 and what appears to be evening of the 25th April. I have taken some photos and will post them.

The maps have symbols for guns and what appear to be machine guns (a line with a dot either side of it, which Chris Henschke informs me is the German symbol for machine guns). Note the book was written in 1935 and as the Germans trained the Turksih Army it possible they used German symbols. I have given some descriptions of the symbols below and they are readily seen in the photos of the maps. Can someone with any knowledge of them please advise on what they represent?

The 0830 map shows the dispositions of the platoons of the 2nd Battalion Company in the Kapa Tepe area and the movements of the remainder of the Regiment from Maidos across to the valley running East of Third Ridge (Kavak Dere), their route up the valley and deploying onto Third Ridge between Kemel Yeri (Scrubby Knoll) and Point 165 to the south. The map shows Turkish Platoons as follows – one south of Anzac Cove, one on Plugge’s Plateau , one at the Fisherman’s Hut and one on Second Ridge north of the 400 Plateau. There are no weapon symbols with them. This map also shows the route the platoon at the Fisherman’s Hut took to get to Duz Tepe (Battleship Hil) and then its withdrawal to Chunuk Bair.

Regarding symbols – there is a captured gun battery on Kanli Sirt (Lone Pine) (symbol – a line with a shorter line either side and a horizontal line across the base – this symbol has a figure 3 at the base indicating the three captured guns) , a different gun symbol at Gaba Tepe (a line with a shorter line either side) and yet another different symbol (arrow with a circle on the shaft with the figure 4 at the base) behind Palamutlu Sirt to the south of Gaba Tepe. There is a battery symbol on Point 165 on Third Ridge and north of that, the German machine gun symbol on Kemal Yeri (Scrubby Knoll). There is a tear in the map and the symbol is hard to see on the photo but it can be seen clearly on the map itself.

The 1100 map has the same symbols but with an additional battery at Kavak Tepe (southern end of Third Ridge), a battery just south of the summit of Chunuk Bair and a German machine gun symbol on Suyutagi (on the flank of Chunuk Bair SW of the battery symbol) It also shows the German machine gun symbol moving from Kemal Yari to Top Bair due S of Battleship Hill and due E of Mortar Ridge.

The evening (?) map shows the gun batteries in the same positions with one just S of the crest of Chunuk Bair, one on Point 165 and one on Kanli Sirt (Lone Pine) which has been recaptured. The German machine gun symbols have moved forward with one on Kermiz Sirt (Johnston's Jolly) and one at the extreme southern end of Edirne Sirt (Mortar Ridge).

The III Corps organizational chart in the appendices of the Turkish General Staff Study of the Chanakale Campaign shows that only two regiments out of the three had a machine company in each of the 7th, 9th and 19th Divisions on the 25th April; the Regiments without machine gun companies were the 20th, the 25th and the 77th.

The 0830 map below showing an overview of the Anzac Area and two close ups showing the Fisherman's Hut area and the route the platoon took back to the main range and the 27th Regiment's deployment on Third Ridge near Scrubby Knoll.

[Crunchy]

Close ups from the 0830 map showing the symbols at Kape Tepe

[Crunchy]

0830 map showing the symbol at Palamutlu Sirt

[Crunchy]

1100 map map showing overview of Third Ridge and Chunuk Bair and close ups of Third Ridge and Chunuk Bair

[Crunchy]

Evening map showing overview of dispositions and close ups of Kanli Sirt (Lone Pine) area and Chunuk Bair area

[Crunchy]

Hopefully a larger version of the Kanli Sirt area showing the German MG symbols on Kirmiz Sirt and due E at the southern end of Edirne Sirt

[Crunchy]

In addition to the above information, the Head Historian at the AWM gave me some typed notes he had taken from the account of Lieutenant Colonel /Major? Sabri? Mahmut CO 3rd Battalion, 26th Regiment. (Record K34980, Imperial War Museum, London 12 typescript pages) regarding the defences at Seddulbahir area at Helles. The notes were apparently taken as part of the British OH research by Aspinall-Oglander

"On 22 April, 3rd Battalion took over defences of Seddulbahir area: " coastline about 5kms long from Tekeburnu, Hill 141, Hill 138, W Beach (Tekekoyu), V Beach (Ertugrul) and Morto Bay.

Strength of the defences:3/26 Regiment numbered 1100men (including 100'unarmed -staff and support?0, divisional engineer company of 200 men, and the four small 37.5mm (1.5in) guns (mountain guns - pompom/Nordenfelt quick firing guns?). Poste platoon and company defences on main features: one platoon in the ruins of Ertugrul fortress, one platoon near Seddulbahir village jetty. Defenders under aerial observation and heavy naval bombardment for next two days and unable to do much to improve defences (trench system along coast); at night they completed triple row of wire obstacles on beaches, Allied activity convinced the Turks that the landing wood soon take place."

... Excellent fire discipline: when the enemy made their assault there was to be no hurry and concentrated fire was to be opened only after the boats were within 200- 300 metres of the shore. Morale was high during the enemy preliminary bombardment and the Turkish soldiers were eager to respond to the enemy even though nearby comrades were buried by shell fire.

The Landing Under heavy shell fire and machine gun fire from the landing ships, the Turkish defenders kept up a constant fire from their trenches and' changed the colour of the sea with the blood of the bodies of the enemy... The shore at Ertugrul cove (V Beach) became full of enemy corpses, like a shoal of fish."

Five boatloads of British were sunk at Seddulbahir pier."

The notes then go on to describe how "the British began to establish a foothold at Tekeburnu and W Beach through sheer weight of numbers and with heavy loss. Turkish losses mounted and ranks thinned as no reinforcements arrived, telephone lines cut and four small artillery guns put out of action; by late morning Turkish numbers reduced to 800 men, British forces began to envelop some Turkish positions."

There is no mention of any maxim guns, although the four 37.5mm guns (/Nordenfelt) are mentioned but not their actual location.

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

Final Map from the Turkish version of the Turkish OH showing the Ottoman defence positions in the Kapa Tepe area.

It shows infantry down to platoon and section level.

A four gun battery in the area of the 400 Plateau with the notation 4 Dag Topu, a battery position at Kapa Tepe with the notation 2 Mordedenfill [sic] 2 Mantelli, a four gun battery position behind Semer T with the notation 4 Kisa Obus. This is in the same position as the 27th History maps shows as Palamutlu Sirt. There are no other weapon positions shown. These dispositions match those marked on the 0830 map above

[Chris Henschke]

Crunchy,

These are the only symbols I can find similar to what you have shown.

Chris