TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[Eceabat]

Hi all,

I've finally found time to join in here, with things in Turkey having been rather hot of late.

Anyway, Mantelli guns. These were indeed older artillery pieces, given in Turkish accounts as being 8.7 cm. There were two of these guns emplaced near Kabatepe, the emplacements positioned so as to allow the guns to fire north, ie, covering the area from Kabatepe towards Fisherman's hut and beyond.

Nordenfelts and their location. Having sat down with well known Turkish historian Sahin Aldogan (beer was had), we thrashed out a list of positions for most of the 25mm and all four 37mm Nordenfelts on 25 April.

Of the 11 25mm multi barrelled guns, we positively identified the positioning of eight: two were at Kabatepe; two at Zigindere (at the mouth of Gully Ravine) with one of these guns being captured at X Beach; two guns at Ece Liman, the small port area on the Gulf of Saros; and two at Kumtepe, in the hills above where the present day Kum Hotel is located about 3.5 km to the south of Kabatepe.

Of the four 37mm guns, two were positioned inside the castle at Seddulbahir, at the eastern end of V Beach, and two more emplaced at the Erturgal Battery, the artillery position above the beach to the west known to the Allies as Fort Number 1.

For what it is worth, there were also four 150mm pieces emplaced at the Olive Grove, with two further 105mm down the coast at Kumtepe. There were other guns emplaced to the south of Kumtepe, as this was a region the Germans and Ottomans felt was most likely for a landing.

According to Sahin, and based on Turkish and Ottoman sources including the Turkish official history, the 26th Regiment, which was defending the beaches at Seddulbahir on the morning of 25 April did not have a machine gun company attached.

The four gun machine gun company of the 25th Regiment, which had been withdrawn from the landing area a day or two before 25 April, was in reserve. The company, which had previously been deployed in emplaced positions above V Beach, was camped in an area between the village of Krithia and Anderya Farm and did not come into action until later in the day.

The First and Third Battalions of the 27th Regiment, along with its organic machine gun company, were bivouacked close to Maidos, now Eceabat, with none of that regiment’s four machine guns anywhere near the landing beaches at dawn. (Ducks for cover at this point)

The Third Corps of Esat Pasha did not have any unattached machine gun units (dives below the parapet again) so it is rather hard to work out where any other machine guns would have come from.

In his book “Gallipoli: Through Turkish Eyes” Haluk Oral cites a previously unpublished account of the action at the Fishermen’s Hut by the commander of the Ottoman troops there, Ibradili Ibrahim (late known as Ibrahim Hayrettin, a reserve lieutenant commanding the Second Platoon of the 4th company of the Second Battalion of the 27th Regiment. While the account is detailed, it does not mention a machine gun. Another account by Lt Ibrahim, held by his family, is basically the same and also does not mention any machine gun. (runs like bloody hell as the barrage descends).

Errr, Chris H, you mentioned the document from the Headlam collection on aerial photography at Gallipoli and how you were unable to win it in bidding on e-bay. Sorry but I am the sod who beat you out, with the document going to be loaned to the private museum of Ozay Gundogan in the village of Buyuk Anafartalar as part of a temporary display.

Hope this is of some interest.

Cheer

Bill

[green_acorn]

Bill,

I was happy to see a copy go to Turkey, I assume you also won the document in Ottoman script, as soon as I saw the bid from Turkey I left it alone. Being on a pension and having spent too many thousands so far acquiring things for a Museum here and my research for a history on intelligence, I had to let them go. There was a second copy of the "Reading Airplane Photographs" document that went to a gentleman in the US, I was not happy after trying to get help and nothing but stunned silence here.

I also note in the very poor thumbnail preview images I saved that the document was written in about Aug 1915 as it mentions the new German Regulations for the employment of machine guns of Jun 1915 and makes comparison to Flanders. The document notes the employment of the MG's in Turkish front line trenches, being placed near the communications trench to allow rapid redeployment to the second line and that the MG position was to be protected by a strong infantry presence. It notes that the MG's were employed to give "flanking" fire ideally from behind cover and that the German practice of concrete bunkers had not been adopted. The document also states that it was very hard to determine MG positions from aeroplane photographs.

Hope this helps the discussion a little.

Kindest Regards,

Chris H

[Crunchy]

Bill,

Welcome to the discussion. It is good to have someone from the Turkish viewpoint participating and many thanks for the information you have provided.

In Ibradili Ibrahim's description of the Fisherman's Hut action, does he describe the layout of his platoon and the location of his section posts? Also does he describe the number of Australian boats that landed in the vicinity of the Fisherman's Hut and the action he took against them?

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

Jeff,

Thanks for that. For those who haven't got access to Plate 3. it shows the dispositions of Ottoman guns on the 18 Feb 1915. Guns covering the Dardanelles and Helles but nothing on the Aegean Coast at all. Later plates show a gun symbol at Kapa Tepe but that's all.

Cheers

Chris

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Jeff

Good guess and on the money. Mantelli Guns were 87mm in calibre.

Interesting to note that the gun at Kaba Tepe memorial is a 75mm rather than a Mantelli. It is good to see the principle of "near enough is good enough" in operation here too.

Chris

You will find that Michael posted a copy of Plate 3 at Post 119, the plate Jeff referred to in his post:

 

Cheers

Bill

[Bryn]

It's reported that two Krupp field-guns were overrun at or near 'The Cup' on the 400 Plateau by the 9th Battalion on 25th April. Turkish machine-guns were also reported to have been observed here being loaded onto donkeys.

[Crunchy]

Bill,

Thanks for that. Sorry everyone - old age is getting to me!!!

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

Bryn,

When speaking with Loutit, he claimed to have taken the Krupp guns at The Cup under the direction of Major Brand, BM 3rd Brigade. Brand wanted him to attack head on but he manoeurved around to the north and took them from the left rear flank, ie from NE. He felt that Brand and others got the credit for it, as after that he then pushed on towards Third Ridge. Made no mention of machine guns at all.

Cheers

Chris

[michaeldr]

Bill W.,

Thanks for the info on the Mantelli/Mantelkanone; that's a great help

Bill S.,

Glad to see you back in circulation and thanks for sharing with us the thoughts of our friends over there

re your "Ducks for cover at this point"; ducks have also been waddling and quacking around here (see my post #111 above)

Personally, I am persuaded that there is no real conflict between the two sets of researchers on this point

What the lads heard and suffered on the beaches may not have been fire from a Maxim or a Vickers, but rather from the thirteen multi-barrelled 25mm Nordenfelts (yes, technically not a machine-gun, but nevertheless producing a MGs rate of fire)

I hope that you can find the other missing five 25mm guns - that would be great.

Do you have any thoughts on why these guns were listed by the Ottomans together with their artillery?

One more idea to test with you if I may;

similar guns ie. 25mm Nordenfelts and 37mm Pom Poms are listed as being with the Canakkale Fortress command. Since engineers and artillery from the Adrianople Fortress command were sent to Gallipoli in the summer, is it possible that there was also a similar transfer from the Canakkale Fortress command in the spring, or was the date of the landings too soon after 18th March to allow them to even consider such a thing?

best regards

Michael

[Eceabat]

Hi all back again for a brief moment.

Bryn, according to the Ottoman 9th Division's order of battle, there were four 75mm mountain guns of the division's 7th Battery emplaced at Lone Pine. Three were overrun and the fourth run back to gun ridge, coming into action later in the day. The other three guns were recaptured later the same day.

Though Bean gives an account of a second three gun battery at Lone Pine, Ottoman and Turkish accounts say clearly there were only four artillery pieces anywhere near the 400 Plateau on 25 April.

Michael, as to the Canakkale Fortress Command, it had none of its units deployed on the Aegean side of the coast at any time. It did have some artillery units in the Seddulbahir Castle and at Fort Number 1, those the gunners were withdrawn after the artillery pieces in these two positions were destroyed by British naval bombardments and landings by Marine demolition crews.

The 9th Division's Fortifications company, basically its field engineer company, was in the V Beach area on 25 April, adding its strength to the defences. However, it did not have machine guns.

Below, with the permission of Professor Haluk Oral, is the entire text of a letter written by Lt İbradılı Ibrahim (İbradılı being the town where he was from) in 1945 to a well known radio producer and script writer of the time, Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi, who worked on a program called Parade of Heroes.

Esteemed Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi

I will be very happy if with the following letter of mine shall be of help and service to you regarding your assignment for 24th April 1945.

As follows:

I am scribbling these few lines thinking that the moment has arrived to remind everybody of what a handful of Turks can accomplish even in the face of crushing odds in terms of weapons and number of men, and that they would willingly perform all over again those feats that they once carried out in the past to protect their motherland, should another become covetous of it today.

I was part of a platoon made up of ninety soldiers, which was part of the fourth company of the third (actually the second, my note) battalion of the twenty-seventh regiment, and which on Sunday, 24th April 1915 had been assigned the duty of keeping a look-out for the enemy, expected to approach from the sea, at a place known as Ağıldere near Arıburnu. On the early morning of that day, upon facing the resistance of two guns and of our limited number of rifles, the English, who had attacked Arıburnu with the aim of landing, turned towards Ağıldere and attacked there, thinking that they would meet with less resistance. As for us, we faced them with our few weapons and our faith, and thanks to the devastating fire we rained down upon them, within an hour’s time we had felled and destroyed so many invading soldiers that the shores were covered with their bodies. (According to information received by our regiment’s commander, Ali Şefik, and according to the admissions of the English themselves, their losses at Ağıldere were 100 soldiers; from what we saw, however, this number was definitely higher.)

Following this, and respecting the dictates of war whereby one must strive to hold the high ground, we went up to the hill of Kocaçimen (later called Conkbayırı), which dominated the positions held by the enemy, and then after having left some of our men there, we pretended that reinforcements had come from the rear and surged forward towards the enemy, getting close enough so that our weapons would be effective and stopping them by engaging them with our intensive fire. In this way we managed to gain time in favour of the main forces which were following behind us. (As the esteemed Celal Dinçer [a well known Turkish broadcaster of the time] observed) we were advancing towards a landing force 100 times more numerous than us, and the adversaries, knowing that such a move was unfeasible with the strength of only a few men, had been so surprised that they could only stop in their tracks. Unsure of what to do as they strove to grasp the situation, and thus losing four hours, the adversary failed to reach the high ground that we held, and the fact that this highest point of the Gallipoli Peninsula remained in our hands, turned out to be one of the main factors why the Dardanelles remained unbreached. The fortunes of war were helping us; finally the first and second [actually the third] battalions of the twenty-seventh regiment, which of the great forces to our rear were those nearest to us, were approaching us on one side under the command of Ali Şefik and a little while later, the 57th Regiment of the 19th Division (together with the late Atatürk) arrived at our position. At the conclusion of the attack carried out in conjunction with these new forces, the enemy were confined to a narrow strip of the shore and rendered harmless. Meanwhile, I had been forced to leave the battle due to a serious injury. I was deeply saddened at having to give up command of my platoon, which had acted with uncommon heroism; however, I found consolation in thanking God a thousand times over for having granted me the honour and happiness of commanding these heroic soldiers as a reserve officer and second lieutenant.

After I left the battlefield it must have become apparent that I had done my duty, because Atatürk gave orders to those in authority to promote me with an extraordinary procedure to first lieutenant and to honour me with a silver war medal for war merits. I am happy and grateful for having attained his favour; since the miracle he performed on the peninsula is known by the whole world, like all citizens I remember him with gratitude and praise, and pray God to hold him in his favour.

I am not sure if I have been able to satisfactorily describe the atmosphere of those days with this letter. But I did not want to go into more detail, lest I should waste your precious time. I have been honoured by writing to you and I submit my deepest respects.

Mahmudiye Neighbourhood, 163rd Street, House Number 2 upper floor

İbradılı Hayrettin Ağıldere

It is interesting to note that the Lieutenant adopted the surname Ağıldere in later life when Ataturk promulgated requiring such measures, commemorating his fight at Fisherman's Hut.

Hope this is of interest.

Cheers

Bill

[Bryn]

Thanks Bill.

What's also interesting to me is that this was not written until 30 years after the event. I have to question how it is that other accounts, both more contemporary and numerous, and in agreement with each other, seem to be being disregarded on the basis of this one radio interview. There seem to be all manner of shifting reasons found as to why other accounts, for example by Bean, by the 7th Battalion, the 11th Battalion, the 12th Battalion and (I haven't posted this one yet) Chaplain Fahey (RC Chaplain who landed with the 11th Battalion), should be regarded as possibly unreliable.

In any case, this passage - as translated - explicitly confirms the presence of two guns. "On the early morning of that day, upon facing the resistance of two guns and of our limited number of rifles, the English, who had attacked Arıburnu with the aim of landing, turned towards Ağıldere and attacked there, thinking that they would meet with less resistance."

[Eceabat]

Hi Bryn,

"In any case, this passage - as translated - explicitly confirms the presence of two guns".

Indeed it does, but Lt Ibrahim could well be referring to the Lone Pine artillery pieces, those that you mentioned, rather than machine guns.

In no way am I saying that other accounts should be discounted based on this letter (it was not a radio interview) but I posted this as an account of what happened on the north flank at Ariburnu on 25 April, in part to support other Turkish and Ottoman sources that say there were no machine guns in that area at the time.

Cheers

Bill

[green_acorn]

Bill,

Thank you for posting the letter from İbradılı Hayrettin Ağıldere, fascinating reading and it leads to an alternative view.

Your securing of those Headlam documents means I will have to visit the Penninsula sooner rather than later, I briefly visited in Nov 05. I have a real excuse now, original documentary vidence not available in the UK or Australia.

Thank You,

Chris H

All,

May I suggest that the other issue we may be overlooking is the pre-war drilling of a professionally officered conscript army in mass infantry fire drills, many soldiers firing in a disciplined and controlled manner such as Ağıldere and the other 90 soldiers at Fisherman's Hut could replicate the effect and sound (crack) of a small number of machine guns. The specific drill is the Feu de Joie, the French Fire of Joy, where each rifleman fires in quick succession. The Fue de Joie was started by the French as a parade routine, but there is no reason why it could not be used by well disciplined soldiers under command on the battlefield, it is just a matter of fire control.

A platoon of 90 men, with say 40 soldiers firing Fue de Joie would easily replicate the modern fire pattern of two machine guns. I would doubt that on the day many ANZAC's would have experienced a feu de joie on the parade ground let alone on the battlefield. With other soldiers as designated marksmen and as one of my past CO's Rollo Brett used to say, "the average shots" aiming for torso shots in volley, rapid and sustained rates, many different fire effects would have been experienced on the battlefields over a sustained period.

I seem to recall that the fire discipline and fire effects of the "Old Contemptible" British regular soldiers on the Western Front was also mistaken for machine gun fire by the Germans.

Cheers,

Chris H

[Bryn]

Precisely Bill. He could be referring to the guns on Lone Pine (even though there were four, not two), but that's equally as speculative as saying he could be referring to machine-guns.

Meanwhile, my point regarding the finding of all manner of shifting reasons as to why other accounts might be unreliable has already been illustrated.

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

Bill - Thanks for the letter - it is very illuminating.

Mates, I am not sure why anyone is speculating on the location of the 1 inch Nordenfelt Guns. There is no way on this earth that they could have been anywhere near Anzac on 25 April 1915. They were not portable in the sense that the Maxim was portable. If you click on the link, you will see a pic of the 1 inch Nordenfelt Gun.

http://web.ukonline.co.uk/stephen.johnson/arms/gun12.jpg

It is a big gun ... I mean a really big gun. Since it needs a stable foundation before it can be fired, the time and effort required by a team of engineers would mean that it would have taken a couple days to prepare the site. 25 April would have been done and dusted before the gun would be ready to fire. The fluid nature of the warfare meant that it was not able to be quickly dismantled and thus easily captured if the site had been over run. It is not a gun a squad is about to dismantle and take off in a matter or minutes.

Cheers

Bill

[Crunchy]

Eceabat Bill,

Many thanks for posting Lt Ibrahim's letter. As Bill Woerlee says - very illuminating. I was surprised that he states he had 90 men with him - a little less than a modern rifle company's strength. Interesting that he fell back to Chunuk Bair and encountered the Australians in that area. As for stopping them, Tulloch had reached his objective which was Battleship Hill and the 2nd Brigade which was to pass through Tulloch had been diverted to the area south of Lone Pine by Sinclair-MacLagan. I detect a sense of the old issue of exaggeration of the enemy force facing one in contact, with his estimation of the number of Australian's killed near the Fisherman's Hut. If Bean is correct that only three boats landed than I would expect there were fewer than 100 in the area. I agree with you that the two guns he is referring to would be artillery pieces rather than machine guns. When soldiers speak of guns they are referring to artillery pieces, not small arms.

Thanks again Bill.

Cheers

Chris

[green_acorn]

Eceabat Bill and others,

May I ask do you have examples of the Ottoman military symbology used at the time? This far removed from the events, I don't think anyone will be able to honestly resolve the issue of the number and disposition of MG's and like weapons (other than those captured), though experts could make reasonable supposition on their deployment. I would think the most reliable evidence to start with would be the Turkish Orders and Turkish annotated maps of the day and days prior.

Regards,

Chris H

[Jeff Pickerd]

The reference to the Mantelli Mountain gun that Bill Woerlee has quoted from the book by Lt. Col. Şefik Bey "Çanakkale-Arıburnu Şavaşları ve 27 nci Alay" (The Çanakkale and Arıburmu Battles and 27th Regiment), has reminded me of some research I undertook for a mate several years ago. His Grandfather was a gunner with the 4th Battery, 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, that landed at Anzac Cove late in the afternoon of the 25th and ran up one gun, which engaged the Turkish gun firing from Gaba Tepe.

It is possible that it was this Australian 18 pounder that silenced the Mantelli gun just after 6 p.m. rather than the shellfire from one of the warships as suggested by Lt Col Sefik Bey.

Unfortunately, the War Diaries of the 4th Battery have not been digitised as yet, but the 2nd FAB Headquarters diary has, AWM 4, Class13/30 – Headquarters 2nd Australian Field Artillery Brigade.

At 1915 – AWM4, 13/30/5 – April 1915, the following has been recorded:

“25-4-15 – ANZAC COVE – 3.30 p.m. – Portion of Hd Qts and 1 subsection 4th Battery with 12 horses, one gun and two wagons landed. Gun in position by 6 p.m. and fired few rounds in direction from which enemy’s shells were coming.”

The 4th Battery, 2nd FAB, according to C. E. W, Bean, landed two guns on the beach at Anzac Cove on the afternoon of 25th April, around 5.30pm, but were subsequently ordered to re-embark back to the transport ship, as no suitable positions could be found for the guns.

Col Johnston was evidently determined to have his artillery present at the landing, for one of Major Phillip’s 4th Battery 18 pounder’s, was run up the beach and set up on a knoll at the southern end of Anzac Cove near the entrance to Shrapnel Gully, just above Brighton Beach, which opened fire on the Turkish gun emplacement at Gaba Tepe at about 6.00 pm, silencing it.

C. E. W. Bean has left a description of this incident:

“At 5.30pm the wounded, lying in hundreds at the southern end of the beach, on stretchers and off stretchers, doctors hurrying through them, naval officers giving orders, boats pulling alongside; heard a sudden bustle and clatter and a shout: “Look out, make way!” Stretchers were hurriedly pulled aside, and between them came a team of gun horses, the drivers urging them; and after them, deep in the sand of the beach, a single gun of the 4th Battery, Australian Field artillery. The wounded, and even the dying, cheered as it passed through them. Willing hands undid its chains and dragged it up a steep path made by beach party and engineers to the southern knoll of the beach. At 6.00pm this gun opened upon Gaba Tepe, and its second round of shrapnel appeared to silence for the night the last persistent gun in the Gaba Tepe battery.”

Jeff

[Bryn]

'An article by a Turkish officer in the "Turkish Military Review", October 1926, admits that the Turks had four old-pattern maxim guns at V, but states that two of them were knocked out by the naval bombardment before the troops landed. They also had two pom-poms at V. The article does not admit that there were any machine guns at W; but Br.-General Hare is certain that two were firing on the beach from the right flank when he landed.'

(Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations : Gallipoli, Vol 1 p221).

This article is said to state explicitly that were machine guns and Nordenfeldt guns (pom-poms) at V Beach. Even if every single allied source that reported machine guns during the landings was wrong, this is a Turkish account that states they were there. This conflicts with other Turkish accounts that say they were not there, just as the allied accounts do.

[Crunchy]

Thanks Bryn,

That is useful.

Cheers

Chris

[Ozzie]

Been following this thread and it seems that it comes down to the Turks say, the British say, the A&NZ's say.

Amongst all this we have input from experienced soldiers, readers of historical documents, and people who have made this their life's work.

Now in all this mix of info, maybe someone would like to do some sort of comparison for a simple idiot (me), as in a chart or map, that would outline the possibles, the definates and definitely nots.

There is so much info in this thread. By doing an outline (map), it might make it easier to comprehend with visuals.

Yours

Lost in the enfilade

Don't you all smirk now.

[green_acorn]

Been following this thread and it seems that it comes down to the Turks say, the British say, the A&NZ's say.

Amongst all this we have input from experienced soldiers, readers of historical documents, and people who have made this their life's work.

Now in all this mix of info, maybe someone would like to do some sort of comparison for a simple idiot (me), as in a chart or map, that would outline the possibles, the definates and definitely nots.

There is so much info in this thread. By doing an outline (map), it might make it easier to comprehend with visuals.

Yours

Lost in the enfilade

Don't you all smirk now.

Ozzie,

Being somewhat of a visual person myself (as we all are), I do agree, in fact many of the threads on the GWF could use well anottated maps. I would love to have some of the Digital mapping software with " digital elevation modelling" to show the recorded, stated, suggested and guessed positions with "line of sight" fans from each to prove or disprove the possibilities. It can be done quite quickly, I was using such commercially available software fifteen years ago, the telco's use them for planning mobile phone repeater towers.

cheers,

Chris H

[CSMMo]

Just to add a bit from the 29th Divisional War Diary for 25-26 April:

"1 Section 460 How Battery landed and brought into action at water’s edge.

Landing at V Beach held up by pom-pom fire and heavy rifle fire from old fort S.E. 138. 460 How Battery and 26th FA Battery ordered to shell this point. Did so and enabled Infantry to capture this position about 11 a.m.

Mountain Arty from position 138, 26th Battery and 460 How Btry shelled supported attack on Old Castle firing on W. and N.W. sides of it and probably materially helping infantry to capture the Old Castle Fort. The Turks began retiring when under our Arty fire. Capt. G.N. Walford Brigade Major who had been lent to act as Brigade Major 86th Infantry was killed by a sniper in Sedd el Bahr after the capture of the Old Castle."

There wasn't much artillery at the landings and all came in via W Beach from about noon onwards 25 April. (Some accounts say there was none!) Once they were in position and firing (esentially flanking V Beach defenders), this, coordinated with the movement up from V Beach, began to consolidate the Allies line.

But you can see that the guns at V Beach were identified here as pom-poms.

I hope this is helpful.

Mike Morrison

[Peter Doyle]

'An article by a Turkish officer in the "Turkish Military Review", October 1926, admits that the Turks had four old-pattern maxim guns at V, but states that two of them were knocked out by the naval bombardment before the troops landed. They also had two pom-poms at V. The article does not admit that there were any machine guns at W; but Br.-General Hare is certain that two were firing on the beach from the right flank when he landed.'

(Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations : Gallipoli, Vol 1 p221).

This article is said to state explicitly that were machine guns and Nordenfeldt guns (pom-poms) at V Beach. Even if every single allied source that reported machine guns during the landings was wrong, this is a Turkish account that states they were there. This conflicts with other Turkish accounts that say they were not there, just as the allied accounts do.

I'd be interested to know if anyone has actually seen this - as I had little luck in tracking it down. If anyone's got a copy, I'd be interested!

Peter

[Guest Bill Woerlee]

'An article by a Turkish officer in the "Turkish Military Review", October 1926, admits that the Turks had four old-pattern maxim guns at V, but states that two of them were knocked out by the naval bombardment before the troops landed. They also had two pom-poms at V. The article does not admit that there were any machine guns at W; but Br.-General Hare is certain that two were firing on the beach from the right flank when he landed.'

(Aspinall-Oglander, Military Operations : Gallipoli, Vol 1 p221).

Bryn

Unfortunately that article is printed in Ottoman Script which unless there is a translated version, will remain hidden. In 1928 the Turks began to use the Latin alphabet.

But despair not. If we go back to our account from the trusty Lieutenant Colonel Sefik Bey, commander of 27th Infantry Regiment, he gives the following information in an article published in The Military Magazine Number 40 of 1935:

"The soldiers were armed with Mauser rifles. The battalions had neither Machine Gun units nor heavy or light Machine Guns. One soldier in each squad was armed with hand grenades. The others had entrenching tools such as axes and shovels. A Machine Gun Company was attached to the Regiment. There were four Maxim guns. These Maxim Guns arrived without spare parts. For the sake of Allah, we didn't look for spare parts during the 25 April 1915 battles. They worked very well that day but in other battles, the lack of spare parts rendered our Maxims as useless."

I am not sure if this adds anything to the common pool of knowledge but it confirms that the 27th IR had 4 Maxims employed during the battles of 25 April but were out of action due to lack of spares rather than being put out of commission through hostile action.

Cheers

Bill