TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI

[gilly100]

Captain RL Leane of C Coy 11Bn was in the first wave and gave some interesting detail on how the boats came ashore around Ari Burnu, with intermingling a factor.

 

"Drake Brockman landed further to the right as did the 10th Battalion. My company was on the extreme left of the attack, but the 9th Battalion boats landed with and to the left of us. The 9th received heavy fire from a machine gun placed to the left front."

 

Leane was widely regarded as one of the finest officers in the AIF from start to finish.

 

Ian

[gilly100]

There seems to be very little focus on Ottoman weapons placed at Gaba Tepe proper for the 25 April Landings other than a couple of Nordenfelts and a Mantelli that get talked about in various books, but reading below what Bean wrote in his Vol1 OH seems to allude to some rifle calibre machine gun/s also being there. I note Steve Chambers book on the Anzac Landing had this following description, or part thereof as well as a photo of a ship board maxim on the torpedo boat destroyer HMS Beagle, described as being hit by maxim fire in two places. Interestingly, this description of what has to be mg fire remains unattributed at this stage, although it must be in Beans notebooks and diaries somewhere. Nevertheless, the description can surely be about mg fire. In light of Murray Ewen's evidence from Germany, I think this worth raising. Not sure how I missed it in the first place!

 

"...The tows of the Beagle, with Captain Milne's company, came in a thousand yards to the south of this again (Hell Spit or southern end of Anzac Cove, my words), near the big hill which formed the southern side of the same valley - part of the 400 Plateau. On the first alarm the Turks on Gaba Tepe at once sighted the Beagle, and opened upon her with every rifle and machine gun.. The range was long, but one machine gun had it accurately. Its shots pattered on the high bows of the destroyer like hail on an iron roof, and the water through which the boats had to move was whipped to spray by bullets."

 

Sounds like a beaten zone. Hardly Nordenfelt fire I think. 

 

Ian

[gilly100]

From HMS Beagle's ship's log for 25 April 1915

 

5.05am  Arrived at beach and proceed to disembark troops. Rifle and machine gun fire opened on ship during disembarkation.

         Casualties - 1 CPO slightly wounded, 1 leading sig severely.

6.30am  Disembarkation completed.

 

Seems like some of these Royal Navy chaps had the same experience as the men they landed. Bear in mind the Beagle was well south of all the other destroyers and hence attention from the garrison at Gaba Tepe. The log is also handy for timeline on the disembarkation procedure. 

Ian

[gilly100]

765 Donald Gordon Campbell 11Bn scout, first wave

 

It was hoped we  might land without the Turks knowledge, and with that object in view, the scouts (about 25 of us) were packed up in the bows of the leading boat, so that as soon as we got ashore we could push ahead and try and locate the enemy. When within about three hundred yards of the shore, the enemy opened rifle and machine gun fire on us....

 

more to come

 

Ian

[gilly100]

From Midshipman Ronald Dent aboard HMS Chelmer off North Beach we have:

 

"The troops commenced to get into their boats. They were as merry as anything and one would think they were going to a picnic instead of a tough scrap. Everything had to be performed quietly as possible and by the time they had all got into the boats it was well past 4am and commencing to get light. Directly they commenced to be towed towards shore (by a picket boat), the enemy opened a rapid fire with Maxims and for the next half an hour there was nothing short of a perpetual rain of bullets."

 

Ian

[gilly100]

Here are some more 11Bn blokes(early morning Landing accounts) and one 9Bn man whose first hand 25 April account correlates nicely with the 2nd Brigade men (5Bn) such as Derham MC and Hooper MID who fought at the Pine Ridge Hotchkiss gun pits til late that first day and night. Chuffed to add him to this part of the first day's battle as it supports the evidence of these gun pits (unacknowledged by the No early 25 April MG writers, academics, historians et al) AND an abandoned Turkish machine gun. Had I seen this earlier it would have been added to my Pine Ridge Guns 25 April 1915 article recently published in The Gallipolian late last year .

 

348 Frank Thomas Youd A Coy 9Bn AIF

 

"... a gun shelter with funk pits and deep communication and shelter trench connecting with other shelters... There were two field guns, one in the shelter and another..

...and lay behind the mound while one of the lads discovered a Turkish machine gun near the trench, evidently left in a hurry as there was a plentiful supply of ammunition laying alongside..

 

11Bn AIF

188 Hedley Howe A Coy (was with Bean on the Gallipoli Mission in early 1919)

"Abdul opened up with machine guns.".. 

 

967 JRT Keast A Coy

"two machine guns and one Hotchkiss 3 pounder* besides a fair number of rifles"

 

* I suspect this may refer to a similar account by Drake Brockman, who led A Coy that morning, referring to Hotchkiss gun fire, although I believe it was the 10pounder Hotchkiss guns on Pine Ridge.

Amazing really. After all these years digging and yet more first hand accounts keep popping up. Where are all the Turkish/German accounts? The ones we want are locked up somewhere. What a complete joke this new yarn is.

 

Ian

 

 

[gilly100]

For the authors of the last few years that have been instrumental in running the no mg argument I would ask. Did any of you search in German archives for sources of information on German Naval landing detachments greater participation than previously known? Did any of you access Dardanelles Fortified Command records to evaluate its men's potentially wider role in opposing the landing operations(has anyone ever looked at these records?)? Has anyone bothered to look into Ottoman Naval records to see what role its men and weapons had in same? 

I think fair questions to ask in light of Murray Ewen's findings of late and published recently in The Gallipolian. Not an exercise in belittling anyone, merely pointing out that answers are sometimes found where no one chooses to look, whatever their research methodology. I think this last point is highly pertinent to the issue and that just looking at Turkish Army records, in particular 27th Regiment and 9th Division in general, was not enough, and looking at Allied records means discounting hundreds of supporting eye witness accounts. The latter in itself should have prompted a more thorough and complete search.

Ian

Edited 9 April , 2018 by gilly100

[Guest]

I found this on Europeana apologies if it's been posted before. A sketch Plan of S.W. end of Gallipoli Peninsula showing Turkish defences existing April 25th 1915.

 

Mike

 

Edit Deleted image as there appear to be copyright issues. Follow the link to see sketch.

 

Edited 2 May , 2018 by Skipman

[Rockturner]

Nice find Skipman and it's finally good to see someone besides Gilly having a say.

Was there ever any doubt? The fissure running through this discussion get's wider by the day.

Well done.

LonerangerVC

[gilly100]

6 minutes ago, Rockturner said:

Nice find Skipman and it's finally good to see someone besides Gilly having a say.

Was there ever any doubt? The fissure running through this discussion get's wider by the day.

Well done.

LonerangerVC

 

Nice drawing too. Would it be those pesky old pattern maxims so long ago recorded and so recently tipped like garbage into the myth history dustbin? Nice find Mike and thanks for posting.

Ian

[michaeldr]

 

If you have the map disc produced by the IWM & WFA, then you will find this particular sketch under ref M_003894

 

Regarding V Beach - The "machine gun" marked as being on the left of V Beach corresponds roughly with position of the 4 Pom-poms (37mm). They were noted by Lt-Col W. de L. Williams at 06:35 hrs [see the foot-note on p.232 of the Brit OH].  According to the Turks two of the four were put out of action by the naval bombardment and the other two only got off a few belts before jamming. They were operated by 10th Company (3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment) who lost their commander, Captain Hüseyin Hüsnü, early on (perhaps at the same time as the two guns were hit) and the company was then famously commanded by Sergeant Yahya, who I think survived and was decorated. A memorial and a symbolic cemetery marks this site today.

The MG marked as being at the right flank of the beach, firing from the rounded corner tower of the old castle was also seen by Williams - see the same foot-note. I'm pretty sure that if you go back through this thread then there is also an account of one of the RNAS (armoured car unit) men who describes this gun as seen from his own MG position in the bows of the River Clyde  

The "Gallows" shown as facing across the left of the beach were probably dummy guns - somewhere or other there is a photograph of these

I have no information on the guns marked as facing the centre of the beach

 

regards

Michael

[emrezmen]

Since it was not possible to read the entire topic I'm not sure whether what I am going to say now has been said before but I'll still be happy to contribute through war diaries (not official history! though I don't have any problem with it, it's quite reliable) from the Turkish side and I'll also be happy if I can convince a few people who still tended to believe that the Ottoman decision-makers (or Liman Pasha) were stupid enough to put their invaluable and scarce weapons at the disposal of a bunch of forlorn hopes.

 

I'm going to share some documents from the War Diary of 27th Regiment. Diaries dating from March 1915 to April 1915 were published last year and more to come in near future in another two volumes. 

 

 

Most of the people are neglecting something which is very critical to understand whole point: The structure and organization of Ottoman army/regiments. At that time, the Ottoman army was organized according to German army model. This means every infantry regiment has a seperate company for its machine guns but this, of course, remained only on paper throughout the war because the number of machine guns was always limited. A machine gun company of a regiment was ALWAYS at the disposal of CO/HQ. The battalions didn't have any machine gun. The CO, of course, could attach the machine gun company to one of his battalions but was this in case on 25th April 1915? Where were the MGs of 27th Inf Rgt? Here are the answers:

 

Starting with an official report (of course with a little translation) on the battles of 25-27th April, attached to war diary, written by CO of 27th Rgt. Lt.Col. Mehmet Sefik several days after the 27th April. Keep in mind that the reports/official battle narrations must be correct as possible as they could be:

 

 

"From the date of 19 March 331 (1 April 1915) two battalions of the regiment and a machine gun company (makineli tüfenk bölüğü) were at Maydos' olive groves, as a reserve force of 9th Division."

 

Now let's continue with hand-drawn maps from war diary. Dispositions of 27th Rgt at Anzac on 24/25th April:

Close-up to landing area. 1st ( ١ ), 2nd (٢ ), 4th (٤ ) 5th ( ٥ ) and 7th ( ٧ ) Platoons positioned between Fisherman's Huts and Victoria Gully:

 

 

These are drawn at the request of senior-officers (sometimes at the request of 9th Div CO Col. Halil Sami). As you see, artillery is shown but there is nothing about MGs. If there was a MG platoon/company, it would have shown here as in the following map showing the 27th Rgt's dispositions on 27 March, exactly a month before the landings:
 

 

And on this map dated 25th April 1915, you can clearly see that the 27th Rgt's MG Coy positioned on Third Ridge after the Sefik's arrival:

 

 

The maps attached to war diary are quite revealing for the situation at Anzac, I think. One last thing that I want to share about the defence of 27th Rgt, is another official report from the diary that reflects the movements of the regiment and its machine guns on 25th April:

 

 

"The commander of the 9th Division ordered 27th Regiment under Lt. Colonel Şefik Bey to move to Kabatepe region and interfere the enemy with its battalions, machine gun company (makineli tüfenk bölüğü) stationed at Zeytinlik and the mountain battery stationed at Çamburnu."
 

As you can see, it is obvious that all 4 MGs of the regiment were with Lt.Col. Mehmet Sefik (as it's supposed to be) when landings started. When we put all the maps, reports etc. together, we see that there is no contradiction between these and any other Turkish sources. In hundreds of pages of correspodences, reports, or maps, there is not a single sentence indicates that even a single MG has left its company in order to join the 2nd Bn/4th Coy at Anzac before 04:30 am on 25th April. At this point, please don't expect me to take personal diaries and post-war memoirs serious, written by the soldiers who lived their first war experiences on that day. When MGs opened fire from the boats, the enthusiastic and inexperienced Australians thought that it was Turks who fired the MGs. That's all. Let alone firing with MGs, the platoon at Plugge's under OCdt. Muharrem couldn't open a proper rifle fire. When they started to fire they were too late and very first Australians had already landed and were entered the blind spot of the Turks. Moments later, 80 soldiers of the platoon found themselves in a surrounded position and only four or five wounded managed to retreat.

 

At Seddülbahir, the story was more or less the same.

 

As we all know, the 25th Rgt (with a MG Coy on its organization!) was responsible for the defence at Seddülbahir until relieved four days before the landings by 26th Rgt which has no MG Coy in its organization from the outset. You can see 9th Div's organization in following sketch. 27th (٢٧ )  and 25th Rgts (٢٥) have MG Coys while 26th (٢٦) doesn't:

 

 

The divisional order given by Col. Halil Sami on 21th April about the displacement of two regiments (25th and 26th), according to Liman v. Sanders' instructions:

 

 

The last article is about this change:

"26th Regiment will relieve the 2/25th Regiment at Kumtepe with one of its battalions and 25th Regiment's two battalions at Seddülbahir region with its two other battalions. The battalions of 25th Regiment and Machine Gun Company (Makineli Tüfenk Bölüğü) will be going to 26th Regiment's camp at Sarafim Farm."

 

A part of another battle report from 27th Rgt's diary:

 

 

 

"Thinking that a single battalion is inadequate, 26th Regiment commander asked for immediate support. Thereupon, the division gave an order to 25th Regiment to send its two battalions and Machine Gun Company."

 

As the battle rages on, the CO of 26th Rgt Lt.Col. Hafiz Kadri asked for help as he realized that his regiment was under pressure. The division commander, Col. Halil Sami, sent 25th Rgt's MG Coy along with two battalions. This is because 26th Rgt was devoid of machine guns or any automatic weapons except for two already unmanned pom-poms. I, again, didn't came across anyting about MGs on this sector. If there were any MGs, we would definitely see them in the reports or any other part of the diary. And of course, we need to take 3/26th Rgt CO Maj. Mahmut Sabri's war-time report into consideration. Still, hopefully, I'll come with more persuasive information about 26th Rgt in the future.

 

To sum up, the whole issue cannot be considered independently from the doctrine adopted by Liman v. Sanders. There were MGs on the beach until several days before the landings and these were withdrawn. This is, of course, something related with the defence strategy of Liman v. Sanders. Heavy MGs were valuable weapons than they are today. If you want to held a beach only for a while with outposts or small detachments which obviously are going to a certain death, you wouldn't leave your valuable and limited weapons with them. It's simple as that. You can not locate a machine gun at every beach, since you still don't know actual landing points and you don't already have plenty of MGs in your whole army. You have to use them sparingly.

 

If you combine the report written by Mahmut Sabri and Col. Sefik's post-war account with all other Turkish sources, you'll see that the evidence provided by defending side is far more logical, compatible and therefore stronger, contrary to the claims of some people.

 

I hope to add more in the future if possible. I apologize in advance for any mistake.

 

 

Edited 19 June , 2018 by emrezmen
Grammatical corrections

[gilly100]

All very well known to most of us involved in this debate, but why no decent records of DFC, Ottoman naval contribution and German naval landing detachments? To expect one to believe that all our soldiers were mistaken and only heard naval pinnace mgs firing is frankly absurd; and what of the likes of our decorated Diggers on 25 April that dismantled or handled enemy mgs that day? And those British witnesses at V Beach that correlate together so accurately? What of Ozgen and Colonel  Raschid Bey and their evidence? Why does the Ottoman Turk ally, Germany, rate so few mentions in your Gallipoli/Cannakale history? They don't even get a memorial site if I am correct.

No, not convinced one iota.

Ian

 

 

[emrezmen]

Dear Ian,

I don't want to go into any personal debate and this is the last entry from me on this discussion, at least for a while.

 

History is all about documents. Regardless of their quantity, personal narratives can only be considered correct if they're not in conflict with authentic documents. You read them for the fun or to get some interesting overlooked details. The Turkish (or German) navy may have provided some guns to the infantry in order the create new MG Coys (In April 1915 the entire army had only 230 MGs and Enver was still trying to establish new MG Coys) but that doesn't mean they were being used on the beaches on 25 April. If it was, we would've surely seen it in Turkish records (not talking about official history) or in 27th Rgt's war diary in particular. Anyway, I'm sharing reports and direct orders given by the people who were actual organisers of defence, and sketches/maps drawn by them, while trying to put all these in a kinda logical cause and effect context with general Ottoman defence strategy. I will not try to explain again primary, clear documents at this point. 

 

You've mentioned about a guy called "Ozgen." While don't know about other guy, Col. Raschid, I have read the original memoirs (see below) of so-called "Ozgen" (his full name is 'Abdurrahman Özgen'). He was an officer candidate in 27th Rgt and that memoir he wrote 55 years after the war is disappointingly full of inaccuracies, exaggerations and ideological to a certain extent. It's basically what we called "fiction." As far as I can see, there is no "evidence" of any kind in the book and the events are horribly mixed up together. It's only a memoir after all.

 

 

Other than that, he was not even in 2nd Bn and definitely not with the shore detachments. He was with 3rd Battalion which is arrived at battlefield 3-4 hours after the landings.

 

Winning decorations for "dismantling/capturing MGs" also doesn't mean that there were MGs on the beach on that day. The MGs, of course, involved in battle later on but Turks didn't lose any of them (At Ariburnu, at least). I don't know how many Australians received a decoration for their actions on 25 April and can't say anything without seeing their dispatches. Those decorations may be related to capturing of two field guns at Lone Pine. But I'm afraid they will probably fail to give an exact opinion in the face of strong evidences in primary Turkish records.

 

Still, If you really so much interested in personal narratives, you may try to take a look at war-time reports written by 27th Rgt/8th Coy OC Cpt. Faik, OCdt. Ibrahim Hayrettin and OCdt. Muharrem (first guy to open fire on Australians). All three were in direct command of shore platoons (will not post their reports here since no English version is available and I've no time to translate them, sorry. Still I can share them later with anyone who really interested).

 

On 06/05/2018 at 14:01, gilly100 said:

Why does the Ottoman Turk ally, Germany, rate so few mentions in your Gallipoli/Cannakale history? They don't even get a memorial site if I am correct.

 

And this is a completely different subject and has nothing to do with our discussion. 

 

Edited 7 July , 2018 by emrezmen
Some grammatical corrections

[gilly100]

Thanks Emrezmen

I know of no account that has Royal Navy pinnace mounted mgs firing in the later waves of the Landing and yet the men in these waves  on North Beach are adamant on taking mg fire. Only two pinnace mounted mgs fired briefly in the first wave. And Ibradili Ibrahim Heyrettin talks of rifles and 2 guns south of his position at Ari Burnu proper. What he means by that i feel is unlikely to be artillery. To discount the likes of Cpl Weatherill, Lts Hooper and Derham is not wise in my opinion. And for Turk scholars and historians of this campaign to not delve into DFC records and the wider Turco German fleet is somewhat fraught in light of Murray Ewen's recent research and article. Please note. To say winning decorations for 25 April and dismantling enemy mgs does not mean there were mgs there near the beach that first day, clearly indicates you have not read the detail on Weatherill and his scout officer, Talbot Smith, nor countenanced the evidence of Hooper and Derham, who also saw and handled an enemy mg on Pine Ridge on 25 April. Again, thanks for putting up the 27 Regt info. I wish someone would tootle off to the archives of DFC and Ottoman/German Navy to help complete an otherwise and currently one dimensional offering of evidence.

Cheers

Ian

Edited 7 May , 2018 by gilly100
adding further comment

[Jeff Pickerd]

Emrezmen,

 

My many thanks for putting forward the published dairy of the 27th Regiment, and hopefully an English version will also be published.

These records do conform, and confirm, much of that which has been put forward from other sources in this long topic on the machine gun question, but as one who cannot speak or read Turkish, I still have some trouble with the correctness of the conversion through the three languages to some aspects of those translations.

The maps you have put up from the dairy are of great interest, even with the Ottoman transcriptions the ordinance symbols do relate to other later Turkish Gallipoli maps I have sighted.

I do strongly agree with your opinions drawn from the dairy to the distribution of the machine guns on the morning of the 25th April, 1915.

Again my many thanks for taking the time to post and comment upon these records.

 

Jeff

[gilly100]

It would be great to see some primary source documents from DFC and Turco German fleet as well. What do you make of Weatherill, Hooper and Derham evidence Jeff? How could they possibly be mistaken? All I have seen from the Ottoman side is 27 Regt stuff. Nothing much else and it all screams to me that digging elsewhere might prove interesting. Why has no one sought access to these other records. Are they open to look at or not? Were they open to the Australian Research Council sponsored affair led by Harvey Broadbent through Macquarie University? Or was it not on the list?

Ian

[Jeff Pickerd]

Ian,

I have refrained from making any comment to this topic for quite some time, and have only done so now to thank emrezmen for his posting of the detail from the war diary of the 27^th Regiment, which is great interest to me.

Now you have asked of me a number of questions, and I shall address these as they appear in your post.

“It would be great to see some primary source documents from DFC and Turco German Fleet as well.”

For the landing in the Anzac Sector I would ask why? Such a search would be a pointless exercise. It has now been established that there were no German Officers, Infantry, Sailors, machine gunners, or artillerymen in the Ari Burnu Sector on the morning of the 25th April 1915. The distribution of the units of the III Army Corps is well documented, and Professor Mesut Uyar has covered that extensively in his book “The Ottoman Defence against the Anzac Landing”. There is now more than enough documentation to substantiate the distribution and movements of the various Battalions, and Company Platoons of the 27^th Infantry Regiment at Ari Burnu, especially to the whereabouts of the four machine guns of the Regiment up until their deployment on Scrubby Knoll at around 7.40 a.m.

I have found it interesting that C.E.W. Bean in his Official History of Australia In The War of 1914-1918, Vol 1, gives an extensive outline of the Turkish forces on Gallipoli from late March up to the 25^th April, pages 235 to 242, which includes the Map No.8 “The Distribution of the Turkish forces on the Peninsula prior to the landing” All that accords exactly to the Turkish forces distribution as detailed in the Turkish records. Here it is of note that at this point of Bean’s history of the Gallipoli landing he makes mention of trenches, weapon pits, and camps at Ari Burnu, but absolutely no mention of any machine gun emplacements. Quite strange when he will go on to mention numerous reports of machine guns being employed, heard, sighted and captured. The last point of machine guns having been captured is at odds to the fact that the Turks did not lose any machine guns at Anzac in April. The Australian War Diaries have no reference to such captured weapons.

The two Nordenfelt guns and the two Mantelli guns at KabaTepe were the only weapons from the Fortified Zone Command at Ari Burnu, and had come under the command of the III Army Corps.

“What do make of Weatherill, Hooper and Derham evidence Jeff?”

INCREDULOUS!

I would take their accounts, as to all others who claim to have seen, heard, come under fire from, Turkish machine guns as just plain wrong in light of the Ottoman records, the remarkably low numbers of dead and wounded on the beach of Anzac Cove during the landing, the rapidity of advance up the steep and rough terrain, and rapid withdrawal of the Turkish defenders. If there were all those machine guns facing the landing, those Turks manning them must have been the most inept and incompetent ever encountered. How vastly different it became from 7.40 a.m. onwards when Lt Col Sefik positioned his four machine guns on Scrubby Knoll and halted the Australian advance.

“How could they possibly be mistaken?”

I could not hazard a guess, but to my mind they were totally mistaken. In reality it would only be they who could answer that question and it is now far too long ago for that to ever be happening.

“All I have seen from the Ottoman side is 27 Regt stuff. Nothing much else and it all screams to me that digging elsewhere might prove interesting.”

I would suggest the simple reason for that was the fact that it was only the 27^th Regiment defending the Ari Burnu sector, I fail to see just what you would hope to achieve by searching elsewhere. In reality those mysterious machine guns simply did not exist, as too, those several 10 pound Hotchkiss guns in Hooper’s gun-pits. Whatever happened to these guns? There does not appear to be any other reference to them other than Bean at page 389. Apart from the one gun in action at Kaba Tepe and later the gun battery at the Olive Grove, the 7^th Mountain Battery with its four 75 mm Krupp Mountain Guns were the only guns at Ari Burnu on the morning of the 25^th April, three were captured, one was got away. That is also well documented.

In reality, there is nothing that I have outlined here that has not been covered on numerous occasions throughout this long running topic. A great deal has now been published to support the notion to there not having been any Turkish machine guns opposing the landing. I have followed your posts of accounts to the presence of machine guns, but when I have examined those objectively they just don’t seem to stack up to the probability of being factual. On constantly going back over C.E.W. Bean’s writing of the landing just about all of these reports of Turkish machine guns just don’t make any sense to their effectiveness or abandonment.

This will now be my last word on this topic, unless of course, you can come up with definite proof to the contrary.

 

Jeff

 

Edited 24 May , 2018 by Jeff Pickerd

[michaeldr]

It must be a good idea that this discussion continues, as it is only by the exchange of ideas that there is any chance of the two sides ever understanding one another. By explaining theories and bouncing ideas off each other, then hopefully, in the fullness of time, we will arrive a complete agreement on what happened.

 

Example 1

Jeff's post No.1368 above has:

“It would be great to see some primary source documents from DFC and Turco German Fleet as well.”

For the landing in the Anzac Sector I would ask why? Such a search would be a pointless exercise. It has now been established that there were no German Officers, Infantry, Sailors, machine gunners, or artillerymen in the Ari Burnu Sector on the morning of the 25th April 1915.

However, see Klaus Wolf, page 145:

Aus dieser Truppe entstand später durch die Zusammenfassung des bereits vor Ort befindlichen Beobachtungspersonals für das indirekte Schießen die sogenannte „Landungsabteilung“ unter Führung von Oberleutnant z. S. Boltz.

 

This indicates that the German Navy did already have some personnel stationed on the peninsula prior to the arrival of the machine-gun detachments from the Goeben & Breslau. This first group were employed as artillery observers for the indirect naval fire coming from the Turkish warships in the Dardanelles.

 

Where were these German Naval gunnery observers actually stationed? Were they in the 'Ari Burnu Sector'? When did they first arrive there?

 

It should also be noted that in the Helles sector, the KOSB met a German officer above Y Beach on the 25^th April (see Westlake's 'British Regiments at Gallipoli' p.88)

 

Example 2

Emrezmen's post No.1362 above has:

As the battle rages on, the CO of 26th Rgt Lt.Col. Hafiz Kadri asked for help as he realized that his regiment was under pressure. The division commander, Col. Halil Sami, sent 25th Rgt's MG Coy along with two battalions. This is because 26th Rgt was devoid of machine guns or any automatic weapons except for two already unmanned pom-poms. 

 

However, Steel & Hart p.91 have:

“Originally the Turkish defences (V Beach) had included four 37mm pom-poms but two of these were destroyed by the bombardment, leaving only two in position left of centre of the beach.” The four pom-poms are shown in Organisation Chart No.5 - 5^th Army (April 19, 1915) in A Brief History of the Çanakkale Campaign in the First World War published by the TGS, 2004. They appear along side the thirteen 25mm Nordenfelts, under the 9^th Division.

 

 

It is also pertinent to ask at this point; where were each of the thirteen 25mm Nordenfelts placed?

 

The two pom-poms which were still operational after the initial bombardment, fired on the approaching tows, their explosive shells killing the many of the occupants as well as setting some of the boats alight. The four pom-poms are also mentioned in the Naval Review, Vol.IV, issue 1, p.136 in A NARRATIVE OF H.M.S. AGAMEMNON IN THE MEDITERRANEAN - “Two pom-poms serviceable and two damaged were captured"

….....................................................................

 

Rather than being seen as scoring points off anyone, I hope that the examples given above add to the picture of events at the landings, and help to us to get nearer to a complete historical account which is acceptable to both sides.

As far as I can see, unless we keep discussing this subject, then there is no chance that one side will ever fully understand the other, and I doubt that that is a situation which anyone wishes to see endure.

 

 

Michael

[gilly100]

Well I don't disagree Michael. I think Murray Ewen's last Gallipoli Maxims article in The Gallipolian gave us all some new and interesting info which almost no one has commented on apart from some pathetic jibes on Facebook.

The above comments regarding evidence of the likes of Weatherill, Hooper and Derham defy belief. And of course, this will not be my last word as more accounts come to light. They will get posted here for perusal by those still interested. If one wants to poke at Bean, fair enough, but fair dinkum, while you're  at it have a good read of the TOH Gallipoli for the Landings and tell me how brilliant that is! So grateful all our war records are largely available and online to anyone courtesy us the taxpayers. I think it was those same taxpayers via the Australian Research Council that provided the funds to get that TOH translated to English. Shame some of that coin didn't get put towards other archives as mentioned before.

I think the German role is highly downplayed and requires further research. I have attached my article on the Pine Ridge guns for those interested. Just an old draft copy but pretty much what went in The Gallipolian.

Ian

 

Pine Ridge Guns 25 April 1915 Anzac[1871].pdf

Edited 26 May , 2018 by gilly100
adding further comment and attachment

[gilly100]

743 Bugler Frederick Ashton 13 Platoon, D Coy, 11 Bn AIF on his Landing on 25 April and later in the day when he was captured.

From our wonderful Battye Library in Perth on microfilm reel. Ashton clearly was quite well educated.

 

"Rushing ashore, we immediately fixed bayonets, threw off our packs and lay down on the beach above the high water mark, waiting for what would happen next... we were subjected to a fairly heavy mg fire, the flashes of the rifles and the noise of the bullets striking close by.. With our officer lying on the beach with a gaping wound in his chest, and covered with blood, we were at a loss to know what our next move should be... (Note by me -this officer was leading14 platoon, Lt HH Walker)

 

Later in day up around Baby 700

 

"At the same moment a shout caused me to look up ahead of me and I found myself, to my dismay, looking down the barrels of half a dozen Turkish rifles, the soldiers half hidden in a sort of cave... One of them gave me a crushing blow on the back of the head with his rifle butt and I sank down on my knees. Without quite losing consciousness I felt myself being dragged along to a slight rise to the left where a couple of German officers were in charge of a machine gun post had seen what had happened. Arrive there. They stripped my equipment from me.... Thinking things over later, and comparing notes with other unfortunates who were later captured, I am convinced that I owe my life to the two German officers who happened to be spectators of my capture.." (My note -  Martin Troy of 16Bn who was captured around 3/4 May made the same claim about his capture)

 

Ashton goes on to explain being moved elsewhere and taken before a Turkish officer, wounded in both legs, who attempted to interrogate him, partly in French due to language barrier.

His account also marries up with earlier goings on at the beach with his officer Lt Charles Gostelow, who also wrote of coming under mg fire from the left.

 

As for proof, how many dozens of accounts does one need? Fair dinkum. And this won't be my last say on this as they just keep on coming!

 

Ian

 

Edited 6 July , 2018 by gilly100
addition

[Guest]

Mates,

 

As stated before and we again go over the details you seam to think these MG were Germans or some other ideas?

 

Germans Sailors (naval gunners) were in the defenses as stated by Michael, they were in many Batteries manning the straits defenses or more correctly supporting the Ottomans in there defenses.

 

A number died during the Allied attempts in March and later in these Batteries helping the Ottoman defend there.

 

Men like

 

Haentjens    Capt Naval    OC Aleman battery att Ottoman Batteries at Kumkale

 

Haspi    Capt Naval    OC Usedom battery att Ottoman Batteries at Kumkale
 

Lass Robert    Pte Naval    att Ottoman Batteries at Kumkale KIA 9-6-15

 

There are no German MG companies raised during this time and only stated after the landings.

 

These MG companies are also well known and there operations, as we have mentioned them before under Kottwitz von    Capt to Maj Naval    Turkish cruiser "Hamidiye" 1914 to Gelibolu'daki Deniz Çikarma Birligi komutani (Naval Units Commander (Naval MG Sects Marine-Landungsabteilung) at Gallipoli)

 

While MG's may have been stripped from Ottoman ships, if any were sent to the Army these would have been to the shore defenses along the straits, as British Marines had landed during March and they would have wanted to counter these attacks again.

 

But so far none are mentioned in any reports other then those shown in Orbats as mentioned by Michael?

 

As to a book in english written by a Turkish writer see Mesut Uyar "The Ottoman Defence against the Anzac Landings 25 April 1915" by the Australian History Unit Publishing.

 

S.B

Edited 8 July , 2018 by stevebecker

[gilly100]

Yes Steve I have the Mesut Uyar book.

Same bloke that calls us zealots I believe.

I found it interesting that Ashton could delineate between Germans and Turks. 

His fellow POW Troy of 16Bn was also clear in one of his accounts that it was a German that made sure he was kept alive. Their accounts and they were there. It's just incredible that all our blokes are always mistaken or gilding the lily. All of them virtually. What a joke quite frankly. More to come soon no doubt.

Cheers

Ian

[Guest]

Mates,

 

Thanks to Emrezmen we now have Capt Ozgan, we known now he is Abdurrahman Efendi 12th company 3Bn 27th Regt

 

Not as he said a staff officer at 19th Div HQ and some how became a MG officer above the beaches?

 

Walter Mitty or what?

 

At lest he was there that day and fought hard

 

I take it that (Ozgan) was his family name which Ataturk made all take in 1934 after he came to power.

 

Other 12th Company officers

 

Capt Galip WIA 25-4-15

 

Lt Ahmet Mucip (Kemalyeri) who replaced him

 

Lt Medeni Efendi 

 

S.B

[Fedelmar]

https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1341851?image=5

 

https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1341851?image=7

 

https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1341877?image=9

 

https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C1342708?image=10