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Remembered Today:

Cambrai Nov 1917


armourersergeant

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When the German counterattack came against the 55th division of 7th Corps i have rerad that they were holding an area more suited to two or three divisions but were they also holding a position of new ground that they had advanced into or was it old ground that they would have prepared for defence, ie their old front line?

Also how overwhelming was the artillery attack before hand and also ignoring the apparant lack of defence in depth due to numbers how superior was the German advance in tatics, that is to say was it up and over or stormtroop type tatics?

I also believe that 55th was in a 'funny' kind of position, of whose making was this?

Three nice easy questions for you to answer if anyone has an hour or two to post :lol:

ta

Arm.

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Guest Michael Orr

Dear Arm,

I hope these points from my 55th Division notes help to answer your questions. They are mostly based on Coop’s history of the division and the Jeudwine papers in the Liverpool Record office.

On 3rd October 1917 55th Div took over a frontage of 8,000 yards, “four times the length held at Ypres”. This was increased to 13,500 yards, measured along the trenches or 9,200 in a straight line at the end of the first week in November. The northern part of the divisional area consisted of fortified posts with a connecting trench, rather than a continuous fire trench. An additional problem was the boundary with 12th Division in the north ran diagonally NE-SW behind the front of the left-hand brigade, depriving it of depth in defence. The division only got permission to put troops in Villers Guislain on 28th November, which was too late to effect the defence plan. So it was a “funny kind of position”. However some of the problems were probably inevitable, given the lie of the land, the road plan and the devastation caused in the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line which limited the places where reserve troops could be deployed.

The division had received few personnel replacements since their attack at Ypres on 20/9/17 and 164th Brigade lost over 600 men in the diversion at Gillemont Farm and the Knoll on 20th November and had been withdrawn to rest & re-fit. The effective strength of the division on 30 November was about 11,000 and the two forward brigades on 30th November had less than 7,000 men (ie in the front line the division had less than 1 man per 2 yards of front).

The artillery available to the division was 44 x 18 pdrs, 2 x 4.5” hows and 4 x 6” hows; most of the division’s 4.5” hows were under corps control for counter-battery work. This was 1 gun per 295 yards of trench frontage (or 200 yards in a straight line).

As far as German tactics were concerned, it seems that their attack was almost a rehearsal for the March Offensive, with a heavy artillery bombardment, including gas and ground attack aircraft, and infiltration tactics by infantry exploiting mist and the dead ground of Banteux & Twenty-Two Ravines along the interdivisional and inter-corps boundary. However according to the British Official History, quoting German sources, the infantry were not sufficiently trained in the new tactics.

55th Division (Jeudwine) and VII Corps (Snow) were very aware that an attack was likely but had decided that they could hope to hold vital points until reinforced and were not justified in asking for reinforcements when Byng wanted every man and gun to develop success to the north. III Corps (Pulteney) refused all requests for assistance, including Jeudwine’s request for counter-preparation fire on likely German forming-up areas in Banteux Ravine at dawn on 30th November. I believe that Byng was at fault in failing to take account of the German threat to the flanks of the Cambrai Salient and to ensure coordination between III & VII Corps.

Michael Orr

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Thanks Michael,

that helps considerly to put a picture in my mind of the problems they faced, but i have one thing to clarify if i may.

You say they were not in their opinion justified to ask for help, do you mean that they did not actually ask for help from army headquarters because everything i have read points to them asking for aid but that it went unheaded?

Anyway thanks again

Arm.

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Guest Michael Orr

Dear Arm,

The decision not to ask for re-inforcements was taken “after 20 November” at a conference between Snow and his divisional commanders. As the threat became clearer Snow & Jeudwine tried to arrange support from III Corps. They did get the boundary shifted on 28th Nov to put Villers Guislain & Vauclette Farm into the VII Corps/55Div area. That made it possible to put 1/4th North Lancs in Vauclette Farm for immediate counter-attack in support of 166th Bde, which was crucial on 30th November. VII Corps tried to arrange that 12th Div in III Corps would have a brigade on call to 55th Div about Heudicourt but when Jeudwine went to discuss this with Scott of 12th Div on 29th Nov, Scott had had no orders from III Corps & said he had not a brigade to spare. However Jeudwine did arrange that 5 batteries of III Corps Heavy Artillery at 12th Div’s disposal should bring “concentrated annihilating fire on the enemy assembly places at 6.30 am” on the 30th. III Corps rang Jeudwine that evening and cancelled the arrangement as a great waste of ammunition if there was no attack. Jeudwine said “if we were attacked it would be a great waste of life and was much worse” but the counter-preparation was not fired.

As far as I am aware VII Corps and 55th Div did not actually ask for reinforcements in the sense of extra troops or guns &c coming under their command.

Best wishes

Michael

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Thats very interesting Michael its the first time i have heard that version of events and it puts a different angle on the versions i have heard to date where did you get this info?

I seem to know have had seven or eight differing versions of the same event all from different sources and it is making finding the truth very hard. I suppose the truth looks different depending on which angle you look at it.

thanks

Arm.

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Guest Michael Orr

My main source are the Records of the 55th (West Lancs) Division deposited by Gen Jeudwine in the Liverpool Record Office. There are several files dealing with the Cambrai Counter-Attack and its aftermath because Jeudwine was very keen to protect the division's reputation. This includes corrspondence with your friend Snow and a copy of the Hesdin Inquiry report, with Snow & Jeudwine's unfavourable comments on Maxse.

Michael

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