the attack at gommecourt 1st july 1916

[armourersergeant]

I have of course come across the battle of Gommecourt in my study of General Snow and took the resons for the attack at face value but know i have had some thought regarding the validity of the diversionary attack. It was supposed to be a diversionary attack and lots was done to alert the germans to the effect that they were coming but...

1..If the artillery was keeping the germans in their dug outs was the only way the Germans were going to see the 'extra ' movements, by air recce and if so surely they would have seen all the movements along the complete third and fourth army front?

2..With the artillery bombardment being along the german front on the Somme would they not have been expecting a massive assult along the front and not just in one area.

3..Can anybody tell me wether it is known if Snow or Allenby ordered the resummption of the attack after the intial one failed(considering it purpose it was bound too) when surely they had done the job designated. I have read that Allenby was under some pressure too prove himself?

any thought please

Arm.

[Jonathan Saunders]

With regard to point 3) I have always understood it was Allenby who gave orders for the attack to continue in the afternoon although the two Divisions by that time had completed their designated task of diversion.

I know yr relatively new to the study of WW1, as I am myself, so if you havent read Middlebrook's First Day of the Somme, I would suggest you elevate it to the top of yr reading list!

[Jonathan Saunders]

Sorry Arm having to do this clandestinely at work. Not sure about 1).

Re 2) I believe the intention of Gommecourt was to give the expectation that the attack may develop to the north. The Germans did not expect an attack on such a large front (a 17 mile stretch) and I think what few reserves the Germans had went to the centre and northern part of the Somme. Therefore the diversion did work as it contributed to the successes that were achieved in the south of the battlefield.

[Chris_Baker]

With regard to Point 2:

Official History 1916 Volume 1

Page 252: "It was also suggested by Sir Douglas Haig that there should be simultaneous activity, as far as could be arranged, against the Gommecourt salient, then in the Fourth Army sector, for the purpose of attracting the attantion of the enemy's artillery and reserves to that side".

Page 257, referring to Rawlinson's reaction to Haig's thoughts: "This (Gommecourt) he said, was beyond what the Fourth Army could accomplish with the resources allotted to it. Sir Douglas Haig, therefore, transferred the task to Third Army".

Page 308: referring to Haig's meeting with Third Army on 30 June: "The Third Army will assist in the first and second stages of the operations by securing the Gommecourt salient, co-operating with artillery in the attack of the VIII Corps as already arranged, and holding the enemy on the Third Army front by continuing a general activity on the same lines as have already proved so effective during the last few days".

Page 310: "..in addition to the full preparations against the Gommecourt salient, General Allenby concentrated his resources for an attack on the Monchy salient; on a front of 1500 yards north of Ficheux (one mile north east of Blaireville); and on the salient north of Roclincourt, with a systematic bombardment corresponding generally to the artillery programme of the Fourth Army".

So it was worse than you think. It was not only the Somme front where the enemy was placed on notice of an imminent attack, but all the way to the north of Arras!

[bmac]

Gen Snow was given the task of attacking Gommecourt on April 28th 1916 after Gen Rawlinson decided that such an attack was beyond the means of the 4th Army. Both Snow and Allenby were opposed to the attack. Because of French attacks just to the south of Hebuterne in June 1915, the Gommecourt area had become one of the most heavily fortified parts of the Western Front. About 120 reinforced and linked dugouts had been built and the area was well supplied by a complex network of light railways. No Man's Land was also far wider than was normally acceptable for an attack: up to 800 yards on the 56th Division front and 400 on the 46th Division front. In addition, the terrain on the 46th Division front allowed for observation deep into British lines from German positions behind Gommecourt village.

Allenby and Snow were concerned by the strength of the position in front of them and the weakness of their own. So concerned that they argued an alternative strategy for an attack further north at Arras. Here the terrain was more favourable, the German positions less well developed and the German forces fewer and of lower calibre. Their argument was this: a diversionary attack with no prospect of exploitation was best delivered against a point of enemy weakness not strength. The more so as they had been given explicit instructions not to attempt to conceal the projected assault. By the very nature of such obvious preparations for an attack, especially on a weak part of the line, German reserves of both infantry and artillery would be drawn to this area of the front. Wherever they came from would weaken the German ability to respond to the main advance further south. They could, therefore, achieve the result desired without exposing their men to unnecessarily heavy casualties.

The Official History states (Military Operations France and Belgium 1916, Vol. 1, page 454):

"It was, however, asking very much that two divisions new to the ground should attack at two months' notice defences of the strength of Gommecourt, unless a complete surprise without much previous preparation were intended. The enemy salient was in reality a small modern fortress. It required siege operations, or, at any rate as events proved, bombardment by super-heavy guns to destroy its dug-outs, as well as a great amount of trenchwork to get within assaulting distance, besides an ample supply of labour for carrying up stores and munitions…. It seems improbable that G.H.Q. realised the strength - and that strength enormously increased by flanking artillery defence - of the Gommecourt salient. If an attack is to be made merely in order to hold enemy troops and prevent their employment elsewhere, a weak or vulnerable part of the enemy's front should be chosen, not the strongest. Further, Gommecourt was particularly easy of defence, and from the shape of the ground it was a most difficult place from which to disengage troops in the event of partial failure or incomplete success. "

All objections, plus the alternative of using VII Corps artillery on 1st July to suppress the German artillery concentrated around Puisieux, were rejected by Haig.

So, Snow and Allenby had to work with the following objectives:

1. To draw reserves away from the area of the main attack prior to the attack going in;

2. To divert German artillery fire away from the northern end of the main attack at Serre; and

3. To straighten the line by reducing the Gommecourt salient.

Objective 3 would be a 'happy' by-product of first two objectives. As no reserves were allocated to the attack, even if they had been completely successful, no exploitation of the success was either required or possible.

In order to achieve objective 1, the attacking divisions were instructed to make their preparations as obvious as possible. The clearest indication of intentions was the digging of a completely new front line trench by the 56th Division some 300 metres in front of the existing lines dug by the French in 1915. On the nights of 25th-27th May, 3,500 men, mainly of the 167th Brigade, dug two kilometres of trenches and associated communication trenches, suffering remarkably few casualties in the process.

Throughout May and June, a network of roads, light railways and trenches was constructed; telephone cables were laid and buried; artillery positions prepared; and large quantities of stores brought up. If this was not enough to alert the Germans, a German aircraft somehow managed to get well behind British lines (at a time when the RFC had almost complete aerial domination) and flew over some fields near Halloy where the German trenches had been laid out with white tape so that the men could practice attacking. Whilst this had the desired effect of alerting the Germans to the impending attack it also exhausted the men. No Labour Battalions were available for this work and the men due to 'go over the top' were required to do back breaking labouring work in dreadful conditions (May and June were unseasonably wet) for two months prior to the attack. Four days before the attack, Snow told Haig, "They know we are coming all right".

The net effect of this was that the German 2nd Guards Reserve Division was brought into the salient to assist the 111th and 52nd Division already there. In addition, six heavy artillery batteries came with them and, later, two regiments of artillery from the 10th Bavarian Division then in Corps reserve near Arras. This concentration of artillery gave the defenders a substantial advantage over the British artillery supporting VII Corps' attack. These reserves, however, were not drawn away from the main attack area but from the Gommecourt sector itself or areas further to the north.

British artillery consisted of 56 howitzers (15" down to 6") and 28 guns (9.2" to 4.7") plus the 18pdrs and 4.5" howizters of the divisional field artillery. The majority of these batteries were still in the UK in early May and had not fired a shot in anger; some did not arrive until the middle of June and were not ready to fire until the planned beginning of the bombardment. For example, the two 12" railway mounted howitzers of 103rd Siege Battery managed to fire just two rounds each (both on June 23rd) before the bombardment started on the 24th June. The inaccuracy of inexperienced gunners, equipment failures and the poor quality of the shells (especially the 9.2" howitzer shell) led, therefore, to a lot of sound and fury within the German defences but very little impact. The 55th Reserve Infantry Regiment, for example, reported casualties of only 5 killed and 44 wounded throughout the seven days of the bombardment. Cover of darkness was used to repair trenches and damaged wire and aerial photographs taken on the morning of the 1st July by No. 8 Squadron RFC show precious little damage to trenches except in a couple of strongpoints at either end of the 56th Division's attack.

Oddly enough, though infantry preparations were made as obvious as possible, artillery preparations were kept as secret as possible. Very little fire, other than registration of targets, was allowed before U Day (24th June, first day of the bombardment) consequently, German activities of strengthening their defences went unhampered throughout most of June.

On 1st July, the concept of the diversionary attack was shown to be flawed within a few minutes. The attack on Serre collapsed in bloody shambles, partly as a result of the heavy German artillery fire from Puisieux which was supposed to have been drawn away by the Gommecourt attack. When the Serre attack ceased, this artillery switched to a bombardment of the 56th Division's front. This, plus the artillery of the 2nd Guards Reserve, 10th Bavarian and 111th Division to the north resulted in a barrage "more severe than in any other sector (on the Somme front)" (Military Operations France and Belgium 1916, Vol. 1, page 460).

The attack of the 46th Division north of Gommecourt was a disaster. Poorly planned and organised, subject to heavy artillery fire, caught up on old French wire undiscovered in the long grass, the North Midlanders were mown down in No Man's Land. By 9am the attack was over in spite of various attempts, organised at a local level, to renew the attack in the early afternoon. Maj Gen Montagu Stuart Wortley was brought before a Court of Inquiry and was the only senior officer removed as a result of the failures of 1st July.

56th Division's attack was initially successful but the Londoners were then cut off from their reserves by the strength of the German artillery and were then subjected to counter-attacks all day. Running out of bombs, the remains of the right wing of the attack withdrew in mid-afternoon and the last men on the left left the German trenches about 8pm. Confusion was such that VII Corps HQ seemed not to know about the withdrawal of the 56th Division and orders were received at 10.30pm to mount raids on the German lines in order to ascertain the position of any British troops remaining there. These orders were later cancelled.

General Snow did not exactly endear himself to the men of the 56th Division after the event. In the course of a speech he stated "...and when I heard that you had been driven back, I did not care a damn. It did not matter whether you took your objective or not. Our attack was only a feint to keep the German Guards Divisions occupied whilst the main attack was being made down South".

Casualties in the attack were nearly 7,000, with over 2,200 dead. German losses were about 1,100.

[Andrew Hesketh]

Regarding the desire to draw German artillery away from more southerly attacks.....I've done a lot of research into the attack by the 1/7th Sherwood Foresters (see my tag line below), the most northerly battalion of the entire day. I am coming to the fairly clear conclusion that all the artillery directed on them , and indeed the 46th Division as a whole, largely came from German batteries that were out of range of the main attacks (e.g. Serre). In other words, it is likely that the Gommecourt diversion failed to divert any meaningful artillery response at all, it merely attracted devastation from units in other places. In fact, the more I look into Gommecourt the more futile it becomes. For example, why was no firepower laid on the 'Little Z', a small protrusion to the north of Gommecourt, from which multiple machine guns shredded the Foresters. This seems to have been a major oversight.

Regarding 1. In the above area, German accounts indicate they could clearly see the attack forming, though I've found no precise details as to how. My assumption is that some brave souls were lying forward in saps etc.

Regarding 3. There were follow up attacks from the 46th Division, but they appear to have been ordered in the optimistic (and ultimately incorrect) assumption that some of the first waves were still holding on in enemy trenches.

I would welcome any counter-comments to the above, it is an issue of great importance to me.

All the best,

Andrew

[bmac]

The artillery programme had all Corps artillery moving away from the front lines and into rear areas immediately the attack went in thus areas like the Z and Little Z would have been left unattended during the day. As it was thought that some men from the 139th Brigade were in the German lines I would guess that there would have been reluctance to bring artillery fire on these areas. Certainly, artillery co-operation between the infantry and the corps artillery seems to have been poor. 56th Division repeatedly asked for artillery fire to suppress the German artillery near Puisieux and to deal with the even more obvious howitzer that was dragged out of Rossignol Wood and used to attack the strongpoint occupied by the London Scottish, all to no effect.

There was a large number of German batteries based in Adinfer Wood, some miles to the north of Gommecourt, which were brought to bear on the 46th Division. These would have been out of range of Serre. The eighty guns and howitzers of the 2nd Guards Reserve Division alone fired some 22,000 shells on July 1st. Add to this the firepower of the other 120 guns of the 52nd and 111th Divisions and one can get some idea as to the huge weight of shell dropped on the 46th and 56th Divisions in the space of about 14 hours.

Clearly, the Germans were on the alert for the attack after seven days of bombardment and two things would have made the timing even more certain. Smoke was released early on the left of the 56th Division line and, rather more obvious, the Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt Mine went up at 7.20am, ten minutes before the attack.

[Andrew Hesketh]

Bill,

Spot on. I wrote the above from work without access to my notes and I couldn't remember the name of Adinfer Wood. One other location for much of the enemy artillery was (from memory - could be wrong) Monchy au Bois.

"The artillery programme had all Corps artillery moving away from the front lines and into rear areas immediately the attack went in thus areas like the Z and Little Z would have been left unattended during the day.."

Correct again Bill, but I'm still a bit miffed by this decision, as the attack would not be directed at that point, but run parallel to it. I suppose they may have worried about some innaccurate rounds causing casualties on the attacking troops, but I can't see how that would have been less preferable than giving the Germans in those positions uninterrupted flanking fire. I haven't yet consulted the records of the British artillery in this episode, and I suppose I'll find some answers there. In any case, the British artillery 'lift' was cocked up and many of the advancing waves suffered from it - "Our artillery has not stopped and is dropping shells near us. A red light is burned to try and stop them." (Pte Stevenson). The red light was also a disaster as it was also a signal used by the Germans to call in divisional artillery support.

If anyone is interested in my account of the attack of the 1/7th SF, take a look at http://www.multeen.freeserve.co.uk/1-7th%20Btn.htm

This is part of Dr. Mike Briggs excellent site 'Chesterfield Sherwoods on the Somme'.

All the best,

Andrew

[armourersergeant]

Some really good info and feed back thanks all,

Some points.

Sigs.. I have the book but have only skim read the pages relevant to Gommecourt but i see how well the narrative flows it will be an easy book to read when i get to it. With all the research i have done on Snow i am getting contradictory info so i try to back up what i find with quotes being established, thus can you remeber where you read about Allenby giving the order. if i remember Middlebrook only hints that Allenby gave the order?

bmac...great info ta, the quote of Snows speech can you remember where you read it or where the quote originates from, it does sound at the very least pompous and particularly callous but he does seem to be a bit of a bummbler on occasions(it may be he was trying to let them know that failure was not a problem to there objective). Most have no two good words to say about Snow, yet when i delve i see little eveidence is given to substatiate the claims.Alot seems to be hear say passed down. I know Montgomery did not like him and said he was too old and Haldane did not have a good word too say either but i have not found any others.

once again thanks fro the replies.

Arm.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Arm,

Yes Middlebrook does not pin down the order to continue the offensive at Gommecourt. He indicates it was either Snow or Allenby. I am sure I have read elsewehere it was Allenby but having looked through a handful of Somme related books I cant clarify.

I have to say this was a great thread that spurned some absolutely fantastic responses. Thanks to all for broadening my knowledge on this particular element of the 1 July attacks.

[bmac]

the quote of Snows speech can you remember where you read it or where the quote originates from

Lt F H Wallis, Adjutant of the London Rifle Brigade, in a report to be found at the PRO in file CAB45/132.

[FrancesK]

 

 

In the light of the above, where the objectives of the attack on the Gommecourt Salient are set out, how do you read the following? This is from London Rifle Brigade National Archives War Diary Ref: WO-95-2961-1_02.
I'm a complete beginner in this field, but it seems to me that the Brig-Gen. was being disingenuous in saying that the purpose of the attack, 'containing and killing Germans', was entirely successful. 

 

 

 

Edited 27 December , 2023 by FrancesK

[FrancesK]

There's another anomaly about this. The information in this link suggests that the trenches were full of mud due to incessant rain, but the War DIARY for 1-5 July 1916 says:

Hannescamps  August 1916 1st Bn LRB
1st. Work on all trenches proceeding very well, but work rather hard during day on account of great heat. 'A' Patrol under command of 2nd Lt MOORE went out at night but had nothing to report.
2nd. As above, slight shelling again and (in?) direct hits on our trenches sustained.
3rd.    Ditto          ditto    Casualties 2503 Rfn JARVIS, W., killed, 2 men wounded and Major Husey slightly wounded, but remained at duty. ‘B’ Coy relived ‘D’ Coy in left sector of Batt’n front, ‘A’ Coy and ‘C’ Coy remaining in front line for 8 days.
4th.    Being second anniversary of the War, the Germans indulged in an intense bombardment of the trenches on our left, held by the 5th LEICESTERS, 46th Division, apparently very little damage done, and few casualties sustained. We had no casualties. Bombardment started at 3:30am and our artillery replied promptly. Weather very hot.
See below, from the National Archives:

[Matlock1418]

42 minutes ago, FrancesK said:

There's another anomaly about this. The information in this link suggests that the trenches were full of mud due to incessant rain, but the War DIARY for 1-5 July 1916 says:

Hannescamps  August 1916 1st Bn LRB
1st. Work on all trenches proceeding very well, but work rather hard during day on account of great heat. 'A' Patrol under command of 2nd Lt MOORE went out at night but had nothing to report.
2nd. As above, slight shelling again and (in?) direct hits on our trenches sustained.
3rd.    Ditto          ditto    Casualties 2503 Rfn JARVIS, W., killed, 2 men wounded and Major Husey slightly wounded, but remained at duty. ‘B’ Coy relived ‘D’ Coy in left sector of Batt’n front, ‘A’ Coy and ‘C’ Coy remaining in front line for 8 days.
4th.    Being second anniversary of the War, the Germans indulged in an intense bombardment of the trenches on our left, held by the 5th LEICESTERS, 46th Division, apparently very little damage done, and few casualties sustained. We had no casualties. Bombardment started at 3:30am and our artillery replied promptly. Weather very hot.
See below, from the National Archives:

????? That LR/LRB WD is for 1 - 5 August, not 1 July 1916 ?????

The 1/6th Notts & Derby's WD refers to "very muddy state of our trenches" on 1/7/16 at Foncquevillers so I believe the same for the 1/7th N&D and I might think a similarly for other units only a short distance away on 1 July.

So if I were you then I'd be looking a month earlier in the LR/LRB diary!

M

Edited 27 December , 2023 by Matlock1418
typo

[Matlock1418]

55 minutes ago, FrancesK said:

See below, from the National Archives:

Going back to the eve of the attack = 30 June 1916's entry from that reference:

Image thanks to TNA

I read "The weather during the ?????? was quite abnormal, there being an extremely heavy rainfall and the temperature at times quite cold"

M

[PhilB]

During the month?

[Matlock1418]

2 minutes ago, PhilB said:

During the month?

I did consider "month" but wasn't sure - it seemed to make sense but have left it to you/others to properly decipher!

M

Edited 27 December , 2023 by Matlock1418
typo

[FrancesK]

My brain's completely addled. Thank you. How stupid of me. 

[FrancesK]

22 minutes ago, Matlock1418 said:

I did consider "month" but wasn't sure - it seemed to make sense but have left it to you/others to properly decipher!

M

I'm sure it's 'month'. Thank you so much for the excerpt. 

[kenf48]

17 hours ago, FrancesK said:

In the light of the above, where the objectives of the attack on the Gommecourt Salient are set out, how do you read the following? This is from London Rifle Brigade National Archives War Diary Ref: WO-95-2961-1_02.
I'm a complete beginner in this field, but it seems to me that the Brig-Gen. was being disingenuous in saying that the purpose of the attack, 'containing and killing Germans', was entirely successful. 

There is no record as to why two TF Divisions were chosen for the attack on Gommecourt. It was a major diversion intended to confuse and contain the enemy and has been suggested, albeit without evidence, that it may have been the attitude of the Regular Army towards the TF.  The Germans did bring up an extra Division to defend the position but not, unfortunately from the Somme.

The 56th Division assault was carefully planned and practice trenches dug to allow the assaulting battalions to rehearse the attack a number of times.  It was noted at the planning stage that if either of the Divisions failed to achieve their objective then the other would be isolated.

As noted in the above analysis the Brigades of the 56th Division achieved nearly all their objectives although under sustained artillery and machine gun fire.  By 7.50a.m. the L.R.B.had taken all their planned objectives and were beginning to consolidate and hold their position with much reduced numbers. Due to the less successful assault by 46th Division (or "disaster" as above)  the units of the Division became isolated.   German artillery pounded No Mans Land which meant neither reinforcements nor ammunition could reach them.  The main cause of the failure of 56th Division to hold the positions they had taken was that they ran out of grenades when counter attacked.  They resorted to using German grenades but when they were gone and the Germans counter attacked in large numbers they were forced to abandon their position and attempt to retire.

In that regard the observation in the congratulatory note is not disingenuous but accurate, the 56th Division did hold their captured positions until 'their ammunition and grenades were exhausted' and their bravery in holding their position as their numbers were whittled down was more than worthy of acknowledgement even though the survivors were eventually forced to retire. 

It is always worth reading the higher echelon diaries as a primary source. The 56th Division Diary (WO95/2931/1-4) contains detailed plans, objectives and after action reports for the attack.  These were not so readily available twenty years ago when the above thread began and no disrespect to previous contributors and their detailed analysis of the assault the accounts, to a certain extent, as with the suggested link concentrate on the plight of the 46th Division rather than the initial success and tenacity of the 56th to whom the congratulatory note is addressed.  

 

[FrancesK]

3 hours ago, kenf48 said:

There is no record as to why two TF Divisions were chosen for the attack on Gommecourt. It was a major diversion intended to confuse and contain the enemy and has been suggested, albeit without evidence, that it may have been the attitude of the Regular Army towards the TF.  The Germans did bring up an extra Division to defend the position but not, unfortunately from the Somme.

The 56th Division assault was carefully planned and practice trenches dug to allow the assaulting battalions to rehearse the attack a number of times.  It was noted at the planning stage that if either of the Divisions failed to achieve their objective then the other would be isolated.

As noted in the above analysis the Brigades of the 56th Division achieved nearly all their objectives although under sustained artillery and machine gun fire.  By 7.50a.m. the L.R.B.had taken all their planned objectives and were beginning to consolidate and hold their position with much reduced numbers. Due to the less successful assault by 46th Division (or "disaster" as above)  the units of the Division became isolated.   German artillery pounded No Mans Land which meant neither reinforcements nor ammunition could reach them.  The main cause of the failure of 56th Division to hold the positions they had taken was that they ran out of grenades when counter attacked.  They resorted to using German grenades but when they were gone and the Germans counter attacked in large numbers they were forced to abandon their position and attempt to retire.

In that regard the observation in the congratulatory note is not disingenuous but accurate, the 56th Division did hold their captured positions until 'their ammunition and grenades were exhausted' and their bravery in holding their position as their numbers were whittled down was more than worthy of acknowledgement even though the survivors were eventually forced to retire. 

It is always worth reading the higher echelon diaries as a primary source. The 56th Division Diary (WO95/2931/1-4) contains detailed plans, objectives and after action reports for the attack.  These were not so readily available twenty years ago when the above thread began and no disrespect to previous contributors and their detailed analysis of the assault the accounts, to a certain extent, as with the suggested link concentrate on the plight of the 46th Division rather than the initial success and tenacity of the 56th to whom the congratulatory note is addressed.  

 

Thank you for this. Much appreciated.