13th & 14th May 1915

[michaeldr]

13th & 14th May 1915

The view from London, per the British O. H.

"On the 13th May an appreciation of the military situation on the Western front, coupled with an account of the severe reverse lately inflicted upon the Russians in Galicia, had been drawn up for the War Council by Lord Kitchener. This appreciation advanced a new argument against any further strengthening of Sir Ian Hamilton’s force, namely, the fear of an invasion of England.

Lord Kitchener’s view was that, although Sir John French now had more than half a million British troops on the flank of the French armies, recent experience had proved that the German line in the west could not at present be broken. In these circumstances, he considered that the only course for the Allies in France and Flanders was to maintain a defensive role, and prepare for a gigantic concentration and attack by German forces, such as the Russians had recently been unable to withstand. In such an emerganency France would need every available man that could be spared from England, and then would be the moment for Germany to attempt a landing on the east coast. Lord Kitchener looked upon such a landing as probable, and the danger from it as very serious. For this reason he did not consider it safe at the present moment to send any more of the new divisions overseas………………………………………………………………………

………………….on the 14th May there were three alternative methods of dealing with the Dardanelles problem for discussion by the War Council; to abandon the operations and withdraw from the peninsula; to make a determined assault on the Turkish positions with large forces; or to hold the existing lines, to keep Sir Ian Hamilton’s forces up to strength, send him the one division already promised, and trust to his being able to make slow and steady progress towards the Narrows.

The first of these alternatives was objectionable for political reasons. It was felt that such an admission of failure would not only turn the Balkan scale against the Entente but would almost certainly lead to risings all over the Moslem world. The second course, which might lead to an early and successful termination of the campaign, was obviously attractive; but against it there had to be weighted Lord Kitchener’s view that for the moment not another man could be spared from England. The third alternative avoided both the abandonment of the enterprise and any excessive inroads into Britain’s slender military resources. But it had the inherent disadvantage of a compromise, and would immobilize a large army and a considerable fleet for many months."