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Remembered Today:

BORDEN'S MOTOR MACHINE GUN BATTERY


TD60

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20 hours ago, MikeMeech said:

 

Elaborating on the previous comments. The Motor Machine Gun Service had planned to form 40 MMG batteries, but this was cancelled when the MGC took them over. Over the summer of 1915 the MMGS had recruited heavily for these planned batteries, but most of the personnel from August onwards started forming armoured vehicle units (the earliest  predating the MGC). Once the army inherited the RNAS cars they began forming L.A.B units (four cars)  - these were mostly later combined or upsized to 8 car L.A.M.B units due to having a more effective fighting strength and more economical (in terms of officers and mechanical support). From December 1915 on MMGS recruits in the main ended up going direct to Heavy Branch. Certainly from a strategy point of view the resources shifted into tanks as these were seen as a "war winner". In the first two weeks of November 1916  five MMG batteries were disbanded and research shows most of the personnel transferred directly to Heavy Branch - in what was obviously a planned move - and likely as a result of the tank action at Flers. By spring 1917 there were only three L.A.B units left in France and all of those moved to Mesopotamia. It's interesting to read the war diaries which show what these units were actually doing. For sure the MMG units were still playing an active roll  (bearing in mind the motorcycles were primarily intended as a means of transport to move the guns where they were needed - and the guns dismounted from the bikes for use) the two main activities were extreme range suppressing fire with pre planned fire plans (using the road network behind the allied lines) and as mobile anti aircraft batteries. The small armoured car units were obviously struggling with the conditions - again the war diaries reveal constant mechanical issues (cars out of action for service and repair), issues with road conditions ect . Also shows up constant modifications and increased armouring required due to conditions armoured piercing bullets - these all increased weight to the point the cars were at their limit (mechanically) and even more prone to bogging down. So there were sound reasons for pulling them out and sending them to the middle east where they made much more contribution. It's interesting to see photos of the same cars later in Mesopotamia they removed a lot of the modifications to get the weight back down. Another interesting comparison - looking at the relative battery strengths (MMG battery, L.A.B and L.A.M.B units) shows up the manpower and technical support (and cost) required to put each gun in the field. The motorcycle batteries were more or less self sufficient in mechanical/technical support, and though the armoured car units also had their own mobile workshops they were much more dependent on central "depot" workshops for repairs/overhauls. 

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  • 2 weeks later...

I recall now the source of the quotation about the Vickers orders: the taped recollections of Brig. Gen. Raymond Brutinel, which can be read here

 

Quote

The power of inertia displayed by the Higher Command regarding machine guns, grenades, munitions and so on, paralysed the British Army for some time.  Here is a first anecdote which illustrates this senseless attitude: on the 4th of February 1915 the King inspected the 1st Canadian Division mustered on Salisbury Plains.  The Machine Gun Motor Brigade had been formed on three lines. The Armoured trucks and officers' cars - the ammunition trucks, the repair shops - and other auxiliary cars.  In front of each armoured truck stood the Officer in Command, the driver and the two No.1 machine gunners.  In the truck crouching behind the raised armoured panels were the men completing the crews.

The King was interested by this unusual outfit and dismounting his charger, walked to the first armoured truck; he looked at it and fingered the front armour, then the armour of the side panels, and jumped lightly on a wheel to have a look inside the truck. He was suddenly confronted with the men completing the crews, who rose hastily to attention.  The surprise was great on both sides but His Majesty seemed delighted with the incident and asked questions regarding the number of rounds carried, and so on.  While awaiting his charger, the King said to Lord Kitchener : "This unit should be very useful I think." Much to my dismay, Lord Kitchener replied: "I don't think so, Sir, it would unbalance the fire power of a division."  Lieut. General Alderson, then commanding the Canadian Expeditionary Forces, was near me and he heard the brief dialogue. After the inspection he told me gravely: "I am afraid Lord Kitchener is right."

And that was that.

Here is a second anecdote, in confirmation as it were, of the earlier indictment.  I was very anxious to secure Vickers machine guns for the Motor Brigade and if possible, for the Canadian Contingent, but I feared that the Vickers Works might be swamped by all kinds of orders.  To ascertain the facts, I asked one of my associates in civil life, Mr. Fred Melling, Mechanical Engineer, to arrange a private visit of the Vickers Works.

During this visit, I asked if I could see the machine gun assembly shops. The engineer in charge of our visit said, "I am sorry but there is nothing to see there. We are polishing up a lot of 80 machine guns ordered by Italy before the declaration of war. We don't quite know if we must deliver them. In any case, they seem to have developed in high quarters some sort of prejudice against machine guns. We have no orders on hand and we feel it is a great pity."

We were then at the end of November 1914.

 

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34 minutes ago, 2ndCMR said:

I recall now the source of the quotation about the Vickers orders: the taped recollections of Brig. Gen. Raymond Brutinel, which can be read here

 

 

Hi

 

I can only suggest that Brutinel may have 'miss-remembered' or the engineer in charge was not telling the truth as at November 1914 Vickers had yet to supply the orders that the British Army had requested in the four contracts made during August and September 1914!  If the assembly shops were idle why weren't they producing the Vickers guns already ordered that year?  The company were noted for 'failing to keep its promises on delivery' well into 1915.

 

Mike

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35 minutes ago, MikeMeech said:

Hi

 

I can only suggest that Brutinel may have 'miss-remembered' ...

Mike

As he appears to have done when it came to the date of the incident  - see my post 20. Quite understandable: Brutinel was 80 years old when he recorded his recollections, and he did so some 38 years after the Royal inspections.

 

The Royal occasion of November 4 comprised a series of visits to different camps, including Pond Farm where Brutinel's  unit was camped. That of February 4 appears to have been more one of meeting senior officers and then taking the salute at a march-past of the Contingent.

 

My attempts to access the Brigade's war diaries for this period result in the message "Warning: Descriptive record is in process. These materials may not yet be available for consultation".

 

 

Moonraker

 

 

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2 hours ago, MikeMeech said:

Hi

 

I can only suggest that Brutinel may have 'miss-remembered' or the engineer in charge was not telling the truth as at November 1914 Vickers had yet to supply the orders that the British Army had requested in the four contracts made during August and September 1914!  If the assembly shops were idle why weren't they producing the Vickers guns already ordered that year?  The company were noted for 'failing to keep its promises on delivery' well into 1915.

 

Mike

 

Perhaps the orders were wending their weary way through the hands of War Office "ink-slingers" and arrived at Vickers some time after Brutinel's visit?  Anyone who reads Fuller's memoirs will remember the amusing and pathetic saga of the CIGS' dividers and the bureaucratic round-game that prefaced their issue.  R.V.K. Applin, who I was just reading the other day, recounts similar nonsense as do the memoirs of innumerable other officers. 

 

If questions were raised within the War Office over late deliveries the ink-slingers would be sure to blame the contractor, not their own delay in processing the orders.  Indeed, knowing how other contracts were at times "back-dated", I would be sceptical of dates claimed on them particularly on so tendentious a subject as machine guns.  Vickers has an extensive archive I believe; perhaps someone should dig into it?  The company records are more likely to show what was actually ordered when.

 

 

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1 hour ago, 2ndCMR said:

 

Perhaps the orders were wending their weary way through the hands of War Office "ink-slingers" and arrived at Vickers some time after Brutinel's visit?  Anyone who reads Fuller's memoirs will remember the amusing and pathetic saga of the CIGS' dividers and the bureaucratic round-game that prefaced their issue.  R.V.K. Applin, who I was just reading the other day, recounts similar nonsense as do the memoirs of innumerable other officers. 

 

If questions were raised within the War Office over late deliveries the ink-slingers would be sure to blame the contractor, not their own delay in processing the orders.  Indeed, knowing how other contracts were at times "back-dated", I would be sceptical of dates claimed on them particularly on so tendentious a subject as machine guns.  Vickers has an extensive archive I believe; perhaps someone should dig into it?  The company records are more likely to show what was actually ordered when.

 

 

Hi

 

I think the official records are quite clear and extensive on the subject as they were paying out a lot of money for these orders, the History of the Ministry of Munitions has some detail on this:

 

"The first comparatively small orders placed with Messrs. Vickers in August and September, 1914, were at prices ranging from £167 to £162 per gun (inclusive of spares).  On the larger orders of September, 1914, the firm refused to make any reduction on the ground that the consequent reductions in manufacturing costs were balanced by the need for providing capital for the extensions."  All this was before November 1914, it continues: "The price subsequently fixed for the large orders placed by the Ministry in July, 1915, was £125 per gun, a rebate of £25 per gun being made towards the £300,000 advanced by the State towards the new factories."

 

The pre-war stock of machine guns in the British forces was 1,955, Maxims and Vickers.  The total number of machine-guns ordered between August, 1914, and May,1915, (inclusive) was 3,344 made up of 1,792 Vickers, 1,052 Lewis and 500 Madsen guns.  Promises had been made for the delivery of 2,482 guns, these were 1,592 Vickers and 890 Lewis guns by 29 May 1915.  The actual acceptance by this date were 775 Vickers and 264 Lewis, total of 1,039.  The OHMoM states:

 

"The immediate shortage was mainly due to the failure of either Messrs. Vickers or the Armes Automatiques Lewis to redeem their promises as to immediate delivery."

 

The number of machine guns ordered was based on the manufacturers stated production capacity.  They had the orders they could not deliver on them.

 

Mike

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According to the Official History of the Ministry of Munitions that is?

 

Written when exactly and by who?

 

Would Vickers or anyone else be likely to promise "immediate delivery" do you think? 

 

That hardly seems probable does it as "immediate delivery" could only be made if stock was on hand rather than manufactured to order?

 

Smells more like something else to me.

 

 

 

 

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12 hours ago, 2ndCMR said:

According to the Official History of the Ministry of Munitions that is?

 

Written when exactly and by who?

 

Would Vickers or anyone else be likely to promise "immediate delivery" do you think? 

 

That hardly seems probable does it as "immediate delivery" could only be made if stock was on hand rather than manufactured to order?

 

Smells more like something else to me.

 

 

 

 

Hi

The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions is a twelve volume detailed history of wartime supply of war materials, problems associated with it covering many aspects.  It is a core published resource on the matter.  As it is so large and covers a wide variety of things it has multiple authors and published mainly between the wars.  It is full of data tables, costs and deliveries of items throughout the war.

 

Volumes:

I - Industrial Mobilization 1914-1915.

II - General Organization for Munitions Supply.

III - Finance and Contracts.

IV - The Supply and Control of Labour 1915-1916.

V - Wages and Welfare.

VI - Manpower and Dilution.

VII - The Control of Materials.

VIII - Control of Industrial Capacity and Equipment.

IX -  Review of Munitions Supply.

X - The Supply of Munitions.

XI - The Supply of Munitions.

XII - The Supply of Munitions.

 

I only have copies of the last three volumes, Volume XI has Part V on Machine Guns.

 

You seem to be implying that the information contained in these volumes must be 'suspect', presumably due to it not matching  Brutinel's memory of someone else's alleged comment.  Do you have any other evidence of "Smells more like something else to me" ?

 

Mike

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Smells like some retro-active self-justification: having failed to appreciate the value of machine guns before the war, or indeed for some time after, one can well imagine that a few dates might be changed to make things look better.

 

We know what Gen. Edmonds who edited the Official History had to say about its veracity don't we?  Would the Ministry of Munitions have been more reliable?  That would be stretching the bounds of credulity!

 

I suppose it is possible that Brutinel suffered an aural hallucination, or that he invented the whole thing, but that doesn't seem likely, nor does he seem to have struggled to recall events in the tapes. 

 

Worth remembering too that he was "going on the record" in the most definite way by recording a tape; would he have done so if he stood to be flatly contradicted by other records?

 

Could it have been an elaborate deception by the engineer at Vickers?  Even less likely isn't it when he's speaking to a senior serving officer no doubt in uniform and better yet, a prospective major customer?

 

No, probably the contracts were just back-dated, or Vickers simply didn't receive them until after Brutinel's visit.

 

So what about the "immediate delivery" conundrum?

 


 

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1 hour ago, 2ndCMR said:

Smells like some retro-active self-justification: having failed to appreciate the value of machine guns before the war, or indeed for some time after, one can well imagine that a few dates might be changed to make things look better.

 

We know what Gen. Edmonds who edited the Official History had to say about its veracity don't we?  Would the Ministry of Munitions have been more reliable?  That would be stretching the bounds of credulity!

 

I suppose it is possible that Brutinel suffered an aural hallucination, or that he invented the whole thing, but that doesn't seem likely, nor does he seem to have struggled to recall events in the tapes. 

 

Worth remembering too that he was "going on the record" in the most definite way by recording a tape; would he have done so if he stood to be flatly contradicted by other records?

 

Could it have been an elaborate deception by the engineer at Vickers?  Even less likely isn't it when he's speaking to a senior serving officer no doubt in uniform and better yet, a prospective major customer?

 

No, probably the contracts were just back-dated, or Vickers simply didn't receive them until after Brutinel's visit.

 

So what about the "immediate delivery" conundrum?

 


 

Hi

 

The Official History of the Ministry of Munitions would have been very poor at being 'retro-active justification' as only about 250 copies of each were originally produced for in-house use (lessons learned for a future war) and were only disposed of to the public in the early 1950s.  It is more available now because Naval & Military Press have re-printed it.  Also as the formation of  the Ministry of Munitions was considered a revolutionary step when undertaken during 1915 they would probably not be concerned at 'covering up' any problems with the earlier War Office orders for machine guns or anything else.  I don't think your criticism stacks up.

 

Also Brutinel could not have placed any orders with Vickers in November 1914 as Vickers would have to get permission from the British Government, hence my previous reference to the French order and the government caveat on that.

 

'Immediate delivery' would be as the guns were produced so batches would leave the factory on a weekly or even daily basis, delivery would not wait until the full order to be produced if that is what you are implying?  Vickers was not producing the MGs at the rate they said they would when accepting the orders, many other companies producing other 'munitions' also failed to deliver (eg. shell shortage etc), and as I have looked through MUN documents in the UK National Archives reference other supplies, such as flares, you can see a failure to deliver enough of the orders by the dates required well into 1916 and even later.

 

British Industry had only a relatively small 'military industry' component due to having a 'small' army in continental terms, hence problems with expanding to supply a larger army with increasing numbers of weapons and increased scales.  The shortage of materials, skilled labour, problems about dilution of labour with unions and companies as well as increasing the factory space to produce more were all things that had to be overcome, machine guns were just one part of that supply problem.  Throughout the war the MG output was as follows:

1914 Aug-Dec. - Maxim 13, Vickers 266, Lewis 8.

1915 - Maxim 38, Vickers 2,405, Lewis 3,650, Hotchkiss 9.

1916 - 307, 7,429, 21,615, 4,156.

1917 - 308, 21,782, 45,528, 12,128.

1918 - Nil, 39,473, 62,303, 19,088.

Totals - 666, 71,355, 133,104, 35,381.

 

Vickers made up 29.7% of total output.

 

Mike

 

 

 

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  • 1 month later...

We can agree to disagree on the utter veracity of the History of the Ministry of Munitions.  The limited distribution would make any assertions very unlikely to be questioned, much less contradicted.   The impetus for a cover-up would be considerable, and would extend to high quarters.

 

As for Vickers' contracts and the figures you quote, one can only guess that the contracts were either issued to other companies or back-dated in one way or another. 

 

Personally, I don't find it credible to suggest that Brutinel either invented or mis-remembered the incident recounted: the impression it must have made would be considerable and he obviously remembered it in detail - who wouldn' t?!

 

Some people have remarkably good memories for names, dates, places etc. even in old age; it is a noted characteristic of the elderly that they remember distant events better than more recent ones.  Most of us do not have such abilities and until one encounters such a person and is impressed by their remarkable memory - if one has the wits to notice - one often tends to assume that average memories are universal, when they are not.

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8 hours ago, 2ndCMR said:

We can agree to disagree on the utter veracity of the History of the Ministry of Munitions.  The limited distribution would make any assertions very unlikely to be questioned, much less contradicted.   The impetus for a cover-up would be considerable, and would extend to high quarters.

 

As for Vickers' contracts and the figures you quote, one can only guess that the contracts were either issued to other companies or back-dated in one way or another. 

 

Personally, I don't find it credible to suggest that Brutinel either invented or mis-remembered the incident recounted: the impression it must have made would be considerable and he obviously remembered it in detail - who wouldn' t?!

 

Some people have remarkably good memories for names, dates, places etc. even in old age; it is a noted characteristic of the elderly that they remember distant events better than more recent ones.  Most of us do not have such abilities and until one encounters such a person and is impressed by their remarkable memory - if one has the wits to notice - one often tends to assume that average memories are universal, when they are not.

Hi

However, it should be mentioned that Brutinel appears to have mis-remembered some things, for example his alleged statement, reference MG barrages, that he "...complained that the British 'schools' started to take notice of it only after the famous Vimy Ridge operation in April 1917" is not accurate.  The discussion reference this can be found in books such as 'Battle Tactics of the Western Front' by Paddy Griffith, and 'Machine Guns and The Great War' by Paul Cornish, which has examples of various formations using 'Barrages' and proto-barrages' during 1916 (and even 1915).  Also on the same day as the Vimy Ridge operation other formations were using MG 'Barrages' during the wider Battle of Arras, including the 9th (Scottish) Division (see 'The History of the Ninth (Scottish) Division 1914-1919' by John Ewing, page 188).

More telling is the content of the training pamphlets at the time, used by the units and 'schools' . These include SS 106 'Tactical Employment of Machine Gun and Lewis Gun' of March 1916, SS 122 'Some Notes on Lewis Guns and Machine Guns' of September 1916, and also in Section XVI 'Machine Guns' of SS135 'Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action' of December 1916.  All of these have reference to what would be classed as 'Barrage' fire.  At the time Brutinel would have been aware of these, and probably contributed to them, as would the wider CEF.  I can only assume that at a later date when asked he had 'forgotten' about these details, and I don't think the 1916 documents can be regarded as a 'cover-up'!

 

Mike

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I think we touched on this before: Applin makes mention of going to see Brutinel about barrage methods just after Vimy, reportedly at Gen. Plumer's suggestion.  Of course Plumer like others would be quick to conclude that some innovative tactical method might explain the Canadian success at Vimy, rather than a thorough and detailed preparation and training: the implication of course being that the numerous failed attacks and offensives were not due to the poor tactics, organization and preparation.  A most attractive conclusion for generals with much  blood on their hands.

 

Regardless, to return to Applin if he did not in fact learn anything from Brutinel that he had not already covered in his own research and writing, one would rather expect him to say so, or at least infer it.  However he does neither, but frankly states that he put Brutinel's methods into effect.  Now it could be that he or others in the M.G.C. had evolved similar methods, but could not get authority to use them, whereas the Canadian success at Vimy and the eagerness of generals to find some exculpatory explanation for it, might have meant that he had an authority to conduct such operations that he could not get before...?  Again, despite the modesty of his writing, one would expect some reference to that if it was fact.  Brutinel obvioulsy believed he and/or the C.M.G.C. was the originator of the method.  

 

Brutinel also mentions being asked by G.H.Q. to "retrain" the M.G.C. and to revise the curriculum and methods of their schools in 1917.  One can imagine how delighted G.H.Q. were to rub the noses of the M.G.C. in this sort of way; as much as to say, "You have failed so we are going to get the Canadians to straighten you out."  Anyone who thinks G.H.Q. did not have that sort of attitude ought to buy themselves a copy of Baker-Carr's book.

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5 hours ago, 2ndCMR said:

I think we touched on this before: Applin makes mention of going to see Brutinel about barrage methods just after Vimy, reportedly at Gen. Plumer's suggestion.  Of course Plumer like others would be quick to conclude that some innovative tactical method might explain the Canadian success at Vimy, rather than a thorough and detailed preparation and training: the implication of course being that the numerous failed attacks and offensives were not due to the poor tactics, organization and preparation.  A most attractive conclusion for generals with much  blood on their hands.

 

Regardless, to return to Applin if he did not in fact learn anything from Brutinel that he had not already covered in his own research and writing, one would rather expect him to say so, or at least infer it.  However he does neither, but frankly states that he put Brutinel's methods into effect.  Now it could be that he or others in the M.G.C. had evolved similar methods, but could not get authority to use them, whereas the Canadian success at Vimy and the eagerness of generals to find some exculpatory explanation for it, might have meant that he had an authority to conduct such operations that he could not get before...?  Again, despite the modesty of his writing, one would expect some reference to that if it was fact.  Brutinel obvioulsy believed he and/or the C.M.G.C. was the originator of the method.  

 

Brutinel also mentions being asked by G.H.Q. to "retrain" the M.G.C. and to revise the curriculum and methods of their schools in 1917.  One can imagine how delighted G.H.Q. were to rub the noses of the M.G.C. in this sort of way; as much as to say, "You have failed so we are going to get the Canadians to straighten you out."  Anyone who thinks G.H.Q. did not have that sort of attitude ought to buy themselves a copy of Baker-Carr's book.

Hi

 

I presume you are referring to Baker-Carr's book 'From Chauffeur to Brigadier', I also assume that you do know some historians have found this book 'problematic' at times.  For example Paul Cornish (who was senior curator in the Department of Exhibits & Firearms at the Imperial War Museum at the time) in his book 'Machine Guns and the Great War', on page 39, on Baker-Carr comments that he was:

 

"...an important figure in the development of machine-gunnery in the British Army.  Unfortunately his book is not entirely trustworthy as an account of events.  Not only does the author display a rather relaxed attitude to the recording of dates, but he also appears unaware of developments that occurred in his field of expertise during his eight-year sabbatical from the Army.  Furthermore, the whole book is presented as a heroic struggle waged by the author against the dead weight of the 'military mind'.  Enriching this heady brew is Baker-Carr's evidently festering resentment of those, unlike himself, attended Staff College.  This makes for lively reading, but unreliable history."

 

Baker-Carr does make some good points in his book, however, his 'agenda' causes problems.

 

I can only suggest that you read more widely on the subject, if possible looking at the pamphlets and other documents of the period in question, which will show how machine-gun use and tactics changed without any post-war input.

 

Mike

 

 

 

 

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On 07/08/2018 at 03:33, MikeMeech said:

Hi

 

I presume you are referring to Baker-Carr's book 'From Chauffeur to Brigadier', I also assume that you do know some historians have found this book 'problematic' at times.  For example Paul Cornish (who was senior curator in the Department of Exhibits & Firearms at the Imperial War Museum at the time) in his book 'Machine Guns and the Great War', on page 39, on Baker-Carr comments that he was:

 

"...an important figure in the development of machine-gunnery in the British Army.  Unfortunately his book is not entirely trustworthy as an account of events.  Not only does the author display a rather relaxed attitude to the recording of dates, but he also appears unaware of developments that occurred in his field of expertise during his eight-year sabbatical from the Army.  Furthermore, the whole book is presented as a heroic struggle waged by the author against the dead weight of the 'military mind'.  Enriching this heady brew is Baker-Carr's evidently festering resentment of those, unlike himself, attended Staff College.  This makes for lively reading, but unreliable history."

 

Baker-Carr does make some good points in his book, however, his 'agenda' causes problems.

 

I can only suggest that you read more widely on the subject, if possible looking at the pamphlets and other documents of the period in question, which will show how machine-gun use and tactics changed without any post-war input.

 

Mike

 

Thanks for your suggestion; if I find memoirs by others who were actually there I will certainly make an effort to read them, as time permits.  I flatter myself I've dug up more than the average reader; Applin's memoir for example, and his book on MG tactics...  I've had a copy of Baker-Carr for at least ten years now.  Easy enough in these times to note significant actors as one reads and then research them online: thus I found Stephen Foot's "Three Lives" via a reference in Fuller's memoir, a book which oddly seems to attract very little interest and has never been republished, despite being one of the most interesting and frank of the genre. 

 

I just finished a book by a gentleman who was a curator at a well known arms museum and I am sorry to say it was absolutely laden with factual errors, and there were quite a few blocks of text I recognized from previous publications on the subject.  In fairness it is hard to write on a specialized subject unless it has long been a particular interest.  That matter I will not go into further however.

 

Baker-Carr, perhaps a bit surprisingly for a former instructor at Hythe, mistakes the Palma Trophy for the King's Prize, but then a war and a good many events had occcured since he was perhaps involved at Bisley as he was a "dug-out" who of course was not considered young enough to die for King and Country in 1914 and had to inveigle himself into the war as a "gentleman chauffeur", until enough of the young were killed that space was made for the older.

 

His reported test of the Ross MkIII was amusing and probably reflected as much of a going-into the matter as GHQ then thought worth their time: two or three duffers with no knowledge of small arms and himself.  The defective ammunition is of course ascribed soley to the Americans IIRC!

 

I must say I always find it a rather odd presumption on the part of modern students to think that the attitudes expressed by those who were actually "there" can be dismissed as silly or unwarranted prejudices.  I believe Fuller shared Baker-Carr's contempt for the idea the "P.S.C" after one's name granted the holder miraculous powers of military insight and command, as a good many of the claimants seem to have thought.   Once the incompetence of the higher levels of the professional army officer corps had been demonstrated by the casualty lists and the flops that caused them, a great many people came to see that for all their vaunted qualifications, most were unable to think innovatively and persisted with true "military mind" as both B-C and Fuller called that bloody-minded persistence in repeating costly mistakes and careless preparation again and again and again, despite the evidence that new methods were needed.  Pre-war military life in the UK then attracted a disproportionate share of society's dunderheads for whom a place had to be found.

 

It might work to imply that Baker-Carr simply had a "festering resentment" against the P.S.C. chaps, but Fuller?  Probably the greatest mind to ever wear the King's Uniform?

 

Yes, I know it's now fashionable to pretend that those who were there and often knew the principals personally, or knew those who did, got it all wrong.  Haig & Co. are enjoying with few exceptions a regular summertime of revisionism; mostly a product of an aging population IMHO.  Baker-Carr does indeed write in a somewhat ironic tone; highly restrained I would have called it considering what he witnessed and how many died or were ruined as a result, and what hung in the balance.

 

The fact that B-C doesn't mention anything about for example Col. Applin or the Russo-Japanese War etc. seems to me more likely due to either his making no pretence of having kept himself au courant with MGs after leaving the Army, or more likely if he left in 1907 as I seem recall, he simply was never that well informed about them before arriving in France and made no pretence of having been.   Recall also that he ran into some financial difficulties due to IIRC a divorce and perhaps the Crash of '29.  The book then was quite likely an attempt to write something readable that would sell, rather than a serious study of the whole matter.

 

Of course it could be that Baker-Carr was somewhat ahead of his time in "self-assertion" as I believe what was then termed "self-advertisment' is currently described.  He might have omitted mention of previous MG developments at least in part to make his own contribution seem larger.  One needs to read repeatedly and with care to get a proper sense I suggest.

 

It is worth remembering too that when a person has been a witness to events and actions that seem at best folly and at worst criminal insanity, to remain of sound mind and in reasonable equanimity requires a certain distancing, a certain way of relating to those events.  Some preferred to remember only the good, the cheerful, others - the majority perhaps - tried to push it all out of their day to day consciousness.  Others tried to see it all with a sort of bemused and distant (where possible) irony; I suggest that B-C was one of the latter.  If that is an "agenda" he is welcome to it and to describe it as such to me suggests a rather odd lack of human perception.

 

Personally though, I am quite confident that Baker-Carr's proposal to create a machine gun corps did indeed end up in the "NFI" bin at GHQ, until recovered by the Chief Clerk, and that Fuller was correct in his perception of the attitude of GHQ to tanks, and if I needed further evidence, there are statements like the idiotic remark by Rawlinson to Wilson in late 1918 that tanks and aviation were a waste of manpower and what was needed was more infantry (bayonets). 

 

Bayonets are a much under-rated weapon, but it takes a man of a certain calibre and skill to make good use of one.  Rawly and his ilk had killed most of those men by 1918.  What was needed was the machines that could multiply the power of those that remained so as to best fill the gaps left by those missing hundreds of thousands.  Those not overly afflicted with "military mind" were able to see that and quite early in the war.  Baker-Carr was certainly one of those and it is a sad testimony indeed that they were so much in the minority and had to struggle so long and so hard against opposition in high places that seems to have ended sometime after WWII.  Opposition that cannot even be called the Bourbons of military thought as they indeed forgot much!

 

 

 

 

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  • 3 years later...
On 11/04/2005 at 20:05, Borden Battery said:

The following sample of the Borden Motor Machine Gun Battery war diary material is being transcribed by a two-person team from the CEF Study Group. The material is in near final draft but subject to a final proofing. This War Diary contains several references to Lt. Evert Dysan CURRIER.

 

His Attestion Papers can be accessed from this site at no charge:

-- http://data2.archives.ca/cef/gat1/071423a.gif

-- http://data2.archives.ca/cef/gat1/071423b.gif

Evert Dysan Currier was born in Ottawa, Ontario on 9 February 1882. His profession was a mechanical engineer. His military background included service with French's Scouts in South Africa [1900-01) and WCOR 43rd Regiment, 37th as a private. He signed his Attestation Papers on 16 December 1914 in Montreal. He was married.

He is seriously wounded and later dies on Sep 26, 1916 during a heavy artillery bombardment at COURCELETTES and later dies at wounds at the Dressing Station in ALBERT.

Sustaining 23 casualties from a Battery of only 56 men is a clear indication of the intensity of the artillery bombardment.

-------------------------------------------------- D R A F T ----------------------------------------------------------

Thu., Nov 25, 1915 WESTOUTRE, BELGIUM

Day fine. Fairly quiet along our front. Enemy shelled WATLING STREET in front of MAXIM FARM during A.M. We did not operate our Machine Guns this day on orders from O.C. Lieut. CARRUTHERS R.C.R. 2 NCO’s and 21 men reported at 4 p.m. and got settled in dugouts and started work on M.G. Continued. M.G. strong point in front of VIERSTRAAT. Sergt. CURRIER relieved Corp. KNAPP at MAXIM FARM he returned to billets with an attack of grippe.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C., Borden's Motor Machine Gun Battery.

Mon., Mar 20, 1916 WESTOUTRE, BELGIUM

Fine. Aerial activity during the day. Some enemy shells landed in VIERSTRAAT between 6 and 7 a.m. also during the day, and some in the vicinity of our batteries at rear of VIERSTRAAT. During the afternoon the enemy shelled the ground along the front of VIERSTRAAT. Our field artillery active all day. Lieut. Currier reported for duty and instruction, and was put in charge of gun and party at VIERSTRAAT No.1. Nothing unusual at night.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

April 5, 1916 Wednesday WESTOUTRE, BELGIUM

Weather.-

Capt. P.A.G. MacCarthy and Lieut. E. D. Currier took four guns and 22 N.C.O.’s and men to Voormezeele to take over the Headquarters and Machine Gun emplacements of the 3rd Motor Machine Gun Battery (British.) Left Billets at 6. P.M. and arrived at Vierstraat at about 7. P.M. and marched the party along the Brasserie Road to Voormeezele, where the new positions were taken over and relief completed about Midnight. This relief took place under very heavy Artillery [inserted by hand. fire]. The enemy's Artillery putting over a bombardment which was practically a Barrage fire and kept us all night covering the position and ground occupied by our Machine Guns. About 5. A.M. the 6th Inf. Bge. [added by hand.……] that everybody was to stand too as the Germans were attacking.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Mon., Apr 10, 1916 WESTOUTRE, BELGIUM

Weather.- Fine.

About 1.30 A.M. the enemy put over an intense artillery barrage, covering the front lines, support trenches and all roads and rear lines of communication, which lasted until about 4.30 a.m. During this heavy bombardment Capt. MacCarthy and Lieut. Currier made the rounds of all Machine Gun emplacements and found everybody on the job and nobody wounded. During the forenoon a number of H.E.’s were fired into Voormezelle Centre and a large number all around our Headquarters during the afternoon. Everything very quiet between 1 P.M. and 5 P.M. About 4.45 P.M. Major Holland V.C. and Col. King D.S.O. called in at Voormezelle Headquarters for a few minutes. From 8 P.M. to 9.45 P.M. the enemy put a heavy artillery curtain fire across our position and lines of communication to prevent our troops moving into support. After this things became very quiet through the rest of the night.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

 

Fri., Apr 29, 1916 WESTOUTRE, BELGIUM

Weather.-Fine

Lieut. Battersby relieved Lieut. Currier at 9.30 P.M. At midnight received a wire stating that prisoners had reported that the germans were to make an attack with gas before morning, accordingly went to French Trench and sent Sergeant Montgomery to “Sardine Box” and stood to all night. At 12.45 A.M. Heavy rifle fire suddenly developed in front of K[e]mmell Hill which quickly grew into an attack and heavy Artillery Fire followed which lasted until 2.45 A.M. The Germans attacked with gas at the “ Bull Ring and [crossed out by hand. “Hollandeschen” and replaced in the right margin by. “Hollandsches”] Salient but were driven off with heavy casualities. The gas cloud blew back over their own lines and the Germans were seen to leave their own front lines and run back overland through our Artillery Bar[r]age. The Enemy succe[e]ded in penetrating our front line at the “Bull Ring” but were immediately bombed out.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Thu., Jun 1, 1916 GODEWAERSVELDE, FRANCE

Lieut. Battersby relieved Lieut. Currier at Sept. Post. Weather fine. British Observation balloon broke loose during the evening, and drifted over the german lines and was shelled very heavily without any apparent effect. After a heavy bombardment of our lines the enemy attacked and took part of our front lines just south of Hooge, held at the time by the 7th Bgde. , 3rd Canadian Division.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C

Fri., Jun 2, 1916 GODEWAERSVELDE, FRANCE

Weather.- Fine

The Germans again opened an intense bombardment of our lines just south of Hooge, commencing at 7.00 A.M. At Noon they attacked and took about a mile of our front line coming through over 700 yds in depth. They took over 500 men and Officers prisoners, including [inserted by hand. Brig.] Genl. Mercer and Brigadier Genl. V.S.A. Williams. The Canadians counter-attacked and took back part of the line inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. We had to wear tear goggles owing to the tear shells. Our 12’’ guns fired all night. [ Inserted by hand. Genl. Mercer was afterwards found to have been killed; His body was recovered and he was buried with military honors at Relinnighelst.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C

Sat., Jun 3, 1916 GODEWAERSVELDE, FRANCE

Weather.- Fine

Very heavy reciprocal bombardment all day. 14 British Aeroplanes passed over on a raiding expedition We saw one falling behind the enemy’s lines. The enemy set one of our Stores of S.A.A. on fire near Ypres. All stood to all night with everything as we were expecting an attack. All the 2nd Division stood too all night. Placed our Machine Guns in shell holes in advance in the open to command country north of the canal. At 8.00 P.M. a violent attack was made north of Hill 60 which lasted about an hour. The actual dispositions of these attacks were very plainly visible from our Gun Positions near Sardine Box Emplacement.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C

Sat., Jun 3, 1916 GODEWAERSVELDE, FRANCE

Major Holland, V.C., Lieut. E.H. Holland and Lieut. E.D. [C]urrier were posted to ‘A’ Camp with 4 Machine Guns for a stand To.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C

Sun., Jun 4, 1916 GODEWAERSVELDE, FRANCE

Weather.-

At 1 A.M. a fierce bombing attack was made by the Canadians at the same moment a fient attack was made by the British division in front of Kemmel to relieve the pressure at Hooge. Stood to all night. Several shells hit our Parapet without exploding saving us casualities.

Standing to at “A” Camp.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C

Mon., Jun 5, 1916 GODEWAERSVELDE, FRANCE

Weather.- Cloudy.

The detatchment of the 24th Can. Inf. Battn. at Sept. Post was relieved by the Kings Liverpool Regt., 3rd Imperial Division. Huns attacked over Hill 60 but the 8th Can. Inf. Battn. immediately counter attacked and bombed them out, the bombers displaying great enthousasiam while carrying out their task. At 11.30 P.M. Lt. Holland and Lt. Currier and four guns arrived and took up positions near ecluse No. 6. on the Ypres Comines Canal.

At 11.30 P.M. took over Nos 1.2.and 4. tunnels and Gordon Post with 4 Machine guns and Officers and men previously detailed to “A” Camp, Major Holland V.C. making his Headquarters at Bedford House. Heavy shelling of all Calibres of guns and trench Mortars on our left from 12.30 to 1.30 P.M.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C

Tue., Jun 6, 1916 GODEWAERSVELDE, FRANCE

Weather.- Raining.

Quiet in the forenoon. Avery heavy bombardment by both sides commenced about noon. Germans attacked and took our front lines at Hooge. Major Holland V.C. visited Sept. Post about 10 P.M. and he also visited [the] other Gun positions on the Canal.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C

Tue., Jun 6, 1916 GODEWAERSVELDE, FRANCE

Weather;- Raining in the A.M and Cloudy and clearing in the P.M.

Early in the Afternoon the enemy heavily shelled our front, Comines Canal and the Bluff. Our Artillery retaliating vigourously. Our ‘Planes active during the evening and night. Intermittent shelling during the night.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C

Wed., Jun 7, 1916 GODEWAERSVELDE, FRANCE

Weather.- Fine Raining in the evening

Lieut. Battersby and his guns were relieved by the 9th Bgde. (Imperial) at 2. A.M. Reached the Billetts at 4. A.M. the 8th.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C

Wed., Jun 7, 1916 GODEWAERSVELDE, FRANCE

Weather.- Raining in the A.M. Cloudy P.M.

Lieut. Currier relieved Major Holland at Bedford House from 11. A.M. to Midnight, Lieut. Holland taking charge of the guns at the Tunnells, Bluff and Gordon Post. Intermittent shelling all day. Our ‘Planes active during the evening and after dark. Considerable Machine Gun and Rifle fire during the night.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C

Thu., Jun 8, 1916 GODEWAERSVELDE, FRANCE

Weather.- Cloudy.

Intermittent shelling all day. Enemy and our ‘Planes active during the afternoon and evening. Heavy rifle and Machine Gun Fire during the night. Capt. P.A.G. MacCarthy returned from leave to Paris.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C

Sun., Jul 2, 1916 GODEWEARSVELDE, FRANCE

Weather.- Fair.

Several of our aircraft active during the evening. After 7.30 P.M. Machine Gun from the enemy was very brisk, until Midnight. Night very quiet. Lieut. E.H. HOLLAND was relieved by Lieut. W.F. BATTERSBY at 9.00 P.M. Lieut. HOLLAND proceeding to Camiers for Machine Gun Course. Lieut. E. D. CURRIER should have relieved Lieut. HOLLAND but had to attend a Board of Inspection for the R.F.C.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt.

Thu., Jul 27, 1916 BELGIUM – (Location to be Confirmed)

Weather.- Fine and Warm.

LIEUT. E.D.CURRIER and party returned at 5 P.M. from Gas Course and were much pleased with what they had learned, the course being very thorough.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt.

Fri., Aug 4, 1916 BELGIUM – (Location to be Confirmed)

Weather fine. Cool. Nothing unusual to report. All classes in training ‘carrying on’. Lieut Currier and 3. O.R. attending course at 3rd Can. Divisional Gas School. None of this Battery in the trenches.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt.

Wed., Aug 9, 1916 BELGIUM – (Location to be Confirmed)

Weather Scorching hot. Brigade Syllabus being continued. in accordance with Operations Order from O.C. 1st C.M.M.G. B’g’de. Major Holland V.C. went to the “B’ Line trenches taking Lieut. Currier with 6 Guns and crews of “C” and “D” Batteries and relieved Capt. Wilkin and Gun Crews of “A” Battery completing the relief at 10.50 p.m. Capt. P.A.G. MacCarthy acting O.C. at billets.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt.

Sat., Aug 12, 1916 BELGIUM – (Location to be Confirmed)

Weather fine. Major Holland V.C. and Lieut. Currier in the Trenches. Lieut. W.F. Battersby at Headquarters Billets carrying on classes in M.G. Training. Capt. P.A.G. MacCarthy at Cassell with Anti air craft Detachment.

Major Holland reported the following from the Trenches.

At 8.30 a.m. the enemy opened a very heavy Barrage of Artillery fire on our front line trenches between Hill 60 and Verbrandenmolen apparently with 5.9’s and 4.1s. They had registered these points yesterday. At 9.45 a.m. enemy lifted some of his fire to Batteries in rear of Railway dugouts. At 10.30 A.M. Zillebeke was heavily shelled with H.E. and Shrapnel, cutting our wires between Priest’s House and Valley Cottages. Two direct hits were made on the School House. At 11.15 a.m. fire slackened. Nothing further unusual occurred during the day.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt.

Mon., Sep 11, 1916 CONTAY, FRANCE

Weather fine.

Received message from 1st Canadian M.M.G. Brigade Headquarters for “C” and “D” Batteries to go to ALBERT tomorrow and establish Headquarters there and to make that our advanced Base to work out our M.G. locations from.

Major E.J. Holland V.C. and Lieut. E.D. Currier went to POZIERES to reconnoitre.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt.

Thu., Sep 14, 1916 ALBERT, FRANCE

Weather. Fine.

The N.C.O.’s + men left Billets in ALBERT with 8 guns.- the following Officers going in charge.- Major E.J. Holland V.C., Captain P.A.G. MacCarthy, Lieut. Battersby, Lieut. Currier composing “C” Battery. Lieut Holland having been attached to “B” Battery. “C” Battery took up and consolidated a Machine Gun position N.W. of POZIERES. The guns were set up and laid during the night to fire at 6.20 A.M. the 15th inst.

---signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt.

Sun., Sep 24, 1916 CONTAY, FRANCE

Sunday. Foggy all forenoon. Fair during rest of day.

Captain MacCarthy + Lieut. Battersby on instructions from O.C. 1st Canadian M.M.G. Brigade left at 5 A.M. to make a reconnaissance of the position to be occupied by the Borden Battery for the action of the 25th + 26th insts. Made location and returned to CONTAY by 1. p.m. At 5 p.m. Lieut. Battersby, Lieut. Currier and Lieut. Maisonville took their Sections up to location and as a working party they prepared the position for the placing of M. Guns digging deep trenches and making cover from shrapnel This party left from COURCELETTE about midnight.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Tue., Sep 26, 1916 WEST OF COURCELETTES, FRANCE

Fine day.

Battery all in position and laid guns for action. Were under heavy shell fire all morning. Pte. Anderson being wounded about 10. a.m. This Battery opened fire at 12.35 pm on targets laid out by O.C. 1st Canadian M.M.G. Brigade and continued firing throughout the action according to schedule lifting the Barrage from time to time as our troops advanced. On receipt of a message by runners from O.C. 14th Canadian Infantry Battalion we put on a special Barrage covering the right flank of his Battalion and annihilated a German counter attack. This Battery was terribly Bombarded by the German artillery barrage all afternoon and during the night. Some Batteries made it their target and searched the area which we occupied. Lieut. Currier was seriously wounded about 1 o’clock and finally died of wounds at the Dressing Station in ALBERT. Private Singleton who was also seriously wounded at the same time died of wounds at the Dressing Station in ALBERT. Private Taylor was killed in Action at about 1.15 p.m. In all there were 23 casualties

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Wed., Sep 27, 1916 CONTAY, FRANCE

Fine day, turning showery in afternoon.

This Battery was withdrawn from its position in the lines W. of COURCELETTE and sent back to CONTAY to rest & to reorganize. Arrived CONTAY about 5.30 p.m.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Thu., Sep 28, 1916 CONTAY, FRANCE

Raining all day.

Battery resting in billets at CONTAY. No parades. Pte J. R. Kennedy promoted Temporary Corporal.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Fri., Sep 29, 1916 CONTAY, FRANCE

Battery parades for Kit and equipment lost in action. O.C. Battery submitted summery of operations of Sept. 25th to 27th to O.C. 1st Canadian M.M.G. Brigade.

Afternoon. Pay parade.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Thu., Oct 12, 1916 ALBERT, FRANCE

Weather.- Cloudy.

Proceeded to ALBERT.

Battery located in billets at 64 + 66 Rue de Boulan

Officers ,” ,” “, ,” 39 Rue de Bapaume.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Fri., Oct 13, 1916 ALBERT, FRANCE

Weather.- Dull. Cold. Hazy.

Received notice that Sergeant #25621 R.G.H.W. MacCarthy} both of BORDENS and Sergeant #202 F. W. Thompson ) M.M.G. Battery MOTOR MACHINE GUN BATTERY had been awarded The Military Medal for Action COURCELETTE Sep 26/27th 1916

Officers of the “C” and “D” Battery went to positions indicated, on the Map by O.C. 1st CMM.G. Bgde to reconnoitre ground and decide on exact location for Gun positions for attack of 16th + 17th insts.

Left Billets at 4.a.m.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Sat., Oct 14, 1916 ALBERT, FRANCE

Weather Changeable. Poor for observation.

Officers went to Tara Hill C. Corps Headquarters to meet O.C. 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade and get maps and plans of scheme of Attack for 16th + 17th insts.

Meeting at 11. a.m. instructions to report again at 3. p.m. to meet O.C. Hotchkiss Detachment to make definite arrangements for carrying water and ammunition to Battery positions.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Sun., Oct 15, 1916 ALBERT, FRANCE

Weather.- Fine.

C. Officers of all Batteries reported to O.C. 1st C M.M.G. Bgde at Tara Hill at 11. a.m. and received orders to cancel all arrangements for attack of 16th + 17th insts & to make arrangements to return to Battery Billets at CONTAY. Battery left ALBERT at 3. p.m. and arrived at Billets at CONTAY

Received warning order from O.C. 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade to be prepared to move to DIVION on morning of 19th inst.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Mon., Oct 16, 1916 CONTAY, FRANCE

Weather. Cold but bright. Good day for observation.

Battery training reinforcements in Side Car driving. preparatory to move.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Tue., Oct 17, 1916 CONTAY, FRANCE

Cold. Rain in afternoon.

B.S.M. Lawson, Ptes Anderson and Logan returned to duty from Hospital at Base.

Lieut O.F. Maisonville (wounded) struck off strength on transfer to C.T.D. Shorncliffe.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Wed., Oct 18, 1916 CONTAY, FRANCE

Weather, Cold, wet and hazy.

Battery engaged in cleaning up Camp, getting equipment in order and loading some on Cars, in preparation for move to DIVION on 19th inst.

Under instructions from 1st C.M.M.G. Bgde, one officer and one man left for DIVION to arrange for Billets for Battery.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Thu., Oct 19, 1916 ALBERT, FRANCE

Weather. Very wet.

Battery left CONTAY at 6. a.m. in order of Parade as laid down by O.C. 1st Can M M. G Brigade and arrived at DIVION about 1. p.m.

All ranks allotted to Billets.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Fri., Oct 20, 1916 DIVION, FRANCE

Weather. Fine, Bright.

Received instructions that the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade now forms part of the 1st Army with H.Qs at DIVION.

Lieutenants Kerr and Kill posted to this Battery as Temporary Lieutenants vide Lieut. Currier and Lieut. Maisonville.

Received instructions that one Officer with three guns and crews be detailed to leave DIVION at 2.p.m. tomorrow the 21st inst., for SAVY-BERLETTE for duty as AIR-CRAFT SECTION

Capt. P.A.G. MacCarthy, acting under instructions from O.C. 1st Can. M.M.G. Brigade, proceeded to SAVY-BERLETTE and made necessary arrangements.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Sat., Oct 21, 1916 DIVION, FRANCE

Weather.- Fine, Bright.

Lieut Holland proceeded with 3 guns and 12 men to SAVY-BERLETTE at 2.p.m. as Anti-AIRCRAFT SECTION

Received order that Lieut W.F. BATTERSBY of the BORDEN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BATTERY has been awarded

“ The MILITARY CROSS”

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

Hello to the Group - new member here.  On one or more postings, someone expressed interest in knowing more about Lt. Everett Dyson Currier, Borden's Motor Machine Gun Battery.  I have a box of artifacts and documents, the personal effects of Lt. Everett Dyson Currier.    

In the unit log posted above, the entry on September 26th, 2016 indicates Dyson, as the family called him, was hit around 1300.  The family was told in a letter from his commander, Captain MacCarthy, his watch had stopped when he was hit by a high explosive shell fragment in his abdomen.  I’ve enclosed a picture of the watch among some of the artifacts in the box, it had stopped at 1316 and appears to have sustained some damage as well.     

If anyone might be interested in my posting more pictures of artifacts and documents here let me know.  I visited his grave in Albert, France on a number of occasions while stationed in Germany with the U. S. Army.  As an Iraq and Afghanistan vet myself, when I was able to finally read the letters recently it really brought home the rawness of what Dyson went through and the profound loss to the family I had only heard about in passing as a child, the connection I feel with those men who lost a dear friend and endured so much so long ago.

EDC Artifacts 1.JPG

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I have been working on short biographic vignettes of the original 59 men of the Borden Motor Machine Gun Battery as per the May 1915 Nominal Roll.  Just happen to have the first draft of the Currier available - each biographic will be expanded over time.  The rest are being posted on the CEF Study Group discussion forum.   Regards Borden Battery

*Corporal Everett Dyson Currier       #249      Becomes Lt.

http://central.bac-lac.gc.ca/.item/?op=pdf&app=CEF&id=B2237-S052

Private and later Lieutenant Currier (Reg 249) was a 32-year-old, married, mechanical engineer, 5’5”, 170 pounds and a large chest.  He had a sister living in New York City, a brother in Ottawa and it appears his wife Claire Currier was also living in New York City. Previously, he had military experience with French’s Scouts, South Africa in 1900 and was one of six original Borden Battery men with Boer War experience – this included Major Holland VC, Captain McCarthy (Wounded) and Lieutenant Holland (KIA) the brother of OC Major Holland VC. In addition, he had 3 years as a private with the 43rd Regiment and may also have know Private Brennan (KIA). 

Quickly promoted to Corporal in Montreal on 21 February 1915, he is briefly hospitalized at the Montreal General Hospital on 12-15 March 1915 with influenza.  At Caesar’s Camp near Folkestone, Kent, he is promoted to Sergeant Driver on 15 May 1915 and later Battery Sergeant Major on 29 January 1916.  A commission at Lieutenant is granted to now Lieutenant Currier on 13 March 1916 but likely acting as a Lieutenant since 1 July 1915.  Formal instruction in machine gun techniques was undertaken at the Canadian Machine Gun School at Camiers, France between 9-15 July 1916.  However; Lieutenant Currier is severely wounded on 26 September 1916 at the Battle of Courcelette, France and died of wounds at No. 3 Canadian Field Ambulance the same day. He was one of 23 causalities in the 56-man battery. The Borden Battery War Diary best describes the situation of his death.

Tue., Sep 26, 1916                     WEST OF COURCELETTES, FRANCE            

Fine day.

Battery all in position and laid guns for action.  Were under heavy shell fire all morning.  Pte. Anderson being wounded about 10. a.m.  This Battery opened fire at 12.35 pm on targets laid out by O.C. 1st Canadian M.M.G. Brigade and continued firing throughout the action according to schedule lifting the Barrage from time to time as our troops advanced.  On receipt of a message by runners from O.C. 14th Canadian Infantry Battalion we put on a special Barrage covering the right flank of his Battalion and annihilated a German counter attack.  This Battery was terribly Bombarded by the German artillery barrage all afternoon and during the night.  Some Batteries made it their target and searched the area which we occupied.  Lieut. Currier was seriously wounded about 1 o’clock and finally died of wounds at the Dressing Station in ALBERT.  Private Singleton who was also seriously wounded at the same time died of wounds at the Dressing Station in ALBERT.  Private Taylor was killed in Action at about 1.15 p.m.  In all there were 23 casualties [DM1] 

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

 

 


 [DM1]Sustaining 23 casualties from a total force of only 56 men would indicate a very heavy artillery bombardment and associated casualties.

 

 


 [DM1]Sustaining 23 casualties from a total force of only 56 men would indicate a very heavy artillery bombardment and associated casualties.

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Fri., Sep 22, 1916                   CONTAY, FRANCE

Fine day.

Lieut. Battersby took all guns and crews to the ranges from 9 A.M. to noon.  Battery cleaning up and repairing cars and cycles all afternoon under Mechanical Sergeant.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

 

 

Sat., Sep 23, 1916                  CONTAY, FRANCE

Daily routine.  Nothing unusual to report.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

 

 

Sun., Sep 24, 1916                 CONTAY, FRANCE

Sunday. Foggy all forenoon. Fair during rest of day.

Captain MacCarthy + Lieut. Battersby on instructions from O.C. 1st Canadian M.M.G. Brigade left at 5 A.M. to make a reconnaissance of the position to be occupied by the Borden Battery for the action of the 25th + 26th insts.  Made location and returned to CONTAY by 1. p.m.  At 5 p.m. Lieut. Battersby, Lieut. Currier and Lieut. Maisonville took their Sections up to location and as a working party they prepared the position for the placing of  M. Guns digging deep trenches and making cover from shrapnel  This party left from COURCELETTE about midnight. 

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

 

 

Mon., Sep 25, 1916                CONTAY, FRANCE

Fine day.

This Battery under Captn. P.A.G. MacCarthy, in accordance with instructions from O.C. 1st Canadian M.M.G. Brigade left CONTAY with full fighting equipment on Motor Transport at 2.15 p.m. and arrived at the Red Cross Station on the POZIERES Road about 3 p.m. and then proceeded to pack the guns + ammunition into Gun positions and completed this task about 5.30 p.m.  All was in readiness for action at 7.30 p.m. At 9. p.m. Captain MacCarthy left for Tara Hill Headquarters of 1st Division to obtain final instructions from O.C. 1st Canadian M.M.G. Brigade whose Headquarters was there and to get watch synchronized so as to obtain correct moment of Zero hour for commencement of the attack which was to start at 12.35 p.m. the 26th inst.  Lieut. O.F. Maisonville was wounded about 5 p.m. and carried to Dressing Station.  A carrying party from the Cavalry 1st Hussars brought in ammunition + water.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

 

 

Tue., Sep 26, 1916                 WEST OF COURCELETTES, FRANCE

Fine day.

Battery all in position and laid guns for action.  Were under heavy shell fire all morning.  Pte. Anderson being wounded about 10. a.m.  This Battery opened fire at 12.35 pm on targets laid out by O.C. 1st Canadian M.M.G. Brigade and continued firing throughout the action according to schedule lifting the Barrage from time to time as our troops advanced.  On receipt of a message by runners from O.C. 14th Canadian Infantry Battalion we put on a special Barrage covering the right flank of his Battalion and annihilated a German counter attack.  This Battery was terribly Bombarded by the German artillery barrage all afternoon and during the night.  Some Batteries made it their target and searched the area which we occupied.  Lieut. Currier was seriously wounded about 1 o’clock and finally died of wounds at the Dressing Station in ALBERT.  Private Singleton who was also seriously wounded at the same time died of wounds at the Dressing Station in ALBERT.  Private Taylor was killed in Action at about 1.15 p.m.  In all there were 23 casualties.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

 

 

Wed., Sep 27, 1916               CONTAY, FRANCE

Fine day, turning showery in afternoon.

This Battery was withdrawn from its position in the lines W. of COURCELETTE and sent back to CONTAY to rest & to reorganize.  Arrived CONTAY about 5.30 p.m.

--- signed P.A.G. MacCarthy, Capt. O.C.

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Borden Battery, amazing!

I have the official documents to augment his story, much of the official description above previously unknown to me.  

The family correspondence relating to his life in the Regiment and the officers letters to his sister Clare after his death are also in the box along with much more.

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Here is some more material on Currier from my working notes.  He was one of the good ones within a clutch of real tough characters.  Borden Battery

This battle on the Somme also demarks the start of increased causalities for the Borden Battery, or "C" Battery.  However, the "Borden's" as they continued to call themselves continue to remain slightly apart and are not content to totally relinquish all of their original character within the larger Brigade.  They are adept at their tasks, are recognized with trophies for machine gun proficiency and tend to be selected for the instruction of other units - they appear to work at maintaining their own esprit de corps. However, attrition of the members will have its affect.

At Albert about 5 p.m. on 17 September 1916 Lieutenant O. F. Maisonville reported for duty and moves into the Lines on at 5:00 p.m. on 25 September and is seriously wounded 24 hours later at 5:00 p.m.  His war is over - having lasted 24 hours.

The following day Lieutenant Currier was seriously wounded about 1 o’clock and died of wounds at the Dressing Station in Albert - he was the first of the original Borden's Armoured Battery members to be die on this date.  Enlisting as a private, this mechanical engineer quickly rose to the rank of Lieutenant.  The second original to die is Private Leonard J. Singleton who was also seriously wounded at the same time and also died of wounds at the Dressing Station in Albert.  Singleton was a mining engineer from Tilehurst, Reading, England and Attested in Montreal on 27 January 1915. Private John Sandford Taylor, a miner originally from Whitehorse, Yukon is the third original member of the Battery to fall on this day - he was killed in action about 1:15 pm on 26 September 1916. 

Earlier in the month, Pte. Beilby was slightly wounded on 15 September. Pte. M. Malkassoff is wounded on 17 September and Private George Gould Scott, another of the miners from the original Battery, is mortally wounded and dies within three hours. Finally, on 26 September Pte. Anderson is wounded in the mid-morning.  From the ranks of 56 men, the Bordens lose 8 men to death and wounds in half a month.  A ninth important founding member of the "C" Battery also leaves in September 1916.  The number of original members of enlisted in Montreal is diminishing rapidly with these changes.

 

 

 

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  • 1 month later...

284627812_BBPostCard1.jpg.d72c92a9349c9e8045af6e48dd92c204.jpg1021851936_BBPostCard2.jpg.8b8dc396b324528e799f00685fa203f3.jpg

Good Morning Gents, here are a few more things from LT Everett Dyson Currier's personal effects box.  It's Veterans Day here in the US day after tomorrow, Remembrance Day in Canada.

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