The Darkest Year: The British Army on the Western Front 1917. Ed Spencer Jones

[Crunchy]

The Darkest Year: The British Army on the Western Front 1917. Ed Spencer Jones. Helion and Company, Warwick, 2022. 510pp.

This is the fourth in the series of splendid books edited by Dr Spencer Jones which provide insights into the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the Western Front, with each volume covering a year of the war. This one delivers the same high standards of scholarship as its predecessors. Their value lies in considering subjects in more detail than more general histories are able to, thereby injecting a more comprehensive and considered view of the issues being addressed. This latest tome offers 16 chapters covering a broad range of subjects from the strategic problems facing the British in 1917, through several studies concerning aspects of the principal battles fought during the year, to the consideration of group cohesion in British infantry battalions, issues facing the development of French and British tanks during 1917, and the Officer Cadet Battalions in the United Kingdom. While 1917 may have been the darkest year of the war for the British Army, generally these essays illuminate the transformation the army was going through following its experience at the Battle of the Somme in 1916.\

Spencer Jones and John Spencer kick off with two studies at the strategic and political level. Jones delivers a thoroughly engaging insight into the strategic problems facing the British government during 1917, the political debates involved in addressing them, together with the widening rift between the British high command and David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, and the resulting consequences. John Spencer pursues a similar theme in which he relates Lloyd George’s dilemma in addressing the strategic issues with his concern to avoid confronting the Germans on the Western Front. Consequently, his relations with his Chief of the Imperial Staff, Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, who was prepared to stand up to him, deteriorated leading to Robertson’s resignation in February 1918. Both essays provide insights into the difficulties of relationships at the highest level when the political and military leaders disagree on where the focus of the principal military effort should be.

As to be expected, many of the contributions address combat studies. Leading off in this genre Michael LoCicero provides a fascinating study into a highly successful German trench raid at Loos in January 1917. Penetrating deep into the British position it resulted in the immediate sacking of a British battalion commander. Their success stemmed from the detailed planning, preparation and innovative deception methods undertaken by the Germans, which offer instructive lessons for today’s soldiers. Two chapters are devoted to the British advance in following up the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line (the Siegfriedstellung). In the first, Nigel Dorrington challenges the generally held view that the Germans succeeded in putting the British on the back foot, both operationally and tactically, by considering the experience of the III Corps. While the execution of their advance was inconsistent, he persuasively argues that, despite the limitations imposed on them by strategic considerations and logistical difficulties, the Corps’ divisions demonstrated they could mount effective operations, absorb new technology, and quickly learn from their experience. In the second Andy Luck compares the performance of the British 8th Division with that of the 2nd Australian Division. While the Australians’ effort was somewhat patchier than the 8th’s, Luck acknowledges the reasons for this and concludes that both demonstrated measurable progress, readily modifying attack formations and took more care with flank protection as the advance developed.

In a wide ranging essay Simon Innes-Jones analyses the development of the British operational art during 1917. In presenting his case he largely focusses on General Sir Henry Horne and the British First Army from the triumph of Vimy Ridge in April to the equally successful capture of Hill 70 in August. As he relates, 1917 was a period of considerable tactical debate within the British Army, as the effective ‘bite and hold’ tactics advocated by Generals Rawlinson, Plumer and Horne gained ascendency over the overly optimistic breakthrough approach favoured by Field Marshall Haig and General Gough, which Innes-Jones contends, with some justification, led to the success of the Hundred Days in the latter half of 1918.

Three chapters consider aspects of the Arras Offensive in April/May. In relating the largely neglected commitments of the Royal Engineers, Alexander Falbo-Wild reminds us of the many and varied tasks the sappers carried out both prior to and during the offensive. Their contribution to the success of the initial attack involved a far greater number of missions than those that current engineers are responsible for, ranging from tunnelling, mapping, chemical warfare, forward rail transportation, rear area and combat engineering, to the provision of signalling and other communications, each of which Falbo-Wild addresses succinctly but with sufficient detail to grasp the magnitude of the engineering effort.

In contrast to the largely positive chapters, Meleah Hampton and Harry Sanderson offer highly critical views on two operations undertaken following the initial success of the Arras offensive. Hampton relates the Australian experience during the advance to the Hindenburg Line and at the two battles of Bullecourt. While one can readily agree with her overall criticisms and conclusions of the Bullecourt operations, others are less convincing. For example, having quoted an instruction that “Strong fighting patrols will be sent out and the enemy cleared out of no man’s land … to enable our attacking force to form up unobserved” she goes on to say “the belief that these ‘strong patrols’ would be able to effect an advance in place of a larger force was never entirely abandoned”, and reiterates this point elsewhere. In doing so she misconstrues both the context and the rationale on the employment of those patrols, and one senses that she seeks to criticise rather than to understand. Sanderson analyses the reasons behind the disastrous Third Battle of the Scarpe that saw the British First and Third Armies fail to either gain or hold any their objectives. Having detailed the deteriorating state and numbers of the British infantry and artillery as the Arras offensive progressed, he then considers the planning and preparations for the attack at Third Scarpe, and outlines the subsequent disaster that befell the British infantry. Quite rightly, Sanderson sheets the responsibility for the shambolic result to an overoptimistic high command which failed to recognise that the culminating point of the offensive had been reached, and in its planning, preparations and execution was overly ambitious and hasty, committing troops who were inadequately supported and ill-prepared for the task. Sadly, there was no imperative to fight either Second Bullecourt or Third Scarpe as the reason for the Arras offensive had passed. Both of these chapters offer sobering lessons for senior commanders of the consequences of failing to properly analyse the conditions facing them, the reasons for conducting battle, and to plan and prepare accordingly.

Turning to the Third Battle of Ypres, in an absorbing study Simon Shephard considers the performance of the artillery against the principles of war devised by the then Colonel J.F.C. Fuller in 1916. Choosing three of the several sub-battles that made up the offensive, Shephard details the artillery plans devised to support General Gough’s overly ambitious objectives at the Battle of Pilckem Ridge, and the step by step approach employed by General Plumer at the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge, and the Second Battle of Passchendaele. Each demonstrates the high level of sophistication that British artillery tactics had achieved by mid-1917, including multiple and deceptive barrages, their ability to completely dominate the opposing German artillery, and to quickly adapt to changing German defensive tactics. It is a chapter that illuminates a rarely discussed and highly successful aspect of this controversial and horrendous offensive.

In a thoroughly convincing chapter, James Tubb challenges Australian criticism of the British 33rd Division’s performance at the Battle of Polygon Wood during Third Ypres. Struck by a German counter attack having just entered the front line on the eve of the battle which overran a portion of their line, and in which they suffered substantial casualties and disorganisation, he demonstrates how quickly they reacted and were able to participate in Second Army’s attack alongside the 5th Australian Division the next morning. While they struggled to achieve all of their objectives, given the considerable disruption they experienced the previous day their performance was highly creditable.

Rounding out the battle studies Richard Hendry narrates the performance of the 47th (2nd London) Division at the Battle of Messines and its defence of Bourlon Wood and the subsequent fighting withdrawal during the latter stages of the Battle of Cambrai later in the year. In both instances, although the division earned some criticisms, he provides ample evidence that it deserved its sound pre-1917 reputation as a good fighting formation.

The remaining chapters cover an eclectic range of topics. Jim Beach relates the contributions of a somewhat shadowy intelligence major on Haig’s headquarters, comparing his analysis of German operational intentions with what actually transpired. Tom Thorpe considers the effects of group cohesion in the battalions of the 56th ( London) Division, and highlights it could have both a positive and a rebellious impact in differing circumstances. Charles Fair discusses the selection and training of junior temporary officers, arguing that by mid-1917 a highly professionalised system of Officer Cadet Battalions had evolved. He contends it produced officers of sufficient quality and quantity which made a vital contribution to the BEF’s success in 1918. However, he offers no evidence for this claim, noting that further research will determine the extent to which the graduates of the system contributed to the final victory. Finally, Tim Gale provides a very useful contribution concerning the problems facing the development of British and French tanks following their inauspicious start in 1916 and early 1917. Central to their development were attempts to coordinate efforts between the two Allies, debates on how they should be employed, the types of tanks required to meet differing roles, and the success of the British at Cambrai and the French at Malmaison in late 1917.

The Darkest Year offers penetrating insights into the conduct of the war and the performance of the BEF when it bore the brunt of the fighting on the Western Front. It shows how quickly the British Army learned from its previous experience on the Somme, and while there were inconsistencies, especially at the higher command level, its development during 1917 set the foundation for victory in 1918. In doing so, there are lessons contained in several of the chapters that officers in today’s armies would do well to consider. Highly recommended.

[phil andrade]

What a superb review, Crunchy, thanks !

 

When I first saw the title of your thread, I expected it to deal with 1915, which is sometimes depicted as the nadir of the army's experiences in the Great War.

I suppose the strategic difficulties -and peril, actually - in 1917 were greater : Russia down and virtually out, France in dire straits, Italy nearly knocked out and Uncle Sam not ready to intervene on the battlefield etc.

 

The BEF, on the other hand,  was beginning to show some tactical ascendancy over the Germans in 1917.

 

That Canadian success at Lens/ Hill 70 in August 1917 was especially portentous in this regard.

 

I'd be keen to see how much coverage that gets in this book.

 

Phil

 

 

 

[David Filsell]

Just received the latest copy of the WFA magazine Stand To!  (edition 126 ) and I simply cannot understand why this important work has not been reviewed in Garrison Library while a much older book, Richard Emden's Boy Soldiers first published in 2006 and republished a number of times gets nearly four pages of copy (written by the author!). Time was when Garrison Library reviewed  only newly published works!

Regards

David

[Crunchy]

Many thanks for your very kind words Phil. There are about five pages of the chapter on Hill 70. It focussed principally on Horne's approach and on the planning of the battle rather than the execution. A more detailed study is Capturing Hill 70: Canada's Forgotten Battle of the First World War edited by Douglas E Delany and Serge Marc Durflinger. It contains nine essays by different authors covering a range of subjects. It is very good.

regards

Chris

[josquin]

As always, your review is exacting in its analysis and most informative in its critique and explication.  An essential reference, clearly.

Josquin

[Crunchy]

Thank you for your very kind words Josquin. I hope you enjoy the book and get as much from it as I did. 

Regards

 Chris 

[Gunner Bailey]

I'll buy this on the basis of Crunchy's excellent review.

I have long held suspicions about the battle of Arras in 1917 and the subsequent reorganisation of Regiments. 

[green_acorn]

Chris,

Thank you for the splendid and detailed review and analysis.  Like Gunner Bailey I will now have to buy the book.

Cheers,

Chris H

 

[Crunchy]

Glad you liked the review Chris. I hope you enjoy reading the book as much as I did. This is a superb series that provides great insights into particular subjects. I am looking forward to the 1918 volume.

Regards

Chris

[TullochArd]

On 02/05/2022 at 00:12, Crunchy said:

The Darkest Year: The British Army on the Western Front 1917. Ed Spencer Jones. Helion and Company, Warwick, 2022. 510pp.

This is the fourth in the series of splendid books edited by Dr Spencer Jones which provide insights into the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the Western Front, with each volume covering a year of the war. This one delivers the same high standards of scholarship as its predecessors. Their value lies in considering subjects in more detail than more general histories are able to, thereby injecting a more comprehensive and considered view of the issues being addressed. This latest tome offers 16 chapters covering a broad range of subjects from the strategic problems facing the British in 1917, through several studies concerning aspects of the principal battles fought during the year, to the consideration of group cohesion in British infantry battalions, issues facing the development of French and British tanks during 1917, and the Officer Cadet Battalions in the United Kingdom. While 1917 may have been the darkest year of the war for the British Army, generally these essays illuminate the transformation the army was going through following its experience at the Battle of the Somme in 1916.\

Spencer Jones and John Spencer kick off with two studies at the strategic and political level. Jones delivers a thoroughly engaging insight into the strategic problems facing the British government during 1917, the political debates involved in addressing them, together with the widening rift between the British high command and David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, and the resulting consequences. John Spencer pursues a similar theme in which he relates Lloyd George’s dilemma in addressing the strategic issues with his concern to avoid confronting the Germans on the Western Front. Consequently, his relations with his Chief of the Imperial Staff, Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, who was prepared to stand up to him, deteriorated leading to Robertson’s resignation in February 1918. Both essays provide insights into the difficulties of relationships at the highest level when the political and military leaders disagree on where the focus of the principal military effort should be.

As to be expected, many of the contributions address combat studies. Leading off in this genre Michael LoCicero provides a fascinating study into a highly successful German trench raid at Loos in January 1917. Penetrating deep into the British position it resulted in the immediate sacking of a British battalion commander. Their success stemmed from the detailed planning, preparation and innovative deception methods undertaken by the Germans, which offer instructive lessons for today’s soldiers. Two chapters are devoted to the British advance in following up the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line (the Siegfriedstellung). In the first, Nigel Dorrington challenges the generally held view that the Germans succeeded in putting the British on the back foot, both operationally and tactically, by considering the experience of the III Corps. While the execution of their advance was inconsistent, he persuasively argues that, despite the limitations imposed on them by strategic considerations and logistical difficulties, the Corps’ divisions demonstrated they could mount effective operations, absorb new technology, and quickly learn from their experience. In the second Andy Luck compares the performance of the British 8th Division with that of the 2nd Australian Division. While the Australians’ effort was somewhat patchier than the 8th’s, Luck acknowledges the reasons for this and concludes that both demonstrated measurable progress, readily modifying attack formations and took more care with flank protection as the advance developed.

In a wide ranging essay Simon Innes-Jones analyses the development of the British operational art during 1917. In presenting his case he largely focusses on General Sir Henry Horne and the British First Army from the triumph of Vimy Ridge in April to the equally successful capture of Hill 70 in August. As he relates, 1917 was a period of considerable tactical debate within the British Army, as the effective ‘bite and hold’ tactics advocated by Generals Rawlinson, Plumer and Horne gained ascendency over the overly optimistic breakthrough approach favoured by Field Marshall Haig and General Gough, which Innes-Jones contends, with some justification, led to the success of the Hundred Days in the latter half of 1918.

Three chapters consider aspects of the Arras Offensive in April/May. In relating the largely neglected commitments of the Royal Engineers, Alexander Falbo-Wild reminds us of the many and varied tasks the sappers carried out both prior to and during the offensive. Their contribution to the success of the initial attack involved a far greater number of missions than those that current engineers are responsible for, ranging from tunnelling, mapping, chemical warfare, forward rail transportation, rear area and combat engineering, to the provision of signalling and other communications, each of which Falbo-Wild addresses succinctly but with sufficient detail to grasp the magnitude of the engineering effort.

In contrast to the largely positive chapters, Meleah Hampton and Harry Sanderson offer highly critical views on two operations undertaken following the initial success of the Arras offensive. Hampton relates the Australian experience during the advance to the Hindenburg Line and at the two battles of Bullecourt. While one can readily agree with her overall criticisms and conclusions of the Bullecourt operations, others are less convincing. For example, having quoted an instruction that “Strong fighting patrols will be sent out and the enemy cleared out of no man’s land … to enable our attacking force to form up unobserved” she goes on to say “the belief that these ‘strong patrols’ would be able to effect an advance in place of a larger force was never entirely abandoned”, and reiterates this point elsewhere. In doing so she misconstrues both the context and the rationale on the employment of those patrols, and one senses that she seeks to criticise rather than to understand. Sanderson analyses the reasons behind the disastrous Third Battle of the Scarpe that saw the British First and Third Armies fail to either gain or hold any their objectives. Having detailed the deteriorating state and numbers of the British infantry and artillery as the Arras offensive progressed, he then considers the planning and preparations for the attack at Third Scarpe, and outlines the subsequent disaster that befell the British infantry. Quite rightly, Sanderson sheets the responsibility for the shambolic result to an overoptimistic high command which failed to recognise that the culminating point of the offensive had been reached, and in its planning, preparations and execution was overly ambitious and hasty, committing troops who were inadequately supported and ill-prepared for the task. Sadly, there was no imperative to fight either Second Bullecourt or Third Scarpe as the reason for the Arras offensive had passed. Both of these chapters offer sobering lessons for senior commanders of the consequences of failing to properly analyse the conditions facing them, the reasons for conducting battle, and to plan and prepare accordingly.

Turning to the Third Battle of Ypres, in an absorbing study Simon Shephard considers the performance of the artillery against the principles of war devised by the then Colonel J.F.C. Fuller in 1916. Choosing three of the several sub-battles that made up the offensive, Shephard details the artillery plans devised to support General Gough’s overly ambitious objectives at the Battle of Pilckem Ridge, and the step by step approach employed by General Plumer at the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge, and the Second Battle of Passchendaele. Each demonstrates the high level of sophistication that British artillery tactics had achieved by mid-1917, including multiple and deceptive barrages, their ability to completely dominate the opposing German artillery, and to quickly adapt to changing German defensive tactics. It is a chapter that illuminates a rarely discussed and highly successful aspect of this controversial and horrendous offensive.

In a thoroughly convincing chapter, James Tubb challenges Australian criticism of the British 33rd Division’s performance at the Battle of Polygon Wood during Third Ypres. Struck by a German counter attack having just entered the front line on the eve of the battle which overran a portion of their line, and in which they suffered substantial casualties and disorganisation, he demonstrates how quickly they reacted and were able to participate in Second Army’s attack alongside the 5th Australian Division the next morning. While they struggled to achieve all of their objectives, given the considerable disruption they experienced the previous day their performance was highly creditable.

Rounding out the battle studies Richard Hendry narrates the performance of the 47th (2nd London) Division at the Battle of Messines and its defence of Bourlon Wood and the subsequent fighting withdrawal during the latter stages of the Battle of Cambrai later in the year. In both instances, although the division earned some criticisms, he provides ample evidence that it deserved its sound pre-1917 reputation as a good fighting formation.

The remaining chapters cover an eclectic range of topics. Jim Beach relates the contributions of a somewhat shadowy intelligence major on Haig’s headquarters, comparing his analysis of German operational intentions with what actually transpired. Tom Thorpe considers the effects of group cohesion in the battalions of the 56th ( London) Division, and highlights it could have both a positive and a rebellious impact in differing circumstances. Charles Fair discusses the selection and training of junior temporary officers, arguing that by mid-1917 a highly professionalised system of Officer Cadet Battalions had evolved. He contends it produced officers of sufficient quality and quantity which made a vital contribution to the BEF’s success in 1918. However, he offers no evidence for this claim, noting that further research will determine the extent to which the graduates of the system contributed to the final victory. Finally, Tim Gale provides a very useful contribution concerning the problems facing the development of British and French tanks following their inauspicious start in 1916 and early 1917. Central to their development were attempts to coordinate efforts between the two Allies, debates on how they should be employed, the types of tanks required to meet differing roles, and the success of the British at Cambrai and the French at Malmaison in late 1917.

The Darkest Year offers penetrating insights into the conduct of the war and the performance of the BEF when it bore the brunt of the fighting on the Western Front. It shows how quickly the British Army learned from its previous experience on the Somme, and while there were inconsistencies, especially at the higher command level, its development during 1917 set the foundation for victory in 1918. In doing so, there are lessons contained in several of the chapters that officers in today’s armies would do well to consider. Highly recommended.

Hello Crunchy. Based on your excellent review I've just parted with a Pony (£25) for a second hand copy.  I confidently predict I'm not going to be disappointed as you've generously identified several threads I need to explore further. Many thanks for taking the time and trouble to share your observations with your GWF muckers.

Edited 6 November , 2023 by TullochArd

[Justin Moretti]

Thanks for this review. I've ordered it on Amazon and I see some titles that appear to be related. Can you please tell me what the actual related titles are for all the years of the war, so I can be sure I'm buying the right books?

[Michelle Young]

Stemming the Tide, At All Costs, Courage Without Glory.

[Justin Moretti]

Thanks.