Ballistics, trajectories and "under the guns" at Beersheba

[Pete Lowery]

I've a [heretical] question about the Light Horse Charge at Beersheba, 31Oct 1917... 
The popular story is the Turks didn't reset their sights and the Turks shot high. "Under the guns" [from a popular movie] is a common phrase ...

My question is how high does a Turk 8mm Mauser land at about a mile/1600m? 

Was it Shock Action, poor marksmanship or what that let our 4th and 12th Light Horse carry the day??? 

 

Edited 9 October , 2021 by Pete Lowery

[MikB]

The condition where smallarms shoot high because of incorrect sight settings would normally result from their being set for a much longer range than that of the current action. 

If the defenders had set their sights for their maximum range at the start - actual start distance looks too great, about 2 miles - then by the time the attackers came within really effective rifle range - say about a 1/3 of a mile - they'd certainly be shooting tens of feet high if the users really didn't readjust. It is imaginable that something like that might've occurred.

Smallarms trajectories at long range are pretty problematic because of the angle of descent. If that's, say, 15 degrees as at over 2,000 yards, then a 10 yard error in range setting can make the difference between missing the enemy over their head and digging the dirt at their feet. And that's if everything is perfectly to specification with rifle, ammunition and shooter.

 

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[AOK4]

1 minute ago, MikB said:

The condition where smallarms shoot high because of incorrect sight settings would normally result from their being set for a much longer range than that of the current action. 

If the defenders had set their sights for their maximum range at the start - actual start distance looks too great, about 2 miles - then by the time the attackers came within really effective rifle range - say about a 1/3 of a mile - they'd certainly be shooting tens of feet high if the users really didn't readjust. It is imaginable that something like that might've occurred.

Smallarms trajectories at long range are pretty problematic because of the angle of descent. If that's, say, 15 degrees as at over 2,000 yards, then a 10 yard error in range setting can make the difference between missing the enemy over their head and digging the dirt at their feet. And that's if everything is perfectly to specification with rifle, ammunition and shooter.

 

.

Normally, defenders only started firing at an advancing enemy when he was within a reasonable distance so that aimed fire would take effect. There's no officer that would order his men to start firing at an enemy 2 km away... (at least in my opinion)

[MikB]

10 minutes ago, AOK4 said:

Normally, defenders only started firing at an advancing enemy when he was within a reasonable distance so that aimed fire would take effect. There's no officer that would order his men to start firing at an enemy 2 km away... (at least in my opinion)

I'd agree it would seem a weird thing to do, but things like that did happen, eg. IIRC at Omdurman using volley sights - and were sometimes alleged to be effective. Similarly, of course, you'd expect that capable soldiers would readjust their sights as the range closed, even if their officers failed to order it. Obviously, none of us were there, so we ain't gonna know... 

Edited 9 October , 2021 by MikB

[MikB]

There's also a bit of internet gossip on US gun forums that Turkish Mausers shoot high at under 400 yards unless the user employs some feature of the sights correctly. I don't know the rifle, so didn't fully understand the description, but the possibility of a training issue comes to mind.

[Guest]

Mate,

This myth has been around since the charge, that all the Ottomans had there sights set because of what is often said was a Rifle found with that sight setting on it?

I can find no cause for this to be true, as most Light Horsemen in the charge didn't notice any difference when charging and the many men sot down by this and MG fire from the two Ottoman MGs in the defences, prove the Ottomans were just bad shots.

While Ottoman fire is always shown as strong they were never the best of marksmen.  

A number of actions in the desert shows this as fact, while we (Australian and British sourses) all show that the Ottomans had many MG's when in fact they had few or none.

As I said there is no proof that the Ottomans all left there sights at what ever setting given in most sources other then and off the cuff comment that has been passed on for us fools, but even if correct the problem with shooting at distance has only a short beaten zone where they would possibly be safe from the fire, as the closer you get to the rifle the less distance for the bullet to travel.

Most records agree most ALH men were shot down close to the first Ottoman Trench, either by Rilfe or MG fire.

 

S.B

 

 

[Pete Lowery]

stevebecker :... Thank you! That is my thinking... Even if the sight setting as left at (say) 1600m... the dead-zone ballistically [for an 8-10' man on a horse] is rather small. Once a mounted Trooper is close no sight setting should matter much. 

Artillery is a different matter, due to splinter effect...

[Guest]

Mate,

Just to add the Ottoman Regiment was the 2nd Infantry, a well seasoned unit that had been raised in the Country and been on garrison duty for most of the war and attached to the 27th Div for some months.

The Regiment had around 700 to 800 men in three Bn's and an MG Company, each Bn around 250 + men.

At the charge one Bn and MG company were fighting the British Corps and the two Bns in the trenches had the standard three Companies and one Bn MG platoon/Company

Around the time of the charge a Bn had already moved with the 3rd Corps HQ, leaving only one Bn, as a rear guard in the trenches, they had been there a while (some months) so knew the ground, and ranged it, so why any soldier would have his rifle set to 1600 meters is unknown, when the normal engagment would have been around a quarter of that distance.

There were no German officers in the 2nd Regiment, to tell the Ottoman soldiers to set there rifles, so don't believe the Movie?

Cheers

S.B

[Pete Lowery]

stevebecker: VG! Thanks.

[James A Pratt III]

There is a youtube presentation of this charge. It occured at dusk so the Turks may not have had clear targets to shoot at.

[Guest]

Mate,

Of cause shooting at a moving Target is very hard at distance and range brings in so many veritables, and shooting head on makes the target even smaller.

Like Napoleon found  its better to shoot side on, then facing the target.

Most soldiers are trained to shoot at around 300 meters (at lest in my day) while you can shot further, but even at 300 meters in different weather condions bring in so many effects can decide where your bullets will strike.

That's why the idea that the Ottomans started to fire there rifles at around 1600 meters is silly.

Of cause they did engage us with their guns, but the British Horse battery took care of that.

The only weapon to shoot at 1600 meters would have been those guns and possibly the MG's.

But of around 800 ALH men changing, possibly less then five to ten were hit before we got to around 300 meters when the most losses happened by rifle and MG, A famous action was an Ottoman MG that shot down around six or more men from the 4th ALH Regt before they reached the first trench.

 

S.B

[Guest]

Mates,

Just to bring this back. I notice this account by a soldier in the 4 LH MGS of that battle

"During the day of attack the Anzac Division and 3rd Brigade attacked on a flank, with the infantry
attacking on the front. We were in behind the town. Just about sundown we got the order to prepare for attack,
whereupon every mobile unit in the vicinity began to move, so as to make a vast dust cloud to act as a screen.
The 4th Brigade of the Light Horse were detailed to take the town, my machine gun-section being
attached to the 4th Light Horse Regiment. The order was given to gallop, march, and away we went through
dust and shrapnel up to the redoubts, to be met by a volley of rifle fire at practically point-blank range.
At any rate, we never wavered, the 12th LH Regiment remaining mounted with hat or bayonet in hand
until they had galloped into and captured the town, with numerous prisoners and by no means a large casualty
list.
There was lots of evidence to point to the attack as having taken the Turks completely by surprise. In
the headquarters, tea had been prepared, some being on plates and in bowls, whilst the cooking coppers were
still hot and filled with soup, which, I can assure you, went down dusty throats very nicely. There were
numerous field guns deserted, and in good working order, with plenty of ammunition nearby. We were told
that our prisoners totalled 1 500, which, I think, is a fair tally for a few hundred men to capture with only a
bayonet or hat in hand.
 

918 letter: Private 2312 Thomas Brown
4th Machine Gun Squadron

Found on Trove.

SB

[Jeff Pickerd]

The Map 1A – Palestine, is not an accurate depiction of the positions of 4^th & 12^th L. H. Regiment’s formation for the advance at 1630 hours, or the layout of the Turkish trench systems out from the town. It does have its uses as a general guide to the operation, for instance, the track running from Iswaiwin to Beersheba (approx. 6 miles distance) shown as W Road, the Turkish Redoubt at Hill 980, and the Turkish trenches on east side of Hill 1180 with the position of the Nott’s Battery R. H. A.

But the most valuable and accurate map of the charge is that drawn up by Lieut F. R. Massey, Adjutant 12^th L. H. Regt. 3 days after the charge, and held by the Mitchell Library, NSW. This sketch map has 21 alphabetical notations describing the advance of both Regiments, plus all other features marked on the map. Very few authors of Beersheba accounts seem to have accessed and analysed Lieut Masseys’ work.

https://collection.sl.nsw.gov.au/record/74VKOjKvXEJy

The times and distances from Beersheba are the key to how the charge of the 12^th & 4^th LH Regt’s unfolded, and it is important that those times and distances are reported correctly.  Much has been written of the charge, although probably the best sources are those recorded closest to the 31^st October 1917.

H. S. Gullett in the 1^st edition, 1923 of the Australian History, Volume, No. VII,  Sinia and Palestine, has the 4^th LH Bde at Iswaiwin area, at around 3.00 pm four miles from Beersheba (page 394). This is misleading as Iswaiwin is roughly 6 miles distant. Further he states that at just before 4.30 pm the 12^th & 4^th LH Regt’s were behind a ridge about a mile North of Hill 1280, (north/west of Khasim Zanna) and from the crest of this ridge Beersheba was in full view, four miles away to the north-west.

Colonel Eustace Graham Keogh, Suez to Aleppo, published 1955.

“In consequence of air attacks 4 ALH Brigade had been somewhat dispersed, and one regiment was on outpost duty. It was 1630 hours before it was concentrated and ready. Between Khasim Zanna and the Turkish trenches on the east of the town lay four miles of bare, open ground, good galloping country. The brigade deployed with two regiments forward - 4 ALH on the right, 12 ALH on the left - and 11 ALH in reserve.”

Excerpt of the charge at Beersheba by  Lieut Gerald William Nutting No. 4, 11^th LH Regt

History of the Fourth Light Horse Brigade, Australian Imperial Forces, War 1914-1918 and Egyptian Rebellion 1919, Page 25/26, published in 1953,

“At 1615 (4.15 pm) orders were received from the G.O.C., Australian Mounted Division, and also direct instructions from the Corps Commander that the 4th L.H. Brigade should directly attack Beersheba and take the town before dusk. The Brigade was then in reserve about six miles east of Beersheba.
It was realised by the Brigadier that he would have to act quickly, as only a little over an hour of daylight remained. The Brigade was assembled in a valley about half a mile south of Hill 1390,

The Brigade was ordered to saddle up and move when ready under the second in command of each regiment, the senior to command. The Brigadier and Brigade Major, accompanied by C.O.s of the 4th and [26]  12th Regiment, galloped to reconnoitre a covered way of approach for the Brigade to the point of deployment. This was necessary as the 3^rd LH Brigade had just previously been heavily shelled in an attempt to cross exposed ground. The Brigade moved at 1630 at the trot. Shortly after two enemy planes passed over and dropped bombs, and, on return, one flew  low and machine-gunned the Brigade Headquarters personnel and signal troops which were moving in the rear of the Brigade, but no material damage was done.

The route taken was along the Wadi for about a quarter of a mile south and the Brigade deployed where the road crossed 1100 contour. The 4th Regiment advanced on the left of the Anzac Mounted Division and the 12th Regiment advanced on the left of the 4th L.H. Regiment, these two regiments attacking mounted in three successive waves each one squadron. The files were at about four yards' interval and three hundred yards' distance between squadrons.”

Lieut Masseys’ sketch map depicts the advance at 5000 meters (3.1 miles approx.) South-East from Beersheba.

As to the question of the Turks failing to adjust their sights, this, as Steve has suggested, is one of those myths that have arisen from the very outset from within reports of the charge, with no actual evidence ever been recorded to support it as a fact.

As far as can be seen the earliest is from the 3 page report written by Brigadier-General, W. Grant, Commanding 4^th A.L.H. Brigade, dated for inclusion in the October 1917 war diary.

“The rapidity of the attack seemed to demoralise the enemy as they mostly fired high, and it was afterwards found that the sights of their rifles were never lowered below 800 metres. The enemy artillery was also unable to estimate the pace, and the shells all went over the heads of the advancing troops.”

But the report on Operations (Attack on Beersheba) By 4^th A.L.H. Brigade, 31-10- 1917, dated 2^nd November, Appendix 188, also signed by Brigadier-General Grant only states:

“The rapidity of the attack seemed to demoralise the Turks and also avoided their artillery fire.”

General Grant offers no other evidence to support the claim of the sights not being adjusted, but the story flowed from there.

Unattributed History of the 12^th L. H. Regt, published date unknown.

“The rapidity of the attack seamed to demoralise the enemy as they mostly fired high, and it was afterwards found that the sights of their rifles were never lowered below 800 meters. The enemy artillery was all so unable to estimate the pace, and the shells all went over the heads of the advancing troops.”

Fowler, JE "Chook", Looking backward, (Canberra 1979), pp. 21-7:

“The artillery fire had been heavy for a while. Many shells passed over our heads, and then the machine gun and rifle fire became fierce as we came in closer to the trenches some of the Turks must have incorrectly ranged the sights on their rifles, as many bullets went overhead.”

The ballistics and trajectories of the Turkish 8mm Mauser would not have been the issue as most of the Australian casualties occurred as they came up into close range of the Turkish trenches at E through H on Masseys’ map. General Grant’s theory of the Turkish artillery going over the advancing lines of Horsemen would seem reasonable.

(Inserts in Italics are mine)

Jeff