Winter's 'Haig - A Reappraisal'

[kerry]

Dear All,

somewhat behind the drag curve I have only now just finished reading Winter's book 'Haig - A Reappraisal'. I had read the standard work on Haig some years ago, and Winter's book puts a different light on issues. I broached the subject at my local WFA meeting, in the margins, and was startled by the disdain I attracted for wasting my time reading such a book. Winter is clearly an extremely unpopular fellow hereabouts. I was prompted to read it after reading similar emotive scorn in a recent edition of 'Stand To!'.

The acid test oft quoted is that it was British troops holding a victory parade marching along the Rhine. Were it not for Haig, it would have, apparently, been German troops doing the same along the Tees.

Is Winter comletely off the wall and wide of the mark in the quality of his analysis, or has his book attracted such villification from certain quarters exactly because he is too close to the mark?

In the final analysis I guess the individual must make his/her mind up, but Winter's book does pose questions (and tries to answer them) that Terraine and others do not seem to.

I'm sorry if this line is old hat to our longer-standing members who've probably heard all this before. But as a new boy to the area of strategic appraisal post facto, I 'd be interested in the views of my betters and elders regarding Haig's leadership and conduct. Why indeed wait 6 weeks between Plumer's operation to clear the Messines Ridge and starting the push to the U-Boat ports? And did Haig and Sankey really doctor and sanitise Army and Bde histories to place the conduct of CIGS beyond reproach, under threat to the 'contributors?

Aye,

Kerry

[john w.]

Kerry

Havent read the book.. but feel that there is often more to it than meets the eye. Other recent threads have asked questions about generals as people and also how effective they were with the people about them. I feel that this is relevant here.

In addition in Blindfold and alone the author uses a picture of Haig sat at a table and states that he refused to grant execution to 9 out of 10 cases... an alternative view I felt to the 306 who were executed. It seems that any author can utilise their material to generate whatever constructed argument they want and this seems to be the case here.

The debate will continue but I do feel that alternative views are a necessary part of the deabte, not just dismissed as being possibly erevisionist...

perhaps one day I will get to the book.....

John

[Hedley Malloch]

I heard Winter speak at a WFA meeting a few years ago. The book is based on his Ph.D thesis, awarded by Oxford University; his supervisor was Norman Stone. Winter's starting point is that all British official sources are contaminated, weeded and edited to produce a particular view of WW1 and the conduct of the war on the Western Front. Winter's description of Edmunds, the official British historian, is of one the cleverest men who ever lived; he had to be to write such a large tissue of internally consistent untruths.

Winter then described how he combed 'uncontaminated' sources in Australia, Canada and private sources in the UK. The result of Winter's work was a day-by-account of the conduct of the war on the Western Front. He said that when laid end-to-end the boxes and files which held his data were over thirty yards long.

Given this background, and his other credentials (author 'Death's Men' and 'First of the Few') then what he says has to be taken seriously. Against this is the fact that his work does contain factual errors apparent even to the Western Front novice (eg Ovilliers was attacked by the 29th Division on 1 July) and he cannot reference all his evidence.

Unfortunately the ensuing debate has become one of personalities at all levels; Haig as a butcher and bungler; the politics and personalities of the British academic historians - Stone is not well-liked and criticising Winter is said to be seen as one way of getting at Stone. Perhaps professional jealousy plays a part: Winter, a schoolteacher, has three titles published by Penguin, a fact which few of his critics occupying more elevated positions in the British academic hierarchy can match.

What to make of this? I think it comes back to Winter's starting premise: that the British public were lied to, and systematically mislead by their elected politicians over the conduct of a major war, and then tried to cover up that fact.

That couldn't possibly be true … could it? Nothing like that every happens … does it?

I understand that Denis's health has deteriorated significantly in recent years. I am sure we would all wish him a speedy recovery.

[bmac]

I was at a presentation recently given by someone from the NAM who roundly blamed 'the politicians' and held up High Command as doing their best in difficult circumstances... "and, after all, Haig led them to victory". Politicians are an easy target, more especially in today's cynical climate. Certainly, up to 1917, there were many demands from French and UK politicians for the expulsion of the German Army from Northern France and Belgium. However, it was also a politician, Lloyd George, who refused to send more troops to the feed the mincing machine of 3rd Ypres.

Politicians may have demanded victory (what else could they ask for?) but it was the Generals who made the tactical decisions. It was Haig who believed breakthrough battles were possible in 1916 and 1917 and who only turned to describing them as 'wearing out battles' after any chance of a breakthrough was clearly dead, along with thousands of his men.

The Great War may only have come to be popularly thought of as 'futile' when it was clear that there would be another World War twenty years later but, at a tactical level, there are plenty of examples of futile attacks, badly planned, pointless in their objectives and costly in the extreme. Politicians cannot be held responsible for them, but the Generals who made them happen can and should be.

[Mark Hone]

My problem with 'Haig's Command' was that it gave the impression of having been written in one of those 'alternative universes' from an episode of 'Star Trek'. In this alternative universe Haig is a national hero, his blithering incompetence concealed by a vast conspiracy orchestrated by the evil genius James Edmonds. In his book Denis Winter reveals the horrifying truth to a shocked and disbelieving audience....Unfortunately in our (real) universe Haig has been a popular hate figure for decades defended only by isolated voices such as John Terraine (at least until fairly recently). The conspiracy, if such it is, has been an almost unmitigated failure.

[Terry_Reeves]

Bill

With great respect, isn't this just the line that Lloyd George took in his "War Memories" (1934) when he sought to put all the blame on the Generals in an attempt to absolve himself and his political bretheren? History isn't that easy I'm afraid.

Terry Reeves

[armourersergeant]

I have recently ranted on line regarding historians being able to take info and distort it too fit the truth they wish to see so i feel quiet qualified to venture a few comments about this.

Firstly i am coming to the opinion that we will never really establish a good or bad figure of Haig. He had good traits and bad ones. He excelled or performed well at certain times and at others showed dogged stupidity. But we all look at this with hindsight which is the mother of all historians they are unable to take this away from any analysis they conduct of anything.

Haig had a cast iron belief that he was the one too lead the British soldiers too victory, after all you needed a hard heart to send all those boys to there deaths day after day. We can see the way the battles should have been faught and we do this with modern communicational technology they had the fog of war and the constant pressures of allies and the need to relieve the pressure being brought to bear in other parts of the lines It is very easy to criticise after the event and we can do no more for we were not there. Mistakes were made and not all of them were Haigs fault some were made by subordinates under him. Some by the people he trusted to give him information (this was within his power to change so long as he was aware of it?)

What i believe and it is my opinion only is that the factors you have to look at is could we have done it better under another commander and with less casualties. try to put hindsight aside and think who had performed well in the high command upto late 1915...Smith-Dorrien?.. he was for home already never to return. Haig at Loos? uhm.... French was passed his best... Plummer had not proved much to date and was he hard enough?

etc etc etc......

This is where i stop for I used to believe i had an answer to this but i no longer do. I am no lover of Haig i believe he suffered incompetance in his staff that is unforgivable and that he let personell feelings get into the way he conducted battles and appointed commanders.That said i am at a loss to say if during 1918 we could have hoped for a better commander who let the likes of Monasch do his best or to subordinate himself for the good of the allied cause by backing and even suggesting a French overall commander, when they had hardly proved themselves the masters of the battlefield.

Sorry this does not answer your question.

Arm.

[bmac]

Bill

With great respect, isn't this just the line that Lloyd George took in his "War Memories" (1934) when he sought to put all the blame on the Generals in an attempt to absolve himself and his political bretheren? History isn't that easy I'm afraid.

Terry Reeves

Sorry, are you saying that LG did allow more troops to go to France during and after 3rd Ypres? If so, why were there so many complaints about the number of men retained in the UK in 1918 when the German Spring Offensive took place and why were they there? Also, please don't tell me that "History isn't that easy" without providing something to refute my statement. I am quite happy to accept alternative viewpoints and to be corrected when wrong but I get a tad peeved when the recipient of condescending remarks.

[charlesmessenger]

Winter drew his primary source material largely from archives in Canada and Australia. When reputable scholars in those countries checked them, they discovered a number of cases where he had either taken quotations out of context or misquoted them. The resultant impression was that he had bent the evidence to fit his thesis, which is as Hedley puts it.

This is sad, given his two excellent earlier books.

Norman Stone himself is a highly reputable scholar, but his expertise is Eastern Europe, viz his excellent Eastern Front 1914-17. I am not convinced, however, that his knowledge of the Western Front was sufficient for him to query in detail Winter's PhD work, especially since so much of his material was drawn from sources outside Britain.

For those interested, there is supposed to be a new study of Haig on its way by Frank D Vandiver, an American. He recognises the shortfalls in the Winter book, but it will be intriguing to see what he makes of it all.

Charles M

[Guest Simon Bull]

I have not studied Haig in any great detail and I am not properly qualified to support any opinion that I might hold re Haig's competence or lack of it.

However, I am always deeply unimpressed by the argument that Haig's merit is in some way proved by the fact that the allies won the war. There are any number of other possibly relevant reasons for that success. In short, those who use this as as a sole (or significant) argument to support Haig seem to just presume that the effect (winning the war) is produced by the cause (Haig). Issues of causation are never that simple.

Simon Bull

[john w.]

History is the study of things in the past, interpretations are made about things in the past. All interpretations are constructs which are used to explain the past. Constructs are made on an individual basis hence conflict of interpretations. Its the way we are.. individuals and we dont always see the same event in the same way....

John

[Terry_Reeves]

Bill

I'm sorry if you found the comment condescending, it wasn't intended to be. L-G, however did try to distance himself from the loss of of life by laying the blame at the feet of senior officers. I'm not too fussed about the Haig argument personally, it will always go round in circles, but the politics of war simply cannot be divorced from the business of fighting it.

Terry Reeves

[Alan Lines]

I broached the subject at my local WFA meeting, in the margins, and was startled by the disdain I attracted for wasting my time reading such a book. Winter is clearly an extremely unpopular fellow hereabouts. I was prompted to read it after reading similar emotive scorn in a recent edition of 'Stand To!'.

Kerry,

What a shock, getting comments like that from the WFA membership.

I read the book several years ago and did get the impression that Denis Winter was trying so hard at times to discredit Haig that it spoilt the book a little. But having said that I find the same when reading any of John Terraine's books which show Haig in such a good light.

[Hedley Malloch]

However, I am always deeply unimpressed by the argument that Haig's merit is in some way proved by the fact that the allies won the war. There are any number of other possibly relevant reasons for that success

Spot on, Simon. Absolutely agree. We could have had butchers and bunglers in charge of a learning organisation.

[Geoff Parker]

I can see the bad and good points regarding Haig (probably more bad

than good). But one thing I have often wondered about was the German offensive if 1918. Prior to that Haig had always been totally opposed to the British Army under French command, and yet when it looks like the German breakthrough is going to finish the war he offers to place the Army under French command.

It has often crossed my mind whether he did this so that in the event of a total disaster he would not carry the responsibility but could blame the French.

Geoff

[kerry]

The undusputed fact that Winter used Dominion resources to research his book on Haig's conduct during and after the War, raises the question why?

Can we not trust British official histories?

Kerry

[Bryn_Hammond]

Kerry

I was going to provide a link to a review of Winter's book by Jeffrey Grey (a senior Australian academic) and leave it at that. However, instead here is an extract from that review directly relevant to your posting. It's taken from:-

http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/comment/bo...st/booklist.htm

(I searched using Google)

"General Haig and Combat in Europe

Winter, Dennis Haig's Command There is a very good review of Haig's Command by Correlli Barnett, in the Times Literary Supplement, April 19th, 1991. Barnett is highly critical and there followed over the next couple of weeks a sharp exchange of letters with Winter.

Barnett's critisms of Winter as a researcher are too long to reproduce here, but his comments were supported by John Hussey (Letter TLS, 10th May) and Dr.Jeffrey Grey of the University of New South Wales, in a letter to the TLS, August 9th 1991. Dr. Grey's comments are particularly interesting, since Winter made so many great claims for his use of Australian sources;

" Much of Winter's claim to authority and originality lay in his alleged use of archival materials held in Australia, and on this your readers may find further comment useful.

A check of the documents cited in the Heyes papers, collected for C.E.W.Bean in London in the 1920s, and in the correspondence between Bean and the British Official Historian, Sir James Edmonds, not only fails to substantiate Winter's claims but reinforces still further Barnett's criticisms of his capacity as a reasearcher.

Space does not permit a full listing, but such a catalogue would include the misidentification of documents, misquotation of documents, the running together of passages from different documents without identification in any form that the material is from different soures, and misdating of material.

The most serious shortcomings are to be found in his handling of the Bean-Edmonds correspondence. Here Winter misdates a letter by seventeen years in order to support his conspiracy case against Edmonds, and his 'quotations' from the correspondence must be viewed with considerable distrust. To give but one example, on page 31 he cites Edmonds to the effect that 'before 1914 the army was very feudal in its status and...great personages still exercised the higher patronage.' What Edmonds actually wrote to Bean, in June 1929, was: 'I can't help feeling that you think the BEF of 1914 was still the fuedal army it was in 1899 before the South African War...Efficiency, not birth, alone counted!' A reading of the correspondence in toto undermines still further the complexion which Winter chooses to place on Edmonds endeavours..."

There's a good deal more. If Jeffrey Grey's comments are true (and I have no reason to suppose they are not), it rather shows Winter in a bad light. If true, any book that contained such distortions would deserve to be treated with circumspection, if not disdain. After all, a historian's job is surely to establish a critique based on sound analysis and reporting of the facts. Isn't it...?

[Hedley Malloch]

The undusputed fact that Winter used Dominion resources to research his book on Haig's conduct during and after the War, raises the question why?

Can we not trust British official histories?

Kerry

Winter thought not. As I understand Winter's position, successive generations of historians had failed to come clean about the conduct of the war and as a result the British public had become locked into a lie. All public sources regarding the conduct of the war, including Haig's personal diaries, had been weeded or altered to produce a 'no alternative' view. They could not be trusted.

Winter did not just use Canadian and Australian sources; he also drew on UK documents the 'weeders' missed such as letters and diaries of well-placed, but highly critical insiders such as Cuthbert Headlam whose testimony cannot be lightly dismissed.

Is this a realistic view or is it paranoia? You pay your money and you take your choice. In my opinion disclosures surrounding the reasons (or lack of them) regarding the UK government's support for US war against Iraq mean that it looks rather less paranoid than it once did.

With respect to the finger-pointing and search for scape-goats between politicians and the high command, I think that it shows that success (1918) has a million parents, whilst failure (1914-17) is an orphan.

[paul guthrie]

I have read this one time only; I read good books including WW1 multiple times. He went so far past objectivity when he questioned Haig's sexuality that I was just appalled.