27th Division 2nd ypres

[armourersergeant]

Do any Pals have information on the performance of the 27th division during 2nd Ypres as i have seen an article in which it mentions that they came in for high praise from GHQ for their conduct during the battle.

Ta

Arm.

[paul guthrie]

Coincidence but US 27th ( NY National Guard ) was also in action near there near Kemmel in August 1918. They and 30th ( Tennesse North Carolina, some South Carolina ) National Guard were with British Army their entire time.

[Annette Burgoyne]

Hi Arm

I know the 2nd K.S.L.I. and the P.P.C.L.I. both fort well, and can give you an accout of them, mainly K.S.L.I., I have Official History and can give brief details of rest of Div., that is if no one else replies in the next few days. It could take some time for me to look through Regt. History etc. and tpye up info.

Just from memory most of 27th Div's heavy fighting was during May.

Paul - Troops of American 27th Div. were attached to 1st K.S.L.I. during July 1918 for instruction.

Regards

Annette

[armourersergeant]

Annette

Sounds like a long labourious job, info would help but dont go mad only if and when you get the time, leave it awhile see if others come fwd with anything.

Thanks

Arm.

[Annette Burgoyne]

Never labourious, Arm, just time consuming

[armourersergeant]

thanks, just trying to show off my english language skills and failing to impress.

arm

[garyem1]

Arm,

I have a book from the BattleGround Europe Series, ( ST Julien. Ypres) Lots of refs to the 27th Div. I Will read it again and see what I can dig up, but would rather wait for Annette to reply. I am still a learner.

garyem1

[armourersergeant]

any info appreciated Gary, dont worry about learner my 'L' plates are still on

Arm.

[garyem1]

Arm,

The 27th div, had 3 brigades.

The 80th consisted of. 2/K.S.L.I

3/K.R.R.C

4/K.R.R.C

4/Rifle Brigade.

P.P.C.L.I

The 81st consisted of. 1/Royal Scots

2/Gloucesters

2/Cameroons

1/A.& S.H

9/Royal Scots

9/A. & S.H

The 82nd consisted of 1/Royal Irish

2/D.C.L.I

2/R. Irish Fus

1/Leinster

1/Cambridgeshire

Who are you interested in.

garyem1

[Guest Ian Bowbrick]

Arm,

2nd Bn Royal Irish Fusiliers fought with great distinction and suffered many casualties in a gas attack at 2nd Ypres. My wife's grandfather was one of the reinforcements for these casualties sent out in July 1915 when they were at Armentieres. Three months later he caught a blighty wound with the rest of a MG crew when the Germans blew a mine under their trench and he missed going to Salonika with the Division as a result.

Ian

[armourersergeant]

Gary and all, my main reason for wanting some info is too access how well or bad the whole division did over the course of its involvement during the battle as i am studying the officer commanding, General Snow. I have seen an article that he had an arguement with Currie of the Canadians and also that his div was given praise for their conduct during 2nd Ypres.

I do not wish to put people to too much trouble for specifics unless they wish too, All info is greatly recieved and will be studied

Ian,

I shall be following 27th div to Salonika (not literally) as i am also studying Forestier-Walker and he took over command whilst the div was out there. Shame that your relative did not go(not for him though) as the info you may have had would have been great.

Thanks lads and lassies.

Arm.

[Geoff Parker]

Arm

There certainly was a disgreement between Currie and Snow during

1st Ypres. I believe Snow was given overall command of the troops

on the northern flank of the salient and because of the confused nature of the fighting the were orders and counter-orders flying about.

I have two Canadian books on the 1st Canadian Div at Ypres will have a

look and give you the story from the Canadian side.

Geoff

[garyem1]

Arm,

The 27th and 28th were holding the line from Zonnebeke down to Hooge during the battle, (1st and 2nd gas attacks) So the poor souls had the Germans in front of them, with the threat of them breaking through the Canadian lines behind them (St Julien) and cutting them off. Some units of the 27th/28th were called upon to reinforce the units behind them, but my little book does not cover any fighting for the area on the front line that they were holding. Annette where are you? Arm needs some info here and I am not doing very well.

garyem1

[armourersergeant]

thats a help gary.

it helps form a picture for me in a concise form as to what the pressures were on the men in the line who were faced with a new kind of warfare.

Arm.

Ps your doing fine.

[AOK4]

Hello,

I researched Gheluvelt, so I know the Germans there didn't attack, but there were strong patrols, trying to see if and when the English would retreat towards better positions. That they would retreat because of the gas attack was certain for the Germans...

Jan

[Geoff Parker]

Arm

Sorry out on the lash last night so did not have chance to

look up the disagreement between Snow and Currie, will check

tonight. And that should have course been 2nd Ypres (getting my

1st, 2nd, 3rd's mixed up)

Geoff

[Annette Burgoyne]

Hi garyem1 - I am still trying to pick my way through Official History, trying to find info. that may help Arm. The Official History is a little heavy going and I keep going off on unnessary trails.

Hi Jan - The Official History records that the 27th & 28th Divisions were attacked about midnight on 22nd April, and that the attack failed. At the time of first reading this I guessed that the attack was no more then probing to see if this part of the British line was up for it or not.

Hi Arm - The Official History does not mention any disagreement between Snow and any Canadian Gerneral, that does not surprize me, but I can see were a disagreement may well of arisen, I will hopefully post you info. from Official History tonight.

Regards

Annette

[Geoff Parker]

Arm

Ref your question about the argument between Snow and Currie

during 2nd Ypres. I obtained most of the following information from "Welcome to Flanders Fields" by Daniel G Dancocks (This is a Canadian publication).

Following the German gas attack and the following breakthrough the Canadians 1st Division was holding the front line on the northern sector of the salient, but had extended their left flank in an attempt to cover the gap left by the French retreat. Their position was desperate and British units were being fed into the front line to try and stop the German advance.

On 24th April 1915 Plumer handed control of all V Corps reserves to Major General Snow with instructions to deploy these reserves as he saw fit.

Currie at this time commanded 2nd Canadian Brigade and his command was faced with distruction and reinforcements were badly needed. His junior commanders had been unsuccessful in getting British battalions to advance to support 2nd Can Bde. So Currie left his Command post and crossed the battlefield on foot in an attempt to get reinforcements. He came upon Brig. Gen Bush, commanding the York and Durham Bde and ask that he advance his troops to support the Canadians. Bush refused saying he was still waiting for one of his battalions to arrive and at that point went off to look for them. Shortly after he left the missing Battalion arrived and Currie asked its C.O., to advance on St. Julien to support his Bde but the C.O., refused without and order to do so from Bush.

Currie then met an office from 3rd Canadian Bde who informed him that the proposed counter-attack by British units had been cancelled and that they had been ordered to defend GHQ line. Currie learnt that there was a British Divisional HQ at Potijze so he hurried there.

This is where he met Snow. The following is a quote from Currie's own account in 1926.

"He at once3 asked me who I was. I told him and with the aid of the map proceeded to give him my appreciation of the situation ....... As soon as I mentioned that apparently there was a gap between the left of my 8tb Bn and the 3rd Bde troops, he shouted at me and asked how dare I allow a gap to occur. To hear him one would have thought that I personnally and solely was responsible for that gap ........ He roundly abused me and told me to get out, shouting at me to "Give them hell, give them hell"

When I considered the position of all the troops of 2nd Bde and my inability to move two battalions whom I thought had been sent to our assistance, I confess that at that moment I thought I had never heard a more stupid remark. I have thought about it many times over the last 11 years and am still of the same opinion.

I asked if I might send a message to the 1st Canadian Div, but had no sooner sat down at a table to write the message than he again shouted at me, saying that I was taking much too long over it. That was an insult and so at variance with the treatment which one office should receive from another of superior rank that I was dumbfounded."

Snows version was different. He later contended that Currie had already made up his mind to pull back the 2nd Can Bde out of the front line, and that

Currie showed him an order from the withdrawal. Snow claimed he angrily ripped up the order and then "Forcibly persuaded" the Canadian Brigadier to keep his troops in their trenches. Snow later said "If Currie was an English officer I would have had him put under arrest and he would probably have been shot."

A Canadian Engineer, Lt E.F. Lynn apparently witnessed part of this confrontation and observed that Snow was "Excited, raving, abusive and insulting" and thought he was "Close to an attack of apoplexy"

This episode became the subject of a bitter British-Canadian dispute when the official British history was published by Edmonds who apparently accepted Snow's version of events, and claimed it was not biased against the Canadians and that to the contrary he had covered up a number of unpleasant incidents particularly the unsoldierly behavior of General Currie and some of the higher officers.

Sorry its a bit long winded but I know you're researching Snow. If you require any further info from the Canadian Engineer off forum.

Geoff

[Annette Burgoyne]

Hi Arm

I’ll try and keep it brief, I will skip the main details of the German main attack of 22nd April, and mainly give details of the 27th Div. and Gen. Snow but other units have to mentioned to help make a little sense. One of the critical days was the 24th, and it’s the day I think that Snow would have come into conflict with the Canadian General (someone will put me right if I wrong), I have not had time to see how this compares with Geoff's post above? Arm if you can get to look at The Official History, 1915, Vol I, it would give you a better idea as to how critical the fighting was, then my attempt to give you the details, but here goes.

As soon as Generals Bulfin (28th Div.) and Snow (27th Div.), on the right of Canadians know of the break through in the French line and the retirement, they sent their immediate reserves towards the threatened Canadian left flank, without waiting for orders.

The 27th Div. sent the 4/R.B. to position between Potijze and St. Jean. The 2/K.S.L.I. sent two coys to G.H.Q. Line Potijze and possibly one or two coys were sent to 80th Bde. H.Q at Verlorenhoek (I have three different souses of information for 2nd K.S.L.I. at this time and all three have different tales). The 2/Wessex (engineer Coy), were sent to Wieltje to put it into a state of defence.

The 27th & 28th Div. were themselves attacked soon after midnight. Although these attacks failed Gen. Plumer hesitated to utilize all the reserves of these divisions at this point. The 27th Div. H.Q. at Potijze behind the new front, very soon became a focus of communications and the point to which corps reinforcements and reserves were directed.

During early hours of 23rd April two more battalions of the 27th Div. joined the 4/R.B. & 2/K.S.L.I. in corps reserve at Potijze. These two battalion, the 2/D.C.L.I. & 9/R.S. took part in attack in afternoon on this day, along with units of 28th Div. & 13th Brigade, the line was only advanced a small distance. 4/R.B. then sent to 13th Bde and relieved its two front line battalions.

More of the Canadian line was lost in the early hours of the 24th April. The convenience of the H.Q. of the 27th Div. at Potijze for command of the new front from St. Julien to the canal was now so evident that a suggestion was made at Second Army H.Q. to place Gen. Snow in command of this sector; but the idea was not acted on. However, at 9 a.m Gen. Plumer had given him command of all troops in corps reserve in the vicinity of Potijze; and empowered him to use his discretion in employing them to meet unexpected local developments, if communication with Corps H.Q. happened to be interrupted, which it was frequently. A second attack at about 11 a.m. fell on the 3rd C.I. Bde (Br.-Gen. Turner), there were now no reserves in the 3rd C.I. Bde, except for the odd platoon here and there. As no reinforcements were appearing the Canadian battalion commanders on the spot decided to evacuate the exposed position on the western end and forward slope of the Gravenstafel ridge, and take up position covering cross roads a thousand yards south-east of St. Julien, in the area know as Fortuin. This retirement was press heavily by the Germans. There were no reserves near Potijze (the 2nd K.S.L.I. were still in G.H.Q. line at Potijze at this time but they must have been there to guard Div. H.Q. ?), Gen. Snow only had his own divisional reserve, the 1/Royal Irish, which he directed towards Fortuin. There was a gap between the left flank of the 2nd C.I. Bde (Currie) and the 3rd C.I. Bde. Two battalions of 150 Bde., who were at the disposal of the 28th Div., were ordered by Gen. Alderson (1st Canadian Div.), to man G.H.Q. line near Wieltje in support of the 2nd & 3rd C.I. Bdes. But at 11.35 a.m. on hearing about the second retirement he instructed them to make a counter-attack but before these instructions could take effect a large force of Germans were seen to be moving on St. Julien. Gen. Alderson, was convinced of the importance of holding on till more reinforcements arrived but the three Canadian battalion commanders in the line of the attack met to consider their options, their left flank was threatened from Kitchener’s Wood plus they had received an erroneous report that the right flank of the 2nd C.I. Bde. was retiring and also the 1/Royal Irish had not yet turn up, they decided to withdrawal as far as Gravenstafel-Wieltje road. At 1.40 p.m. Br.-Gen. Turner accepted that the retirement of his right was inevitable and his left must conform, he ordered his rest of the Bde & attached units to occupy G.H.Q. line covering Wieltje (some units did not retire until late evening).

The 2nd C.I. Bde. were holding their own, the danger spot was Fortuin, Gen. Snow, felt it necessary to act. There were no V. Corps or 27th Div. Reserves at Potijze, the two battalions of the 150th Bde., were making their way to Potijze, the nearest reserves were the 1/Suffolk and 12/London (Rangers), 28th Div., who had only been relieved from front line the night before. There was no time to obtain Gen. Bulfin’s consent, so in the stress of circumstances Snow took the extreme course and sent these two battalions towards Fortuin (in the evening Snow sent the 2/K.S.L.I. & 8/D.L.I. of his own Div., to the 28th Div. to replace the two he had commandeered) he also ordered 2/Glos. of his own Div., who were in support in Sanctuary Wood, to move to Potijze. At the same time-2.15 p.m.-as the senior officer on the spot, and all communication by wire having been cut, Gen. Snow called on Br.-Gen. Turner to move every man he had to stop any advance via Fortuin at all costs. The 3rd Canadian Bde. did not received this message until 4.05 p.m., Gen. Alderson, backed it up, on gaining knowledge of it at 4.35 p.m., with a message to Br.-Gen. Turner along the same line. Just to point out, how out of touch the command was, the last part of Gen. Alderson’s message to Br.-Gen. Turner ran as follows “I have no exact knowledge of your situation at the present moment, but hope that you are still blocking St. Julien and in close touch with the 2nd C.I. Bde.”

By 3 p.m. the two battalions of the 150th Bde. (Br.-Gen. Bush) had assembled near Potijze, en route and whilst there they received many different orders. Br.-Gen. Currie, 2nd C.I. Bde, personally appealed to Br.-Gen. Bush to counter-attack, but the latter pointed out that their original order to counter-attack had been cancelled. A staff officer of the 27th Div. ordered them to make Fortuin good and stop the Germans advancing from St. Julien. As the Suffolks & Rangers, neared Fortuin they were assured-in-error- by a staff officer that St. Julien was in Canadian hands and that they were needed to cover the left flank of the 2nd C.I. Bde., which was about Boetleer’s Farm, they attempted to reach Gravenstafel ridge but only got as far as the Zonnebeke-Keerselare Rd. where they were stopped by heavy shell fire from both sides, the British Artillery had not been informed that British troops were entering this area. Currie also ordered two of his battalions, who were near Fortuin, to move to Boetleer’s Farm. Just as the Sufforks & Rangers were making their way to Gravenstafel ridge, Br.-Gen. Bush force were arriving at Fortuin. At the cross roads they found and drove off some Germans. Then seeing other Germans in force advancing out of St. Julien, they attacked and drove Germans back on the village, this counter-attack effected its purpose and the Germans made no further advance on this day. This is were possibly the disagreement between Snow & Currie may hay occurred (but I do NOT KNOW this for sure, someone with more knowledge of the two can put me right), Currie was wearied by the gap on his left flank and wanted it filled or covered but Snow was wearied of farther German attacks from St. Julien in the centre, add the fact that non of the Generals had a full picture of what was going on in area out of their control.

Do you want me to carry on for 27th Div. & Snow for the rest of battle, most of the 27th Div’s heavy fighting took place in May.

Regards

Annette

[mordac]

From pages 76-77 of Nicholson's Official CEF History:

As daylight on the 24th faded, General Currie's 5th and 8th Battalions were still holding firm in the original front line. But he had been much disturbed about his open left flank, where a company of the 5th Battalion at Boetleer's Farm and the survivors of the 7th Battalion's company at Locality "C" held the only remaining positions of the "subsidiary line" along Gravenstafel Ridge. All morning he had anxiously awaited the planned counter-attack by the two battalions of the York and Durham Brigade, and at about 1:00 p.m., when efforts by his rear headquarters staff at Wieltje had failed to urge these forward from the G.H.Q. Line, Currie took the extreme course of leaving his command post (which had been moved to 400 yards south of the Fortuin Road junction) and going back himself, "it being thought", he writes, "that they might move for me when unlikely to move for other officers of lesser rank". Before he went he left provisional instructions for his two front line battalions to fall back to the Gravenstafel Ridge, if necessary- an order which was not put into effect. Having failed to persuade Brig.-Gen. Bush (who had now received General Alderson's order cancelling the counter-attack), Currie personally saw General Snow (about 3:00 p.m.) and gave him an appreciation of the situation, but could not obtain assistance from him. The best he could do was induce some stragglers from the 7th Battalion, who had lost their officers, to go forward and join the 8th Battalion.

Garth

[armourersergeant]

Annette,Geoff,

What you have done is brilliant and also very comprehensive and you get my greatest thanks. I will take any or all the info that people can provide so long as they do not mind.

Annette if you would prefer to give me the jist of the narrative that would be fine, but if it is no trouble i'll take what you can get for me.

Thanks

Arm.

[armourersergeant]

As regards this Snow Currie business it seems to me that once again i am to be faced with the two camps of guilty or innocent. It sounds to me that both men were worried by the German actions and under severe pressure it may just be the fact that Currie came across to Snow as a panicing officer and he gave him both barrells so to speak. Not a calming action to say the least from a superior officer. Wonder if it made Currie go back and steady the line to show Snow what he was made of?

We shall see?

Arm.

[Annette Burgoyne]

Hi Arm

It will take a few days to a week, mainly because I get side track very easy. I see you are also asking for info. on 27th in Salonica, I do not have Official History for that area but looking at the 2nd K.S.L.I. losses, disease was the biggest enemy. Out of the 80 men who lost their lives while in this area only 9 were K. in A. and 4 D. of W.

Regards

Annette

[jhill]

Arm,

I know this is an old topic now, but I was just browsing through the Canadian National Archives War Diaries site (which we have been praising on this forum for some time), and I notice that they now have some diaries of some British units. In particular, War Diaries of the 27th Division for the 2nd Ypres period are online, including Gen Snow's final report.

If you have not already seen them you might find them interesting.

[armourersergeant]

Had not discovered this before its a gold mine and you are a star for pointing it out.

Arm.