Hundred days offensive August-November 1918

[Guest]

Am a newcomer to this discussion format.

 

Qu; Success of the Hundred Days Offensive in 1918 down to 

1) improved application of 'bite and hold' by Allied armies or

2) improved use of 'combined arms' or 

3) The birth of the modern style of warfare

 

Thank you

[Dai Bach y Sowldiwr]

Welcome.

There is a current thread  entitled '100 Days' which might be of interest:

 

[phil andrade]

20 hours ago, Welshexile said:

Am a newcomer to this discussion format.

 

Qu; Success of the Hundred Days Offensive in 1918 down to 

1) improved application of 'bite and hold' by Allied armies or

2) improved use of 'combined arms' or 

3) The birth of the modern style of warfare

 

Thank you

 

Warmest of welcomes to you, Welshexile !

 

Please take a look at the thread that Dai has suggested.

 

In the meantime , let me pitch something in that I believe has been overlooked as a factor in the success of the Hundred Days : the enormous loss of life suffered by the Germans in their offensives from 21st March 1918 to mid July. Not only was that loss severe in the quantitative aspect  ; it also entailed an excessive attrition in qualitative terms, with elite units and officers being expended disproportionately , and morale being damaged very significantly .

 

This is, of course, stating the bleeding obvious : but sometimes the obvious merits another look.

 

Phil

[ejwalshe]

Answer D) None of the above.

 

Currie.

[kenf48]

The thread referred to above seems to be more concerned with an analysis of casualties by country than strategy and tactics of the opposing armies.  

 

14 hours ago, phil andrade said:

 

In the meantime , let me pitch something in that I believe has been overlooked as a factor in the success of the Hundred Days : the enormous loss of life suffered by the Germans in their offensives from 21st March 1918 to mid July. Not only was that loss severe in the quantitative aspect  ; it also entailed an excessive attrition in qualitative terms, with elite units and officers being expended disproportionately , and morale being damaged very significantly .

 

 

Another major contribution not mentioned in that thread, or in the suggestion by the OP was the Blockaded, which meant Germany, and the Army was systematically starved of resources while the civilian population was literally starving.  A situation, together with that related by Phil that led to the post war myth exploited politically that the German Army was not defeated.  

Although there were examples of improvisation the shortages meant serious logistical problems such as moving troops and equipment rapidly to the Front.   That is not to diminish the loss of life discussed on the other thread but merely to highlight the complexity of the campaign.

 

6 hours ago, ejwalshe said:

Answer D) None of the above.

 

Currie.

 

Not helpful to a new member.

 

Ken

 

[phil andrade]

Regarding Currie and his Canadians - and I fully acknowledge the achievement of Moreuil Wood and the activities of motorised MG units - they appear to have kept their powder rather dry while UK units were fighting for their lives- and in too many cases losing those lives - in March and April. When they plied their strength so brilliantly in August, and exploited fully in September , they were relatively fresh, rested, up to strength, well trained and properly equipped.

 

I expect I’ll need some enlightenment here.

 

 

Phil

[phil andrade]

Following on from my earlier point, and anxious not to be the one trick pony that I tend to be on the casualty figures, I do want to share a revelation that has just hit me : in the forty days between March 21st and the end of April 1918, the British killed more German officers than they had in the entire year of 1917.  

 

It’s hard to exaggerate the repercussions of this.

 

Phil

[adk46canada]

Phil

 

The Canadians had some very important advantages that other similar formations in the BEF did not enjoy. i will give brief overview of these:

 

- Training: The 1st, 3rd, and 4th Divisions were out of the line from early May to late June/Early July for intensive open warfare training. I doubt any other formation had this opportunity to conduct such extensive and intensive instruction. Multiple war diaries and after action reports attest to the value of this training during the Hundred Days. All the elements including infantry, artillery, signals, engineers, medical, machine guns, and CASC underwent this training.

 

- Material:  The Corps had more, including more wireless sets, permanently assigned trucks, machine guns and field artillery. It even had more typewriters. In 1918, typewriters were cutting edge technology.

 

- Structural: The Corps retained the 4 battalion brigade structure and up to the mid-point of Second Arras had an extra hundred men per battalion assigned, each division had an extra machine gun company, along with a raft of increases in support services. Two vital changes that sometimes are only discussed were the expansion of the engineers in each division to a three battalion brigade and two tramways companies giving the Canadians its own light rail service. During Second Arras, the infantry were not called on to provide work parties unlike British battalions and the engineering work was done faster and more efficiently as a result

 

Manpower: Owing to conscription the Canadians had a more robust supply of replacements available. The situation did not get tight until after Second Arras, so Canadian battalions started Arras at close to full strength in most cases. These troops had undergone the full training cycle. Also prior to the Hundred Days, Canadian battalions had the luxury of combing out lower grade men and replacing them. The British were having to put Category B men into the front line as garrison battalions.

 

Semi-Permanent Formation: The Corps was semi-permanent unlike British Corps into which divisions transferred in and out. The 51st (Highland) Division, which served with the Corps at Second Arras, was in its tenth corps at this point and this does not count the multiple times it served with the same corps. Canadian divisions remained with the Corps for the most part and knew they would always return. As a result, more of a common doctrine and understanding developed. The British BGGS of the Corps said later it had a life unlike British corps. 

 

Semi-independence: The Canadians had moved into a more independent status by 1918 such that Currie could complain to the Canadian politicians when Haig broke up the Corps during the spring offensive. The C-in-C had to respond by reversing his decision. Haig had to operate knowing that he had to give the Canadians more leeway than a standard British corps. Making this more tolerable was the sterling reputation the Canadians had earned in 1917 as a crack formation. As a result, the Currie could more readily demand more resources, a better plan, or a change than could a standard British corps commander. An example was Currie's advocacy of his Canal du Nord operation over the concerns of the army commander. Currie was used to getting his way. He did not in all cases but certainly more than the average corps commander.

 

Regards

Bill

[phil andrade]

Jeepers Creepers, Bill, what a tour de force !

 

Now I feel well and truly enlightened....thanks.

 

The status of Canada as a nation must have been immensely enhanced by the Great War.

 

Phil

[MikeMeech]

On 05/11/2019 at 21:43, Welshexile said:

Am a newcomer to this discussion format.

 

Qu; Success of the Hundred Days Offensive in 1918 down to 

1) improved application of 'bite and hold' by Allied armies or

2) improved use of 'combined arms' or 

3) The birth of the modern style of warfare

 

Thank you

Hi 

 

You are correct to assume a number of factors were involved in the success of the '100 days' offensive.  It does go back to the German Spring Offensive as the losses of the German Army during these was basically irreplaceable.  At the end of the German advances they had captured territory (a large amount of which they had given up a year before to shorten their line) and now lengthened their line with less troops proportionally to defend it, with the actual physical defences being weaker then the ones they had advanced from.  Two relatively small attacks by the BEF, at La Becque (British with Australians on the flank) 28 June, 1918  (using artillery/infantry + air support) and Hamel (Australian/US/British troops, Tanks/artillery/infantry + air support) indicated that the German defences could be pushed back.  The French then made their counter-attack 'Second Battle of the Marne' (French with some US, Italians and two British Divisions using tanks/artillery/infantry + air support including RAF 9th Brigade) starting 18th July, which was also successful.  This was followed by the Battle of Amiens (Australian, Canadian, British and French troops using tanks/artillery/infantry + air support).  From then on there were 'continuous' attacks along the whole 'allied' front at some point, which meant the now weakened German forces could not concentrate very effectively at any point to engage in major counter-attacks.  By the time the Germans had returned to their major defence lines eg. Hindenburg LIne,  they were even more weak in personnel and the 'allies' had set piece attack methods that could break into these defences.  Despite the 'allies' undertaking a 'war of movement' it was not on the scale of what was possible during WW2, and there was always a problem of the logistics trying to keep up.  However, the movement forward was perfectly adequate to prevent the Germans forming strong defence lines in time to stop the advance.  The nature of warfare changed after the German main defences were breached, with Germans relying heavily on machine-gunners and artillery to try and delay the allies.  This meant large set-piece attacks became rarer and infantry attacks became more like WW2 type fighting, having tank and artillery support and air support when the weather permitted.  Indeed tanks were used to breach hedges that had been wired by the Germans to form gaps for infantry to get through to attack a German strong point, rather like the battle of Normandy during WW2.  You do see some forms of the 'modern style of war' but it still had a little way to go.  It was never an easy advance but the Germans could not stop it.

This is a rather simplistic summary but the important fact is that all the allies were involved in making attacks along the line keeping the Germans on a 'back foot' therefore forcing the German Army into an Armistice.

 

Mike

[DarrellDuthie]

To Bill’s superb exposition of the factors underlining the success of the Canadian Corps in the 100 days (and by extension the success of the entire campaign that was to end the war), I think you have to add the generalship of Lt-Gen. Currie – in the footsteps of an earlier comment. By way of support, the following (by no means an exhaustive list).

1)      Currie's willingness to stand up to superiors when the situation warranted. His determination to keep the corps intact (i.e. not thrown piecemeal into the Spring defences) whilst retaining the 12 battalion/division structure (rather than 9), etc., caught the ire of Haig. With time the field-marshal was to see the wisdom of this. Likewise, Currie’s conviction to press ahead at the Canal du Nord in the face of deep scepticism by his Army commander Horne, and others, was courageous. Precious few generals in the war did likewise.

2)      The training and preparation of the Corps owed much to Currie’s broad encouragement of learning amongst subordinates and other ranks. Equally, implementing those lessons was a key priority. View the expansion of the number of machine guns per battalion, the buildup of the engineers, and the other factors Bill mentioned.

3)      Generally the right decisions in terms of personnel. The glaring exception being the ousting of his finest general, Lipsett, in mid-September.

4)      Sound operational plans and execution. I think for example of the daring Canal du Nord operation, the topographically challenging assault at the Luce and Domart on 8 August, and the Valenciennes/Mont Houay attack.

5)      His convincing council to superiors: e.g. at Amiens when Currie persuaded Rawlinson and ultimately Haig of the advisability of halting the Amiens advance, and to attack instead at Bapaume. To Haig’s great credit he did this (notwithstanding Marshal Foch’s objections and his own track record).      

 

Darrell

Edited 7 November , 2019 by DarrellDuthie

[ejwalshe]

@DarrellDuthieWish I wrote your reply.  You said it better than I would have.

 

May I add another to your list for Currie in the same terse fashion?

 

6) Andrew McNaughton

[2ndCMR]

The Canadian Corps also showed what COULD HAVE been done with British soldiers if properly led, organized and equipped; and if the best had not been thrown away like confetti in 1914-16. 

Yes, it was "The birth of a nation", but determined efforts were made between the wars, during WWII and after, to ensure that Canada never had such an opportunity again,  and never lived up to its promise, and that is where the situation remains today. A larger subject than can be encompassed here.

 

Lipsett was an officer of the best type and the fact that the Corps did not apparently suffer from his departure says something about strength of the body as a whole, as does its success despite a type such as Gen. David Watson.

Edited 8 November , 2019 by 2ndCMR

[Guest]

On 05/11/2019 at 22:43, Welshexile said:

Am a newcomer to this discussion format.

 

Qu; Success of the Hundred Days Offensive in 1918 down to 

1) improved application of 'bite and hold' by Allied armies or

2) improved use of 'combined arms' or 

3) The birth of the modern style of warfare

 

Thank you

Hello Welshexile,

 

from the German point of view I would also emphasize the fact that the German Imperial Army had lost about 700.000 men during its spring offensives and an additional 800.000 men during the Allied counter offensives in the summer and autumn. Above all, the best divisions had been exhausted recklessly during the offensives and when the Allies started their counter-offensives these divisions had to be used again to stop the Allied advance.

A good example is the 3rd Guards Division which had suffered heavy losses duing the spring and the summer. Nevertheless this division was used again and again to plug holes in the line, and when the AEF attacked in the Meuse-Argonne sector, it was thrown against Pershing's troops even though its companies had only 25 men; The Guards Fusiliers had dwindled to a point that they could place only one man on 25 metres of trenchline. These units were used up beyond the point of recovery, and in my opinion the Hundred Days Offensive was just another example of a strategy of attrition in so far that now it was not possible any longer for the German High Command to rest divisions in "quiet" sectors of the western front so that they could recover from their previous battles.

 

best wishes

Alfons

[phil andrade]

Alfons,

 

Welcome !

 

Another of my statistical observations, if I may : the entire number of German soldiers captured on the Western Front in the entire Great War was 774,000, if the Allied claims are to be believed. Of this number, almost exactly half ( 385,000) were claimed in the period from mid July 1918 to the Armistice .  I would think - and it’s only supposition on my part - that up to  twice as many were killed or wounded, or poisoned by gas, in the same period. That 800,000 you cite for the summer and autumn of 1918 might well be very short of the mark.

 

Whatever the actual figure, the  numbers of prisoners claimed by the Allies testify to a catastrophic collapse.  How far we might attribute this to Allied skill as opposed to German deterioration is difficult to gauge ....I suppose the two things blended.

 

Phil

Edited 24 November , 2019 by phil andrade