Senior commanders in 1914

[lostinspace]

I finally found a clear account of the attack made on the 12th of October by Hickie's 13 Brigade, it is from "Invicta: with the First Battalion, the Queen's Royal West Kent Regiment in the Great War" p.p. 55-56:
"Operations near Bethune. On 11th October the 13th Brigade, under Brigadier-General Hickie, left Valhuon at 8 a.m. as reserve to the II Corps. The Battalion reached Drouvin (4 miles S. of Bethune) at about 6 p.m. and billeted there. At 9 a.m. on the 12th it marched to Beuvry (2 miles S.E. of Bethune). Here the Brigade received at 3 p.m. orders to advance in a S.E. direction against the enemy, who was in position between La Bassee and Vermelles. The Queen's Own was on the right of the Brigade, the Duke of Wellington's in the centre, and the K.O.S.B on the left, with the K.O.Y.L.I in reserve. After passing Annequin the enemy was found to be holding his position in force, and the Brigade entrenched in advance of the road between Givenchy and Noyelles.

"The Battalion was on the left of the French in this operation, which was the first attack on Vermelles. It was understood that the French also were attacking at 3 p.m., but they did not do so, and the Battalion appeared to attack alone. No headway could be made and we had no artillery support....During the day the Battalion suffered over fifty casualties.... These losses were caused principally by an enfilading rifle and shell fire from the village of Vermelles.
"The 13 was occupied in strengthening the trenches.... The French on our right, subsequently attempted an advance against Vermelles, but could make no progress."

Two things: it seems pretty clear that the only attack made was on the 12th of October by two battalions of the brigade, the next day another attack was ordered but Hickie refused to make it, he  "declined to cooperate without orders from superior authority."  Hickie was then placed on the sick list that evening.
In regards to Le Pilly on the 19th/20th. I think Daniell (sp?) would have been justified in pulling back, despite the GHQ order, but when the German counterattack came it was so overwhelming he didn't have a chance to. GHQ was clueless at this point despite intelligence of a massive German attack on the way. I suppose all the intermediate HQs were too intimidated to issue the recall order on their own.
 

Dave
 

 

[Perth Digger]

There are two main points that come from what you've found on Hickie, Dave, that help to explain the wider issues surrounding Le Pilly. The first is the question of command. Hickie's fate was a reminder to commanders to do as they were told, as you say. These are the possible relevant points made in Field Service Regulations:

 

Hickie could have used ii, but as he was not out of contact with Division I suppose he had to query the order rather than ignore it. On the other hand, he could have used iii to justify his position on the order. However, if he had felt that circumstances required the order to be changed, but had gone ahead anyway and made no progress, under iii he would have been responsible for the failure. He was between a rock and a hard place.

 

The other big issue, for which there seems to be little material, that comes from this period in October is how the allies worked together. Liaison between the French and the British seems to have been very poor. It's worth remembering that the French were on either side of II Corps and thus cooperation was vital. The only justification for 2nd RIR remaining at Le Pilly overnight on the 19th would have been if they knew for certain that the French cavalry would be making another attack on Fournes on the 20th. But I can find nothing to say what the French intended to do. I suppose what is needed is access to French war dairies, accounts of the period etc. 

 

There is this rather strange statement in 8th Brigade's War Diary for the 20th:

 

 

 

The first sentence is perplexing: did they not know what had been happening at Le Pilly since the early morning? Why is 'counterattack' used in the second sentence? Does this suggest that 8th Brigade knew that the French were going to attack but were pre-empted? And why use 'seemed' in the last sentence? Is this an attempt to deflect responsibility onto Division HQ?

 

I suppose one can over-analyse documents which were written under great pressure, so maybe I'm making too much of all this. But it's enjoyable!

 

Mike

[Robin Garrett]

The web site http://www.ww1infantrycos.co.uk/ lists infantry commanding officers of WW1. You could see how many battalion COs in command in 1914 had been replaced by the end of the year (or whatever date you are using).

 

 

 

[Perth Digger]

That's a very useful site, Robin. Thanks for letting me know.

 

Mike

[Robin Garrett]

Mike

 

If you look at the pages on the (King's) Shropshire Light Infantry (my old regiment) and particularly the 1st/4th Battalion, you will see I produced some biographies of the COs. Happy you use these on your site, if you want. The CO (Arthur Garrett) who took the battalion to the Far East in 1914 and brought them back to the Western Front in 1917 was a vague relation of mine.

 

Robin

[Perth Digger]

Thanks for the offer, Robin.

 

Any website that has a photo of the great Bob Dawson, 6/Royal West Kent Regiment, on its front page gets my vote!

 

Mike

[lostinspace]

We really have no way of knowing how, or if, Hickie defended his decision; keeping quiet might have been a condition for future employment. In an earlier case, Brigadier-General Frederick Ivor Maxse, 1 (Guards) Brigade, returned to England in late September "for a rest". In Far from a Donkey: The Life of General Sir Ivor Maxse, Kcb, Cvo, Dso (John Baynes) it suggests the destruction of 2nd Bn. Royal Munster Fusiliers in a rear guard action at Etreux, and then a refusal to send out an advance guard per the orders of the GOC 1st Division on 6 September may have prompted the decision to remove him. It's worth quoting Far from a Donkey (p.p. 116-117) on the latter: "Following the brush with the enemy cavalry in the morning, 1st Guards Brigade was advancing after midday when Haig came forward with General Lomax, GOC 1st Division to instruct Ivor to send out patrols, supported by an advanced guard, towards a point where he believed the enemy were trying to check the British advance to cover their own retreat. For some reason Ivor  demurred, possibly because he felt that his hands were full enough with simply keeping his tired troops on the move without any extra commitments, the need for which he may have doubted. Haig gave vent to his considerable annoyance over the matter in his diary: 'Maxse made difficulties and seemed to have lost his fighting spirit which used to be so noticeable at Aldershot in peacetime!' It is also likely that the constant complaints Ivor made during the retreat, as recorded in his 1920 notes, would have caused considerable annoyance at divisional and corps headquarters".

I doubt that the loss of the Munsters, in itself, would have caused Maxse to lose command, it was likely a cumulative process. Hickie however, was only in command for thirteen days, Smith-Dorrien probably determined that an example had to be made immediately "Pour encourager les autres".

Dave

[Perth Digger]

One example was soon followed by a second, Dave. Mackenzie also and he lasted less than a fortnight too. Ruthlessness or panic, I can't decide.

 

Mike

[lostinspace]

 

11 minutes ago, Perth Digger said:

One example was soon followed by a second, Dave. Mackenzie also and he lasted less than a fortnight too. Ruthlessness or panic, I can't decide.

 

Mike

I think the high command figured that if you didn't do something to stop subordinates from questioning or refusing orders the army would fall apart. I can't remember now where I read it, but after war was declared there were fears by some that the men would refuse to fight, thus the exhortations in orders not to surrender, fight to the last etc. This clearly sent a message to most battalion commanders that it was best to wait until the last minute before ordering a retreat, thereby creating situations where entire battalions were lost during the early period of the war. Just my opinion of course.
I'm not familiar with Mackenzie's situation, I'll have to do some more research!

Dave

[Perth Digger]

A bit of context here, Dave, from Elizabeth Greenhalgh's on-line article in War and Society  (2019): 'The French Army on the Western Front', p.4:

 

"In August 1914, France mobilised five armies. By 3 September ... General Pierre Ruffey was relieved of command of his 3rd Army ... and Lanrezac (5th Army) ... By December only six of the original 20 corps commanders remained in post, although some of the changes were promotions ... In all, Joffre sacked 162 officers exercising a command."

 

I was just sending this when your last arrived.

 

Mike

[Perth Digger]

Mackenzie took over 3rd Division on 15 October 1914, after Major-General Hubert Hamilton was killed while talking to an officer of 2nd RIR in the trenches the day before. He was degummed by the end of the month, with Le Pilly a primary reason. He later commanded 61st Division at Fromelles.

 

Mike

[lostinspace]

Oddly enough, the II Corps files for October contains numerous files of French (mostly 21st Army Corps) correspondence. Probably some gems in it, but I can only pick out words here and there.