Senior commanders in 1914

[Perth Digger]

Before considering trying to compile a list of all Divisional, Brigade and battalion commanders (ranks of Major-General, Brigadier-General and Lt-Colonel and/or Major) who failed to last, for whatever reason, the fighting of 1914, I was wondering if there are places where such data already exist in tabulated form? Infantry, cavalry and artillery. 

 

Thanks

 

Mike

Edited 22 August , 2019 by Perth Digger

[lostinspace]

3 hours ago, Perth Digger said:

Before considering trying to compile a list of all Divisional, Brigade and battalion commanders (ranks of Major-General, Brigadier-General and Lt-Colonel and/or Major) who failed to last, for whatever reason, the fighting of 1914, I was wondering if there are places where such data already exist in tabulated form? Infantry, cavalry and artillery. 

 

Thanks

 

Mike

 

 

Not to my knowledge. Peter Hodgkinson came out with a book and website about battalion commanders a few years ago that might be of some use to you. He has a chapter in "Stemming the Tide", edited by Spencer Jones on the same subject. That book also has chapters on brigade and divisional commanders during 1914 (it's really just a very broad survey though). From what I've read the majority who failed to last were killed or wounded, especially infantry battalion commanders. Guest had a long running thread on officer survivability in the original BEF a few years ago that might be helpful. It's likely that you would have to research cavalry and artillery officers on an individual basis. 
 

Dave   

Edit: Here is Mr. Hodgkinson's website: http://www.ww1infantrycos.co.uk/british regiments.html

His book is "British Battalion Commanders in the First World War", Ashgate, 2015.

[robertb]

Try: 'Bloody Red Tabs.  General Officer Casualties of the Great War' by Frank Davies & Graham Maddocks (1995) ISBN - 978-1783462377.

[Perth Digger]

Dave and Robert

I have both books, thanks. I'd use both to get some information. I've just got Nikolas Gardner's Trial by Fire, which puts much emphasis on the loss of officers as a cause of (what he claims) was the poor performance of II Corps in October 1914. It was the number of senior officers being sent home at that time that sparked my interest.

 

Mike

[lostinspace]

So, you're really looking for those who were relieved for poor performance in 2nd Corps rather than overall casualties. I'll have to re-read Gardner, it's been awhile.

 

Dave

[Perth Digger]

Both really, Dave, just to see proportions of dead, wounded, sick (genuinely) and degummed. 

 

Gardner's thesis (it began as a PhD under, I think, Tim Travers) is that personal animosities at the highest level is the main factor when considering the BEF's performance in 1914. This led to very high casualties, especially amongst officers, leading to loss of momentum. Personalities are certainly one factor, in my view, as it conforms to the general maxim that responsibility flows upwards and blame flows downward in most chains of command, whether in the armed forces or in business. But in Gardner's book everything is fitted into this thesis; there are no alternative explanations. It becomes repetitive and stale. And, of course, the result is that the Germans become mere cyphers. What they are doing is hardly relevant.

 

Mike

[lostinspace]

5 minutes ago, Perth Digger said:

And, of course, the result is that the Germans become mere cyphers. What they are doing is hardly relevant.

Yes, I agree with that. It should also be mentioned that the German reserve corps were ill-trained, ill-equipped and poorly led, while the active corps had been bled just as badly as the formations of the BEF. In Gardner's defense, most author's frame their books in the same fashion, some facts are used that support their thesis while others that do not support it are either not used at all or discounted. When you are writing about events that happened a century ago, new and different is hard to come by.

[Perth Digger]

Not much good being new and different if the result is distortion. In my generation historians were expected to face up to material that did not conform, not to hide/ignore it. But that was before "theory" took over, putting the cart before the horse.

 

Mike

[lostinspace]

Oh no, I'm not disputing that. But how many books from your generation do you consider fulfill your expectation? I guess I'm pretty cynical about authors (and their books),in my opinion, everyone has an agenda.

Dave 

[Perth Digger]

It's interesting that for the past 30 years or so it has been argued that everyone has a bias and that it is better that that bias is openly proclaimed and displayed. IMO there is a difference between bias and opinion, but let that pass. The "old" historians, of course, had a "bias" and an agenda. You knew that from reading their books, not because they proclaimed them loudly and proudly! Again, IMO being open about one's "bias" or prejudices has meant that it is no longer necessary to deal with unpalatable material. It can be ignored because I have set out my stall beforehand and wouldn't be expected to do anything other than follow my party line. The modern world of academia thinks it is being more honest. In fact, it isn't. Openness has led to closure. 

 

I agree with your cynicism, Dave, if not for similar reasons.

 

Rant over! This is not to say that I have no admiration for many (most) books I read on WW1.

 

Mike

[lostinspace]

Well said. I guess we are straying a considerable distance away from your original post, I'll look through some of my material to see if I can come up with any information on 2nd Corps officers that were replaced for poor performance in October.

 

Dave

[David_Underdown]

Birmingham University have a list of all British generals over the course of the war https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research/activity/warstudies/research/projects/lionsdonkeys/index.aspx 

[Perth Digger]

Thanks, Dave. I know of: GOC 5 Div, Charles Fergusson, GOC 3rd Div Colin Mackenzie, GOC 8th Brigade Beauchamp Doran. The last two were sent home once II Corps went on the defensive.

 

Thanks also David. I've seen that, but unfortunately I would have to sift through them all to find 1914 participants. 

 

Mike

[charlie962]

This old thread might have one or two ?

 

(officer non-combat fatalities 1914)

 

Charlie

 

 

[stiletto_33853]

Mike,

Any Use??? there is a complete List of all officers (Staff) and commanders  in one of the Divisions Appendices.

 

Andy

Edited 22 August , 2019 by stiletto_33853

[Perth Digger]

Thanks Charlie and Andy.

It's possible that it was just II Corps that had a significant number of changes. As well as the three mentioned above, B-Gen G J Cuthbert, 13th Brigade, was sent home at the beginning of October and his replacement, B-Gen Hickie, was replaced within a fortnight. Five replacements in a month at that level of command seems a lot to me.

 

Mike

[lostinspace]

 

9 hours ago, Perth Digger said:

Thanks Charlie and Andy.

It's possible that it was just II Corps that had a significant number of changes. As well as the three mentioned above, B-Gen G J Cuthbert, 13th Brigade, was sent home at the beginning of October and his replacement, B-Gen Hickie, was replaced within a fortnight. Five replacements in a month at that level of command seems a lot to me.

 

Mike

Mike,

I looked into the careers of G.J. Cuthbert and W.B. Hickie after they were sent home in October. Both were given brigade commands; Cuthbert in November of 1914 (140 Brigade, 47 Division), and Hickie in April of 1915 (53 Brigade, 18 Division). Both went on to command divisions: Cuthbert 39 Division, Hickie 16 (Irish) Division. Cuthbert was disliked by the Territorials as they did not appreciate his regular army obsession with appearance, while his tendency to be "obstinate and mulish" aggravated his superiors. He was removed from command in August, 1917. On the other hand Hickie seemed to be competent enough to retain his command until February, 1918, when he was sent home sick (Wikipedia).
I have a feeling that during the autumn of 1914, division & brigade commanders were still under the impression that they had the final say as to whether an order was actually carried out or not. In Hickie's case, on 13 October he was ordered to support a French attack but due to the unfavorable ground "declined to cooperate without orders from superior authority." thus endangering not only the French attack on his right but also 15 Brigade on his left (Gardner,p.p. 120-121). He was sacked, having been in brigade command all of thirteen days. I guess the point Gardner makes is that Hickie, had he been more experienced, would have made the attack despite the terrain. Apparently the French attack went ahead but was "thwarted" while it is unclear if 15 Brigade attacked or not, but did take casualties. Apparently, this episode didn't worry the authorities that gave Hickie another brigade five months later.

The above account of Hickie's attack is taken from 5 Division War Diary, II Corps War Diary, and Gleichen's "The Doings of the Fifteenth Infantry Brigade", all of which I have (II Corps War Diary courtesy of Andy Pay). I'll check these sources to see if there is more information to be had.
 

Dave

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Perth Digger]

Thanks, Dave. There presumably was a shortage of qualified senior officers too. 47 and 18 Divisions were pretty good units. Maybe someone was a bit trigger happy in October 1914.

 

Mike

 

PS: Andy Pay is so helpful, isn't he?

Edited 24 August , 2019 by Perth Digger

[lostinspace]

Hi Mike,

  
I'm finding that Hickie's attack was much more complicated than Gardner's brief account. I'm going to do some more digging, but It appears that 13 Brigade might have been directly under the command of II Corps during the French counterattack on Vermelles. I found an order timed 6:50 a.m.,12 October from 5 Division with a message saying: "Herewith copy operation orders 21st French Army Corps with reference to co-operation of British battalion at Annequin. Will you please issue instructions to General Hickie as he is no longer under 5th Division orders". The reference to a battalion at Annequin refers (I think) to 1st Norfolks, of 15 Brigade, sent by Smith-Dorrien to cover a gap between the left of the French XXI Corps and the La Basee Canal on 11 October. 13 Brigade had been in II Corps reserve, but apparently replaced 1st Norfolks south of the canal on 12 October. More to follow.

Yes indeed, Andy is a gem.

Dave

[Perth Digger]

HI Dave

If 13th Brigade was Corps Reserve, did that mean it answered directly to Smith-Dorrien? II Corps diary says Hickie went home sick; Gardner assumes this meant he was sacked. Probably right, but it can't be presumed (although no doubt there is other evidence which I don't have access to).

 

Mike

[lostinspace]

13 Brigade had been in reserve on 11 October around Bethune, but was apparently moved south of the canal on the 12th in order to help the French with their counterattack on Vermelles (on the 13th). I don't have anything definitive on whether 13 Brigade was under direct command of II Corps. It's been my experience that "sick", "seedy" etc. covered those who were actually sick but also officers who were sent home. Hickie had been appointed Brigadier-General and  Adjutant & Quarter Master General II Corps on 20 August, I believe to replace Lt. Col. Edye, injured in an auto accident on 16 August.
The Official History doesn't mention anything about an attack by 13 Brigade or a French attack on the 13th,  only noting: "South of the canal, the French closed up to the right of the 13th Brigade, but no advance was made.") and "Br.-General Hickie was placed on the sick list this day and command of the 13th Brigade was taken over by Lieut.-Colonel A. Martyn, The Queen's Own (Royal West Kent Regiment)" p. 80, Official History, 1914 vol. II. 

 

Dave 

[lostinspace]

According to the attached message from 5 Division to 13 Bde. on 12 October, it seems likely that the brigade had been directly under II Corps but was then returned to 5 Division. 

The area of the proposed attack was directly south of the canal from Annequin towards Cuinchy in support of the French on their right and 15 Bde. on their left (north of the canal). Difficult ground indeed. Here is the link to an old thread that has a map of the area: 

Image below is from WO/95 1510 (downloaded from Ancestry).  

[Perth Digger]

That looks definite enough, Dave, thanks. 

 

Strangely, a few weeks ago I was looking at the large number of Guards officers who vanished in January 1915 when a German mine went up. At pretty much the same place overlooked by those brick stacks and the railway Triangle. 

 

Mike

[lostinspace]

Mike,

Oddly the 13 Brigade H.Q. diary has a two day gap in it, 12 & 13 October, so no info there. I did find mention of attacks in the K.O.S.B. history. Apparently, the 2nd K.O.S.B. & 2nd Duke of Wellington's were ordered to attack Cuinchy at 4:00 p.m. on 12 October. The attack failed with the K.O.S.B. losing two officers killed, one wounded plus ten other ranks killed and wounded. The next day the K.O.S.B. attacked again, no time stated, and gained about a "furlong" (an eighth of a mile, 220 yards). Losses were heavier with one officer killed, two wounded, and sixty other ranks killed and wounded. The Duke of Wellington's history doesn't mention any of this, only relating that 13 Brigade was "ordered to move in the direction of Vermelles and La Bassee against the Germans entrenched. Reaching Annequin they were found to be in force, so the 13th Brigade took up a line north of the Givenchy-Noyelles road. All day on the 13th Annequin was heavily shelled, but on the next the Battalion was relieved by a French battalion.", p. 114, History of the Duke of Wellington's Regiment.
I know I'm beating a dead horse with all of this, we are never going to figure out exactly how and why Hickie was sacked, but still interesting to find out what you can. 
Dave

[Perth Digger]

Hi Dave

Thanks for your efforts. I'm currently looking at Field Service Regulations to see where responsibility might lie. There was scope for "local initiative" for interpreting an Order, so 2/RIR could have been withdrawn despite the Order from GHQ via II Corps that all ground was to be held on 20 October. In this case no initiative was used. FSR does not say anything about NOT using one's initiative! It looks to me, though, as if Brigade had to take responsibility more than Division, as being closer to the battalion in the chain of command.

 

FSR, Vol.1, is downloadable.

 

Mike