The infantryman's rifle

[David Prestidge]

This may be controversial, but here goes. Given the carnage caused by artillery, machine guns and grenades, is there any evidence that the infantry man's rifle, be it SMLE, Gewehr98 or Lebel, was anything other than a prop? Obviously snipers caused deaths, but then this was a specialist trade. I imagine no data exists to show the number of casualties caused by bullet wounds from a single rifle. I have been reading WW1 accounts and histories for 50 years or more, and the more I read, the more I think that the rifle was just something for the PBI to hold - the major damage was going to be caused by other means. Your views?

[David Prestidge]

And before anyone says 'Mons' - yes, I know about the regular army's spectacular rate of fire in those early days, but let's apply my question to 1915 onwards.

[MikB]

8 hours ago, David Prestidge said:

This may be controversial, but here goes. Given the carnage caused by artillery, machine guns and grenades,

...

 

You forgot disease and infection.

 

But anyway, what if the PBI who crossed the wire, survived the machine guns and reached the enemy trench lines, did so with nowt in their hands but bay'nit and bomb?

Sometimes the absence of something could make a more apparent difference than its presence. But it'd still be decisive - in a less conspicuous way.

Edited 21 August , 2019 by MikB

[Ron Clifton]

Hello David

 

Casualties ans Medical Statistics, a volume within the medical Official History series, estimates that about 60% of British battle casualties (i.e. excluding disease and infection) were caused by artillery and 40% by bullets from rifles and machine guns. It is not clear what the proportion caused by machine guns was, but there would certainly have been many rifle casualties from incidents such as trench raids.

 

Ron

Edited 21 August , 2019 by Ron Clifton

[Steven Broomfield]

Given the amount of debate about the falling standards of musketry in the 1917-18 period, I suspect that the men at the sharp end certainly had a view about the value of the rifle.

[David Prestidge]

Hello Ron - I hope you are well. Those figures are pretty much what I would have thought. I take on board the earlier comment about disease and illness. Gallipoli would be a particular example, from what I have read. Clearly, you couldn't have infantry operating with nothing in their hands. Distinguishing between fatalities/wounds caused by rifle rounds or machine gun fire is obviously impossible, particularly as the respective weapons used the same calibre bullets.

[Gunner Bailey]

5 hours ago, Steven Broomfield said:

Given the amount of debate about the falling standards of musketry in the 1917-18 period, I suspect that the men at the sharp end certainly had a view about the value of the rifle.

One of my grandfathers was a SAPPER. His unit war diary records very regular musketry practice. They needed it too. At Loos they fought with the infantry and at Mametz Wood in July 16 he and his comrades had to drop their tools and help fight off a German counter attack. 

 

Always expect the unexpected. 

[Steve1871]

in the trenches, both sides were rightfully afraid to stick their head above their trench, even without a sniper around, there would be several, or many RIFLES were sticking through slits and other small openings. When a charge was made, yes, machineguns would open up,but on both sides, combined, hundreds of rifles would be firing as fast as their frightened soldiers could shoot. Some battles would last all day,that would be as massive amount of rifles shooting,and yes,killing or wounding soldiers,. even with a lot of machine guns in use on both sides , the sheer amount of rifles used,I believe, would account for the majority of deaths in the Great War. My humble opinion

[Gunner Bailey]

I see on the web that British factories alone produced 7,000,000,000 .303 rounds. That's a lot of shooting by any standards.

[dman]

Problem with infantry using their rifles was poor marksmanship 

 

In the mass conscription armies of the time were little time available to train the common soldier in how to shoot 

 

Some organizations like the US Marine Corps had a tradition of marksmanship - at Belleau Wood Germans were astonished to be under accurate small arms fire from ranges of 800 yards 

 

 The Marine Corps was a relatively small organization - several thousands in armies of millions 

 

In the US Army many soldiers from rural backgrounds (Ie Alvin York) was familiar with firearms and were able to accurately shoot 

[MikB]

8 hours ago, Steve1871 said:

in the trenches, both sides were rightfully afraid to stick their head above their trench, even without a sniper around, there would be several, or many RIFLES were sticking through slits and other small openings. When a charge was made, yes, machineguns would open up,but on both sides, combined, hundreds of rifles would be firing as fast as their frightened soldiers could shoot. Some battles would last all day,that would be as massive amount of rifles shooting,and yes,killing or wounding soldiers,. even with a lot of machine guns in use on both sides , the sheer amount of rifles used,I believe, would account for the majority of deaths in the Great War. My humble opinion

 

I thought it was fairly well-established that *about* 60% of fighting casualties were inflicted by artillery fire. I think smallarms casualties tend to be consolidated as rifle and MG wounds would be impractical or impossible for medics to distinguish.

[Steven Broomfield]

17 minutes ago, dman said:

Problem with infantry using their rifles was poor marksmanship 

 

In the mass conscription armies of the time were little time available to train the common soldier in how to shoot 

 

 

As I alluded to in Post 5

17 minutes ago, dman said:

 

 

Some organizations like the US Marine Corps had a tradition of marksmanship - at Belleau Wood Germans were astonished to be under accurate small arms fire from ranges of 800 yards 

 

 The Marine Corps was a relatively small organization - several thousands in armies of millions 

 

 

Was it also possible that, relatively at least, there was a higher proportion of regulars in the USMC?

 

Out of interest, the British Army had a tradition of good musketry, too. There are several threads on the Forum about it, but pre-war, prowess was highly regarded, highly prized and well-rewarded. The problem in wartime was, as you say, the numbers of men passing through, but also the availability of machine guns and bombs. The emphasis was on the superior killing power of these weapons, to the detriment of good musketry. This was addressed to some extent in 1917-18.

Edited 22 August , 2019 by Steven Broomfield

[Richard2]

When I was a child, my Uncle Joe who had served in France told me that marksmanship training in the US Army was very poor during the war.  Uncle Joe enlisted several years before the USA entered the war, and at that time the Army had much higher standards for marksmanship.  He said that the men who were trained before the war could use a rifle effectively.  Most of the men who were drafted or enlisted during the war were not very good with a rifle, unless they already knew how to shoot well before entering the Army.

[trajan]

Here is some official data...

 

Third Battle of Ypres On the 21st September 1917: of an overall total of 10,789 wounded on the first day, most from shellfire, 2,933 were by bullet, 17 by bayonet, and 77 by hand grenades. On 27th September 1917: of the 2932 casualties, the majority were from shell splinters and sherds, 600 were from bullets, eight from bayonets, and 16 from hand grenades.

 

By contrast - 

 

The Russo-Japanese War The approximate ratio for casualties, as recorded by official military observers was: by hand weapons, 7%; by rifle fire (including I assume machine guns) 83-85%; by artillery fire 8-10%

 

Trajan

[Khaki]

I did read that later in the war when grenades (Mills) became more available, that it was noticed that the conscripts were more likely to respond to an attack by throwing grenades than repelling an attack with rifle fire. I don't know how true that was but its sounds probable. Can't say that I blame them, after living in trenches often swept by MG fire and the "keep your head down" mentality and witnessing what happened to those who didn't, it seems logical that the first response would be a quick shower of outgoing grenades to neutralize or slow down an attack.

 

khaki

[PhilB]

And, of course, the cleaning of it helps prevents boredom among the soldiery.

[Heid the Ba]

On 23/08/2019 at 08:17, trajan said:

Here is some official data...

 

Third Battle of Ypres On the 21st September 1917: of an overall total of 10,789 wounded on the first day, most from shellfire, 2,933 were by bullet, 17 by bayonet, and 77 by hand grenades. On 27th September 1917: of the 2932 casualties, the majority were from shell splinters and sherds, 600 were from bullets, eight from bayonets, and 16 from hand grenades.

 

By contrast - 

 

The Russo-Japanese War The approximate ratio for casualties, as recorded by official military observers was: by hand weapons, 7%; by rifle fire (including I assume machine guns) 83-85%; by artillery fire 8-10%

 

Trajan

At the risk of re-opening old arguments, 17 were wounded by bayonets, we don't know how many were killed, which could have been in the hundreds.  Perhaps by 1917 the main combat function of a rifle was as a bayonet extender.

[Bob Davies]

Interesting question. From "The Tigers" by Mathew Richardson, chapter 8, The Fighting at Polygon Wood. (early Sept 1917)  Pte D A Bacon, 9th Battalion Leicesters remembers..."At 5.30am the enemy launched a determined infantry assault against our positions, through the smoke screen. The first wave of attackers was beaten off by 'A' Company using Lewis gun and rifle fire."  So an absolute necessity to have a rifle and small arms ammunition (SAA).  Shooting competitions are mentioned in the war diaries when the soldiers are resting up from the front line.  Regards, Bob.

 

Edited 4 December , 2019 by Bob Davies
To add a full stop!

[Mark Finneran]

David lots of great input on what seems to me a bit of a strange question, in the nicest possible way, unless you offered it for healthy debate.   As always easy for any of us to 'review' something with hindsight but even today the personal weapon of a soldier is 'the rifle'. With the LMG or HMG equivalents as supporting systems. Is that relationship still wrong and un-tested? Just what was the alternative in WWI for most if not all armies?  The logistics of any MG, light or heavy machine gun means more than one soldier 'occupied'. Defence fine with breadth of fire, but all the factors/complications in the assault? What weapon system then, before and after, provides single shot accurate and let's face it efficient value for money. One round one hit...ideally. What other weapon provided personal protection but in the right hands disproportionate reach. Then the psychological effect with confidence in your personal weapon and we all know what a superb rifle the British and Commonwealth Forces had. This fact alone should not be underestimated as a motivator for these brave men. Then when mentioning reach, close quarter battle and assault in order to 'meet' with the enemy - the need for a bayonet! The longer the better we know was the norm against an adversary (in general terms and discounting trench weapons, shotguns, grenades and even rifle attached wire cutters).  So for me the answer is obvious, the quality of the British rifleman which is well known, (and is it any surprise that some say training quality degraded over time!)  the physical purpose of any rifle, but above all, what was the alternative over a hundred years ago. Anyway just a point of view as an enthusiast of the formidable Imperial German MG!  Mark

[David Prestidge]

Some good points, well made. It is worth noting that 'top brass' on the British side didn't entirely trust the common soldier, at least in the period leading up to 1914, as witnessed by that strange device, the magazine cut-off, allegedly engineered to prevent blokes blazing away indiscriminately and wasting ammo.

[squirrel]

Or when circumstances permitted to load single rounds maintaining the rounds in the magazine for when rapid fire might be required.

1 minute ago, squirrel said:

 

 

Edited 5 December , 2019 by squirrel

[reese williams]

David,

The concern for the infantryman using too much ammunition was not limited to the British. It was a common thread in pretty much all countries as the transition was made from single shot to magazine loaded repeaters. The folks making the decisions in the transition period were mostly those who had been involved in wars fought with muzzle loaders in the mid 1800s. In the US it led to the trapdoor Springfield, a single shot being adopted over repeating rifles in the 1870s. The US didn't go to a repeater until the 1890s. The 1903 Springfield also had a magazine cutoff function, though engineered differently. It was feared the PBI would adopt a "spray and pray" mentality and also that logistics couldn't keep up with the envisioned amount of ammunition that would be expended. It wasn't lack of confidence as much as an inability of older high ranking decision makers not being able to foresee how technology would change the battlefield. A problem we still deal with and probably always will.

[Andrew Upton]

8 hours ago, David Prestidge said:

Some good points, well made. It is worth noting that 'top brass' on the British side didn't entirely trust the common soldier, at least in the period leading up to 1914, as witnessed by that strange device, the magazine cut-off, allegedly engineered to prevent blokes blazing away indiscriminately and wasting ammo.

 

2 hours ago, squirrel said:

Or when circumstances permitted to load single rounds maintaining the rounds in the magazine for when rapid fire might be required.

 

 

Officially neither of these statements had been true since at least as early as 1909. As quoted previously on the thread linked below:

 

"IAW Musketry Regs Part I, 1909 with 1914 Amendment, Page 104, Para 264.

 

Section 53 - Use of the Safety Catch and Cut-Off

 

Troops armed with rifles fitted with safety catches will invariably set the catch to safety before movement. The use of the cut-off is to be confined in their case to occasions when they are not actually engaged with the enemy, when it may be employed for the purpose of charging the magazine without inserting a cartridge in the chamber, or to unload the rifle while retaining cartridges in the magazine. It is never to be used to enable the rifle to be used as a single loader, and is not to supersede the safety catch."

 

 

 

[The Dark]

On 22/08/2019 at 10:17, Steven Broomfield said:

 

Was it also possible that, relatively at least, there was a higher proportion of regulars in the USMC?

 

The Marine Brigade had around 15% "old timers" (men with at least one year of service). The 5th Marines had 20% of their men with 1 year of service or more and the 6th Marines had 10% with 1+ year. They did have a lot of officers and NCOs with experience in colonial conflicts, but I don't think they had a particularly high proportion of experienced men by comparison to the European armies (although it was about triple the proportion of the US Army units in 2nd Division - only 5% of them had been in the service for at least a year).

[rd72]

On 04/12/2019 at 21:35, David Prestidge said:

Some good points, well made. It is worth noting that 'top brass' on the British side didn't entirely trust the common soldier, at least in the period leading up to 1914, as witnessed by that strange device, the magazine cut-off, allegedly engineered to prevent blokes blazing away indiscriminately and wasting ammo.

 

Hi all.  Just to confirm things, the magazine cut-off had absolutely nothing to do with fire control or firing single rounds by the time of the Great War.  It was kept, on into the era of charger loading, as a safety device.  Full stop.