The French Army Thread

[phil andrade]

The watershed of 1st July 1916 is so pronounced in the statistical record of the French army’s performance, as I’ve attempted to define it in earlier posts.  This of course begs the question as to how far the British commencing their share of the heavy lifting allowed the French to perform more effectively ; and as to whether these significant French achievements were due to improvements in their own right, which were occurring anyway.  A combination of both, I suppose.

 

Phil 

[phil andrade]

At the risk of being a one trick pony, I’ll submit a rough and ready assessment of how the French army compared with the British Empire  on the Western front when it came to the deaths incurred and the prisoners captured in the two periods, August 1914- June 1916, and July 1916 to November 1918,

 

These figures are for deaths( all causes), not total casualties, which aggregated several millions in addition to the dead.

 

French ....August 1914 to June 1916 : 775,000 dead, 95,000 Germans captured.

 

British.....August 1914 to June 1916 : 150,000 dead, 15,000 Germans captured .

 

French....July 1916 to November 1918 : 500,000 dead, 300,000 Germans captured.

 

British....July 1916 to November 1918 : 575,000 dead, 300,000 Germans captured.

 

Those are figures “ rounded”, in order to convey the impression rather than deliver precision.

 

I think they reveal the great change that occurred with the commencement of the Battle of the Somme.

 

They also indicate the huge disparity in the Franco British burden in the earlier period : note that French deaths exceeded those of the British Empire by more than five to one.  It’s also apparent that the British lost ten lives for every German they captured, while the French lost just over eight.

 

Thereafter, more British than French died, although the French succeeded in capturing as many prisoners. This despite the triumph of the Hundred Days in 1918, when the British and Dominion forces surged ahead of their allies and achieved the best exchange rate.

It was in the attritional battles in the second half of 1916 and throughout 1917 that the French made their most remarkable progress in this respect.

 

Phil

[charlie962]

Always fascinating to see these figures. Percentages alone are easily misleading.

 

1918 must have had a significant distorting effect-  initial Spring Offensive principally targetting the British sector, then the very costly victories of the 100 days (for which it would be interesting to know the Brit/french comparatives ?)

 

Charlie

 

 

[phil andrade]

How right you are about the distorting effects of the 1918 fighting on the statistics, Charlie !

 

Almost exactly half of all the Germans taken prisoner on the Western Front throughout the Great War were captured in the victorious Allied offensive between mid July and the Armistice in 1918. The British share of prisoners was disproportionately large in this period : nearly 190,000 compared with just under 140,000 taken by the French. There were an additional 60,000 captured by the American and Belgian armies.

 

The corollary is apparent when we survey the Allied loss of prisoners in the German offensive of earlier 1918.

 

More than sixty percent of all British prisoners captured on the Western Front 1914-1918 were taken in 1918.

 

As nearly as I can tell, some 225,000 French soldiers died on the Western Front in 1918. This loss was accompanied by the capture of 150,000 German prisoners: three lives for every two prisoners.

 

The British did better that year, capturing 200,000 Germans and losing a very similar total of dead in the process....a parity in exchange, and fifty percent more successful than the French.

 

This makes the French superiority in 1916 and 1917 all the more apparent : and this especially in the 1916 battle of the Somme, when they captured twenty percent more Germans than the British, while suffering fewer than half as many casualties.

 

Phil

[charlie962]

1 hour ago, phil andrade said:

This makes the French superiority in 1916 and 1917 all the more apparent

!!! A huge topic on its own.

 

What also needs to be taken into account is the respective size of each army each year.  There are a lot of other factors but ....

 

Charlie

[phil andrade]

One thing makes me uncomfortable about those figures, Charlie.

 

I cite the totals of British Empire and French dead, by periods, on the Western Front.  British troops who died of disease or accident in the the UK are not included ; French soldiers who died from similar causes in their garrisons behind the lines are : they’re on French soil, therefore they die on the Western Front.  The difference is not too big : deaths from disease were relatively few. The overwhelming majority of deaths were battle fatalities .....but I do need to come clean about this.

 

Here I touch on another theme that might be fruitful for discussion.  The reputation of French medical services in the Great War is not good.  You’ll find historians of the calibre of Alistair Horne making much of this.  I have to say that I wonder if this is fair. Very high French mortality  - and today is an appropriate time to reflect on this, being the anniversary of the worst of all days, 22nd August, 1914 - might reflect the circumstances of defeat and retreat, or rout, rather than intrinsically bad medical services. If wounded soldiers cannot be reached, then they’re obviously in lethal danger, even if the medical services are competent. Quick evacuation is vital ; if this is thwarted by severe repulse, or precipitate retreat, then the proportion of fatalities rises commensurately.  I’m convinced that the grotesquely high ratio of dead among the French casualties of the early 1914 battles is largely attributable to this - as was the freakishly high number of British dead on the First Day of the Somme.

 

Phil

Edited 22 August , 2019 by phil andrade

[charlie962]

3 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

The reputation of French medical services in the Great War is not good

I think we discussed this not so long ago ?  When you think that in the Napoleonic Wars they were way ahead with ambulances and evacuation from the battlefield (remarkable man Dominique Jean Larrey - I read his biography recently) it makes you wonder what happened.

 

10 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

I’m convinced that the grotesquely high ratio of dead among the French casualties of the early 11914 battles is largely attributable to this

Yes

 

Charlie

[phil andrade]

5 minutes ago, charlie962 said:

When you think that in the Napoleonic Wars they were way ahead with ambulances and evacuation from the battlefield (remarkable man Dominique Jean Larrey - I read his biography recently) it makes you wonder what happened.

 

 

 

What happened ?

 

French armies retreating and abandoning their wounded to die.  Perhaps I oversimplify, but it looks like that’s what was happening at Rossignol and elsewhere on 22nd August 1914.

 

Failure to evacuate wounded is, in itself, a failure of medical services....but we need to countenance the circumstances that prevented that evacuation.

 

At Verdun - at least in the first half of the battle - converging German fire prevented decent recovery of the wounded.

 

There was outrage in the Nivelle Offensive because three thousand wounded were said to have been left to die in the forward zone before they could be evacuated down the chain of care.

 

On the other hand, when the evacuation system was allowed to operate because a battle had been won, I suspect the French medical care was as good as any.

 

Phil

 

 

 

[Gardenerbill]

If anyone is interedted,I posted a 'Carte Postale' of a French soldier in the Postcards topic, post #6932:

 

 

[phil andrade]

A point of clarification , please.

 

British people like to depict the BEF of 1914 as uniquely combat  experienced in Western Europe, on account of the warfare in South Africa.

 

Hadn’t the French colonial contingents been tested by fire in their North African possessions in the years preceding the Great War ?

 

I ask this because I suspect too much has been made of British experience in the Boer War ; I’m also thinking about the French  Colonial Corps that got so appallingly beaten at Rossingnol, and wondering how many of its soldiers had experienced combat in Algeria /Morocco.  Were they more experienced in this regard than the Germans who slaughtered them ?

 

Judging by what Joe Robinson and partners have written in their new book The German failure in Belgium, August 1914, which I have read and reviewed, it’s abundantly clear that there was no monopoly of ineptitude in the Allied armies of 1914.

 

The British cavalry is generally acknowledged to have been the best of the lot in 1914 : surely this must be attributable in large degree to South Africa.  I would also suggest that hygiene standards were highest in the BEF....again, the harsh lessons of the Boer War must have impinged here.

 

But we are still confronted by the story of excellent French contingents being badly worsted by Germans who were “ greener” than they were, and I am intrigued.

 

Apart from their fighting against the Herero and Numqua in SW Africa, and a role in the quelling of the Boxer Rebellion in China, what had the Germans experienced in the decade or so before the Great War ?

 

Am I right in imagining that the French had “ smelt powder” more than the Germans in that period ?

 

Phil

[Keith_history_buff]

41 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

A point of clarification , please.

 

British people like to depict the BEF of 1914 as uniquely combat  experienced in Western Europe, on account of the warfare in South Africa.

 

Hadn’t the French colonial contingents been tested by fire in their North African possessions in the years preceding the Great War ?

 

I ask this because I suspect too much has been made of British experience in the Boer War ; I’m also thinking about the French  Colonial Corps that got so appallingly beaten at Rossingnol, and wondering how many of its soldiers had experienced combat in Algeria /Morocco.  Were they more experienced in this regard than the Germans who slaughtered them ?

[snip]

 

But we are still confronted by the story of excellent French contingents being badly worsted by Germans who were “ greener” than they were, and I am intrigued.

 

Apart from their fighting against the Herero and Numqua in SW Africa, and a role in the quelling of the Boxer Rebellion in China, what had the Germans experienced in the decade or so before the Great War ?

 

Am I right in imagining that the French had “ smelt powder” more than the Germans in that period ?

 

Phil

 

I lack knowledge and quotable sources to comment at length, but I would see a different parallel. 

The British Army, a force composed of regular soldiers, had been tested by fire in its colonial possessions in the years up to the turn of the 19th/20th Century. It was the "modern warfare" of the Anglo-Boer war where a number of lessons were learned the hard way by the British Army.

Thinking aloud, the Infanterie Coloniale were regulars. I would be interested to know to what extent the forces at Rossignol were composed of conscripts/reservists from bataillons de marche, and just how much of the force was comprised of pre-war regulars, whose terms of service permitted them to be served overseas. If there was a large influx of new men in August 1914, then unit cohesion can't have been great. 

[charlie962]

25 minutes ago, Keith_history_buff said:

If there was a large influx of new men in August 1914, then unit cohesion can't have been great

With long established conscription and regional association of regiments, I thought unit cohesion was not a problem, until the policy of 'brasssage' was adopted c 1916. The main handicap for the French was the misguided doctrine of  offensive à outrance - I give the wiki link but not saying its the best !

 

The British medical services certainly benefited from lessons drawn from appalling mistakes made in South Africa.

 

Charlie

[Keith_history_buff]

There is a point with regard to these troops that I did not explain too well.

Conscripted men would have performed their obligatory military service, and have been called up in the event of a national emergency. These troops of the French Metropolitan Army were to be used to defend France, and were not supposed to deploy overseas.

This is in stark contrast with the regulars of the Armee Coloniale, who were raised for overseas service in the colonies. The question that I have is whether the colonial units would have deployed in the same state of composition as at July 1914. If there was an expansion of these forces, and if their ranks were bolstered with conscripts from a bataillon de marche or similar - if this was permissible in a time of national emergency - could there have been a change in the "character" of colonial units at that specific time?

[Christina Holstein]

Hello Tomb1302, thank you for joining the Forum. Good to have you here to discuss French matters. I have a pdf of General Passag's book but haven't got hold of a printed copy yet. He is a very interesting man and his division played an important part at Verdun, both in the 1916 battle and also in the (French) Second Offensive Battle in 1917, on which I've spent a lot of time this year.

 

Phil - Chasseurs à Pied are indeed Light Infantry. An Aspirant is an 'officer in training', i.e. he has done the necessary time at War College but has to serve a certain time with the troops before he becomes a fully fledged officer.

 

Hello Pete, my old friend,Malancourt Wood, what a wonderful place. It may be that the 29th Division, raised in what we call the sleepy south, was regarded with suspicion just because they were from the south. We might think of the S. of France as the land of milk and honey but it much of it was pretty poor in those days and I don't see any reason to suppose the men weren't as tough as men from other parts of France but they were certainly regarded at higher levels as not putting sufficient effort into things . One of the two regiments that collapsed so quickly on 20 March 1916 (the 258th) had been regarded with suspicion since 'un certain panique' was observed in early fighting, not to say disorder in the ranks and even a stampede and abandoned trenches, but how much of the official reaction was fair and how much of it was due to prejudice is impossible to say. I'm sure that prejudice played a part.

 

Christina

 

[Ancre1917]

I think this thread is to be welcomed. Those of us who are English can be remarkably Anglocentric sometimes and it will do us good to see the Great War from another country’s perspective. I’ve thought for a long time that we ought to explore what the British learned about infantry and artillery tactics from the French army’s experience at Verdun, for example, and what the French learned from us. I’m not aware of any books that cover this particular aspect of mutual learning. There’s a bit in William Philpott’s “Bloody Victory”, but that’s about all I’ve been able to find.  Does anyone have any other suggestions? 

 

Might it it be possible for the moderators to make this a separate forum with sub groups featuring other allied countries’ armies and including those of the central powers?

 

Thank you to everyone who has contributed so far. I’ve found it fascinating. 

 

Richard

[Jojessholli]

Really pleased to find this thread - I know very little about the French during the war, so no doubt will find many things of interest here.

[phil andrade]

This is not something that I know ; but it does seem plausible to me :  the startling Canadian success at Vimy in April 1917 bears some relationship to Currie visiting the French in February 1917, and listening to what they had to say.  It was Currie’s superior, Byng, who advocated this liaison , and as to how far Haig was leaning on Byng here, I have to wonder.

 

The French success at Verdun in the last three months of the battle must have commanded  the admiration of Allied ( and enemy?) commanders.  In the event, it was to prove hubristic .

 

Of all French battlefield achievements in the Great War, was there any more worthy of acclaim than the counter offensive on the Marne in mid July 1918 ?

 

Phil

 

 

[MikeMeech]

46 minutes ago, phil andrade said:

This is not something that I know ; but it does seem plausible to me :  the startling Canadian success at Vimy in April 1917 bears some relationship to Currie visiting the French in February 1917, and listening to what they had to say.  It was Currie’s superior, Byng, who advocated this liaison , and as to how far Haig was leaning on Byng here, I have to wonder.

 

The French success at Verdun in the last three months of the battle must have commanded  the admiration of Allied ( and enemy?) commanders.  In the event, it was to prove hubristic .

 

Of all French battlefield achievements in the Great War, was there any more worthy of acclaim than the counter offensive on the Marne in mid July 1918 ?

 

Phil

 

 

Hi

No!  Haig was not leaning on Byng in this respect.  Currie's liaison trip to the French betwen the 5 and 8th January 1917 was part of a GHQ arranged visit (not even the first).  Some other officers on this trip were Birch (GHQ), Uniacke (Fifth Army), Major Alan Brooke (18th Div), various divisional commanders included Deverell (3rd Div), Stephens (5th Div), Scott (12th Div), Couper (14th Div), Shute (63rd (RN) Div) as well as Currie.  A previous group visited in November 1916 included Solly-Flood, who was working on the new Infantry tactic manuals. A brief account of these visits can be found in'From the Somme to Victory' by Peter Simkins (pp.46-49).  Also of interest on this subject is 'Learning to Fight' by Aimee Fox.

The first documents on French battle experience that were distributed around the BEF I have seen date from 1914.  During Verdun the correspondence between the French Air Arm and the RFC are copious, and changes in air and air/ground tactics were changed for the Somme battles due to the French experience at Verdun. There was also attendance of each others courses etc. where tactics techniques etc were discussed.

 

There is a problem with the Battle of Vimy as a good performance by the Canadians has been turned into 'national myth' on websites and some books, one of the worst 'myths' being about McNaughton and Sound Ranging, which appears to have little relationship to the actual history of SR and the people involved.

 

Mike

[phil andrade]

Thanks for chipping in here, Mike.

 

i remember now that it was reading your posts - either here, or on another forum - that had brought this Franco British liaison episode(s) to  my mind !

 

Verdun looms larger and larger as a catalyst.  The battle so often described as senseless , futile and indecisive starts to look like one of the biggest “ game changers” of all.  How else can we account for the fact that the French so often got the better of the Germans after July 1916 ?  British commentators have insisted that this was attributable to the British and Dominion exertions on the grand scale, commencing with the 1st of July, 1916.  That seems to me to be a singularly ungracious withholding of credit from the French.

 

Phil

[Jools mckenna]

Talking about Anglo-Franco relations, I have a couple photos of British troops with french troops. 

[Ancre1917]

Thanks Mike and Phil.  I'll buy these two book recommendations.

 

What would be great is if someone could point up the specific lessons the British and Dominions learned from French successes (and failures).  From what I think I know, French artillery tactics were of a high order and were used by the British artillery during the latter stages of the Somme campaign 1916. The use of different infantry attacking formations at Verdun has also been commented on somewhere. 

 

What would seem to me to be impossible is that neither side learned anything from their ally.  I cannot believe that either officer cadre would have such closed minds as not to learn from the successes and failures of others.  But, then you never know!!  I've worked in places where the same mistakes are made over and over again.

 

This is proving to be an eye opener in more ways than one.

 

Richard

[phil andrade]

The French could not afford to repeat mistakes, because their first ones had been catastrophically expensive. 

 

About one fifth of their entire wartime loss in killed and missing was suffered in a period of five weeks. No other belligerent -  not even Austria-Hungary  - took such a large portion of its irrevocable wartime loss in such short order.

 

A nation that gets a beating like that has to get its act together pretty damned quickly !

 

edit : perhaps the Romanians took an even bigger proportional hit in their initial fighting. I should have thought of them.

 

Editing again : no...I did check, and the French experience stands unique in this respect.

 

Phil

 

 

 

 

Edited 28 August , 2019 by phil andrade

[MikeMeech]

1 hour ago, Longton1971 said:

Thanks Mike and Phil.  I'll buy these two book recommendations.

 

What would be great is if someone could point up the specific lessons the British and Dominions learned from French successes (and failures).  From what I think I know, French artillery tactics were of a high order and were used by the British artillery during the latter stages of the Somme campaign 1916. The use of different infantry attacking formations at Verdun has also been commented on somewhere. 

 

What would seem to me to be impossible is that neither side learned anything from their ally.  I cannot believe that either officer cadre would have such closed minds as not to learn from the successes and failures of others.  But, then you never know!!  I've worked in places where the same mistakes are made over and over again.

 

This is proving to be an eye opener in more ways than one.

 

Richard

Hi

 

As I have mentioned it in the previous post, Sound Ranging in the BEF was developed from French systems in use during 1915 (the British looking at theses systems from about March 1915), the British deciding on the 'Bull' system.  Lt. W L Bragg becoming involved from about August 1915 and started the first British section after observing the French.  It has to be said that the first French and British sections were not that good due to problems with the Shell-Wave and Gun-Wave recording.  This problem was mainly solved by the introduction of the Tucker microphone which had replaced the earlier microphones by September 1916.  In August 1916 it was decided to increase the original 8 Sections to have one section for each Corps, 20 Sections were available after the Winter of 1916/17, so before the Battle of Vimy/Arras. An example of French equipment used and modified by the British.

Detailed information on this subject can be found in:

'Report on Survey on the Western Front 1914-18' Compiled by Col. E M Jack, 1920 (you may still be able to get this as a free download on-line.)

'Flash Spotters and Sound Rangers' John R Innes, originally 1935.

'Artillery Astrologers' by Peter Chasseaud, 1999.

Also Annex L 'Sound Ranging in France 1914-1918' by Sir Lawrence Bragg in Farndale's 'History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery Western front 1914-18', 1986.

 

Mike

[Ancre1917]

Thanks Mike. Does this show that French artillery practice was generally in advance of that used by the British?  Do you know of any other techniques employed by French gunners before they were taken up by the British?

 

Does anyone have concrete examples of how infantry tactics were taken from French experience?

 

This is all good stuff and is just what I've been interested in for some time but never been able to prove. 

 

Richard

[phil andrade]

Richard,

 

The best people to consult here would be the Germans.

 

Their assessments of the relative skills of the French and British are on record.

 

Wetzell gave the French the edge in skill, but credited the British with more staying power.

 

This was in the fourth year of the war.

 

Phil